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ABSTRACT 
Why do people go into rooms to watch other people speak? What is it that is 
taking place when a performer walks onto a stage, or steps up to a microphone, 
and, in the silence that has fallen, begins to speak? This thesis considers both 
the pleasures and the anxieties that attend such public acts of speaking, and 
responds in particular to the kinds of utterances that announce themselves as in 
some way ‘non-serious’. It takes, as its founding example, comedian Stewart 
Lee saying, of Top Gear presenter Richard Hammond, ‘I wish he had died in 
that crash’, before adding, ‘it’s just a joke… like on Top Gear’. This, I suggest, is 
a complex moment that calls into play many of the key questions of 
performative theory, restaging them within the context of early twenty-first 
century Britain, where speech is mediatized and monetized as a form of 
entertainment.  
 
Against this backdrop, the thesis draws on key works by Shoshana Felman and 
Judith Butler, to argue that the ethics that emerges from such an enquiry would 
be one based on our mutual, shared unknowingness about what our bodies 
‘say’ when we stand up to speak. Crucially, this might also be an ethics 
responsive to a certain kind of funniness. This thesis examines performances 
that are attuned to this kind of funniness: the stand-up comedy of Stewart Lee; 
the philosophical performance of J.L. Austin; the postmodern theatricality of 
Kinkaleri, and the stalled conversations via which the practice of performance 
studies itself takes place. Acknowledging the rhetoric by which its own 'voice' is 
figured, this thesis both narrates and stages moments of confusion between 
bodies and figures, examples and jokes, theory and performance. It aims to 
discover how such confusions, and the pleasure and anxiety they induce, might 
become politically useful.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1. Scenes of address 
 
This thesis asks what happens when a person stands on a stage and speaks. It 
centres on performances that emphasize the act of speech, the kinds of 
performances that begin when a performer walks onto a stage, or steps up to a 
microphone, and, in the silence that has fallen, begins to speak. It responds to 
performances that begin with, or consist entirely in, acts of speech addressed 
directly to an audience. Such performances might well begin with a ‘good 
evening’, might well involve an audience being addressed as ‘ladies and 
gentlemen’, and being told ‘thanks for coming’. These sorts of utterances call 
attention to the situation of performance, to our shared presence in a particular 
place and time, either overtly or subtly: ‘I’m glad to be here tonight’, the 
performer might say, or ‘now I’d like to say…’ 
 
By beginning thus, with the scene of live performance, I hope to lay the ground 
upon which broader questions about the scene of spoken address might be 
staged. What are our expectations of that scene? How are we to define its 
limits, the limits of our responsibility within it? How are we to reconcile the 
embodied act of speaking with the effects and consequences that reach beyond 
it? And why might it remain important to ask what it was that happened when 
that particular body spoke those particular words in that particular place and 
time? After all, in this age of digital communications, have we not moved 
somewhat beyond the idea that a person’s physical presence is necessary for 
their act of speech to be received, understood, effective, of interest? Why then 
fixate upon this scene, the scene in which one a person, a lone individual, 
addresses a gathering of persons? Is this not an essentialist move, to return to 
the person standing there and saying things out loud, to imply that this 
constitutes speech ‘as such’? Can a research project framed thus really hope to 
discover something about our contemporary relationship with speech and 
language more generally?  
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The word ‘speech’ carries the connotation of something more formal than an 
everyday conversation, and this is, in part, why I have chosen to frame my 
research interest using this term. ‘A speech’ is a public address, one associated 
with direct, front-facing presentation in the first person. Speech-making, in this 
sense, is associated with rhetoric. A term in use from ancient Greece to the 
present day, rhetoric in its original sense was public speaking for political 
purposes, or more precisely ‘a technique of persuasion performed before the 
city council, the demokratia, the skill of convincing the demos’. 1 In his Rhetoric, 
Aristotle sought to systematize the methods by which such an orator might seek 
to influence the mental state of his listeners. In this thesis, I engage with the 
idea of rhetoric, and more specifically with the idea of a ‘rhetorical figure’, a 
figure of speech, although I draw my understanding of these terms from more 
recent intellectual formations. According to Shannon Jackson, herself a 
Professor of Rhetoric and Theatre,2 the ‘theory explosion’ in the academic 
humanities in the twentieth-century can be understood as ‘a revival of the 
rhetorical in a new form’.3 Arguably one of the most influential texts of this ‘new 
rhetoric’ was Paul de Man’s ‘Semiology and Rhetoric’ (1973),4 an essay that 
has exerted a strong influence upon my work in this thesis. For her part, 
Jackson considers de Man’s deconstructive take on rhetoric, alongside the work 
of Jacques Derrida, particularly in De la Grammatologie (1967),5 to have 
unhelpfully sidelined the oratorical dimension of rhetoric in favour of an 
emphasis on the textual. Certainly, it could be said that, after Derrida’s thorough 
and persuasive critique of Western intellectual thought’s metaphysical 
privileging of speech, declaring a research interest in ‘speech’ risks coming 
across as at best naïve, at worst, reductively essentializing.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Vujanović, Ana ‘Performative Rhetoric of/and Contemporary Performance’, Frakcija: 
Performing Arts Magazine, 38/39 (2005), 12-25 (p. 13).  
2 Currently at the University of California, Berkeley. 
3 Jackson, Shannon, Professing Performance: Theatre in the Academy from Philology to 
Performativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 182. 
4 Paul de Man ‘Semiology and Rhetoric’ in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), 
pp. 3-19 (first publ. in Diacritics, 3:3 (1973), 27-33).  
5 Jacques Derrida, De la Grammatologie (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1967). 
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In response to such concerns, in the first instance, I assert that the idea of a 
person standing there, saying things out loud, in the presence of others, 
remains important to the way we imagine speech. This is an assertion that will 
be contextualized more thoroughly in due course. For now, I will turn to Jerry 
Seinfeld, who, as a stand-up comedian knows a thing or two about public 
speaking, and who puts it like this: 
 
According to most studies, people’s number one fear is public speaking. 
Number two is death. Death is number two. Does that sound right? This 
means to the average person, if you go to a funeral, you’re better off in a 
casket than doing the eulogy.6  
  
Whether or not ‘most studies’ would verify this, the fact that it works as a joke 
suggests there is something in it. Seinfeld’s joke reflects the way in which the 
scene of public speaking is a locus not only of anxiety, but also of expectation, 
even hope. We want a public speech to be meaningful, moving, affirming, 
perhaps even transformative. And if it can’t be all of these things, at the very 
least, a public speech could, in the course of undercutting our expectations of it, 
make us laugh, as Seinfeld seems to be reminding us. And yet, the widespread 
fear of public speaking suggests that, more often than not, speech fails to meet 
our expectations. If, in practice, our speech tends to be less moving, less 
affirming, less transformative and certainly less eloquent and witty than we 
would ideally wish it to be, then what kinds of expectations, hopes and anxieties 
are brought into play when we go to sit in rooms and watch people speak?  
 
In the context of a performance, the kind of speaking that interests me here is 
referred to as 'direct address'. In the following section, I will consider the 
theatrical practice of direct address in a historical context. First, I wish to draw 
attention to the odd semantics of the phrase itself. In the simplest terms, the 
verb 'address' is to direct something toward another person, or thing. According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘address’ is originally a borrowing 
from French, addresser: 'to direct, guide, to make straight, to set up, to raise, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cited in Kélina Gotman and Samuel Godin, ‘It’s My Show, Or, Shut Up and Laugh: Spheres  
of Intimacy in the Comic Arena and How New Technologies Play Their Part in the “Live” Act’, in 
The Laughing Stalk: Live Comedy and Its Audiences, ed. by Judy Batalion (Anderson: Parlor 
Press, 2011), pp. 253-270 (p. 255).  
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stand up'.7 Already, within the etymology, some peculiar doubling-over is taking 
place (not to mention that highly suggestive inference of someone or something 
standing up, raised). Moreover, in many of its usages, both archaic and 
modern, the verb ‘address’ is all but synonymous with ‘direct towards’. The 
etymology and semantics of address – that which is direct, has direction – 
reveals what it is that might feel a little bit funny about the phrase direct 
address. For, if an address is, by definition, always directed, then demarcating 
one kind of utterance as direct address seems odd, an anxious over-insistence. 
Perhaps this tells us something about the affective experience of being 
addressed in the conditions of a performance. ‘Now I’d like to say…’ says the 
performer, in a direct address that is oddly redoubled, as though the performer’s 
act were saying, ‘I am speaking to you, and I am calling attention to the fact that 
I am speaking to you’. Is this why it seems that there is something inherently 
funny about the body that stands on stage and, in the silence that has fallen, 
begins to speak? Is there some constitutive irony of a body performing its 
performance of speaking, a funniness that can be felt before, even, a word (let 
alone a joke) has been spoken?  
 
 
2. Speech onstage  
 
In Talking to the Audience, Bridget Escolme writes of a ‘post-nineteenth century 
assumption about theatrical progress: that at some point around the turn of the 
sixteenth century, the unsophisticated relics of a performance practice that 
predates London’s first designated theatre spaces begin to “develop” into 
“useful and more naturalistic” conventions of character representation’.8 
Escolme cites Andrew Gurr’s The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642, an 
account of the Elizabethan theatre that considers the persistence of direct 
address – explanatory asides and prologues as well as soliloquies – in 
Shakespeare’s otherwise very modern-seeming texts as rather unfortunate, 
even mildly embarrassing. As Gurr writes, 'Falstaff’s catechism on honour is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010). 
8 Bridget Escolme, Talking to the Audience: Shakespeare, Performance, Self (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2005), p. 7. 
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relic of the clown’s role of “interloquutions with the Audients”’.9 According to this 
teleological narrative, direct address, which is thought of as all too 'direct', 
character-breaking, implausible, is gradually eradicated as subtler and more 
sophisticated modes of theatrical exposition take hold. In naturalistic theatre, 
actors do not address the audience directly, but pretend to be people having a 
conversation in a bounded fictional world. The spectators are not acknowledged 
directly; rather, they are permitted, as it were, to overhear. Direct address has 
no place in this more serious kind of theatre. It is, as Gurr’s reference to the 
clown suggests, something that belongs on the popular stage, or in the circus 
ring, perhaps, or the sideshow of the travelling fair.  
 
And indeed, direct address can be considered more properly within the purview 
of the historian of popular performance, even folklore. It is, argues Peter Bailey, 
'an ancient feature of popular culture', one that, in the newly industrialized cities 
of Victorian Britain, was adapted for newly commercialized modes of 
entertainment. In the new Music Halls, the comic acts were drawn, initially, from 
pub-based entertainers, whose acts developed out of 'the well-practiced 
techniques of the street ballad singer'. 10 To pursue this popular history a little 
further, into the twentieth century Oliver Double – a stand-up comedian and 
scholar who has written a history of British Variety theatre11 – Music Halls were 
replaced with Variety theatres, venues that offered ostensibly the same thing: 
mixed bills of touring 'acts'. To simplify a complex scene: a typical mid-twentieth 
century Variety act might consist in a person wearing a funny outfit, singing 
comic songs, and maybe telling a few jokes in between. Gradually, the talk bits 
got longer and the songs shorter, until some time around the mid-twentieth 
century there were so-called 'monologuists' doing nothing but jokes. Double 
calls such acts ‘embryonic stand-up’. He writes that, ‘In the 1920s and 1930s, 
stand-up comedy was still new enough for people to invent their own variants of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), p. 103. 
10 Peter Bailey, Popular Culture and Performance in the Victorian City, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 131-132. 
11 Oliver Double, Britain Had Talent: A History of Variety Theatre (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012). 
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it, refusing to restrict themselves to just standing there and reeling out gags’.12 
But then, it seems, something changed. Ted Ray, who began performing on the 
Variety stage in the early 1930s wearing what Double calls a ‘cartoonish 
costume’, has this to say: 
 
One day I found myself thinking: You’ve been wrong all along. Why keep 
yourself aloof from the audience? Why not be one of them? Forget all 
about comic make-up, the white bowler hat, those fantastic, ridiculous 
props. Why, there’s no need even to bother about a dinner jacket. Just 
be human. Stroll on the stage in an ordinary suit, just as if you’d walked 
in from the street.13 
 
Although neither Ray nor Double himself make this fully explicit, it is a fair 
enough conjecture that this change had something to do with the introduction of 
public address systems into the variety theatres in the early 1930s. Before that, 
as Ronnie Tate has said, ‘You had to learn to throw it out so everybody could 
hear, but you had to shout your guts out to do it‘.14 The rise of microphone 
technology rendered effortful vocal projection unnecessary: this is widely 
accepted. First in radio broadcasting, and later in live performance the 
microphone ‘opened the way to, had indeed demanded, a less forceful, more 
intimate, more natural kind of vocal production and vocal communication’.15 
 
It is possible, then, to trace two parallel and yet in many ways complementary 
historical narratives of speech onstage. One tells of how theatre evolved from 
direct address towards naturalistic dialogue. The other tells the story of the 
'birth' of stand-up from the mixed bag of Variety. Both, it should be added, are 
necessarily simplified here. I have simplified them in order to demonstrate the 
shared values at play in both, and reflect on what that tells us about attitudes 
toward speech: what is 'natural' is privileged over what is perceived to be 
'artificial', less ‘sophisticated'. Anecdotal and scholarly narratives of stand-up’s 
development also tend to view naturalistic speech as the telos of the artform, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Oliver Double, Stand Up! On Being a Comedian (London: Methuen, 1997), p. 30. 
13 Cited in Double, Stand Up!, p. 32. 
14 Cited in Double, Stand Up!, p. 36. 
15 Henry Pleasants, The Great American Popular Singers (London: Victor Gollancz, 1974), p. 
143. 
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although comedians would not call this speech naturalistic. Indeed comedians 
and scholars of comedy often seem to do everything they can to distance 
stand-up from practices associated with the theatre. As Double writes, ‘Today, 
there is an idea that the stand-up should present him or herself to the audience 
undisguised by theatrical artifice, wearing everyday clothes instead of a stage 
costume’.16 According to this of kind narrative, the microphone just happens to 
have come along at the right time, and thus speed the evolution of stand-up 
performance toward its ultimate aim of becoming just like a conversation (albeit 
a somewhat one-sided, and yet much wittier and adroitly timed version of one), 
and thus hardly a performance at all, more like something that naturally 
happens. 
 
My own study of speech onstage starts out from a critique of this naturalism, 
which, in Chapter Two, drawing on de Man’s work, I suggest, might be thought 
of as a kind of aesthetic ideology. An ideology of naturalness can be detected 
both within discourses of stand-up performance and within theories of humour. 
Just as a theorist can claim that ‘Laughter is vital to the human condition’,17 
Double can say, of a student stand-up comedian, ‘it’s clear from the beginning 
he’s a natural’.18 Although neither claim seems, on the face of it, all that 
controversial, both, as I argue in Chapter Two, are in need of deconstruction.  
 
Instead of taking pleasure in what feels ‘natural’, this thesis is responsive to the 
various discomforts, weird feelings and funny incongruities that arise when a 
body gets up on a raised platform, stands in front of other bodies, and begins to 
speak – says something like ‘Good evening and thanks for coming’ (and here 
note the importance of beginnings, which tend to be concentrations of 
awkwardness). In particular, this thesis has an ear for modes of speech that 
strike awkward compromises between ceremonial formality and casual 
informality. In order to articulate my understanding – and my enjoyment – of 
such scenes of speech, I draw on a critical and historical narrative informed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Double, Stand-Up!, p. 31. 
17 Ronald K. L. Collins, ‘Comedy and Liberty: the Life and Legacy of Lenny Bruce’, Social 
Research, 79:1 (2012), 61-86 (p. 61). 
18 Oliver Double, Getting the Joke: The Inner Workings of Stand-up Comedy, 2nd edition, 
(London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 13. 
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postmodern and poststructuralist thinking, one that emerges from a perceived 
convergence and intermingling, some time around the late 1950s or early 
1960s, of popular entertainment and avant-garde theatrical practice.  
 
Direct address formed a central, even constitutive part in the development of 
what has been called, in an influential study by Hans-Thies Lehmann, 
‘postdramatic theatre’. Lehmann frames direct address as a practice whereby 
‘Theatre is emphasized as a situation, not a fiction.’ Direct address, writes 
Lehmann, makes ‘the representational aspect of language recede in favour of 
its theatrical reality’ and can take the form of ‘lamentation, prayer, confession or 
rather “self-accusation” […] or of “offending the audience”’.19 As Lehmann 
himself asserts, that these last two genres of direct audience address also 
happen to be titles of plays by Peter Handke20 is no coincidence; Handke’s 
works could be considered leading examples of this strand of postdramatic 
direct address, as could much of the work of two highly influential performance 
companies, the Wooster Group and Forced Entertainment. Both have been 
drawn repeatedly to experiment with front-facing performers who speak to the 
audience, often using microphones. Lehmann considers what he calls ‘the 
caesura of the media society’ to be a key context for the development of 
postdramatic dramaturgies, calling attention to, for example, the Wooster 
Group’s ‘high-tech, intermedia aesthetics’, their use of video, sound effects and 
microphones to, as he puts it, ‘fragment and infract the dramatic text and the 
bodies of “characters”’.21 Bound up with this use of technology and media 
onstage is an adoption of what Lehmann terms a 'media aesthetic' via a 
'parodic and ironic refraction'.22 This aesthetic is characterized by ‘the rapid 
succession of images, the speed of conversation in shorthand, the gag 
consciousness of TV comedies, allusions to the popular entertainment of 
television, to film and television stars, to the day-to-day business of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. by Karen Jürs-Munby (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 128. 
20 Peter Handke, Plays: One (London: Methuen, 1997).  
21 Lehmann, p. 19. 
22 Lehmann cites, as examples of this, the work of British-German company Gob Squad, and 
German theatre maker René Pollesch, in whose work 'punchlines form a text' and 'screwball 
comedy and sitcom serve as models', p. 168.  
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entertainment industry’.23 Of course, what Lehmann is describing here might 
also, and perhaps more readily be termed ‘postmodern’.  
 
In his two key studies, Liveness and From Acting to Performance, Philip 
Auslander offers useful terms for the ‘crossover’ between postmodern ‘avant-
garde’ practices and the sphere of mass culture. Auslander describes the 
dominant mode of postmodern performance as ‘non-matrixed’, a term first 
introduced by Michael Kirby in his 1965 book Happenings to describe a mode of 
performance which made no attempt to pretend that the performer ‘is someone 
other than himself or in some place other than the actual place of 
performance’.24 Reflecting on the successful film acting careers of, for example, 
several of the Wooster Group’s regular performers, Auslander suggests that, 
although ‘originally meant to differentiate “performing” from conventional acting’, 
non-matrixed performance ‘ultimately served as a training ground for the kinds 
of performance skills demanded by the mass media because, like film acting, it 
depends on mediation for its significance'.25 It might be added that stand-up 
comedy could also be thought of as a form of non-matrixed performance, and 
has, at various times been quoted and referenced by practitioners of 
postmodern performance.   
 
For the purposes of my own study, which foregrounds the act of speaking, I 
wish to emphasize the central role that the microphone has played in the 
development of both stand-up comedy and key works of so-called postdramatic 
theatre. It seems to me that previous studies, including Lehmann's, do not place 
nearly enough emphasis on the microphone: it is not only a stage tool, 
something a performer might use, but, a place, a position, a stage-in-itself. And 
it is not only a convenient way of making speech louder,26 but invites (and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Lehmann, p. 168. 
24 By means of example, Kirby offers the following scene: ‘The orchestra conductor walks on 
stage, bows to the audience, raises his baton, and the curtain falls’. This is another formalized 
beginning that, to me, suggests the potential for a certain kind of awkward funniness (Michael 
Kirby, Happenings: An Illustrated Anthology (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1965), p. 27).  
25 Philip Auslander, Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999), p. 34. 
26 As, for instance, folklorist Ian Brodie suggests in his recent study of stand-up comedy: the 
microphone is that which ‘makes one loud without forcing one to be loud’ (Ian Brodie, A Vulgar 
	   16	  
perhaps demands) a particular kind of speaking. It is my contention that the 
microphone does not simply make things louder: by amplifying speech that 
sounds ‘intimate’ and ‘natural’, the microphone makes things weird. And, it is 
when postmodern theatre puts the microphone on a theatrical stage, a place of 
signification, that this weirdness becomes manifest. For, in semiotic terms, the 
microphone is a signifier of speech (indeed, a search for 'speech' on Google 
Images returns, almost exclusively, stock images of, and featuring, 
microphones). Another doubling, then, in the direct address spoken at a 
microphone: on a stage, the microphone signifies 'speech', at the same moment 
as making it louder.  
 
It is this doubling (I am speaking to you, and I am showing that I am speaking to 
you) that makes the theatrical direct address inherently funny. And it is in the 
postmodern theatre that this funniness is exploited; indeed, in several notable 
cases a certain funny sensibility becomes the dominant or defining mode of a 
postmodern of postdramatic performance practice. Drawing on my own 
personal experience, and predilection, I am thinking here, in particular, of the 
work of Forced Entertainment and Lone Twin, two British companies who have 
enjoyed a considerable amount of success on the European festival circuit over 
the past twenty (and more) years. This thesis is not a study of the work of either 
Forced Entertainment or Lone Twin, but its understanding (and appreciation) of 
a certain kind of funny speech on stage has been strongly influenced by my 
experiences of the work of both. In the chapters that follow, I seek to test and 
extend understandings of performance developed out of years of spectating, 
discussing (and, it must be acknowledged, attempting to emulate) not only the 
performance, but more particularly the jokes, of these particular practitioners.  
 
At this juncture, and in order to move my discussion into new territory, I wish to 
call upon a set of terms proposed by Larry Lynch in his discussion of the 
speech practices of Lone Twin. Throughout their work (which ranges from 
outdoor performances, often involving a lot of shouting, to full-scale ensemble 
theatre shows), Lone Twin’s Gary Winters and Gregg Whelan appropriate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Art: A New Approach to Stand-Up Comedy (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2014), p. 
52).  
	   17	  
modes of public address from popular entertainment genres, such as ‘Good 
evening everyone, and thanks for coming’; ‘Thank you, and goodnight’. Lynch 
suggests that this citational quality, which he calls speechness, inheres in ‘the 
way in which recognizable modes and styles of public address are displaced 
from their original context and reconfigured for different purposes’.27 Such 
utterances, write Lynch, ‘tell us of the work’s gigness or showness’, and in 
relation to this proliferation of nesses (ness-nesses), Lynch clarifies: ‘I put it like 
this because we know that it is not a gig, or show, not in that way. This play and 
displacement of speech genres in turn enables a play and displacement of the 
performance itself’.28  
 
In Lynch’s model, the gigness or showness of such performances relates to our 
knowledge that this is not a gig or a show. By this logic, the quality of a 
performance’s speechness remains ambiguous: it is not clear whether Lynch is 
saying that the speechness has to do with our knowledge that this is not a 
speech, in the sense of a formal public address, or with our sense that this is, 
somehow, not speech. This is an ambiguity that I find useful. Perhaps 
somehow, impossibly, the performance of speech is interesting to us because 
we know it is, somehow, not speech, at least ‘not in that way’. If Lynch is right, 
and speech in performance is speech that announces its own speechness, and 
in doing so tells us it is somehow not speech, then this kind of ontological 
doubt, or doubleness, could be counted amongst the central problems of 
performance theory. Speech in performance is somehow, then, recognizable 
simultaneously as speech and not speech – as something like speech but not 
quite it. An investigation of speech in performance, therefore, cannot help but 
ask ontological questions about speech. Questions that relate to the doubling 
and the redoubling of the body, and the act, in the moment of direct address: I 
am speaking to you, and I am showing that I am speaking to you, but also, I am 
not really speaking to you. These are also, as I will argue, questions that relate 
to the curious ontology of ‘just joking’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lynch, Larry, ‘Speechness: Grammar and Play in the Writing of Lone Twin’, in Lone Twin: 
Journeys, Performances, Conversations ed. by David Williams and Carl Lavery (Aberystwyth: 
Performance Research, 2011), pp. 245-251 (p. 245). 
28 Lynch, p. 248. 
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3. Just a joke  
 
I wish, now, to offer what will serve as a paradigmatic example of the kind of 
speech act that will animate my thinking in the chapters that follow. Standing 
onstage at the Leicester Square Theatre in London, in November 2009, the 
stand-up comedian Stewart Lee has been, for some minutes talking about 
Richard Hammond, at the time a presenter with the BBC’s highly popular 
motoring magazine programme Top Gear. He has already made it clear that he 
dislikes, indeed hates Top Gear ‘cause it’s willfully and deliberately incorrect, 
right?’ As a student in the nineteen eighties, someone who identified himself as 
an ‘Alternative Comedian’ in the ‘era of political correctness’, Lee says, ‘I like 
political correctness, I think it’s good’.29 And so, he says, he has been trying to 
work out which of the three Top Gear presenters he detests the most, and has 
settled on Richard Hammond. And then he starts talking about Hammond, 
indeed, he talks about him for upwards of twenty minutes. But one thing he 
says about Hammond is more memorable, and has aroused a great deal more 
discussion, than anything else Lee said onstage that night (or any of the other 
nights on which he performed the same material onstage): 
 
‘I wish he’d been killed in that crash,’ he says. ‘I wish he’d been killed and… 
decapitated’. 
 
Lee is referring the high-speed dragster crash that occurred during filming three 
years earlier, in 2006 – an accident that left Hammond with serious head 
injuries. An accident that did nearly kill him. And so, at the Leicester Square 
Theatre, Lee’s remark meets with a shocked and disbelieving murmur.  
 
Well, I do,’  
 
He walks to the front of the stage, purposefully, and adds, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This routine can be viewed on Stewart Lee, If You Prefer a Milder Comedian Please Ask for 
One, dir. by Tim Kirkby (Comedy Central/Real Talent, 2001), DVD. This and subsequent 
quotations from the performance of this routine are taken from the transcript of this recording 
published as Stewart Lee, The “If You Prefer a Milder Comedian Please Ask for One” EP 
(London: Faber and Faber, 2012), pp. 52-63. 
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'…and if that seems a bit much for all the Top Gear viewers… It’s just a joke, 
like on Top Gear.' 
 
Now, in the audience, something changes. I remember it changing: I remember 
that I laughed, and in laughing I identified and gave voice to my own position – 
as one who disagreed with, was angered by, the kind of speech for which Top 
Gear, and particularly Hammond’s co-presenter, Jeremy Clarkson, had during 
that period become renowned. To cite just a few examples, there was the 
‘lighthearted’ reference to sex workers being murdered in 2008;30 comments 
that ‘reinforced stereotypes’ of Mexican people in 2010; an anachronistic 
schoolyard rhyme containing the ‘n word’ on camera in 2013;31 and comments 
during the ‘India Special’ that resulted in the Indian High Commission 
complaining to the BBC about the presenters’ ‘cheap jibes’ that ‘lacked cultural 
sensitivity’.32 On each of these occasions, there were calls from some quarters 
for the BBC to discipline or suspend Clarkson, and more than once the 
corporation responded by saying that Top Gear’s viewers had ‘clear 
expectations’ about his humour.33  When, in 2014, Top Gear was found to have 
breached Ofcom guidelines by including Clarkson’s ‘casually racist’ way of 
referring to Asian people during a location-shoot in Burma, producer Andy 
Wilman responded to complaints by saying it was part of ‘a lighthearted 
wordplay joke’. 34 
 
By making what he himself admits is an ‘indefensible joke’ about Hammond’s 
car accident, Lee is, it seems, demonstrating the insufficiency of the defence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 BBC News, ‘Clarkson Joke Sparks Complaints’ (4 November 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/7707641.stm> [accessed 17 September 2016].  
31 David Collins, ‘Jeremy Clarkson N-Word Shame: Top Gear Presenter Caught on  
Camera Using Racist Rhyme’, Daily Mirror (1 May 2014) <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-
news/jeremy-clarkson-top-gear-presenter-3480875> [accessed 5 April 2016]. 
32 Christopher Hope, ‘India Demands Apology Over Top Gear “India Special”’, Daily  
Telegraph (11 January 2012) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/9007554/India-demands-apology-over-Top-
Gear-India-special.html> [accessed 5 April 2016]. 
33 BBC News, ‘Clarkson Joke Sparks Complaints’. 
34 BBC News, ‘Top Gear Burma Episode Breached Ofcom Rules’ (28 July 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-28522450> [accessed 17 September 2016]. 
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‘it’s just a joke’. So far, so good. We know what Lee is doing when he says: 
 
‘It’s just a joke’ – the Jeremy Clarkson defence – ‘It’s just a joke’. So 
when I said that I wished that Richard Hammond had been decapitated 
and killed, right, like when they do their jokes on Top Gear, it’s just a 
joke. 
 
But then, in a subtle way, something he says complicates the scene: 
 
But coincidentally… as well as it being a joke, it’s also what I wish had 
happened.  
 
With this coda, the question of what it is that is happening here (and whether or 
not ‘it’ is something Lee could be said to be ‘doing’) becomes exponentially 
more troubling. In the midst of the gig, this moment is weirdly, enjoyably 
baffling. It stages a question that, I argue, remains suspended long after the gig 
has finished. Each of the parts of the utterance changes his listeners’ 
perception of the kind of act, he seems to be doing: first he says he wishes 
Hammond had died, eliciting shocked murmurs from his audience. Then he 
says, ‘it's just a joke’, implying ‘I was not serious, I do not wish that’. A slight 
shift in the crowd, some relief perhaps. Then, by saying ‘like on Top Gear’, Lee 
appears to reveal his broader rationale, and the fact that he knows what he is 
doing. Cue satisfied laughter. But then, in a further move, he says 
'coincidentally, it's also what I wish'. Now some laughs, some confusion: what is 
it that Lee is doing by speaking thus? Lee’s final move, the apparent admission 
that he does coincidentally wish what he says he wishes, once again, raises – 
and, I think, displaces – the question of his 'true' intentions. This question is not 
resolved, certainly not within the bounds of the gig, and not by Lee’s 
subsequent explanations of his intentions – on paper, or ‘in person’.  
 
When this show was filmed at the Citizens Theatre in Glasgow on 15 March 
2010, Lee looked directly into the camera and said:  
 
just in case there’s anyone from the Mail on Sunday watching this, I was 
using an exaggerated form of the rhetoric and implied values of Top 
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Gear to satirize the rhetoric and implied values of Top Gear. And it’s a 
shame to have to break character and explain that. But hopefully it will 
save you a long, tedious exchange of emails.  
 
When a transcript of this show was published in paperback by Faber and Faber, 
Lee added further clarification of his intentions via footnotes. Regarding the 
above clarification, he explains that it was added after the publication of a story 
in the Mail on Sunday titled ‘What Prompted Comic’s Sick Tirade Against Old 
Schoolmate Richard Hammond?’,35 so that ‘my intentions were made absolutely 
explicit and no one trying to stir things up could pretend that they had not 
explicitly been told the point of the piece’.36 On paper, and in person, Lee is 
providing two versions of the ‘explanatory aside’. Onstage, Lee ‘breaks 
character' to provide the spoken equivalent of a footnote; in his book, Lee 
footnotes this to offer further explanation.  But, it might be argued that, even in 
spite of this repeated insistence as to his ‘intentions’, nothing that Lee says can 
retrospectively nullify the utterance. Nothing can change the fact that, whether 
or not he meant it, he did say it. To even say that he wishes a real man had 
died in a real accident that really was life-threatening feels like a transgression 
of the boundaries of the gig; it feels like a serious thing to do. 
 
If ‘it’s just a joke’ is the ‘Jeremy Clarkson defence’, then what we might call the 
‘Stewart Lee defence’ might be summarized thus: ‘I was demonstrating that to 
say “it’s just a joke”’ is not enough to excuse the speaker from responsibility for 
speech that is harmful’. The irony is, of course, that for the ‘Stewart Lee 
defence’ to work, it also has to not work, by not excusing him from the 
responsibility for his own utterance. Thus, with a little prodding, it becomes clear 
that the ethical and political stakes of this ‘joke’ (or non-joke) are by no means 
as clear-cut as Lee’s ‘explanation’ implies.  
 
In the aftermath of Clarkson’s eventual sacking by the BBC in March 2015 (after 
a so-called ‘fracas’ with a producer while filming), there appeared online and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 James Tapper, ‘What prompted comic’s sick tirade against his Top Gear schoolmate?’, Mail 
on Sunday (30 August 200) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1209921/What-
prompted-comedians-tirade-old-schoolmate-Richard-Hammond.html> [accessed 5 April 2016]. 
36 Footnote in Lee, The “If You Prefer … EP p. 63. 
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the press numerous articles that, in a mood approaching fond nostalgia, 
revisited ‘the biggest gaffes made by the star’.37 This has a lot to tell us about 
the politics of speech in Britain in the early 21st Century, an era in which it 
seems 'I was only joking' and equivalent comments have become more 
frequently heard, insistently proffered, and increasingly contested. In the 
immediate aftermath of Clarkson’s suspension from Top Gear for an 
‘unprovoked physical and verbal attack’38 on a Top Gear producer, he was 
reported to have criticized the BBC in ‘expletive laden rant’ at a charity auction 
staged at the Roundhouse, an arts venue in North London.39 The following 
Sunday, Clarkson used his column in The Sunday Times to claim ‘it was all 
meant in jest’, a claim that was itself reported in several other newspapers.40 
The ‘Jeremy Clarkson defence’ thus sustains its own micro-economy of intrigue. 
Reluctant as I may be to allow him the valorization of ‘relevance’, Clarkson’s 
career has something to tell us about the politics of public speech in Britain in 
the early 21st Century. As a professional controversialist, Clarkson is both 
celebrated and censured for his spoken transgressions; more than that, he is 
celebrated for being censured. In the British media, there is an economy of 
speech that is sustained by and therefore requires questionable or provocative 
or otherwise scandalous speech conduct (bad speech, wrong speech, offensive 
or ‘non-PC’ speech) in order to provoke further acts of speech (condemnations 
and complaints, accusations/shamings, apologies or self-justifications, 
retrenchments/counter punches, defences, and the various opinion pieces). 
 
A brief glance at the news stories in the British press on any particular day over 
the past ten to fifteen years might suggest that the British public have a 
compulsive interest in people saying things that are, to put it crudely, either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See, for example Sky News, ‘Top Gaffes: How Clarkson Fuelled Controversy’ (25 March 
2015), <http://news.sky.com/story/1253913/top-gaffes-how-clarkson-fuelled- 
controversy> [accessed 29 March 2015]. 
38 Anita Singh, ‘Jeremy Clarkson Sacked by the BBC: Official’, Daily Telegraph (25 March 2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/bbc/11494513/Jeremy-Clarkson-sacked-by-the-BBC-
official.html> [accessed 29 March 2015].  
39 Daniel Welsh, ‘Jeremy Clarkson Fires at BBC in Shocking Rant’, Huffington Post (20 March 
2015) <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/03/20/jeremy-clarkson-bbc-top-gear-suspension-
sacked_n_6907856.html> [accessed 29 March 2015].  
40 Stories of this kind appeared in the 22 March 2015 editions of the Independent, Daily Mirror, 
Telegraph, and Evening Standard.  
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stupid or wrong. Such speech continues to ‘act’ – have force – and it seems to 
elicit a curious kind of compulsion to return, replay. Newspapers reprint the 
hateful utterances of the disgraced so that their readers can experience and re-
experience the feeling of being offended. 
 
Purely on the basis of this kind of media coverage, it seems that an anxiety 
about public speaking is mixed with a curious sort of pleasure in other people’s 
mistakes and transgressions, one that cannot be explained away as simple 
schadenfreude, or the conscientious desire to learn how not to do it (although 
both are in play). Is it possible that what is being called into play (and, by the 
media organizations, exploited), is some kind of compulsive fascination with the 
unpredictable power of speech? A sense of being both disconcerted and, 
perhaps, occasionally thrilled, by the way that an utterance can act (and 
continue to act), apparently in excess of its speaker’s intentions? 
 
 
4. Funny ethics  
 
The question of ‘only joking’ concerns, in a theoretical sense, the line between 
speech and conduct – in other words, something that is 'only' speech, and 
something that is actually done. The terms with which such a discussion might 
most productively be pursued were set out by the philosopher J.L. Austin, in 
How to Do Things With Words, his seminal explication of performativity. Austin 
began his exposition by drawing together a handful of utterances that, he 
argued, could not be considered as either true or false statements. Utterances 
such as ‘I promise…’, ‘I apologize…’, ‘I dare you to…’ do not describe 
something; instead they perform an act, and do so in the moment of being 
uttered. To say ‘I promise…’ (in the appropriate circumstances) is to make a 
promise.41 
 
This project proposes a reading of Austin’s work made possible by the writing of 
Shoshana Felman in The Scandal of the Speaking Body. Felman writes that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
1962), p. 3. 
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object of Austin’s performative theory is ‘the rethinking of the human act’, 42 and 
reminds us of something it is surprisingly easy to lose sight of: the speech act is 
a bodily act. This fact is, to adopt Felman’s term, scandalous inasmuch as the 
body is always to some extent unknowing about what it performs. Because a 
speech act often implies (and sometimes explicitly attests to) the speaker’s 
intention in so speaking, speech and the body are held in ‘a relation consisting 
at once of incongruity and inseparability’. As far as the performative utterance is 
concerned, ‘the scandal consists in the fact that the act cannot know what it is 
doing’.43 
 
The effect of ‘incongruity’ is at the heart of Felman’s conception of the speaking 
body. This incongruity plays a structural role, characterizing as it does the 
manner of the relation between language and the body: they are inseparable, 
but not the same. Neither are they virulently opposed; ‘incongruous 
inseparability’ suggests something more nuanced, something a little bit odd, 
awkward, and – crucially – funny. According to Simon Critchley, ‘incongruity 
theory’ is amongst the dominant explanations of humour offered by the history 
of ideas; as James Russell Lowell, in 1870, writes: ‘Humour in its first analysis 
is a perception of the incongruous’. And, adds Critchley, the work of Kant, 
Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, amongst others, offers distinct takes on this 
basic premise’.44 The funniness of this incongruous interrelation between 
language and the body will be tested and conceptualized as the thesis unfolds. 
At this early stage, I wish to frame the question of incongruity in terms of its 
ability to generate contradictory affects: humour is pleasurable, and yet the ill-
fittingness of that which is ‘incongruous’ can also be uncomfortable. The 
coming-together of these two affects – enjoyment and discomfort – makes for 
an ambivalent feeling that I am calling funniness.  
 
Judith Butler, in Giving an Account of Oneself, writes that the ‘bodily referent’ is 
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‘a condition of me that I can point to, but that I cannot narrate precisely’.45 This 
echoes her formulation from Excitable Speech, where she named the body as 
the ‘blindspot of speech’.46 When she did so, Butler was responding to Felman’s 
reading of Austin. If, in her encounter with Felman’s concept, Butler comes 
close to acknowledging the comic, she does not do so directly. She owns that 
Austin’s tract is ‘an amusing catalogue of failed performatives’,47 and relates 
this to the fact that the body, always to some extent ‘unknowing about what it 
performs […] always says something that it does not intend, and is not the 
emblem of mastery and control that it sometimes purports to be’.48 But even 
though her own formulations suggest it, Butler does not tug at what I read as 
implied in both Felman’s and her own emphasis on the ‘speaking body’: that 
there may be some latent, inherent funniness in the very idea of a body that 
speaks.  
 
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler’s reflections on the body in speech turn 
toward the central role that acts of self-narration play in moral and ethical 
thought. Unlike some traditional moral philosophies, the relational ethics Butler 
is proposing in this book does not proceed from the individual's enlightened 
self-knowledge. On the contrary, this is an ethics based on the apprehension 
that the subject is, necessarily, 'opaque to itself, not fully knowable to itself'.49 
And so, at the scene of speech, one’s attempt to give an account of oneself will 
always necessarily falter on that question of what, precisely, constitutes the ‘I’: 
the first-person pronoun, the ‘I’ that must be deployed recurrently within the 
account, can never fully coincide with the self – the singularly embodied self – 
that speaks it. And thus, when one attempts to give an account of oneself, the 
invocation of the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, which is unavoidable in any self-
description, is ‘paradoxically, a performative and non-narrative act, even as it 
functions as the fulcrum for narrative itself’.50 Butler is by no means intending to 
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offer a theory of postmodern theatre, or indeed stand-up comedy here, but her 
formulations are unexpectedly suggestive when considered in relation to certain 
scenes from both, scenes I consider in this thesis: scenes which stage the body 
as a thing that speaks, and a thing to be seen speaking. For example, Stewart 
Lee telling a story about himself undergoing an investigative medical procedure 
describing his naked body while he stands in front of us, fully clothed, his body 
becoming weirdly, intensely present and yet displaced (Chapter Four). Or the 
various bodies onstage during Kinkaleri's I Cenci/Spettacolo, bodies that for the 
most part seem to be persistently, even stubbornly, avoiding speech, in spite of 
the conspicuous presence of a microphone on a stand slap-bang in the middle 
of the stage, a microphone that remains there (and remains 'live', switched on) 
for the duration of the performance. If something hilarious (although, as I will 
explain at length in Chapter Three, curiously not laugh-out-loud hilarious) 
pervades this performance, it might have to do with the apprehension of some 
latent, inherent funniness in the very idea of a body that can speak.  
 
In the chapters that follow, I dedicate considerably more attention to Stewart 
Lee than to Kinkaleri (or indeed any other practitioner of performance, unless 
perhaps, you consider J.L. Austin as a practitioner which, as it happens, I do). 
When I set out on this thesis project, it was not my intention that so much of it 
would be taken up with Stewart Lee. However, as will become clear, in the 
context of the relational ethics developed by Butler – an ethics from which I 
draw my sense of a speaking body's inherent funniness – Stewart Lee's 
performance is particularly interesting and, at certain moments, peculiarly 
demanding. When we watch Stewart Lee 'give an account of himself', we are 
looking at a body that we know has on some level chosen to put itself in that 
position of exposure – the person we see onstage is also the author, a person 
who has chosen to appear as his 'self' (and who has made a successful career 
of doing so). And yet, the funniness of Lee's speaking body comes into play 
particularly at moments when he is performing (as though) reluctantly. He does 
not (seem to) want to be onstage, speaking, telling jokes, standing up, 
appearing. What makes such sequences weirdly, discomfortingly funny is the 
way in which it seems that the speech (of Stewart Lee) is putting the body (of 
Stewart Lee) in a position of exposure, or vague humiliation. In Chapters Two 
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and Four, by focusing on two such moments from two of Lee's stage shows, I 
begin to work out how the latent funniness of the speaking body might, in being 
mobilized on a stage, offer a starting point for ethical thought.   
 
 
5. Funny feeling  
 
Have you ever had the feeling you are lying, when in fact you are telling the 
truth? Imagine, for example, the following scenario. You are not well. You need 
to excuse yourself from some social or professional engagement. You make a 
phone call, or send an email. You apologize profusely. The more you apologize, 
the more you feel suspected of lying. And so you provide some details, 
evidence: you have a cough, a temperature, you have vomited twice already. 
The more you speak, the more you have the peculiar feeling that your illness 
may, in fact, be fictional.  
 
I draw this example from the work of Denise Riley who, in her study Impersonal 
Passion argues that the peculiar affective power of speech stems from the 
paradoxical fact that language is impersonal: ‘its working through and across us 
is indifferent to us, yet in the same blow it constitutes the fibre of the personal’.51 
Both a philosopher and a poet, Riley sets out to listen to the ‘common twists of 
speech which themselves enact feeling, rather than simply and obediently 
conveying as we elect’.52 Many of the affective peculiarities she describes in her 
study – the victim’s need to hear an apology outweighing the need for that 
apology to be sincere, feeling as if you are lying when conveying a perfectly 
true reason for your absence at some event – stem from a disjuncture between 
the conventionality of a linguistic form and the concrete, personal context in 
which it is being used. For instance, when you ‘call in sick’ you might well feel 
as though you are lying, ‘due not to a psychology of guilt but to the formulaic 
social excuse which overwhelms any truth content’.53 In Riley’s summation, ‘the 
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gulf between the ostensible content of what’s said, and the affect which seeps 
from the very form of the words’ can generate ‘tension, unease, or a feeling of 
dispossession’.54 If the ‘funny’ of this project has much to do with taking 
enjoyment in language, and to a certain extent loving language, this is 
inseparable from a discomforting sense of language’s strangeness, its peculiar 
power. Perhaps it has to do with a sense of guilt or confusion about the 
enjoyment of language. It is laughing at something and simultaneously feeling 
weird about it.  
 
In framing my mode of scholarly attention in terms of funniness, or the funny, I 
am influenced by Sianne Ngai’s work on 'weak or trivial’ aesthetic categories,55 
which she defines in contrast to the 'moral and theological resonances of the 
beautiful and the sublime and the powerfully uplifting and shattering emotions of 
the sublime and the disgusting' upon which the aesthetic tradition focuses.56 
Similarly, unlike terms such as ‘laughter’, ‘humour’, ‘comedy’ or ‘the comic’ – all 
terms that have been the subject of much philosophical speculation – ‘funny’ is 
a word likely to be uttered in a concrete situation in which you do, indeed, find 
something funny. Saying ‘that’s so funny’ is a way of describing an aesthetic 
response, albeit one that sounds fairly trivial, even a bit non-committal, 
alongside the more traditional appraisals concerning the ‘beauty’ and ‘power’ 
(and even ‘truth’) of a work of art.  
 
The funniness I am pursuing might be thought of as comparable to the ‘minor 
and generally unprestigious’ feelings that Ngai writes about in her 2005 book 
Ugly Feelings.57 This kind of focus offers the opportunity to rethink a 
philosophical discourse of emotions stretching back to Aristotle. In contrast to 
the grand passions, such as anger and fear, privileged by this tradition, weaker 
and more pervasive feelings such as paranoia, anxiety, or irritation are 
noncathartic: they promise no ‘therapeutic or purifying release.’ Indeed, such 
‘ugly feelings’ are often ‘explicitly amoral’ – the kind of feelings you might feel 
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bad about feeling because they 'interfere with the outpouring of other 
emotions’.58  
 
Although a feeling that something is funny is often thought of as positive, even 
joyous, it is not quite the same as hilarity. And, although I am writing about 
jokes and comedy, it is not the phenomenon of laughter itself that motivates my 
enquiries. Indeed, I find the persistence of the idea that laughter is a release of 
tension, or repressed emotion, can tend to close down discussion, as if this 
emphatic and involuntary ‘explosion’ constitutes the totality of the utterance’s 
effect, on a person or a situation. As if it is the endpoint, no more explanation 
required. Like Ngai’s ugly feelings, which are ‘defined by a flatness or 
ongoingness entirely opposed to the “suddenness” on which Artistotle’s 
aesthetics of fear depends’,59 finding something funny does not necessarily 
have an end-point. Hence, the exclamation ‘that’s so funny!’ can accompany 
laughter, but more often than not, it takes the place of laughter. After all, the 
funny can be ‘funny-peculiar’ or ‘funny-ha-ha’, and this ambivalence is 
something I want to hold onto. This ambivalent kind of funniness is not 
something that can be flushed out with a single, decisive moment of laughter: it 
worms its way into the body and waits there, to return at the least expected 
moments. If this sounds creepy, then I would add: it is not necessarily an 
unwelcome inhabitation. After all, to call something, or someone, ‘funny’, could 
be also be thought of as a gesture of affectionate mockery, a fuzzy intimacy of 
the kind played out in the old song My Funny Valentine, wherein ‘funny’ is a 
term of both affection and sly belittling.  
 
Much of my work here has been driven by my sense that finding something 
funny – in all the nuanced, particular ways that something can be or feel or 
seem funny – is one of the most tangible, vivid relations I can have with any 
object of study. Furthermore, it may be that there is something funny about the 
level of attention required to investigate the feeling of finding something funny. 
There is something funny about this level of attention, this way of going about 
research, which could be quite aptly described as ‘getting stuck’. I was going to 
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write ‘getting stuck deliberately’, but in fact I am not so certain the adverb 
‘deliberately’ is applicable here, at least not straightforwardly. After all, when I 
spent a whole year writing about a single joke about a tea cosy (Chapter Two), 
it did not feel deliberate: part of me wanted, and tried, desperately, to move on. 
If parsing the meaning of a tea cosy begins to sound like an irreverently trivial 
way to go about research, it is one that by no means lacks a sense of urgency. 
The littleness, the triviality, of that which is funny, and therefore that which I am 
studying, means that my project has had to confront, repeatedly, the question of 
relevance. How might writing that emerges from a vague yet persistent feeling 
that something is funny work its way toward political and ethical questions? This 
is the project I take up, in various ways, in each of the chapters that follows.  
 
As I have already intimated, I am interested in the various ways in which 
speech can make us feel weird. If, as Riley suggests, the affective weirdness 
that so often attends speech has to do with gulf between what words say and 
what they do, this is also productive of pleasure. The backdrop for this enquiry 
is the recognition that speech can not only give us pleasure, but equally make 
us feel funny-peculiar, and yet this discomforting peculiarity is also something to 
which we might be drawn, compulsively, because we sort of like it. 
Concomitantly, the fact that speech can make us feel so funny it itself, on 
occasion, absurdly humorous. That grown men and women can be reduced to 
blabbering, giggling, or awkward wrecks by the uttering of a few words? Now 
that’s funny. This points to something else – that we are identified and identify 
ourselves by what we find funny. We identify our social subjectivities with and in 
our own moments of laughing. Often, in the moment of laughing, what we are 
finding funny is that we find this funny – and in the case of certain potentially 
divisive or controversial jokes, the redoubling of this self-identificatory laughter 
can count as a moment of defiant self-positioning. Saying ‘that’s funny’ or ‘that’s 
not funny’ is not only a way of claiming allegiance with or separation from this or 
that social group or class, it can also double as a way of taking a moral or 
ethical stance. But the way in which the phrase ‘that’s not funny’ can function as 
an accusatory chastisement and the ineffectual cry of the humiliated (often 
simultaneously) points to the shifting power relations of the scene.  
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If speech in performance is speech that announces its own speechness, and in 
doing so tells us it is somehow not speech, then this kind of ontological doubt, 
or doubleness, could be counted amongst the central problems of performance 
and performative theory. And, it might be added, speech that is funny further 
complicates this scene, as does the problem of what it means to be ‘joking’. For, 
a joke can be forceful, it works, yet on an ontological level, it remains ‘only 
joking’; the utterance that both works, on us, and somehow does not work, 
announces its own not-ness. 
 
 
6. Pissing and myth-making 
 
In July 2009 the Guardian’s comedy critic Brian Logan wrote an article about 
the so-called ‘New Offensiveness’, citing social psychologist Sue Becker’s 
identification of 'resurgent bigotry in British comedy'. Citing examples from Little 
Britain to Ricky Gervais, Scott Capurro to Richard Herring, Logan heralded an 
age in which ‘all the bigotries and the misogyny you thought had been banished 
forever from mainstream entertainment have made a startling comeback’. 
Logan framed this as a reaction against the 'right-on orthodoxy' propagated by 
Alternative Comedians in the 1980s, a movement made up of 'proudly anti-
racist, anti-sexist comics'.60 
 
Lee has narrated his own place in this history in his part-autobiography, part 
technical manual on stand-up comedy, How I Escaped My Certain Fate (2010), 
which opens with the line: ‘I never really wanted to be a “comedian”. I wanted to 
be an Alternative Comedian, because all other types of comedian were sell-out 
scum’.61 Lee goes on to recount a certain origin story of British stand-up 
prevalent in the late 1980s, when he began performing: ‘for my generation of 
London-circuit stand-up comedians there was a Year Zero attitude to 1979’. 
The story tells of how, ‘with a few incendiary post-punk punchlines, Alexei 
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Sayle, Arnold Brown, Dawn French and Andy de la Tour destroyed the British 
comedy hegemony of Upper-Class Oxbridge Satirical Songs and Working-Class 
Bow Tie-Sporting Racism’. Lee acknowledges that this is a ‘simplified fable’. For 
one thing, ‘It’s a romantic exaggeration to claim that The Comedy Store had an 
ideological position. It did, for about a week in 1980, but it didn’t when it started 
and obviously its policy today is defined by commercial imperatives alone’.62 Yet 
he admits feeling nostalgic about the 1980s, and there are certain elements of 
this simplified history that still seem to code his understanding of comedy, 
particularly how it relates to class. The ‘majority of live stand-up in Britain’ in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s consisted in ‘increasingly dated and dubious 
working-men’s-club comics’ telling bigoted jokes. And the after-effects of the 
fifties satire boom meant that ‘high-profile left-field TV and radio shows’ such as 
Not The Nine O’Clock News were still helmed by Oxbridge graduates. Although 
Lee himself is, he acknowledges, an Oxbridge graduate, having attended 
Oxford’s Edmund Hall, he writes, ‘In my early days on the circuit, I kept the 
exact location of my education a secret’ because ‘the Alternative Comedy 
scene that was swiftly becoming the dominant trope was expressly and 
understandably against this privileged old guard’.63  
 
According to Lee’s narrative, all this began to change as the ‘right-on’ politics of 
the 1980s gave way to the irony-tinged ‘new laddism’ of the 1990s. In 1993, 
comic duo Rob Newman and David Baddiel played Wembley Arena, the latter 
flying above the arena on a wire, leading to declarations as to comedy being 
‘the new Rock’n’Roll’. Lee describes this as the moment that ‘changed comedy 
in Britain for ever, probably for the worse’. Suddenly, he writes, ‘stand-up 
looked like a career option for ambitious young people, and a cash cow for 
unscrupulous promoters’.64 As Lee has it, this shift in perception, along with the 
cultish popularity of David Baddiel and Frank Skinner’s Fantasy Football (a 
television show in which the two comedians who might previously have been 
doing political stuff on the Alternative scene sat on a sofa and made jokes about 
football) led to a change in the atmosphere of comedy clubs: 
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Football fans and so-called ‘new lads’ began to feel welcome at once 
‘alternative’ comedy venues, in their Ben Sherman shirts, and within five 
years the comedy counter-culture which our illustrious eighties stand-up 
comedy forebears shed blood to build, in the post-punk shadows of fat 
working men's club comics and elitist Oxbridge satirists, was destroyed.65 
 
This narrative, simplified and heavily biased as it may be, is important for 
understanding Lee’s work. Not least because he retells it in a way that makes it 
sound as though he does not fully believe it himself. Perhaps here he is ‘in 
character’ as the ‘smug, stuck-up, politically correct, holier than thou leftie’ that, 
according to Lee, his stage persona sometimes veers towards (as Lee adds, 
this is ‘a character I have researched so thoroughly I often feel obliged to 
behave like it in my own spare time, sometimes for years on end’).66 
 
Keeping in mind Lee’s complaints about the rise of laddishness, his position on 
political correctness and his aversion to the ‘old boy’s club’ of a British 
establishment dominated by Oxbridge graduates (in spite of the fact that he 
himself is one), I want to spend a few moments considering the position, and 
the myth, of the stand-up comedian as a cultural figure. Lee’s book, How I 
Escaped My Certain Fate: The Lives and Deaths of a Stand-Up Comedian, tells 
the story of his return to stand-up after a four-year hiatus. After some modest 
television success as part of the double act Lee and Herring in the mid-nineties, 
around 1999 Lee found himself disheartened, and out of fashion, playing to 
dwindling and increasingly apathetic crowds. He quietly gave up stand-up, 
turning his attention instead to journalism and the satirical musical Jerry 
Springer: The Opera. However, by 2004, he writes,  
 
the simplicity of stand-up, the fact that you can think of an idea in the 
afternoon, after a long lie in, and implement it in the evening, suddenly 
seemed very attractive to me, now that I was a commercial theatre 
director whose attempts to make even the slightest change to the work 
required separate sets of instructions to literally dozens of people67  
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He returned to the Edinburgh Fringe that year with a new show titled, in a blunt 
statement of intent, Stewart Lee: Stand-Up Comedian, having realized, as he 
puts it, ‘that stand-up was just one man on a stage in a room. And so stand-up 
was infinite. […] one man on stage in a room could be anything at all, go 
anywhere, say anything, suggest anything, do anything’.68 Interesting that even 
the proudly politically correct Lee resorts to 'man' when asserting, and 
celebrating, what it is that makes stand-up stand-up (and, it might be added, 
what makes stand-up not theatre).  
 
Is the paradigmatic figure of a stand-up comedian a man? To phrase the 
question in this way is not the same as asking whether people who are not men 
make good comedians, or harking back to that unhelpfully persistent debate 
around the question: ‘are women funny?’69 To acknowledge the possibility of 
even formulating that question is to risk providing the opportunity for the debate 
to be resuscitated, without its terms being challenged. During this thesis project 
I have found myself walking a difficult line between a commitment to anti-
essentialist thinking on gender and a need to acknowledge that there is 
something funny about Stewart Lee that has to do with his maleness, or – to 
subtly shift terms – a funniness that emanates from the fact of him standing and 
speaking as a man. This has, in part, to do with exemplarity, a rethinking of 
which is a key to the conceptual enquiry of this thesis. Before we embark upon 
that work, it will be useful to negotiate a path around a something that may, if 
not acknowledged and deflated, loom over the proceedings in an unhelpful way. 
I will do so via a brief example, one that is offered by John Limon, at the start of 
his 2000 book Stand-Up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America. As part of 
his effort to define stand-up comedy as ‘an absolute or ideal genre’, Limon 
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2436939/Women-stand--theyre-offs-Lee-Mack-claims-comedy-suited-male-personalities.html> 
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examines a joke told by the celebrated (and perhaps, in his way, paradigmatic) 
US stand-up comedian Lenny Bruce some time in the early 1960s. It goes like 
this: 
  
 If you’ve, er, [pause] 
 Ever seen this bit before, I want you to tell me. 
 Stop me if you’ve seen it. [long pause] 
 I’m going to piss on you. 70 
 
According to Limon, this joke elicited ‘seventeen seconds of unanimous 
laughter’ (Limon is listening to a recording of Bruce’s performance on vinyl). As 
Limon notes, ‘by any standards, this is an extraordinary laugh’.71 On paper, it 
does not look much like a joke. Why, then, does the audience at the Lenny 
Bruce gig find it so funny? Limon tests a few comic theories against it, calling 
upon the work of joke anthropologists, cognitive theorists, and folkloric 
discourse around the 'sacred clown'. Freudian 'joke work' seems the most 
promising, for in theme Bruce’s joke is ‘sexual and excremental and aggressive’ 
all at once, ‘almost too obliging a Freudian specimen’.72 What seems to emerge 
from such theorizing, Limon acknowledges, is the sense that Bruce’s joke is a 
deliberate ‘play on all such comic hermeneutics’.73 The opener ‘If you’ve ever 
seen this bit before, I want you to tell me’ suggests that he may be about to tell 
a conventional joke, of the ‘knock-knock’ or ‘man walks into bar’ variety. It is a 
play on ‘the ritual nature of the performance’, lampooning the ‘formal politeness 
of the occasion’ by adopting the ‘stop me if you’ve heard this one’ shtick of the 
light entertainer, here to ‘do a few talk bits’. But then, with the delivery of the 
punchline – ‘I'm going to piss on you’ – 'the formal politeness of the occasion is 
folded into the sordid violence of it’.74 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 John Limon, Stand-Up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America, (Durham and London, 
Duke University Press, 2000), p. 11. 
71 And, it might be added, Bruce was an extraordinary comedian, widely credited as ‘the man 
who single-handedly changed the very architecture of American comedy’, the comedian who 
‘dared to speak the unspeakable’ (Collins, ‘Comedy and Liberty, p. 65) and was duly prosecuted 
for obscenity, and whose early death, in Lee’s words, ‘confirmed the sainthood on him’ (On Not 
Writing, online video recording, YouTube, 3 July 2013, 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrXVaytvJtQ> [accessed 23 October 2013]).  
72 Limon, p. 14. 
73 Limon, p. 15. 
74 Limon, p. 17. 
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‘Joking is an all-male sport in Freud,’ as Limon observes. And, thinking along 
these lines, it is men who stand up to piss, men hold their thing as they do so, 
and by this logic, stand-up can be figured as a sort of male pissing contest. In 
another part of his book, Limon takes it further: 'It would be difficult for the 
typical stand-up comedian to disavow the phallicness of his position,' he writes, 
‘standing above us, the stand-up comedian always seems larger than he, 
usually “he,” is.'75 And, if we are going to allow the phallus to intrude upon the 
proceedings, we may as well acknowledge that comedian Marjorie Gross is not 
the only person to have observed that standing onstage with a mic is ‘like 
holding a penis'.76 And Limon suggests that if 'controlling the mike, talking down 
to us' is having the phallus, this means, in Freudian terms, that penis envy 
ought to be redirected toward the microphone.77 This phallic exposition is 
certainly suggestive as to why a man on a stage holding a microphone may be 
funny (i.e. he comes across as a bit of a dick). But this is also problematic, 
because in it suggests that the symbol, the word, and the fleshy presence of the 
penis have some sort of necessary significance: their coincidence (either in 
innuendo, in a theoretical model, in a moment of getting a joke) is taken as 
meaningful. Whereas, I argue, the funniness of this joke depends on a certain 
conventionality – both of language, and of the stand-up situation – which is not 
a matter of necessity, but of habit.  
 
An alternative approach to this joke, and it is my preferred approach, calls into 
play the theories of Felman and Butler and foregrounds the conventionality of 
the utterance. For, in conventional terms, ‘I’m going to piss on you’ is a 
formulation that has something in common with a promise, or else a threat: it 
refers to an act in the future. As Butler notes, ‘Implicit in the notion of a threat is 
that what is spoken in language may preconfigure what the body might do; the 
act referred to in the threat is the act that one might actually perform’. However, 
‘it would be a mistake to conclude that whereas the threat takes place merely in 
language, the threatened act takes place in a material instance fully beyond 
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76 Cited in Brodie, p. 57. 
77 Limon, p. 113. 
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language, between and among bodies’. Because, as Felman reminds us, 
speaking itself is a bodily act. So, ‘Although the threat is not quite the act that it 
portends, it is still an act, a speech act, one that not only announces the act to 
come, but registers a certain force in language’.78 
 
For Bruce’s utterance to have force, the audience does not need to believe 
Bruce is going to actually piss on them at some time in the future – they laugh 
at him saying it – the saying is already a doing. On what does this ‘violence’ of 
this act depend? Upon the fact that Bruce spoke as if they could ‘stop’ him, as if 
they had some say in the proceedings, before reminding them of the physical 
fact that, as the comedian, the one standing above the audience on a raised 
platform, he is the only one in a position to carry out such an act? If so, both the 
violence, and the funniness, of the punch line might have to do with the 
revelation of the conventionality of the situation. Bruce speaks as if engaging 
them in a two-way exchange that is, of course, no such thing. The punchline, 
such as it is, is a forceful reminder that they themselves are, in a bodily sense, 
exposed both to and by Bruce’s address. Although this does not resolve the 
theoretical problem of the phallus, it does enable me to formulate a number of 
questions that help clarify the nature of my enquiry in this thesis: how is it that 
the figure or example of ‘a man’ can become funny in exemplarity? Why might 
certain performances of certain kinds of maleness be funny in particular socio-
historical settings? If I find certain men’s performance of a certain kind of 
manness funny, how do I begin to position myself in relation to that? 
 
My response to these questions will come most clearly into focus in Chapter 
Four, but it is necessary to acknowledge, at the outset, the way that Lee 
persistently returns to not only toilet jokes, but exemplary scenes of urination. 
For example, as I will discuss in Chapter Two, he dedicates an early part of 
Stand-Up Comedian to an anecdote about ‘doing a wee out of my cock’ on the 
same day as the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. Rather 
than being symptomatic of something deep and psychoanalytical, I suggest that 
we think of these as willfully distracting figures to which Lee returns in order to 
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stage questions about the politics of what it means to be standing, as a man, on 
a public stage, within a particular historical context, and make the claim that one 
is 'just joking'. I argue that the politics of 'just joking' concern how the right and 
power to draw the line between the serious and the non-serious (the light, the 
trivial, the funny) is claimed and enforced. It prompts us to ask: who controls, or 
attempts to control, the space of communication? 
 
 
7. Figures of speech 
 
Might the exemplary be bound up in the speechness of speech in a way that is 
comparable to joking? The introduction of an example can be flagged by the 
saying of ‘Say…’. This signals that the example is merely hypothetical and 
provisional, merely a demonstration for now. It implies that the example might 
be improvised or spontaneous. Similarly, a wish is hypothetical, it refers to an 
alternative reality created by speech, by and in the act of speaking. And so for 
Lee to say, of Richard Hammond, ‘I wish he had died’ is for him to speak in an 
imagined past tense, expressed in the mood of the subjunctive. Sometimes 
called ‘counterfactual’, the subjunctive mood is a conditional tense, a departure 
into the realm of the ‘what if…’. To say ‘I wish…’ signals an entry into the realm 
of hypothesis. An utterance like ‘I wish…’ thus blurs the boundaries between 
serious and non-serious by opening onto fiction – it is, after all, only in the 
presence of a fairy godmother or a genie that the words ‘I wish…’ acquire the 
(magical) power to effectuate something in the very moment of being spoken. 
But, even though, as adults, we know genies and fairy godmothers to be pure 
make-believe, we might well be moved to utter the superstitious cry of ‘don’t say 
that!’ (the unspoken implication being ‘…because it might just come true’).  
 
Lee has spoken into being a parallel reality in which Richard Hammond has 
died. Then he adds detail. He appears to get a little carried away:  
 
I wish, I wish his head had come off and rolled along the track, and all 
shards of metal had gone in his eyes and blinded him… And then I, then 
I wish his head had rolled into a still-burning pool of motor oil but there 
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was just enough sentience left in his spinal column for him to go, ‘Ooh, 
that’s hot’, and then die.  
 
If this hyperbolic, cartoonishly vivid depiction of Hammond’s death is being 
elaborated as an example, then it might be said that Lee is doing so in order to 
make an example of Richard Hammond (and, historically, heads displayed on 
sticks have been used as a fairly visceral way of ‘making an example’ of 
someone). But the thing about examples – their risk, their danger – is that they 
make take on a life of their own. Like heads on sticks, they might continue to 
‘present’ themselves long after they are welcome. In a footnote to his essay, 
‘The Epistemology of Metaphor’, Paul de Man makes the following comment 
about examples: 
 
Examples used in logical arguments have a distressing way of lingering 
on with a life of their own. I suppose no reader of J.L. Austin’s paper ‘On 
Excuses’ has ever been quite able to forget the “case” of the inmate of 
the asylum parboiled to death by a careless guard.79  
 
Felman calls Austin’s examples ‘aberrantly trivial’, and comments on the 
‘unexpectedness’ of this incursion of something trivial, or in other cases 
somehow monstrous and absurd, into a supposedly ‘serious’ philosophical 
discourse. This is a structural model that coincides with the way that many jokes 
work: via the passage from great things to small (from generalized to trivial or 
irreducible). This transition (which has the violence of a slip or a fall) is played 
out in the switch between registers of discourse. And Austin’s repeated 
invocations that we enjoy the process of theorizing, signals his pleasure in this 
failure (this failure to substantiate, demonstrate or prove). The way examples 
make theory collapse is itself funny.  
 
On the subject of examples, de Man also has this to say: 
 
From the experience of reading abstract philosophical texts, we all know 
the relief one feels when the argument is interrupted by what we call a 
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‘concrete’ example. Yet at that very moment, when we think at last that 
we understand, we are further from comprehension than ever; all we 
have done is substitute idle talk for serious discourse.80 
 
Although (or, rather, because) it is not certain that de Man is being entirely 
serious when he writes this, de Man’s comments open onto something that is 
important for the mode and methodology of this study, that is, the potential – 
even the tendency – for examples to perform in ways that do not merely 
exemplify the conscious or intended statement of the text. Examples can 
demonstrate other than you are trying to ‘say’. This is a recurring sticking point, 
a point on which my scholarly practice gets stuck. It also is the mode by which 
this research has taken place. And so it explains something of the structure of 
this thesis, the way it undoes the conventional relation between object of 
enquiry and mode of enquiry, between case study and theoretical reading, 
between theory and practice.  
 
This thesis is responsive to a number of examples or illustrations from 
theoretical texts that might be called ‘famous’: Austin’s marriage ceremony, 
Louis Althusser’s street scene, Karl Marx’s speaking commodities, de Man’s 
deconstruction of Archie Bunker’s ‘what’s the difference?’ Such examples have 
been described as ‘powerfully distracting’,81 both for their readers and, it seems, 
the authors who deployed them. They become objects of ‘evident fascination’82 
or weird compulsion. If, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick comments in Touching 
Feeling, ‘the jokes you remember are the ones that don’t quite work’,83 I would 
offer that the examples that spark conversation are the ones that don’t quite, or 
don’t only, exemplify. 
 
In order to theorize this exemplary failing and overreaching, I am drawing an 
understanding of ‘the figure’ as it emerges in the work of de Man. In the 
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chapters that follow, I deploy the term ‘figure’ in three senses: firstly, as a 
rhetorical figure of speech associated with the literary richness of language (in 
this sense, I am using ‘figure’ in preference to ‘trope’); secondly, as an image or 
an illustrative example, and in this sense I am most interested in an unruly 
figures of the kind that fail or exceed their illustrative function. And thirdly, I 
understand figure to imply the author-figure whose status as this type of author 
(philosopher, stand-up comedian) is – perhaps inescapably – present in our 
reading of the work.  
 
Chapter One, by exposing elements of Austin’s philosophical performance as a 
scene of speech (the giving of a lecture), highlights the various ways in which 
Austin was making an example of himself, of his own speaking body and his 
own exemplary acts of speech. This enables me to position my own work in 
relation to Austin’s example as a philosopher. This chapter raises the problem 
and possibility of examples as jokes. Chapter Two responds to a single joke, 
about a tea cosy. It asks to what extent the funniness of this joke has to do with 
the appeal of the tea cosy itself as a ‘cute’ anthropomorphic thing. An 
articulation is staged between stand-up comedy and literary theory, via the work 
of Stewart Lee and Paul de Man. In this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that an 
encounter between de Man’s deconstructive interventions in lyric poetry and the 
complex address structure of just one of Lee’s jokes is productive. Productive, 
that is, of more than just knowledge about Stewart Lee’s stand-up, or tea 
cosies, or how literary texts might be performed, but of how rhetoric – as 
persuasion and as imagery – shapes our social actions and appearances in a 
late capitalist world full of ‘things that talk’.  
 
Chapter Three began as a historical study of the microphone as a performance 
object. But then, 'for research purposes', I watched a performance by the Italian 
group Kinkaleri, a performance that sparked in me feelings of recognition, 
longing and even love, a performance I found almost unbearably funny. In order 
to theorise this funniness, I engage a reading of Michael Fried’s famous 
description of minimalist sculpture as both ‘literalist’ and ‘theatrical’ to trace the 
genealogy of a certain set of terms within the discourse of modern and 
postmodern art and performance. This chapter stages the question of how to 
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write the experience of spectating into an academic text when that experience 
is necessarily partial, embodied and incongruously personal. In the end, my 
discussion in this chapter focuses not so much on speech, but rather its 
absence in a work of postmodern theatre: a work in which a microphone is 
onstage, and yet speech is, for the most part, withheld.  
 
Chapter Four returns to the question of direct address, and to the scene of 
Stewart Lee’s stand-up performance. It responds to Lee's 2005 show 90’s 
Comedian, focusing in particular on a moment in which Lee’s body is being 
staged – or, put on display – by his speech. My focus on this chapter is less on 
how Lee’s jokes ‘work’ than on how it feels to occupy (and, as it happens, not 
quite occupy) the position of Lee’s spectator. Drawing on the work of Denise 
Riley, I model Lee’s stand-up practice as having less to do with jokes than with 
a certain sort of interpellative address that, in some curious sense, works by 
failing to work.  
 
Throughout, my theoretical interest in the rhetorical figure and the scene of 
address – the bodies and spaces that open within a text – means that my own 
text necessarily stages a series of links and displacements between the place 
of the performance and the place of the page. At best, I hope for the writing 
here to offer a number of thought mechanisms, vivid figurations or oddly not-
quite-working examples that could start conversations within and across the 
discipline of performance, about the discipline of performance.  
 
This thesis project works towards the observation that ethical deliberation, 
although it sounds distinctly unfunny, is not antithetical to the comic, or comedy. 
Rather, there is a distinctive and productive sort of ethics that emerges from the 
comic disjuncture and correspondence between speech and a body. What 
emerges from this disjuncture is named funniness, a feeling that is made up of 
a complex array of affects: identification, longing, discomfort, surprise, anxiety 
(both professional and political), guilt, relief, affirmation, and a feeling of 
pleasurable willing passivity. It asks to what extent these affects could be 
named as or understood to be linguistic, personal, historical, or political. It tests 
writerly methodologies to ask what kind of explanation might be possible. In so 
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doing, this thesis stages a discussion, and a practical negotiation, between the 
spoken and the written, the anecdotal and the theoretical, the theatrical and the 
performative, the serious and the trivial, and ends up moving closer to 
something that might be called ethical, discovering a potential ethics in the 
scene of speech that has been described and in the exemplary or figural mode.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The philosopher onstage: J.L. Austin and performance studies  
 
 
1. ‘This guy’  
 
‘It was one of those over-determined moments in the life of a theatre academic.’ 
So begins Shannon Jackson’s Professing Performance, with an anecdotal 
retelling of a conversation that occurred over dinner at a professional theatre 
event. Jackson, as hired-in scholar, is sitting across from a director and 
dramaturg. The latter asks her to account for the academic trendiness of a word 
he seems, quite understandably, to think she might know a thing or two about: 
‘Isn’t “performativity” the latest thing in “English” theory?’ Jackson responds to 
this question with a stumbling attempt at casual explanation:  
 
“Well,” I began, dreading what would follow, “the concept of 
‘performativity’ within literary studies is a reworking of the ideas of this 
guy, J.L. Austin… and he was, well a kind of philosopher… He wrote a 
book called How to Do Things With Words… and there he argued that 
words are not purely reflective… that linguistic acts don’t simply reflect a 
world but that speech actually has the power to make a world. 1 
 
This is met with casual assurance by the director who responds, simply (and 
some would say simplistically): ‘Oh… you mean like theatre.’ Jackson recounts 
her attempt to explain the theory of ‘this guy’ (‘This guy, this guy…?’) with a 
humorous self-deprecation. She observes her discomfort – ‘I found myself 
staring at the table while I talked’ – and reads this as characteristic of ‘an 
awkward and emergent period in the study and practice of theatre and 
performance’,2 one that is due in large part to the ‘intellectual ferment’ that has 
in recent years come to surround performance, and its related ‘P-words’, across 
a range of academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences.3 In this 
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chapter I will respond to the particular difficulties that attend that most 
troublesome of ‘P-words’, performativity. Taking Jackson’s opening vignette as 
my cue, I am interested in the difficulties performance and theatre academics4 
often seem to experience when attempting to account for the popularity of 
‘performativity’ – an attempt that will often, and perhaps reluctantly, include 
recourse to the ideas of this guy J.L. Austin. 
 
Definitional work on performativity tends to start with Austin; he is widely 
credited as the originator of the term ‘performative’, and its associated sub-field 
of ‘speech-act theory’. A reference to his 1962 publication How to Do Things 
With Words is all but compulsory when attempting to open a discussion on the 
topic. When introducing the term, it is usually considered sufficient to 
acknowledge Austin with a brief nod to his conception of a ‘performative 
utterance’ – something like: ‘an instance in which to say something is to do 
something’ – most probably with a couple of examples, such as "I promise 
to…", "I name this ship…", or (perhaps most reliably) the marriage ceremony's 
"I pronounce you man and wife", before moving on. In this regard, Jackson’s 
‘reductive but brief’ encapsulation of Austin’s work is neither unusual or 
particularly controversial. Austin’s founding proposition remains, at best, 
persuasive and thought provoking. At the least, it is handy in its pithiness – 
what is, in the words of one academic, a nice ‘carry-home concept’. 5 However, 
the finer points of Austin’s work are no longer very often discussed, at least not 
within performance and theatre studies (and certainly not over dinner). This 
may be due to a widespread sense that his ‘foundational work’ on performatives 
has been superseded by expositions that are more provocative, more 
developed, more influential, or more up-to-date. So why does Jackson consider 
the scene of her oddly uncomfortable resort to Austin’s work significant enough 
to place at the beginning of her book-length study of the challenges facing 
performance and theatre studies in the new millennium? For her, it seems, this 
exchange is typical of the kind of ‘bizarre and friction-ridden’ conversation that 
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   46	  
goes on in performance studies – across the artist/scholar divide, across the 
performance/theatre divide, and between performance and theatre scholars and 
academics from other disciplines.6 In this chapter I will explore, specifically, the 
strange prominence of this guy, J.L. Austin, in Jackson’s image of the 
predicament of the theatre academic. More broadly, I will ask: what kind of 
contribution has Austin’s work on the performative utterance made to this 
awkward emergence of performance studies? Is John Langham Austin a figure 
that performance studies finds particularly awkward? 
 
As will have now become clear, Jackson’s extended study of the discourse of 
performance and theatre studies – its sticky moments, avoidances and 
impasses as much as its critical gains – provides a starting provocation and a 
recurring reference point for my discussion. In particular, I am interested in the 
awkwardness that Jackson describes feeling during her own attempt, in her 
capacity as a theatre academic, to account for the cross-disciplinary trendiness 
of a word that sounds like, but then again does not sound quite the same as, 
‘performance’. Performance and performativity are terms that have in recent 
years gained critical currency. It is even possible to speak of a ‘performative 
turn’ in the humanities and social sciences. As Jackson writes, in recent 
decades, ‘scholars drawing from anthropology, sociology, art history, folklore, 
and media studies have developed vocabularies of performance to understand 
artefacts and events ranging from parades to television, from story-telling to 
religious ceremonies’.7 Since ‘the aspects of performance that these scholars 
emphasise can be quite different’, and even contradictory;8 when we talk about 
performance, we are not necessarily – or even usually – talking about the same 
thing.  
Moreover, when scholars outside theatre and performance studies use the term 
‘performative’, there is a good chance they explicitly, perhaps categorically, do 
not mean theatre. As Jackson signals in the opening pages of her book, in How 
to Do Things With Words, performativity’s foundational text, Austin advances a 
categorical exclusion of theatre from his consideration of utterances made ‘in 
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normal circumstances’, describing theatrical language as ‘hollow or void’ and 
‘parasitic upon its normal use’.9 It is possible, on the basis of such comments, to 
assert – as Jackson does – that Austin ‘argued against an alignment between 
speech-act theory and theatre’. In light of this, Jackson charges Austin with 
reproducing ‘a neo-Platonic notion of derivativeness to add a kind of “anti-
theatrical performativity” to the long list of anti-theatrical prejudices that have 
vexed Western intellectual history’.10 This is awkward indeed for Jackson and 
other theatre academics: as she implies, this ‘conceptual opposition’ between 
performativity and theatre is one installed, at the concept’s origin, ‘in the 
beginning’, as it were, by Austin himself. 
 
This account is broadly accepted: Austin asserted that a promise, bet, marriage, 
etc., if spoken by an actor on stage, would not be ‘taken seriously’ as a 
performative utterance, because it was merely an imitation of speech ‘in normal 
circumstances’. Its performative action would therefore be ‘void’. Theatrical 
speech is thus seen as a derivation of utterances made ‘in real life’, and as 
such is of little interest to a philosopher of ‘ordinary language’ such as Austin.11 
It is perhaps hardly surprising, then, that Jackson casts Austin as an antagonist 
at her already friction-ridden dinner table; as she asserts, ‘the director’s 
delightfully assured come back “like theatre” would have been roundly 
contested by Austin himself’.12 It is for this reason that scholars within theatre 
and performance (and Jackson might well include herself in this) have been ‘as 
suspicious of the language of performativity as they are intrigued by its 
theoretical potential’.13 
 
How might we, as scholars of theatre and performance, go about overcoming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Austin, How To Do Things With Words, p. 22.  
10 Jackson, p. 3. 
11 According to its entry in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Ordinary Language 
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mainly in Oxford, for twenty years or so, roughly after 1945’, although the label ‘was more often 
used by the enemies than by the alleged practitioners of what it was intended to designate’ 
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Vol. 7 (1998), pp. 147-152 (p. 147)).  
12 Jackson, p. 4, emphasis added.  
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this suspicion in order to explore the critical potential performativity might hold? 
Why does the term remain so difficult, so daunting? If ‘performativity’ has, in the 
years since the 1962 publication of How to Do Things With Words, gained 
broad critical currency across disciplines, one result of this is that the word has 
acquired an array of different and quite conflicting meanings and uses. For 
example, for so-called ‘speech-act theorists’ such as John Searle, operating in 
the field of linguistic philosophy, ‘performative’ refers to a bounded and 
linguistically specific class of utterances. Whereas, for those working under the 
influence of the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida, or drawing upon Judith 
Butler’s influential theories of subjectivity, ‘performativity’ offers a wide-ranging, 
anti-essentialist view of human action in general. This latter intellectual lineage 
was particularly influential upon the development of gender studies and queer 
studies in the 1990s, both of which explored the political potential of a challenge 
to the classical model of linguistic reference found within Austin’s work: that 
language could be constitutive, rather than merely reflective of reality.  
 
Jackson appears to be drawing primarily on the broad anti-essentialist legacy of 
Austin’s term when, at her awkward professional dinner, she characterizes the 
performative utterance in terms of its ability to ‘make a world’. The world-making 
power of words is, as the director’s response signals, something over which 
theatre makers may well feel they have some special claim. However, an 
assertion that performativity is ‘like theatre’ is liable to exasperate any scholar 
who is versed in the term’s critical history, a scholar like Jackson who is all too 
aware of the ‘conceptual opposition between theatre and performativity' that is 
lodged within the theoretical concept at its origin. This is why, for Jackson, the 
discourse of performativity 'exacerbates an occupational division between the 
artist and the academic’. Against this backdrop, Jackson reflects that the rise of 
‘performativity’ has created something of a ‘disciplinary crisis’ for theatre and 
performance studies. However, she also locates a ‘disciplinary opportunity’ in 
the Austinian focus on ‘the addressive operations of speech’.14 In many ways, 
my work in this thesis project is all about pursuing this particular opportunity.  
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Jackson takes the phrase ‘performance studies’ to refer specifically to 
‘scholarship and scholars that self-consciously composed a late twentieth-
century intellectual formation’, one she associates with an oft-quoted ‘origin 
narrative’.15 This story involves Richard Schechner and his exchanges with 
anthropologist Victor Turner and a 'cohort of thinkers' at New York University, 
and its key moments include 'the avant-garde experimentation of the 1960s' 
which gave rise to what we now know as ‘performance art', an emergence 
associated with New York. Add to that a NYU departmental name-change from 
‘Theater’ to Performance Studies in 1980, and Schechner's now infamous call, 
in 1992, to look to new forms as a means of looking past the outmoded 'string 
quartet' that theatre had become.16 Necessarily simplified as this account is, it 
provides the broad strokes of a narrative that has, for many, underwritten the 
field of performance. A key limitation of this ‘Schechner myth’ is its insistence 
that ‘performance’ gains its legitimacy and identity primarily in opposition to 
‘theatre’: an entrenchment of terms, performance as not-theatre. Jackson also 
usefully recounts a second, and lesser-known origin narrative. This story 
concerns the emergence of the Performance Studies Department at 
Northwestern. Unlike the Schechnerian ‘East-Coast’ version, this 
institutionalization of performance did not occur as a willful separation from, or 
opposition to, theatre. Instead, it emerged out of the pre-existing Department of 
Oral Interpretation, which has always been separate from theatre, and was 
hitherto ‘most often positioned as an aesthetic subfield within Speech, 
Communication and/or Rhetoric'. In bringing this parallel narrative to attention, 
Jackson proposes we think about performance studies as 'the integration of 
theatrical and oral/rhetorical traditions'.17 
 
In order to pursue these questions of speech and performance, it may first be 
necessary to overcome certain obstacles and obfuscations within the expanded 
discourse of performativity. Although for many it is synonymous with speech-act 
theory, the degree to which performativity could be described as primarily a 
theory of speech, or even language, is itself contested. Performativity is a 
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concept that comes out of thinking about language, but whose application 
needn’t be limited to verbal actions or practices. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, a 
prominent theorist of anti-essentialist, queer performativity, writes: 
 
That language itself can be productive of reality is a primary ground of 
anti-essentialist enquiry. To that degree, both deconstruction and gender 
theory seem to have an interest in unmooring Austin’s performative from 
its localized dwelling in a few exemplary utterances… and showing it 
instead to be a property of language or discourse much more broadly. 
You could caricature Derrida as responding to Austin’s demonstration of 
explicit performatives by saying, “But the only really interesting part of it 
is how all language is performative”; and Judith Butler as adding, “Not 
only that, but it’s most performative when its performativity is least 
explicit – indeed, arguably, most of all when it isn’t even embodied in 
actual words.18 
 
Arguably, this has added to the confusion that can attend its usage, particularly 
in settings that are interdisciplinary. In the final chapter of Professing 
Performance, Jackson argues that the theatre/performativity problem highlights 
'a larger set of genealogical tensions and obfuscations' between 
theatre/performance studies and language-centered disciplines such as 'English 
theory', linguistics, and rhetoric.19 She suggests that 'thinking about theatrical 
production and reception through the addressive operations of speech’ means 
joining ‘rhetorical and dramatic legacies that became disconnected from each 
another in the United States over the course of the past 100 years’.20  
 
At this juncture it becomes necessary to acknowledge the geographical divide 
between Jackson’s perspective and my own. The institutional and disciplinary 
genealogies of speech/performance that Jackson traces are specifically North 
American, and the place of Rhetoric and Speech within these institutions is 
specific to that context. Jackson herself holds academic posts in Theatre, 
Dance and Performance Studies and Rhetoric.21 For Jackson, the stakes of 
working through the theatre/performativity conundrum concern ‘the chance for a 
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20 Jackson, p. 216. 
21 As previously noted, currently at the University of California, Berkeley.  
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different kind of reunion between theatre and rhetoric’, suggesting that in the 
United States, the doubtful place of the theatrical in Austinian theory is bound 
up with a specific awkwardness between academic disciplines: as she notes, 
Speech and Theatre are ‘two words that still hang unhappily next to each other 
above the stone entrances of several university departments’.22 Against this, it 
might be offered that, in the United Kingdom, the two words that are most likely 
to hang in unhappy proximity above university departments dealing in theatre 
are ‘Drama’ and ‘Performance’. In the United Kingdom, Speech or Rhetoric 
have never had an institutional footing comparable to that they have enjoyed in 
the USA. At this point, I can do little more than acknowledge this contextual 
difference; my enquiry in this chapter is concerned less with institutional history 
than with the discursive complexity that surrounds the terms ‘performance’ and 
‘performativity’ in their situated usage. In this chapter I will consider the possible 
displacements and subtle shifts in tone that result from temporal, geographical 
and disciplinary crossings – not only of concepts, approaches and critical 
buzzwords, but also of bodies, vocal inflections, and jokes.   
 
The question of a geographical and institutional divide between the USA and 
UK, particularly regarding the question of Speech (that is, both Speech capital 
‘S’ and small ‘s’ speaking,) is also something I suggest we keep in mind when 
we start to consider how Austin himself figures in, and is figured by, the various 
accounts of his work. Again, it is Jackson’s work in Professing Performance that 
has led me down this line of thinking, in demonstrating how the discourse of 
performance is itself performed. In other words, Jackson usefully alerts us to 
how the discursive dynamics of the discipline are played out over dinner tables, 
in classrooms, lecture theatres, rehearsal rooms and conference centre foyers, 
and how these scenes of (often awkward) conversation, explanation and chit-
chat are, for all their apparent triviality, worthy of critical attention. Responding, 
with a degree of license, to Jackson’s invitation to think through these scenes, I 
have begun to reflect on the way J.L. Austin is figured – that is, presented as a 
‘figure’ – by Jackson’s opening vignette. An influential figure, a figure within 
philosophy; a figure at the dinner scene. Jackson’s Austin, ‘this guy’, as she 
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refers to him, is an obstructive figure; unavoidably there, he is not exactly 
helping the rapprochement between academics and practitioners. Perhaps this 
is because he comes across as, at best, somewhat pedantic, at worst, high-
handed – dismissive of theatre, roundly critical of the director’s 
straightforwardness, dogmatically pursuing an agenda Jackson describes as 
‘neo-Platonic’.23  
 
What is Austin even doing here, in this, the paradigmatically awkward scene of 
the specifically, situatedly North American emergence of performance studies? 
As Jackson’s study usefully reminds us, the set of practices known as 
‘performance’ originated in the United States, and more specifically in New 
York, in the 1960s.  
 
This is, as Jackson acknowledges, a necessarily reductive ‘origin story’. As 
such it is simplified through re-telling, and centers on a few memorable and 
supposedly pivotal moments and characters: Richard Schechner making his 
iconoclastic pronouncement about a string quartet; Michael Fried in a dimly-lit 
room, getting disconcerted by a sculpture. Jackson quotes Peggy Phelan’s wry 
assessment of the Schechnerian origin story, the one that centers on his 
interactions with anthropologist Victor Turner, as an intriguing moment in which 
‘two men gave birth’.24 In light of this (and again, with a degree of license), we 
might think of the ‘origin story’ of performativity as one in which one man, J.L. 
Austin, ‘gave birth’. Jackson implies Austin can be cast as the 'originator' not 
only of performativity, but of 'the theatre/performativity conundrum', the one that 
generates much of the awkwardness she identifies as inherent to the 
emergence of performance – as both discourse and discipline – in the United 
States since the 1960s (if we take this seriously, we might even begin to think 
Austin gave birth to a monster).  
 
All this bizarre talk of birth is a reminder that the idea of ‘origin’, or indeed of an 
‘originator’ – of a term, idea, concept – is tricky, but nevertheless stubborn. It 
might be said that a key element of the project of deconstruction and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jackson, p. 3.  
24 Jackson, p. 8 
	   53	  
poststructuralist thought is precisely to debunk these origin myths. A key 
element of Jackson’s project in Professing Performance is working-through of 
the implications of this intellectual lineage, these ‘masculinist origin stories’ for 
performance and theatre studies.25 By drawing attention to specific exchanges 
in various rooms, the odd feelings that go along with them, what Jackson is 
doing is offering a decentered, heterogeneous narrative of the discipline and its 
discourse. The risk of it is that it reifies these scenes as new ‘origin moments’ – 
minor ones, dispersed ones, but origin moments all the same: performance and 
theatre studies as a series of little performances, vividly felt, sometimes 
contradictory, but so tempting, in the re-telling, to link together into a cause-
effect narrative. And, as we know, theatre is itself concerned with stories. 
Perhaps this is the methodological paradox of trying to do poststructuralist work 
in performance and theatre studies: as scholars and makers of performance, we 
may well have a powerful inclination towards, or indeed a professional interest 
in, the belief that the most important moments involve bodies doing things in 
rooms, and we like telling stories about them. But theory has taught us to be 
skeptical of a yearning for encounter, for originary moments, for unmediated 
presence. 
 
Having acknowledged the possible hazard, or pleasure, of this paradox, I hope 
in this chapter to offer some unexpected ways of working with it. In so doing, I 
will argue that although Austin’s status as ‘originator’ of performativity is 
generally accepted, by accepting it with little more than a dutiful nod, we are 
missing something crucial about a philosopher whose work incessantly 
questioned, and invited questions as to, its own entitlement, its own 
philosophical authority. And, crucially, that Austin’s work staged this questioning 
with and through the (speaking, professing) figure of J.L. Austin himself. 
 
 
2. Reading and not reading  
 
Given the subsequent broad critical currency of the term 'performativity', it tends 
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to be thought of as a concept that has overreached – if not entirely transcended 
– the intellectual, disciplinary and socio-historical context in which it was 
developed. But what happens if we furnish the ‘origin myth’, such as it is, of 
Austinian performativity with a little more detail? In particular, what might be of 
interest in the fact that its ‘foundational text’ was originally spoken, that is, 
performed, as a series of lectures? 
 
J.L. Austin delivered the twelve lectures that would later be published as How to 
Do Things With Words at Harvard University in 1955. His thoughts on this topic 
had been developed in the preceding years, for a course called ‘Words and 
Deeds’ that Austin taught at Oxford University, where he held the chair of 
Whites Professor of Moral Philosophy between 1952 and his death in 1960. A 
philosopher who ‘wrote little and published less’, much of Austin’s influence 
within his lifetime was ‘through teaching and other forms of small-scale 
engagement with philosophers’.26 How to Do Things With Words records what 
was probably one of Austin’s biggest gigs – at Harvard, delivering the latest in 
the series of prestigious William James lectures. The text was reconstructed 
from Austin’s own notes and those made by the students who attended his 
lectures, and published two years after his death in 1962. 
 
According to several accounts, Austin’s appearance at Harvard was far from 
warmly received. Although his first lecture drew a substantial audience, the last 
was attended by ‘a core of some twelve to fifteen souls’ and ‘not all of these few 
were happy’.27 Paul de Man, then a junior fellow at Harvard, is said to have 
offhandedly remarked that ‘a somewhat odd and quirky Oxford don was giving a 
series of dull and fairly inscrutable lectures’.28  In light of this, we might reflect 
on the disciplinary problems, impasses, and crises that Jackson tacitly attributes 
to Austin himself. How we might begin to appreciate the inevitable 
mistranslations and misappropriations that must attend any ‘influential’ scholarly 
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performance? And when I write ‘appreciate’ I mean it both in the sense of 
‘acknowledge’ and ‘enjoy’. This is to ask: what if Austin’s oddness and his 
quirkiness were, rather than obstacles to a fuller understanding of his work, 
actually the key to it? Recall, it is Austin's apparent dismissal of the theatrical 
utterance as 'non-serious' that rankles with Jackson, who is out to highlight anti-
theatrical prejudice as it inheres within the discipline of theatre and performance 
studies. However, when it is spoken and when it is being applied to speech, this 
word, ‘serious’, and its various prefixes and suffixes brings with a slew of 
contradictions: ‘Seriously?’ ‘I’m serious!’ ‘Are you serious?’ ‘We take this matter 
seriously’. It is my contention that this word ‘serious’ is bound up in 
contradictory ways with the possibility that one’s speech, one’s intention in 
speaking, will be misunderstood. In light of this, I argue that a reappraisal of 
Austin’s philosophical performance – including his ‘manner of speaking’ – is a 
promising way of re-approaching the conundrum that his work represents for 
performance scholars.  
 
What kind of claim am I making here? Am I to argue that Jackson has 
misunderstood Austin? That she has misread, or failed to thoroughly or 
adequately read Austin’s work? No. In order to overcome the supposed 
‘conceptual opposition’ between theatre and performativity, I do not propose to 
‘correct’ Jackson’s, or anyone else’s, reading of Austin’s work. Rather, my effort 
in this chapter has, increasingly, emerged as that of questioning the way we 
read (or, as it may be, fail to read) so-called ‘theoretical’ texts, perhaps 
especially those that have canonical or foundational status. More specifically, 
my work in the pages that follow consists in challenging the way theorist-
authors are figured by the scholarly ‘Readings’ that remain central to the 
professional practice of academia in the humanities. Rather than offer a re-
Reading (big R, noun) of Austin that would renew and strengthen his place in 
the origin story of performativity, my aim here is to demonstrate how reading 
Austin (small r, verb) – and more specifically, reading Austin with pleasure – 
reveals performativity to be a concept, a way of doing things, that destabilizes 
the ground that supports both origin stories and theoretical concepts.  
 
In this chapter, then, I hope to both test out and make the case for a 
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methodology of reading that might best be described as reading with pleasure, 
and most specifically reading Austin with pleasure. In so doing, I am responding 
to the provocation and the invitation I find in the work of Shoshana Felman, and 
particularly in her book The Scandal of the Speaking Body. Originally published 
in French in 1980, when she was teaching French and Comparative Literature 
at Yale University,29 Felman’s reading of Austin goes against the grain of both 
speech-act theory and the Derridean, deconstructionist treatment of 
performativity. As Stanley Cavell writes, in his Foreword to the 2002 edition, 
Felman’s text ‘has never found the full radius of readers it assumes and 
deserves’ due to certain ‘disciplinary points of resistance’:30 Felman situates her 
encounter with Austin at the convergence of philosophy, linguistics, literary 
theory and psychoanalysis. In a reading that is bold, playful and, to adopt a 
favourite term of Felman's, 'scandalous' (or, in Cavell’s words, 'philosophically 
strictly impertinent'31), Felman reads Austin ‘with’ the dramatic (or ‘mythical’) 
character of Don Juan, the arch seducer of Molière’s seventeenth-century play. 
That is not to say that she offers a straightforwardly 'Austinian' reading of a work 
of literature. It might rather be observed that Felman offers a Don Juanian 
reading of Austin's theoretical writing, and of Austin himself, who she refers to 
repeatedly as a 'Don Juan figure'.  
 
Felman's work in this book has formed a departure point for my own reading, 
rather than a script for it. Indeed, her recurrent references to Don Juan and her 
admission that ‘I had better declare at once that I am seduced by Austin’32 
were, initially, elements of her reading that I strongly resisted. I did not, after all, 
wish to be ‘seduced’ by the man who ‘gave birth’ to performativity. However, I 
was (and remain) intrigued, and persuaded, by Felman’s further declaration 
that: 
 
I like not only the openness that I find in [Austin’s] theory, but the theory’s 
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potential for scandal; I like not only what he says, but what he ‘does with 
words.’ And it is the import of this doing (as distinct from the saying, from 
the simple theoretical statement) that I want now to articulate. After 
having done things with what he says, I shall try to say what he does. To 
say what he does with what he says...33 
  
I do not intend to merely repeat, paraphrase or report upon Felman’s reading. 
Instead, I take it as a provocation, an example. In so doing, I draw on Felman’s 
example as a reader, a reader of male writers considered ‘foundational’ with 
relation to influential theories and discourses, who have taken their place within 
those masculinist origin stories. Felman is a woman reader who acknowledges 
her own act of reading as both embodied and positioned, but not foreclosed by 
either of those things. Felman lays out this ‘ethics of interpretation’ in what is 
arguably her most influential book, What Does a Woman Want? Here she 
describes her effort in terms of ‘the priority of practice’. She advocates 'being 
careful never to foreclose or to determine in advance the reading process', 
either by the imperative to be critical, the impulse to resist the ideological 
operations of the text, or to get from the text the affirmation of a theory one 
already holds. For is not reading powerful precisely because it is ‘a rather risky 
business whose outcome and full consequences can never be known in 
advance’? For Felman, the possibility of reading inheres in ‘the one risk that, 
precisely, cannot be resisted: that of finding in the text something one does not 
expect’, which has to do with the 'never quite predictable potential of surprise'. 34  
 
Felman thus invites/incites me to lay myself open to the potential surprise of 
reading, to approach it as a practice whose outcome is not foreclosed – either 
by the canonical status of the text or the critical status of the author, by 
influential ‘readings’ by other scholars, or even by my own impulse to overturn 
those readings. Working under this aim, I will argue that overcoming the sense 
that Austin is a problem for performance studies (i.e. that theatrical performance 
was a problem Austin was not willing to address) requires a challenge to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Felman, p. 48. 
34 Shoshana Felman, What Does A Woman Want?: Reading and Sexual Difference (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 5-6. 
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way theory and practice are habitually delineated – both within performance 
studies and more generally. My undertaking here is to demonstrate the risk that 
the pleasure of reading brings is that it destabilizes the ‘ground’ on which 
performativity is claimed to be either a technical linguistic, or a properly 
‘theoretical’ concept. Thus I consider what Austin’s famous explication of 
performativity is doing, as distinct from what it is saying, from its (supposedly) 
simple theoretical statement. More broadly, I argue against the idea of a ‘correct 
Reading’, one that aims to extract a technical result, as that which denies the 
pleasures and peculiarities of reading as a time-bound, embodied process.  
 
 
3. Austin’s impasse 
 
In this section, I will trace the main moments in the critical reception of Austin’s 
work, and delineate the various ways in which these responses make it feel 
possible, or preferable, to avoid reading Austin – or at least avoid the risk of 
reading Austin for pleasure. My overarching aim in this section is to show how 
various influential interpretations of Austin’s work cause problems for 
performance studies, and demonstrate how approaches that reinforce a division 
between ‘practice’ and ‘theory’ are particularly unhelpful for performance 
studies as it approaches the question of speech.  
 
As I have already indicated, the lectures later published as How to Do Things 
With Words were developed, originally, for a course called 'Words and Deeds’ 
that Austin taught at Oxford. Austin had been cultivating an approach that had 
been identified as 'ordinary language philosophy', which can be understood as 
motivated by a distaste for the lofty idealism of logical positivism, which for 
some time had been the dominant movement in Anglophone philosophy. 
However, Austin makes only an oblique reference to the philosophical backdrop 
of his work in the first lecture of How to Do Things With Words, when he 
describes what he is about to do as part of a ‘recent movement towards 
questioning an age-old assumption in philosophy’, the assumption being that ‘to 
say something… is always and simply to state something… at least in all cases 
	   59	  
worth considering’.35 This ‘age-old assumption’ was certainly perpetuated and 
enforced by logical positivism, which confidently proclaimed ‘the nonsense, or 
meaninglessness, of “value judgments” (utterances it held to be strictly 
meaningless because neither true nor false)’.36  
 
At the outset, then, Austin gathers a handful of examples – instances that, he 
asserts, cannot be judged on the basis of truth or falsity, but that could by no 
means be called nonsense. ‘I promise…’, ‘I bequeath…’, ‘I bet…’, ‘I name this 
ship…’, ‘I sentence you…’, and perhaps most famously: ‘“I do” (take this woman 
to be my lawful wedded wife), as uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony.’ 
Austin points out that ‘in saying these words we are doing something – namely, 
marrying, rather than reporting something, namely that we are marrying.' (13). 
He names this category of utterances that are not statements ‘performative’, 
commenting that this name is derived, ‘of course, from “perform” the usual verb 
with the noun “action”: it indicates that the issuing of an utterance is the 
performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something' 
(6). At this early stage he identifies the performative, in contrast to what he calls 
‘constative’ – statements that can be and customarily are judged on the basis of 
their correspondence to reality. 
 
Two features of Austin’s mode of theorizing are worth noting at this point. 
Firstly, he sets about undercutting philosophy’s ‘age-old assumption’ by 
example rather than argument. As I will go on to demonstrate, the exemplary, 
the saying of examples, is of central importance to what it is that Austin is doing 
with words. Secondly, Austin freely acknowledges that his ‘isolation of the 
performative’ is merely ‘provisional’, and ‘subject to revision in the light of later 
sections’ (4). And indeed, when he sets out to find a linguistic or grammatical 
criterion by which the performative/constative division might be guaranteed, his 
theorizing, by his own admission, reaches an ‘impasse’ (59). There are 
grammatical criteria that seem promising – for example, many of the most 
explicit or obvious examples of performative utterances feature a verb in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Austin, How to Do Things With Words, p. 12. Subsequent references to this edition will 
appear parenthetically within the text.  
36 Cavell, ‘Foreword to The Scandal of the Speaking Body’, p. xviii.  
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first-person present indicative active mood (“I promise…”, “I bet…”). However, it 
is possible to identify numerous exemplary utterances that perform actions 
without the need of such a verb: as Austin points out, in practice, an utterance 
like ‘Go away!’ does the same job as the performative ‘I order you to leave’. 
And, according to that logic, many supposedly ‘constative’ utterances, 
statements of ‘fact’ – such as ‘there is a bull in the field’ – in practice, do the 
same job as performative utterances. ‘There is a bull in the field’ might function 
as a warning, and as such imply the elided performative verb: ‘[I warn you that] 
there is a bull in the field’. For that matter, even a statement could be thought of 
as implying a performative verb: ‘I inform you that…’, ‘I state that…’. As soon as 
we acknowledge the possibility of these elided performative verbs, it becomes 
very difficult to maintain a clear boundary between speech in its performative 
and its constative function. Having thus failed to find ‘any single simple criterion 
of grammar and vocabulary’ to guarantee the distinction between performative 
and constative (59), Austin surmises that, when we ‘loosen up our ideas of truth 
and falsity’, there is not, in fact, a very clear distinction between performative 
utterances and other supposedly ‘constative’ statements, which are ‘speech 
acts no less than all these other speech acts that we have been mentioning and 
talking about as performative’ (249). And so, in his fifth lecture, Austin 
abandons the performative/constative binary, declaring it untenable. What he 
proposes instead is a general theory of performativity: speech as such is 
comprised precisely of acts, rather than statements. On this basis, it might be 
said that across the first four lectures, Austin proceeds to demonstrate, via slow, 
meticulous steps, the non-viability of his initial theoretical distinction, that 
between performative and constative utterances. It is in the fifth lecture that his 
theorizing, by his own admission, reaches the ‘impasse’ (59), whereupon he 
reflects, ‘I must explain again that we are floundering here. To feel the firm 
ground of prejudice slipping away is exhilarating, but it brings its revenges’ (61). 
 
The most influential responses to Austin can be differentiated by their 
understanding of this self-declared 'impasse', which Austin equates, at least on 
a metaphorical level, with a loss of firm ground. Firstly, to a number of 
prominent American philosophers of language – most notably Searle but also 
H.P. Grice and Jerold J. Katz – Austin’s theory remains promising in spite of 
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what they consider to be the flaws of his taxonomic work. In broad terms, such 
thinkers consider Austin’s failures to arise from his tendency to undermine his 
own findings by amassing counter-examples, and displaying attentiveness to 
the anomalous that borders on the excessive. Such theorists consider 
themselves as Austin ‘inheritors’ and as such have a responsibility to improve 
his work, or as Katz puts it in the title of a chapter, ‘save Austin from Austin’,37 
by reinstating the constative/performative distinction. For many speech-act 
theorists, this has also entailed working with Austin’s exclusion of so-called 
‘fictional utterances’, and attempting to ‘complete’ his work by determining the 
logical status of such utterances. This project involves both correction and 
extension of the taxonomic work Austin began. For these theorists, the 
performative is useful inasmuch as it offers a basis for linguistic analysis, and so 
they set about firming up the distinctions that ground it.  
 
For Derrida, in his influential response to Austin in ‘Signature Event Context’ 
(1977), Austin's failure to find ‘any single simple criterion’ to demarcate a 
performative utterance is no accident. As already noted, Derrida’s response 
could be caricatured as: ‘But the only really interesting part of it is how all 
language is performative’. Beyond this, however, Derrida reads in Austin’s work 
a deliberate and welcome challenge to what he calls 'linguisticism': ‘I should say 
that it is this critique of linguisticism and of the authority of the code, a critique 
based on an analysis of language, that most interested and convinced me in 
Austin’s undertaking’.38 He praises Austin’s analysis as ‘patient, open, 
aporetical, in constant transformation, often more fruitful in the 
acknowledgement of its impasses than its positions’.39 However, Derrida’s 
influential reading of Austin’s work is more famous as a critical deconstruction of 
what he reads as the latter’s dogmatic adherence to a metaphysics of 
presence. Derrida charges Austin with promoting a theory of speech that 
requires the conscious intention of the speaking subject, present for the 
duration of the utterance. Potentially undermining instances of language use, 
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Force (New York: Cromwell, 1977).  
38Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 19. 
39 Derrida, p. 14. 
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those that lack the authorizing presence of conscious intention, Austin excludes 
as ‘non-serious’. For Derrida, Austin thus perpetuates Western intellectual 
history’s centuries-old privileging of speech over writing. 
 
If Austin’s critical legacy is customarily talked about in dualistic terms, this is in 
large part because, in the late 1970s, Derrida’s reading of Austin sparked a 
vigorous public disagreement with Searle. As a result of their heated 
exchanges, which represent ‘one of the most notorious spats of recent critical 
times’,40 Austin’s work became the object of a bitter disagreement about two 
opposing or (supposedly) mutually incompatible styles of thought – Continental 
versus Analytical, French versus Anglo-American, linguistic philosophy versus 
so-called ‘Theory’.41 In her 2002 book Touching Feeling, Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick suggests that a full appreciation of Austin’s concept of performativity 
requires a step to the side of not only the Searle/Derrida spat, but also the 
broad anti-essentialist account of performativity so powerfully developed by 
Judith Butler and others. In one sense, Derrida's and Butler’s performativities 
can be cast in opposition to the ‘hypostatized grammatical taxonomies’ of 
Searle et al.’s ‘positivistic uses’ of Austin’s theory. However, as I will 
demonstrate in the following section, Derrida’s deconstruction of Austin requires 
the latter’s syntactic taxonomies’ to persist as ‘reductively essentializing’, when 
they were originally ‘both productive and playful’. Furthermore, the fact that ‘the 
move from some language to all language seems required by the anti-
essentialist project’ means that such accounts necessarily miss the nuances of 
‘particular bits of language’, and the particularity and peculiarity of what Austin 
was himself doing with words. Sedgwick’s suggestion of a ‘step to the side of 
the deconstructive project’42 has opened up a space for my own efforts to listen 
for the nuances of what Austin had to say about theatre. In the pages that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Loxley, Performativity, p. 1. As Loxley recounts, this disagreement was played out across the 
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follow, I will listen to Austin, closely, and – as the chapter moves to its 
conclusion – tune in particularly to the odd and almost universally overlooked 
things he did with the example and metaphor of the theatrical utterance. 
 
 
4. Derrida’s Austin – avoiding the ditch  
 
Austin’s most oft-repeated comments on the theatrical utterance occur during 
the second lecture reprinted in How To Do Things With Words: 
 
I mean, for example, the following: a performative utterance will, for 
example, be in a peculiar way hollow and void if said by an actor on the 
stage, or if introduced in a poem or spoken in a soliloquy. […] Language 
in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use … (22) 
 
These comments are often read as an extension of the following, from the first 
lecture, when Austin is reflecting on how ‘simply’ saying the words ‘I promise…’ 
could be thought to enact the act of promising: 
 
Surely the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken 
‘seriously’. This is, though vague, true enough in general – it is an 
important commonplace in discussing the purport of any utterance 
whatsoever. I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem. (9) 
 
In both of the above citations, the question of speaking, or using language 
‘seriously’, appears to be the subject of fairly hurried acknowledgement on 
Austin’s part, one that is accompanied by a brief, perhaps cursory, list of 
examples – in the first: the speech of an actor onstage, a poem, a spoken 
soliloquy; in the second: joking and writing a poem. On the basis of these 
examples, it has been accepted that, in effect, Austin established the non-
serious as a broad ‘category’, the paradigmatic examples of which were written 
poetry, theatrical performance, and joking. Indeed, in spite of their differences, 
both ‘sides’ of the Austin debate accept that Austin drew a central and defining 
distinction of this kind between 'speaking seriously' (a primary utterance, 
spoken in 'normal circumstances') and utterances that can be considered ‘non-
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serious’, of which the theatrical utterance remains (merely) the handiest 
example. In the Austin-Derrida-Searle-Derrida exchanges, the theatrical 
utterance is invoked, in passing, as an example of what is not being discussed, 
then of what is problematically excluded, and then of what is wrongly included 
in a list of what is problematically excluded.  
 
But what of joking? If Austin is excluding theatre from his enquiry, it follows that 
he must also be excluding joking. And this seems like an odd thing for Austin, a 
philosopher committed to an examination of the kind language people use in 
ordinary circumstances, to do. For, although certain kinds of set-piece jokes 
might seem to share qualities, in the delivery, with a dramatic soliloquy or 
indeed the recital of a poem, there is another, vaguer and more dispersed kind 
of joking that can overtake everyday, conversational speech. Indeed, the thing 
with joking is that you might not be able to tell, at least at the time, whether or 
not something is a joke. Someone might say something apparently serious only 
to claim, after the fact, to have been ‘only joking!’. And then, of course, there is 
the problem of whether or not we believe them. The cry of ‘only joking!’ might 
be uttered with suave knowingness. Or it might be garbled hurriedly, in 
panicked mitigation: ‘I didn’t mean it! It was just a joke!’ Does Austin mean to 
exclude all of these instances of language use from his study?  
 
Further to this confusion, there is another terminological oddity that attends the 
supposed ‘category’ of the non-serious, one that might well be a sticking point 
for directors and dramaturgs and performance academics alike: how is it that 
soliloquies (so often tragic) and jokes or joking (so often, we hope, comic) have 
both fallen into the category of the ‘non-serious’? We’re caught here between 
the theatrical genre of tragedy and the everyday, dispersed instances of 
lightheartedness, sarcasm, mockery or – more dangerous – uncertain intention. 
A number of Austin’s ‘inheritors’, most notably Searle, have attempted to 
resolve this problem by developing a speech-act theory of the ‘fictional’ or 
‘literary’ utterance.43  
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However, under Felman’s influence, I argue that what this problem requires is 
not a logic-based theory of fictional utterance, but rather, a rethinking of the 
central – and disruptive – role of joking in Austin’s own theory. For, as Felman 
argues:  
 
not only the eminently critical ‘continental’ reception but also the eminently 
admiring and accepting Anglo-Saxon one […] have failed to grasp the 
purport of his humorous performance.44  
 
When Austin’s own predilection for joking, his own non-seriousness, is taken 
into account, it becomes possible to propose that when Austin made his 
comments about ‘speaking seriously’, he was not, himself, speaking entirely 
seriously. This proposition, although it may at first appear to be flippant, a 
question of Austin’s style rather than the substance of his theory, in fact – as I 
shall demonstrate – has far-reaching epistemological implications, which, as we 
shall see, take a fair bit of working through. At the far side of this work lies the 
possibility for rethinking the relationship between the theatrical and the 
performative. First of all, though, it is necessary to examine the finer points of 
the supposed serious/non-serious distinction as it emerges, and becomes 
established, within Derrida’s influential deconstruction of Austin.  
 
 
5. ‘Signature Event Context’ (Derrida takes Austin seriously) 
 
It is largely on the basis of certain passages from Austin’s second lecture that it 
has been possible to accuse him of excluding the theatrical utterance as 
secondary, parasitical and non-serious. In ‘Signature Event Context’, Derrida 
focuses in particular on the passage that contains Austin’s now-famous 
references to the theatrical utterance as a ‘hollow and void’ example of 
language used ‘not seriously’, but ‘parasitic upon its normal use’. Derrida reads 
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Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 65. For further examples of speech act theories of 
literature, see David Fishelov, Metaphors of Genre: The Role of Analogies in Genre Theory 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 119-153.  
44 Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body, p. 96, emphasis added.  
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the passage in question as the second of two gestures of exclusion by which 
Austin demarcates his scheme for the ‘smooth’ or ‘happy’ functioning of a 
performative (14). It is necessary to gain a sense of what is included in scheme 
in order to understand the full import Derrida draws from Austin’s subsequent 
exclusions. I will therefore briefly summarize this key part of the lecture before 
moving onto what Derrida might describe as ‘the offending paragraph’. 
 
In his scheme, Austin tabulates the ‘appropriate circumstances’ necessary for 
an explicit performative, such as a marriage ceremony, to successfully carry out 
its action. He divides these criteria into two major classes: (A.1) to (B.2) are 
contextual factors such as ‘(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances must 
be appropriate’; ‘(B.1) the procedure must be executed… both correctly and 
(B.2) completely’. Then, labeled with the Greek letter (Γ), are two further 
conditions relating to ‘thoughts, feelings and intentions’ that the participants in 
certain performative procedures ‘must in fact have’ (15). Austin acknowledges 
that there is considerable difference between the two kinds of criteria, which is 
signaled by his use of both Roman and Greek letters. Via a footnote, Austin 
also signals that the complications arising from his inclusion of thoughts, 
feelings and intentions will be considered forthwith (‘It will be explained later 
why the having of thoughts, feelings and intentions is not included as just one 
among other “circumstances” already dealt with’). For Derrida, however, this 
offers evidence enough that Austin is reaching toward ‘an exhaustively 
definable context… the teleological jurisdiction of an entire field whose 
organizing center remains intention’.45  
 
In Derrida’s analysis, Austin’s reliance on the organizing presence of a 
conscious intention is compounded by what follows: having established the 
scheme (which is, characteristically, emphasized as ‘provisional’), Austin asks 
'how complete is this classification?' (18). He then goes into detail about what 
he is not including in his considerations – factors that would automatically 
render an explicit performative (such as a promise or vow of marriage) 
ineffectual, doubtful or void. Firstly, he acknowledges that, as actions, like all 
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actions, performatives can be rendered ‘unsatisfactory’ by 'factors reducing or 
abrogating the agent's responsibility': 
 
I mean that actions in general (not all) are liable, for example, to be done 
under duress, or by accident, or owing to this or that variety of mistake, 
say, or otherwise unintentionally… (21) 
 
Having acknowledged this possibility, Austin clarifies: ‘we are not including this 
kind of unhappiness’ (21). This is what Derrida names as ‘the first exclusion’. 
Emphasizing the recurrence of intention as the authorizing criterion of the 
performative, Derrida’s essay then moves on to consider what he now calls ‘the 
second case of this exclusion’,46 and cites the following passage from Austin in 
full: 
 
(ii) Secondly, as utterances our performatives are also heir to certain 
other kinds of ill which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though 
again they can be brought into a more general account, we are 
deliberately at present excluding. I mean, for example, the following: a 
performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or 
void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or 
spoken in a soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every 
utterance – a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such 
circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not seriously, but in 
ways parasitic upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine 
of the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from 
consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be 
understood as issued in ordinary circumstances (21-22).47  
 
In his analysis of this passage, Derrida draws attention not only to Austin’s 
gesture of exclusion, but also to the vocabulary Austin uses to characterize that 
which he is excluding, by pulling out the following words: the ‘non-serious’, 
‘parasitism’, ‘etiolation’, ‘the non-ordinary’. The connotations of these 
descriptors are, for Derrida, telling. With the phrase ‘the etiolations of language’, 
Austin reveals his privileging of co-called ‘serious’ speech. The unusual word, 
‘etiolated’, originally a botanical term, connotes a plant that is ‘pale and weak 
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due to lack of light’. In its more generalized usage it means ‘having lost vigour 
or substance; feeble’.48 Derrida flags this word; for him, Austin’s usage of it 
appears to suggest that he thinks of serious utterance as, effectively, 
invigorated by ‘a free consciousness present to the totality of the operation’.49 
Serious speech is thus ‘full’ of intention, unlike non-serious utterances that 
Austin describes as ‘hollow and void’. Going further, he accuses non-serious 
speech of being ‘parasitic’. This implies that not only does he consider non-
serious utterances as reliant upon serious ones, but that he somehow 
disapproves of them. When he describes non-seriousness as a kind of ‘ill that 
can infect all utterances’ it appears that he can’t help but denigrate it, as if it 
were a disease threatening the normal, healthy practices of speech. At worst, it 
appears that which Austin finds it necessary to exclude non-serious utterances 
in order to maintain the purity of his definition of the successful performative.  
 
In Derrida’s analysis, then, the terms ‘serious’ and ‘non-serious’ become 
attached to a very loaded set of values, which are revealed by the tropisms by 
which Austin models his concept. According to Derrida’s reading, what Austin is 
excluding, when he rules out the ‘non-serious’, ‘parasitism’, ‘etiolation’, ‘the non-
ordinary’, is ‘the general theory’ that would account for all of these supposed 
abnormalities – ‘the possibility for every performative utterance (and a priori 
every other utterance) to be “quoted”’.50 The general theory that would account 
for the possibility that every utterance can be quoted is, precisely, Derrida’s 
theory of ‘general citationality, – or rather a general iterability’. What Austin 
attempts to dismiss as a parasite is in fact the normal condition of language use 
– there is no ‘vigorous host’, no pure originary moment of utterance. In what 
may be the decisive move of his argument, Derrida asks: 
 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 
‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce 
in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or marriage were not identifiable 
in some way as a ‘citation’?51 
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Thus, what Austin seeks to exclude as an anomaly, as that which would render 
the performative ‘void’ – i.e. the possibility that it can be 'quoted' – is in fact ‘the 
internal and positive condition of its possibility’. Derrida argues that these 
relatively specific or explicit performatives are ‘determined modification[s]’ of 
this general citationality or iterability ‘without which there would not even be a 
“successful” performative’.52 
 
To give a sense of just how persuasive Derrida can be, here is a nice quote 
about a ditch: 
 
Is this general possibility necessarily one of failure or trap into which 
language may fall or lose itself as in an abyss situated outside of or in front 
of itself? […] In other words, does the quality of risk admitted by Austin 
surround language like a kind of ditch or external place of perdition which 
speech […] could never hope to leave, but which it can escape by 
remaining ‘at home,’ by and in itself, in the shelter of its essence?53 
 
Citing ‘the quality of risk admitted by Austin that he nevertheless seeks to 
exclude’, Derrida vividly caricatures Austin’s theory of language as remaining ‘at 
home’ in order to avoid falling into a ditch, an abyss of anomaly and 
abnormality, of accident and failure, that surrounds it. Derrida thus thinks that 
Austin situated the risk of failure, of that which is unintentional, as external to 
the performative (‘an external place of perdition’). He emphasizes Austin’s 
phrase ‘hollow and void’ – as if a performative lacking an authorizing intention is 
empty, and as if a failed performative is itself a kind of void, one that Austin 
equates with sheer negation, an ‘abyss into which language can fall’. Derrida 
thus understands Austin to be excluding the non-serious in a single gesture, as 
if it were an overarching category, as if he harboured a moralizing distaste for 
all that could undermine the authority of speech. For Derrida, Austin’s 
meticulousness in enumerating ‘appropriate circumstances’ was an attempt to 
demarcate an ‘exhaustively definable context’, to fix and label ‘an entire field 
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whose organizing center remains intention’.54 
 
The vivid persuasiveness of Derrida’s deconstruction of Austin, represents just 
one juncture within a broader critique of the Western intellectual tradition’s 
reliance upon a metaphysics of presence. Derrida identified a deep-rooted 
tendency to privilege the spoken over the written word, which he considered 
indicative of a metaphysical longing for 'a realm of pre-discursive being and 
immediate, unmediated encounter'.55 Within this tradition, 'the spoken word is 
given a higher value because the speaker and listener are both present to the 
utterance simultaneously'. This co-presence is assumed to produce a more 
authentic encounter, and 'seems to guarantee the notion that in the spoken 
word we know what we mean'.56 Throughout his work, Derrida aimed to 
demonstrate that writing is not a secondary derivation of speech; writing is 
denigrated because it reveals what, traditionally, philosophy has been at pains 
to ignore: the iterability of language – its ability to perform in excess of the 
intentions, and of the physical presence, of any given speaker.  
 
In ‘Signature Event Context’ Derrida rounds on what he reads as Austin’s 
dogmatic attempts to maintain the authority of speech. By ruling out threats to 
that authority as ‘accidental, exterior’, and naming them ‘non-serious’, Austin 
tries, ‘in the name of ideal regulation’,57  
 
to pass off as ordinary an ethical or teleological determination […] that he 
acknowledges elsewhere […] remains a philosophical ‘ideal’ – the 
presence to the self of a total context, the transparency of intentions, the 
presence of meaning […] to the absolutely singular uniqueness of a 
speech act, etc.58 
 
Thus Derrida’s Austin, for all the anti-essentialist promise of his central concept, 
must shore up his idealized notion of speech’s irreducible authority by drawing 
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an ontological distinction between what he calls ‘speaking seriously’ and the 
various secondary, derivative, etiolated usages that fall into the ‘non-serious’. 
And thus ends up repeating an error that is ‘typical of that philosophical tradition 
with which he would like to have so few ties’.59 
 
Against the backdrop of Derrida’s influential intellectual project, and on the 
basis of the passages from How to Do Things With Words that are reproduced 
in his essay, the distinction between serious and non-serious appears to be 
both the central organizing logic, and the gravely undermining flaw, of Austin’s 
theory. As Felman notes, Derrida’s reading is amongst those that has advanced 
the idea of Austin as a 'defender of the values of “seriousness”'.60 However, it 
seems that, for all his close attention to certain elements of Austin’s vocabulary, 
Derrida does not pause to consider the possible complicated and contradictory 
relationship Austin himself had with the word ‘serious’. 
 
What does Derrida assume Austin means by ‘serious’, and by ‘non-serious’? In 
the most straightforward sense, Derrida understands Austin’s non-serious as 
speech that lacks authorizing intention. In this sense, ‘non-serious’ connotes a 
lack of sincerity, which results (or, Austin appears to be arguing should result) in 
a lack of authority, and an utterance that is hollow, etiolated and void. There is 
an additional implication here, one that is not made explicit, but that is strongly 
implied when you read ‘Signature Event Context’ in light of Derrida’s broader 
critique of the Western intellectual tradition: Austin is saying the non-serious is 
what need not be taken seriously, that is, by philosophers – by serious people 
(and Austin’s branch of philosophy, Moral Philosophy, might well be thought of 
as an enterprise that takes itself especially seriously). However, what Derrida 
does not pause to ask is: does Austin go about his philosophizing, that is, his 
speaking, with ‘seriousness’?  
 
According to Felman, those who reproach Austin for his exclusion of the non-
serious do so ‘on the basis of the Austinian statement’. What they are failing to 
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take into account is ‘the Austinian act’.61 The dominant readings of Austin pay 
attention ‘only to what he says, not to what he does’.62 Once again, the question 
over what Austin was doing in what he was saying can be phrased in terms of 
philosophical ground. Derrida depicts Austin as attempting to protect language 
use from what he sees as a sort of unfortunate accident that can befall it: he 
models this as falling into an abyss, or (more comically) a ditch. For Felman, 
‘the very performance of the performative consists precisely in performing the 
loss of footing: it is the performance of the loss of ground’.63  
 
Crucially, although Derrida appears to acknowledge the way that Austin’s 
theorizing tends to destabilize its own ground, he does not appreciate the full 
import, or potential, of Austin’s own ‘non-seriousness’. He does not pay 
attention to what, in light of Austin’s own broader philosophical project, might be 
the import of what Austin himself does with words. To a certain extent, this is 
because Derrida reads Austin with a particular agenda. But I think it also has 
something to do with the way Derrida reads, by (famously) paying the kind of 
extremely close attention to particular paragraphs and sentences that only 
reading allows. Against this, I suggest we risk offending Derrida, and ask what 
happens if we attempt to get a sense of what Austin does with words by 
considering his lectures as lectures, that is, as embodied and situated acts of 
speech? In the following section, I will test out what happens when we attend to 
Austin’s philosophical performance as it unfolds across just one of his lectures, 
and think of this lecture as it might have been encountered as a performance. 
For this experiment, I have selected Austin’s second Harvard lecture, 
‘Conditions for Happy Performatives’, the one containing the aforementioned 
‘offending paragraph’, along with other key passages cited by Derrida. Instead 
of focusing in on those often-cited passages, attempting to refute Derrida’s 
reading and replace it with my own, I suggest we pay attention to the lesser-
known parts of the lecture. I also suggest we survey the movement of Austin’s 
thoughts across the lecture as a whole. In so doing, I will weigh the risk of re-
instating Austin’s authorial intention, his presence, as the organizing centre of 
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the text, against the opportunity of hearing out Austin’s philosophical voice in its 
texture, its quirkiness and its difficulty.  
 
 
6. Austin’s philosophical performance  
 
Austin begins his second lecture by reviewing the gains of his previous outing: 
 
We were to consider, if you remember, some cases and senses (only 
some, Heaven help us!) in which to say something is to do something; or 
in which by saying something or in saying something we are doing 
something (13).  
 
We can already hear something of Austin’s voice in that aside, encased in 
brackets ‘(only some, Heaven help us!)’, which are both an admission of 
limitation and an exclamation. He then reminds his audience of the ‘preliminary 
isolation of the performative’ that the previous lecture attempted, before offering 
the following assessment of how things stand: 
 
So far then we have merely felt the firm ground of prejudice slide away 
beneath our feet. But now how, as philosophers, are we to proceed? One 
thing we might go on to do, of course, is to take it all back: another is to 
bog, by logical states, down (13). 
 
It is unclear at this point whether he means this as a glance at what he 
perceives as philosophy’s tendency to dig its heels in, or else retreat from 
awkward propositions, or whether he is merely lampooning his own capabilities 
‘as’ a philosopher. In any case, if these are the options available to 
philosophers (or we, his audience, if we approach the problem ‘as 
philosophers’), then neither sounds very promising.  
 
In the text of the lectures, something of the manner of Austin’s speech comes 
through in the vocabulary he uses, his little colloquialisms and sayings, way he 
structures sentences, what Sedgwick calls his ‘dandified fastidious syntax’.64 
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Responses to Austin tend to keep this element of his work, as they do his wry 
asides, ‘in parenthesis’. It is indeed customary, in much academic work, to 
bracket off such quirks as inessential to the theory being expounded. However, 
I have come to the apprehension that Austin’s ‘asides’ are worth thinking about, 
in that they tend to be the moments when he slyly weighs up the merits of one 
philosophical approach against another: he talks about what he is doing, the 
way he is doing it, and the limitations he considers a necessary part of his 
project. What frequently emerges from these asides is that Austin’s humour has 
a self-subversive edge. But, I contend, in asides like this Austin is not just being 
amenably self-deprecating, or bracketably wry. Rather, it is by such means that 
he questions repeatedly and insistently his entitlement and authority to ‘say 
something’. And, as we will see, as the lecture goes on, this self-subversive 
tendency gradually overreaches its status as a mere aside.  
 
Before I continue with Austin’s lecture, I will first offer an aside of my own, 
concerning Austin’s antagonistic relationship with the philosophical movement 
known as logical positivism. In the broad terms offered by Geoffrey Warnock in 
the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the dominant Anglophone 
philosophical movement of Austin’s day is described as ‘fundamentally a theory 
of meaning, which was indeed supposed capable of settling rigorously, and in 
fairly short order, almost everything’.65 Expounding the ‘lofty, loose rhetoric of 
old-fashioned idealism’,66 logical positivism dismissed ordinary language (that 
is, language in its situated, daily usage) as an obstacle to philosophical truth, 
and considered that it was the task of the philosopher to ‘seek to find, beneath 
or behind mere surface vagueness and superfluities, the essential structure that 
– according to the theory – must be there'.67 In a reaction against this, Austin 
and those associated with so-called 'ordinary language philosophy', cultivated 
an approach characterized by ‘a deliberate abstention from the pursuit of 
generality, of wide-ranging explanations or justifications, of purportedly 
systematic examination of whole families of concepts’. For Austin in particular, 
this did not amount to a wholesale rejection of theory or theorizing – it was more 
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a matter of ‘prudently limited ambition, of not biting off more than one could 
analytically chew’.68 
 
I could go further with my effort to situate Austin in his context. I could, for 
example, cite some of the several accounts of his work that recount 
biographical details, that discuss Austin’s habits, his relationships, his style of 
speaking. Why am I, for now, resisting this? Perhaps because I want to 
continue my reading of – my encounter with – the Austin of this particular 
lecture without mooring my perception of him, his voice, his presence, to a 
biographical figuring of the man. As part of this I have surveyed, in fairly short 
order, only the most often repeated, easily digested elements of the ‘Austin 
myth’. That and a passing comment, by Cavell, as to ‘Austin’s hobby of raising 
pigs’.69 I will let the pigs prompt the question: to what extent does Austin’s 
quirkiness figure in ‘readings’ of his work? There is something a little bit quirky 
about the way Austin-the-philosopher is depicted by Warnock in the philosophy 
encyclopaedia. It seems that Warnock cannot resist characterizing Austin’s 
philosophical method using metaphors that evoke lowly, everyday activities: 
Austin is said to advocate: ‘patient spadework – walking, even plodding 
…before trying to run’.70 In contrast to luminaries of other more ambitious 
philosophical schools, Austin emerges as a solid pragmatist, one who produced 
work that was thorough, if less than thrilling. What a reader might infer from this 
is that the best thing to do is skip Austin’s ‘plodding’ exposition and cut right to 
his findings, his handy take-home concepts (and indeed, as I have argued, 
many do just that). 
 
Does the Austin of this lecture correspond with the plodding figure we find in the 
philosophy encyclopedia? Sedgwick, a committed reader of Austin, does not 
think so, and I find her characterization of Austin’s style alluring, even 
irresistible. In Touching Feeling, she attributes a certain relish, and even a 
degree of filthiness, in Austin’s philosophical voice. How to Do Things With 
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Words, she writes, ‘is inflected by the language of texture’.71 The ‘dryness’ of 
Austin’s style is beset by ‘wet’ tropisms: he might describe philosophy as having 
to ‘bog, by logical stages, down’ (13), or ‘flounder around’ (151). At the start of 
the third lecture, he comments that ‘we may seem to have two new keys in our 
hands, and, of course, simultaneously two new skids under our feet’ (25). In 
Sedgwick’s evocative terms, it is as though, for Austin, ‘the dimensions of 
true/false (for the constative) and happy/unhappy (for the performative) are 
always in danger of wiping out along the confounding axis of wet/dry’.72  
 
It is notable that Austin tends to deploy these moist tropisms at the moments 
when he is reflecting on way his philosophy is going, reflecting on the 
customary strategies of philosophy. What emerges here is a sense of both 
muckiness and loss of ground. Or perhaps, instead of and out-and-out absence 
of ground, Austin is thinking of a loosening up of its firmness, a kind of mud in 
which one might get ‘bogged down’, or slip and lose one’s footing. At this point, 
we may recall Derrida’s evocative ditch-falling metaphor, which signals his 
conviction that Austin excludes failure as an accident that befalls language. In 
this lecture, however, we are beginning to see that the ‘exclusion’ is not quite as 
clear-cut as Derrida would have it. It seems that Austin is not only interested in 
failure, that he thematised it in his language, but also that he is staging a certain 
theoretical failure on his own part. And when I write ‘staging’ I am deliberately 
invoking that word, that place, that position of being on stage – on the 
philosophical stage, on the literal stage, the podium of the lecture hall. 
Sedgwick attributes a ‘mucky consistency’ to Austin’s taxonomic work in 
particular.73 As we have seen, the perceived flaws or failures of Austin’s 
taxonomy have been a source of contention and concern for his supposed 
‘inheritors’. So, with the surprise, the feel of this mud still fresh, I will now ask: 
how does Austin go about his taxonomic work in this particular lecture, and 
what can it tell us about his philosophical practice? 
 
After reviewing the gains of his previous lecture, Austin introduces the object of 
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his enquiry: ‘Let us first at least concentrate attention on the little matter already 
mentioned in passing – this matter of the “appropriate circumstances”’ (13). As 
he explains, ‘a great many other things have to be right and go right if we are 
said to have happily brought off our action. What these are we may hope to 
discover by looking at and classifying types of case in which something goes 
wrong and the act – marrying, betting, bequeathing, christening, or what not – is 
therefore at least to some extent a failure’ (14). He thereby proposes to 
elaborate what he calls ‘the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong’, or 
‘the doctrine of the Infelicities’ (14). Next, he proposes a framework for the 
success of the performative (which, you will recall, consists of six points divided 
into two major classes – (A1) to (B2), and (Γ1-2) – relating to persons and 
circumstances, correctly executed procedures, and the presence of certain 
thoughts and feelings). Having established these positive criteria, he then 
proceeds to pay more attention to the negative possibilities: to what happens 
when various elements of these criteria are not met. As he observes, there are 
‘considerable differences between [the various] “ways” of being unhappy’ (15). 
Here it appears to get complicated; it gets technical. Austin identifies a class of 
contraventions he calls ‘misexecutions’ – misexecutions arise when the 
conditions he has labeled under (B.1) and (B.2) (‘(B.1) the procedure must be 
executed… both correctly and (B.2) completely’) are not met. He then further 
subdivides this class: ‘The Class B.1 is that of Flaws, the Class B.2 that of 
Hitches’ (17).  
 
So, we now see that flaws are quite different to hitches, and then again muffed 
executions (17) are to be distinguished from botched procedures (16). As you 
might have noticed, this is not exactly the lofty language of abstraction; and yet 
Austin treats this lowly vocabulary with a level of attention that suggests he 
takes it very seriously (I will reflect on the significance such daily inflections held 
for Austin in due course). The Austin that emerges from Derrida’s reading is one 
who sought to exclude as marginal or accidental that which he found 
threatening or inconvenient – as a kind of illness, a parasite, an anomaly. How 
then to account for the linguistic and figural relish with which Austin accounts for 
these aberrations? The second half of this lecture is full of examples of things 
going wrong. For instance, Austin imagines what might render his favourite 
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example, the marriage ceremony, unsuccessful thus: ‘if we, say, utter the 
formula incorrectly, or if, say, we are not in a position to do the act because we 
are, say, married already or it is the purser and not the captain who is 
conducting the ceremony, then the act in question, e.g. marrying, is not 
successfully performed at all, does not come off, is not achieved.’ He 
concludes, or appears to conclude, that in such cases ‘out act (marrying, &c.) is 
void or without effect’. But then, characteristically, he qualifies: ‘This does not 
mean, of course, to say that we won’t have done anything: lots of things will be 
done – we shall most interestingly have committed the act of bigamy’ (17). 
 
The cumulative effect of Austin’s tendency to amass examples, and in so doing 
to imaginatively embellish them, is that the statement he is setting out to prove 
can be all but eclipsed by them. Thinking up the various ‘ways’ that a 
performative act might go wrong requires an imaginative effort that necessarily 
tends toward the aberrant, the perverse. The things that he is, ostensibly, telling 
his audience they need to exclude, ignore, rationalize – emerge as vivid, funny, 
and pleasurable. In other words, Austin’s ‘negative’ examples are full of 
‘positive’ qualities. They are diverting in the sense of being both entertaining 
and distracting.  
 
This effect is compounded as Austin nears the end of his lecture. Having 
established his scheme, he then sets about demonstrating its limitations. He 
does so using a series of quite odd, jarring examples. Having asked ‘Are these 
cases of infelicity mutually exclusive?’, he notes ‘the answer to this is obvious’, 
adding: 
 
No, in the sense that we can go wrong in two ways at once (we can 
insincerely promise a donkey to give it a carrot)’ (23).  
 
Austin’s wry little word-picture is encased in parentheses, as if to signal to his 
(future?) readers, ‘this is a little supplement’, a joking way of demonstrating that, 
in practice, things are more complicated than the neat scheme implies.74 And 
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the donkey is only the start of it. Austin devotes the remainder of the lecture to 
demonstrating how 'the ways of going wrong’ can ‘shade into one another’ and 
‘overlap’ and the decision between them is ‘arbitrary’ in various ways’ (23). He 
demonstrates the indeterminacy of his categories with a series of illustrations 
that begin faux-seriously, but tend increasingly toward the downright silly. First, 
there is: 
 
'Suppose, for example, I see a vessel on the stocks, walk up and smash 
the bottle hung at the stem, proclaim "I name this ship the Mr. Stalin" and 
for good measure kick away the chocks: but the trouble is, I was not the 
person chosen to name it (whether or not – an additional complication – 
Mr. Stalin was the destined name; perhaps in a way it is even more of a 
shame if it was). We can all agree: 
(1) that the ship was not thereby named; 
(2) that it is an infernal shame' (23). 
 
By using numbered points in this way, Austin borrows a mechanism of 
taxonomy in order to stage what is, effectively, a punchline. We might observe 
that what seems to have broken forth in this example is Austin’s voice. Austin’s 
wry, self-deprecating voice seems to have escaped its parentheses and begun 
to infect the formal conventions of philosophical method. In what follows, the 
animals too have seem been let loose. Austin brings his lecture to a close by 
arguing that, whereas in the Mr. Stalin example, the act goes wrong because ‘I 
was not the proper person, had not the “capacity” to perform it’, in instances, 
‘where there is not even a pretense of capacity or a colourable claim to it, then 
there is no accepted conventional procedure; it is a mockery’. And Austin 
characterizes ‘mockery’ by comparing it to ‘marriage with a monkey’ (24). 
Although, he adds:  
 
one could say that part of the procedure is getting oneself appointed. 
When the saint baptized the penguins, was this void because the 
procedure of baptizing is inappropriate to be applied to penguins, or 
because there is no accepted procedure of baptizing anything except 
humans? (24) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A qualification, an aside, a little joke can be signaled by a change in the tone or pitch of the 
voice, an incline of the head, a sly sideways glance.  
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Having reflected so vividly on these matters, Austin ends by saying:  
 
I do not think that these uncertainties matter in theory, though it is 
pleasant to investigate them and in practice convenient to be ready, as 
jurists are, with the terminology to cope with them (24).  
 
Surveying this lecture as a whole, what is it that Austin is doing? On a 
theoretical level, his argumentative moves could be précised as: a) establishing 
a taxonomy he declares to be both ‘obvious’ and ‘not hard and fast’, b) 
complicating it with sub-clauses, c) elaborating a succession of qualifications 
and exceptions before d) declaring that the classificatory act is itself arbitrary, 
and e) compounding this sense of arbitrariness with bizarre and silly imagery 
before, finally, f) saying none of this matters ‘in theory’, although the 
investigation is ‘pleasant’ and the results may prove ‘convenient’ in practice, by 
providing us with ‘appropriate terminology’ to cope with ‘uncertainties’. His 
reference to ‘jurists’ here is interesting, suggesting that, ‘in practice,’ we are, in 
effect, called upon to make judgments relating to the various uncertainties that 
might surround any given speech act. 
 
On this evidence, it would be possible to read Austin as, effectively, arguing 
against himself, dismantling his own theoretical statement, excepting himself 
from the tradition or history of philosophy. Reading this lecture, I find Austin’s 
taxonomic work becomes so overcomplicated that it is near impossible to follow 
without repeat readings. Still, there is something that impresses me about the 
taxonomic work; it seems to promise some level of demystification (as Austin 
might say, a set of ‘shining new tools to crack the crib of reality’75). Thus, 
Austin’s taxonomic work both attracts and resists the will to knowledge, to 
sureness (for Austin, the shining new tools bring with them ‘shining new skids 
under our metaphysical feet’.76 
 
How might I characterize the Austin I have encountered through this reading? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 241, emphasis 
added.  
76 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 241, emphasis added.  
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Inasmuch as his scheme undoes itself precisely through its meticulous attention 
to its possible exceptions, Austin’s performance here is (to amplify Sedgwick's 
characterization) comic dandified fastidiousness.77 When, at the outset, he 
asks, ‘how are we, as philosophers, to proceed?’, he might just be referring 
casually to his self-evident status as a philosopher. Or he might be opening up 
the question of what it would mean to proceed ‘as’ a ‘Philosopher’ (posing as 
one, pretending to be one, acting as one). What kind of philosopher-figure is it 
that responds so curiously to the ‘most interesting’ occurrence of the something 
else that is done when the performative fails, or misfires, who cannot help but 
figuratively put himself right there, at the scene of transgression: ‘we shall most 
interestingly have committed the act of bigamy’; ‘suppose, for example I see a 
vessel in the stocks’. It is my sense that in this lecture, Austin dramatizes the 
predicament of the philosopher who is unable not to attend to the variability, the 
unpredictability of circumstances. What this performance might be ‘saying’ is 
that that the contingencies of reality, of practice, tend to exceed categorization, 
and so disrupt the philosopher’s attempts at taxonomy. Thus, we might propose 
that what Austin is doing through his self-subverting performance is lampooning 
the philosopher who would attempt to impose his overarching, abstract scheme 
upon reality. 
 
In this lecture, Austin both emphasizes and demonstrates the extent to which 
the categories he proposes overlap, shade into one another, leak. That which 
cannot be taxonomized with any degree of finality is the situated practice of 
speech, the contingencies and complexities of everyday speech situations 
(what Austin might call ‘normal circumstances’, what the philosophical 
encyclopedia would refer to as ‘ordinary language’, what others might say is 
‘real life’). But, at the lecture’s end, Austin’s examples become somewhat 
uncoupled from the normal, the ordinary, and the real – overtaken by donkeys, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 I have in mind here Brian Dillon’s characterization of Laurel and Hardy as ‘comic dandies’ 
marked by their ‘total concentration on the phenomenal realm’. The pair ‘take their pratfalls not 
because they are stupid, or careless, or distracted, but because they are too attentive to the 
task at hand. It’s Ollie’s fastidiousness that leads to the loss of his trousers, Stan’s extreme care 
that means he will inevitably hammer that nail into a water pipe.’ Brian Dillon, ‘Another Fine 
Mess: Theses on Slapstick’, in Objects in This Mirror: Essays (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), 
pp. 260-271 (p. 264). 
 
	   82	  
monkeys and penguins, animal-figures that, incongruously, trespass into the 
human world of ceremonial utterances.  
 
Long after the lecture is over, the donkeys, monkeys and penguins remain. How 
am I to respond to my own pleasure in these examples, my own inability to 
ignore or forget them? The animals in Austin’s examples stand out because 
they are in the wrong place. Felman apprehends a quality of philosophical 
scandal in such incursions, in Austin’s insistence on 'the triviality of the witty 
example', which it itself incongruous, marking as it does the intervention of the 
comic onto the otherwise 'homogenous plane of the theoretical stage'.78 
Austin’s incongruous animal figures do, ostensibly, have a theoretical function: 
that is, to demonstrate what is and isn't appropriate, proper, effective. Arguably, 
they overreach this function. How then to account for the enjoyment that Austin 
seems to take in these aberrations? The way his examples of things going 
wrong – and the things that he is, ostensibly, telling his audience they need to 
exclude, ignore, rationalize are, in being so funny, so vivid, all but impossible to 
exclude, to ignore?  
 
 
7. The ‘opposite’ of serious 
 
How might this apprehension of Austin’s playfulness, his faux-seriousness, his 
trivializing methodology help us to overcome – or at least, sidestep – Derrida’s 
pervasively influential critique of Austin? And how might we begin to turn this 
toward the problem of the theatre/performativity conundrum, and so help 
Jackson out at her dinner table, in her attempt to open up Austin’s work for an 
intrigued yet mildly suspicious pair of performance practitioners?  
 
The problem for Jackson and for performance studies is Austin’s apparent 
dismissal of the theatrical utterance as ‘non-serious’, as part of a broader 
‘exclusion’ of all that would threaten the authority of speech. Therefore, in order 
to get beyond Derrida’s reading it is necessary to prise open the serious/non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Felman, p. 84.  
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serious binary and ask if, for Austin, they can possibly be the totalizing, 
metaphysically opposed categories that Derrida had assumed them to be 
(indeed, that Derrida’s argument required them to be). In order to do this, it is 
necessary to put some pressure on Derrida’s assumptions about Austin’s own 
seriousness. If Derrida’s reading of Austin depends on shoring up the idea that 
Austin established the ‘non-serious’ as a category, what he is missing here is 
the possibility that Austin’s understanding of, and commitment to, that which is 
not serious (that which is trivial, entertaining, funny as well as that which is 
unintentional) is heterogeneous, complex and philosophically motivated. 
 
In ‘What Did Derrida Want of Austin’ (itself originally a lecture, reprinted 
alongside the transcript of an accompanying seminar in Philosophical 
Passages, 1995), Stanley Cavell suggests that Austin’s work can be read as a 
sustained attack on one kind of philosophical seriousness: the lofty idealism of 
logical positivism. Cavell points out that, in the context in which Austin was 
working, this style, or school, of philosophy was 'a hegemonic presence more 
complete […] than that of any one of today’s politically or intellectually 
advanced positions’; and it was ‘pervasive and dominant in the Anglo-American 
world from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s and beyond, almost throughout the 
humanities and social sciences’ and was ‘virtually unopposed on any 
intellectually organized scale’.79 Cavell recounts how Austin went after certain 
key figures and texts of this movement so relentlessly that ‘certain philosophers 
have never forgiven him for it’. 80 Austin’s trivilializing, mocking philosophical 
performance was met with outright hostility by some. Therefore, in order to 
catch a sense of what the word ‘serious’ might have carried for Austin, it is 
necessary to understand why this kind of ‘seriousness’ was a problem for him 
and what was at stake in going against it. 
 
Austin’s antagonism towards this philosophical seriousness is something 
Derrida does not acknowledge, or credit – for him Austin ended up repeating 
moves typical of this ‘philosophical tradition with which he would like to have so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Cavell, Philosophical Passages, p. 51. 
80 Cavell, pp. 71-2. Cavell refers in particular to A.J. Ayer.  
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few ties’.81 But, as Cavell argues: ‘Derrida hasn't an ear for, or patience for, 
certain dimensions of Austin, for example, for his allusiveness, his seriousness, 
his mockery of false seriousness.’82 Neither does he consider what might have 
been at stake for Austin in this problematization of philosophical seriousness. 
More straightforwardly, Cavell suspects that Derrida 'simply hadn't read certain 
texts presupposed by How to Do Things With Words'.83 How does this charge, 
of scant or partial reading, relate to Cavell’s other charge against Derrida, 
namely, that he didn’t get Austin’s jokes? Against this, how might my own 
enjoyment of Austin’s unseriousness be put to work? 
 
As we have seen, Derrida takes Austin to be excluding the ‘non-serious’, along 
with ‘parasitism’, ‘etiolation’, ‘the non-ordinary’ in a single gesture (albeit of two 
parts). However, as Cavell notes, in the passages from Austin’s text that 
Derrida cites, there is in fact ‘the exclusion (if that is the word) of two different 
theories’, each of which Austin developed elsewhere. Therefore, when Austin 
says he is ‘"excluding" the theories from his discussion, the obvious sense is 
that they are simply not being rehearsed in this place'.84 The first of these 
theories considers performatives as actions; the second considers them as 
utterances. Austin acknowledges that as utterances, what performatives share 
with all utterances is indeed the possibility for non-serious uses, including those 
‘parasitic’ quotations and recitations, on stages and in poems. In his second 
lecture, Austin acknowledges that although this ‘might be brought into a more 
general account’, it is a possibility ‘we are deliberately at present excluding’ 
(22). This is a theory Austin does indeed develop in a text named 'Pretending'. 
By its title alone, this text would appear to be a promising line of enquiry for a 
performance scholar; it is, however, by Austin’s own admission, one of his least 
significant contributions to philosophy, and one I am for the moment leaving 
aside. A more productive line of enquiry, although one that requires a little more 
work to glean its relevance for performance studies, is that concerning the first 
of Austin’s theories – the one that deals with what Austin calls the ‘extenuating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Derrida, p. 15. 
82 Cavell, p. 70, emphasis added. 
83 Cavell, p. 71.  
84 Cavell, p. 52.  
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circumstances’ that performatives, as actions, share with all actions. That is, 
Austin’s theory of excuses. Austin alludes to this theory in How to Do Things 
With Words thus: 
 
I mean that actions in general (not all) are liable, for example, to be done 
under duress, or by accident, or owing to this or that variety of mistake, 
say, or otherwise unintentionally (21).  
 
Derrida reads this as the first (and lesser) instance of a single, overarching 
gesture of exclusion. However, as Cavell observes, again, this is actually a 
different theory, one that Austin here refers to as the ‘doctrine of extenuation’, 
elsewhere the study of ‘excuses’. He comments: ‘I am not going into the 
general doctrine here… we must just remember, though, that features of this 
sort can and do constantly obtrude into any particular case we are discussing’ 
(21).  
 
As I have already intimated, this juncture of Austin’s reflections highlights an 
important tension within his work, one that Derrida does not recognize, or does 
not find relevant to his own project: that is, the tension between speech and 
body. Cavell is alert to this, and argues that the ‘speech acts’ that Austin 
considers in How to Do Things With Words as human acts, share qualities (or 
liabilities) with both utterances in general and actions in general. Since human 
actions in general, as actions of bodies, are liable to be performed involuntarily, 
by accident, automatically, or unintentionally, so too are speech acts. This 
emphasis upon uncertain intention is important, because the question of 
intentionality can in many ways be considered the pivotal point of Derrida’s 
deconstruction of Austin. In Derrida’s understanding Austin is proposing a 
theory of speech with intention as its ‘organizing centre’.85 In Derrida’s reading, 
Austin dismisses utterances that lack this authorizing intention, that are merely 
‘quoted’, as hollow, void, empty of vigour. Thus, as a result of Derrida’s reading, 
it becomes possible to equate Austin’s all-important concept of the ‘force’ of a 
performative utterance with the thrust of deliberate, directed intention.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Derrida, p. 15. The word ‘intention’ is italicized within Derrida’s own text, signaling its 
importance. 
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However, in ‘A Plea for Excuses’, 86 another lecture which, according to Cavell, 
forms one of Austin’s ‘most notable contributions to philosophy',87 Austin not 
only problematizes Derrida’s supposition as to the centrality of intention; he 
entirely displaces it. In this lecture, Austin thoroughly problematizes intention via 
his consideration of the various excuses that might be offered 'when someone 
is accused of having done something, or… when someone is said to have done 
something which is bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some of the other 
numerous possible ways untoward’.88 Working meticulously, through concrete 
examples, Austin considers the precise circumstances in which one might claim 
to have acted unintentionally, involuntarily, inadvertently, unwittingly, 
spontaneously, impulsively, absent-mindedly, carelessly, inattentively, 
tactlessly, thoughtlessly, clumsily, by accident, by mistake, etc. etc. Against the 
observation that 'the tenor of many excuses is that I did it but only in a way, not 
just flatly like that', Austin pays particular attention to how, in practice, our use of 
adverbs reveals unexpected complications and dissociations in the way we 
account for our movements and actions: 
 
I sit in my chair in the usual way - I am not in a daze or influenced by 
threats or the like; it will here not do to say either that I sat in it 
intentionally, nor yet at the same time that I sat in it automatically or from 
habit… It is bedtime, I am alone, I yawn: but I do not yawn involuntarily 
(or voluntarily!), nor yet deliberately.89 
 
Thus, Austin demonstrates, and emphasizes, that the commonest adverbs 
relating to intention are by no means used 'dichotomistically'. There is no simple 
equivalence or inversion of the kinds of actions you would describe as being 
done 'voluntarily' as those you would say you did 'involuntarily'. When we refer 
to actions, the opposite of 'voluntary' is not, in fact, ‘involuntary but rather ‘under 
constraint… duress or obligation or influence'. Equally, if we wish to describe an 
action as the inverse of 'involuntary' we would not say ‘voluntary’ but, actually, ‘I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Delivered as Austin’s presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in London in 1956. 
87 Cavell, p.53.  
88 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 176.  
89 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 190. 
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did it deliberately’ or ‘on purpose’.90 What Austin is doing here is demonstrating 
the insufficiency of structures based on grammatical logic as a means of 
categorizing human behavior. More specifically, he is showing that in spite of 
their apparent straightforwardness, there is nothing obvious about ‘negations 
and opposites’: 
 
It does not pay to assume that a word must have an opposite, or one 
opposite, whether it is a ‘positive’ word like ‘willfully’ or a ‘negative’ word 
like ‘inadvertently’. Rather, we should be asking ourselves why there is no 
use for the verb ‘advertently’. For above all, it will not do to assume that 
the ‘positive’ word must be around to wear the trousers; commonly enough 
the ‘negative’ (looking) word marks the (positive) abnormality.91  
 
One would have thought Derrida would be amenable to the ways in which 
Austin debunks (or even, it might be ventured, deconstructs) binary logic, and 
the corresponding presumptions as to positive and negative values. The 
reference to ‘(positive) abnormality’ specifically in relation to the word 
'inadvertent' is particularly significant in relation to Derrida’s comments as to the 
(positive) presence of conscious intention as the ‘organizing centre’ of Austin’s 
theory.92 However, it is at this point that I feel it necessary to take a step to the 
side of Derrida’s reading by drawing attention to Austin’s curiously, perhaps 
offhandedly anthropomorphic turn of phrase when he asserts that the positive 
word does not necessarily ‘wear the trousers’ (this term is also, of course, 
gendered – something to which I will return in the final section of this chapter). 
This seemingly offhanded, slightly eccentric tropism does not seem out of place 
in Austin’s lecture, which is full of exemplary bodies whose agency, or authority 
(the extent to which they ‘wear the trousers’ in any given situation) is doubtful.  
 
Reflecting on ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Felman comments that the ‘incongruity of 
Austin’s examples seems to institute triviality itself as a philosophy – as a 
method’.93 As Austin says of his approach to exemplification: ‘it is worth 
employing the most idiosyncratic or, sometimes, boring means to stimulate and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 191. 
91 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 192.  
92 Derrida, p. 15. 
93 Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body, p. 83. 
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to discipline our wretched imaginations’.94 He adds: 
 
By imagining cases with vividness and fullness we should be able to 
decide in which precise terms to describe, say, Miss Plimsoll's95 action in 
writing, so carefully DAIRY on her fine new book: we should be able to 
distinguish between sheer, mere, pure, and simple mistake and 
inadvertence.96  
 
It is on the basis of this lecture that Felman develops what I consider to be her 
most compelling insights, which concern the centrality of the body to Austin’s 
understanding of human action. Felman comments that, when Austin points out 
that there is no such word as ‘advertently’, he makes ‘a linguistic observation 
that seems to proceed from a psychoanalytic intuition’. As she notes, for Austin, 
‘intentionality itself […] is often studied as stemming rather from a discontinuity 
or from a break in intention. Intention, for Austin, is scarcely present to itself, 
scarcely conscious’.97 Cavell agrees, inasmuch as ‘excuses are as essentially 
implicated in Austin's view of human action as slips and over-determination are 
in Freud's’.98 Although they disagree on the extent of the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and performative theory, Cavell and Felman agree that the two 
intellectual projects have a common goal, that is, ‘the rethinking of the human 
act’.99 
 
For Austin, this begins with a meticulous journey through concrete examples 
that reveal the nuances of usage. For example, the way certain adverbs of 
justification are wholly unacceptable in certain circumstances, as in ‘Something 
in the lad's upturned face appealed to him, he threw a brick at it – 
“spontaneously”?'.100 I cannot ignore the extent to which I find such examples 
funny. I detect in them a slapstick tendency, not only in the way bodies are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Austin, p. 184. 
95 Is it a coincidence that a character by that name of Miss Plimsoll featured is Witness for the 
Prosecution, a play by Agatha Christie premiered in London’s West End in 1953, three years 
before Austin gave this lecture at the Aristotelian Society? Might we read in this allusion another 
clue that Austin was not so averse to the theatre after all? 
96 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 198. 
97 Felman, p. 70. 
98 Cavell, p. 53. 
99 Felman, p. 64, emphasis original. 
100 Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 190. 
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depicted, but in the movements of the language itself toward sudden, 
unexpected moments of impact. Whack! The seemingly harmless, mundane or 
boring example is suddenly beset with incongruous, pointless brutality. Near the 
beginning of the lecture, Austin proposes the study of excuses 'provides us with 
one means of introducing some classification into the vast miscellany of 
"actions"’.101 But his examples – unexpected bricks in the face – exceed this 
classificatory aim. What is at stake here, philosophically? What does he do with 
this slapstick violence? Cavell recounts the ‘revelatory effect’ Austin’s 1955 
Harvard lectures had on him, cementing his decision to pursue a career in 
philosophy. He reflects that ‘like any conversion experience… the effect is apt 
to seem out of proportion to anything you might think to call its cause’. There is 
evidently much at stake for Cavell in Austin’s silly examples. He asks: ‘Could it 
really be that so decisive a change in the course of my life …could have been 
brought about by Austin’s trivial, if amusing examples?’.102  
 
Cavell does not go as far as Felman in his acknowledgement of the relationship 
between Austin’s performative theory and psychoanalysis. In his view, ‘in 
contrast to Freud’s vision of the human being as a field of significance whose 
actions express a wider meaning than we might care to be questioned about, 
Austin’s vision is of the human being as a field of vulnerability whose actions 
imply wider consequences and effects and results – if narrower meaning – than 
we should have to be answerable for’.103 Cavell describes their disagreement in 
terms of the ‘interpretive morals’ each draws from Austin’s humour. For him, this 
idea of the human being as a ‘field of vulnerability’ is key; the philosophical 
stakes of Austin's work on excuses has to do with the possibility of forgiveness: 
 
What marks the limit of the excusable, justifiable, the explainable? And 
what lies beyond it? And who has the authority to draw that boundary? 
The contemplation of excuses might well lead one to surmise that the 
consequences, concomitants, up-shots, effects, results, etc. of the human 
necessity for action […] is apt to become unbearable.104  
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In ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Austin dramatizes this moral jeopardy through 
disparities of scale. His examples range, almost imperceptibly, occasionally 
discomfortingly, from the silly to the disturbing: dropping a tea tray, breaking a 
cup, knocking over the milk jug, stepping on a snail, shooting a donkey (again, 
the donkey), smashing a boy’s face in, pushing someone over a cliff. Then 
there is the altogether more upsetting real-life example of Regina vs. Finney 
case heard at Shrewsbury Assizes in 1874 concerning the fatal scalding of an 
asylum inmate in his bath, when a distracted attendant turned on the hot tap 
instead of the cold. Frequently, what the examples make manifest is the 
indeterminacy of the border between (mere, inadvertent) physical movement 
and (serious, consequence-bearing) act: 
 
I do an act A1 (say, crush a snail) inadvertently if, in the course of 
executing by means of movements of my body parts some other act A2 
(say, in walking down the public path) I fail to exercise such meticulous 
supervision over the courses of those movements as would have been 
needed to ensure that they did not bring about the untoward event (here, 
the impact on the snail).105  
 
Austin’s examples dramatize the moral indeterminacies of physical action, and 
do so repeatedly through funny disparities of scale: ‘We may plead that we trod 
on the snail inadvertently: but not on a baby – you ought to look where you are 
putting your great feet’.106 Austin’s examples in this lecture depict the body as a 
doubtful, clumsy, mysterious thing. For Cavell this is key: 
 
Excuses betoken, we might say, the incessant, unending vulnerability of 
human action, its exposure to the independence of the world and the 
preoccupation of the mind. I would like to say that it turns philosophy’s 
attention patiently and thoroughly to something philosophy would love to 
ignore – to the fact that human life is constrained to the life of the human 
body, to what Emerson calls the giant I always take with me.107  
 
It becomes apparent, then, that Austin is doing something philosophically 
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important through his examples, not in spite of but through his inclusion of 
incongruous, jarring, funny details. Indeed, Austin makes his aim in this lecture 
very explicit. He is out to unsettle ‘a vague and comforting idea in the 
background that, after all, in the last analysis, doing an action must come down 
to the making of physical movements with parts of the body’.108 He is thus 
engaged in an effort to discomfort his audience in order to stage the rethinking 
of the human act. He does this through his jarring examples – through comic 
disparity that can often be puzzling, and by highlighting how difficult it is to draw 
the line between intention and unintentional, between social and physical, 
between the material body and subjective agency: ‘If I have broken your dish or 
your romance, perhaps the best excuse I can find will be clumsiness.’109  
 
In ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Austin depicts numerous bodies whose intentions are 
not clear and singular but are multiple and conflicting. Intentions that, to borrow 
Austin's words, 'overlap' and 'shade into one another'. He enumerates the minor 
variations in the excuses we proffer when ‘flurried’, the terms by which we 
account for our action, the way we refer to things our bodies have done. In what 
I consider the most compelling insight of her response to Austin, Felman draws 
a link between his work on excuses, and his work in How to Do Things With 
Words, to reflect on how the speaking body is figured, and theorized in the 
latter. She reads Austin’s remark on breaking dishes and romances, in 
particular, as reflecting a ‘lucid view’ of what she calls ‘the inherent incongruity 
of the speaking body’.110 For Felman, ‘the problem of the human act …consists 
in the relation between language and body’. It is ‘that which problematizes at 
one and the same time the separation and the opposition between the two’.111   
 
In the ninth lecture, considering how to draw the line between the act and the 
consequences, Austin comes up repeatedly against the acknowledgement that 
'the uttering of noises' is a 'physical movement':   
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to say certain words is necessarily, in part, to make more or less 
indescribable movements with the vocal organs. So that the divorce 
between the ‘physical’ actions and acts of saying something is not in all 
ways complete – there is some connexion.112  
 
This echoes Austin’s comment, in ‘A Plea for Excuses’ that: 
 
There is indeed a vague and comforting idea in the background that, 
after all, in the last analysis, doing an action must come down to the 
making of physical movements with parts of the body; this this is about 
as true as that saying something must, in the last analysis, come down to 
the making of movements with the tongue.113  
 
Felman reads in Austin’s work a set of reflections, and demonstrations, of the 
indissoluble yet problematic relation between an act of speech and the body 
that both produces that speech and, in many cases, is the referent of that 
speech. The speaking body refers to, attempts to give an account of, its own 
movements, its own ‘complex internal machinery’. Crucially, Felman argues 
that: 
 
The act, an enigmatic and problematic production of the speaking body, 
destroys from its inception the metaphysical dichotomy between the 
domain of the ‘mental’ and the domain of the ‘physical’, breaks down the 
opposition between body and spirit, between matter and language.114 
 
 
8. The scene of the promise 
 
To breed an animal with the right to make promises – is not this the 
paradoxical problem nature has set itself with regard to man? And is it 
not man’s true problem?115 
 
It is with this citation, from Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, that 
Felman begins her book-length discussion of Austin’s work. For Felman, this 
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prompts the question: ‘In what way is the very logic of promising a sign of a 
fundamental contradiction which is precisely the contradiction of the human?’  
 
In light of this, we can identify something pertinently silly about Austin’s 
recourse to the non-human figure in How to Do Things With Words. There is 
persistence in his recourse to animals that, continuing throughout the lectures, 
can even come across as mildly belligerent: we have already encountered his 
reference to marriage with a monkey, to when the saint baptized the penguins. 
Later he will ask: ‘Can I baptize a dog, if it is admittedly rational?’ (31), and 
insist: ‘We must distinguish the cases of a clergyman baptizing the wrong baby 
with the right name … from those of saying "I baptize this infant 2704" or "I 
promise I will bash your face in" or appointing a horse as Consul' (34-5).116 
Austin’s lectures are repeatedly overtaken by what Simon Critchley, in his 
appraisal of the recurring tropes of humour in philosophy, calls ‘the sudden and 
incongruous humanity of the animal'.117  
 
Felman frames her enquiry, at the outset, under the heading ‘the promising 
animal’, asking ‘what exactly are we doing when we say “I promise”, and what 
are the consequences?’ In his foreword to Felman’s book, Cavell draws 
attention to the fact that Austin, in How to Do Things With Words, ‘identifies 
speaking as giving one’s word, as if an “I promise” implicitly lines every act of 
speech, of intelligibility, as it were a condition of speech as such’. For Austin, 
‘the act and concept of promising is not just one more among performative 
utterances’, but one that is ‘somehow privileged in Austin’s view, naming as it 
were the fact of speech itself’.118 Such is the ‘fact’ of speech; what of the scene 
of promising? As is suggested by the idea that one might ‘stand by’ what one 
says (be it bravely, honourably, or stupidly), the question of taking responsibility 
for what you say (and what you do in saying) is unavoidably a question of 
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speech and the body. And it is a question of bodily presence.  
 
If indeed a promise is the performative utterance par excellence, Felman 
argues that the promise of marriage is the promise par excellence. A ‘necessary 
link’ exists between the two: 
If every marriage is, of course, a promise, every promise is to a certain 
extent a promise of marriage – to the extent that every promise promises 
constancy above all, continuity in time between the act of commitment 
and the future action.119  
 
As Austin himself notes, in his twelfth and final Harvard lecture: ‘Any speech act 
[commits us] at least to consistency’ (154).  
 
Sedgwick writes: the ‘I do’ of the marriage ceremony is the ‘first and most 
influential, arguably the founding example of the explicit performative’.120 
Indeed, as I observed at the beginning of this chapter, the example of the 
marriage ceremony tends to offer itself as the most immediate, handiest 
recourse when one is called upon to explain Austin’s theory of performative 
utterances. Sedgwick comments that ‘fateful reliance of explicit performativity 
on the exemplary, on the single example’ can so often result, in the retelling, ‘in 
the contingency of philosophical and literary practice, the exemplarity of the 
marriage act itself’.121 For those working from queer perspectives, this is 
particularly problematic. However, Sedgwick references Felman’s book when 
she asserts that, if you pay attention to what Austin does with his examples, ‘the 
weird centrality of the marriage example for performativity in general isn’t 
exactly a sign that this train of thought is foredoomed to stultification in sexual 
orthodoxy’. And, as Sedgwick reflects, inasmuch as ‘most of the “I do”s in the 
book are offered as examples of the different ways things can go wrong with 
performative utterances’,122 a more accurate name for How to Do Things With 
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Words might have been ‘How to say (or write) I do without winding up any more 
married than you started out’.123  
 
The Christian marriage ceremony binds two people, two bodies together (‘in 
sickness and in health, ‘til death us do part’). The marriage vow is a promise to 
‘give’ one’s body to another, both in the sense of consummation and fidelity; the 
speech act promises to bring a body with it, in the future. At the very least, it is 
considered a public declaration of one's intention with regard to the union (and 
the fact that a fiancé is referred to as one’s ‘intended’ suggests that the notion 
of an intention is strongly bound up in the convention of marriage). However, 
Felman argues that, when the body is the site of unconscious drives, or as 
Austin would say, ‘mysterious internal machinery’, a marriage vow promises on 
behalf of a body that cannot know what it is doing in so speaking. This is 
Felman’s eponymous scandal of the speaking body. The scandal ‘consists in 
the fact that the act cannot know what it is doing’.124 
 
If the human body is understood as a complicated and uncertain combination of 
drives, preoccupations, physical impulses, habitual actions and unconscious 
aims, then its action in the future cannot be guaranteed by a promise. Austin 
may not explicitly argue this, but he seems to tacitly intimate it in the way that 
he refers to, represents bodies. For example, he seems to be reflecting on the 
untenability of the promising body that promises a body, the idea that a body 
might be ‘yours’ to ‘give’ when, in the third lecture, he comments that an 
infelicitous speech act might include: ‘"I give", said when it is not mine to give or 
when it is a pound of my living and non-detached flesh'.125 
 
Felman stages her reading against the fictional frame of what she calls ‘the Don 
Juan myth’, which she draws from Molière’s text,126 a work of dramatic 
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literature, a play. This becomes particularly useful, within the context of my own 
attempt to unravel a ‘theatre/performativity conundrum’, which produces a 
series of reflections on the ‘illusion’ of the act of promising. According to 
Felman, the authority and value of ‘I promise…’ relies on a ‘referential 
illusion’,127 in other words, the illusion that it refers, and refers truthfully, to an 
inner act (an act of the heart, or mind), one that is underwritten by the fullness 
of a conscious intention. However, it is not necessary that its speaker believe it 
(as Don Juan, compulsive promise-breaker, does not). Although she does not 
directly consider the implications of her theatrical example at any great length, 
Felman’s text is full of suggestions: as she observes, the meanings of the word 
‘act’ are homologous with those of the word performance in English. For 
Felman, in the context of Austin’s emphasis on the marriage vow, the sexual 
connotation of this conjunction is difficult to ignore. As she notes, ‘Sexual 
“performance”, of course, constitutes one important connotation of the word 
“performance” in English; cf. the fashionable concept of “performance 
anxiety.”’128 Felman emphasizes the sexual connotation of ‘performance’, but 
does not pursue the coincidence of the Austinian term ‘act’, as in speech act, 
and the theatrical connotation of what it is to ‘act’. 
 
Alongside these vivid and persuasive appropriations of Austin’s writing, and of 
Austin’s performance, his figure – the philosopher, the man, a ‘highly comic 
figure’129 – I wish to claim something of Austin for myself, and for Jackson and 
her director and dramaturg, sitting at their dinner table. My urgency for doing so 
is twofold. Firstly, as I have already signaled, my pleasure in his examples is not 
just a matter of passing, trivial enjoyment, but has implications for how we 
understand, talk about, and work with ‘performativity’ as not so much a 
theoretical concept, but as a way of operating. On this basis, I want to storm 
upon Jackson’s dinner table and insist ‘Austin is not what you think he is! 
Austin’s examples are not just the “I do” of the marriage ceremony!’ Secondly, I 
think Austin’s work, or rather the tools that I have had to develop in order to 
read it, cannot but equip me for the task of critically reappraising the place of 
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theatre, and the theatrical, within the discourse of performativity.  
 
How do we turn our attention more directly to the theatrical? How to displace 
the Austin who would have 'roundly criticized' the director's assertion that 
performative utterance is ‘like theatre’? What happens when we re-approach 
Austin’s comments on the theatrical utterance, knowing what we now know 
about him – his voice, his relationship with seriousness, and his practice of 
exemplification? And what role in this for what I in particular enjoy about his 
work: the funny incongruity of the speaking body as it emerges from his 
examples? As I have already signaled, my aim here is not to refute the claim 
that Austin theoretically excluded the theatrical utterance, at least not in its own 
terms. Rather, it is to work through a different way of thinking about what it was 
that Austin was doing – with words, with performance. As part of this, my 
reflections are moving, imperceptibly but determinedly, toward a view of 
Austin’s own performance, of the exemplary incongruity of Austin’s speaking 
body.  
 
 
9. The stage  
 
What of Austin’s own non-seriousness, then? As I have established, excuses 
are the means by which Austin problematizes human action. Against this, I wish 
to propose the following: jokes, the theme and the claim of joking, of non-
seriousness, are the means by which he problematizes speech – including his 
own.  
 
As we have seen, the idea that Austin excluded a whole class of utterances as 
‘non-serious’ has been constructed on the basis of two key passages from How 
to Do Things With Words. One is the offending paragraph, the one containing 
his explicit description of an utterance ‘spoken by an actor on the stage’ as ‘in a 
peculiar way hollow and void’ (22). The other is his first mention of speaking 
seriously, which occurs earlier, in the first lecture:  
 
Surely the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken 
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‘seriously’. This is, though vague, true enough in general – it is an 
important commonplace in discussing the purport of any utterance 
whatsoever. I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem (9).  
 
At this point, I contend that if excuses are the means by which Austin 
problematizes human action, then jokes – the theme and the claim of joking, or 
not being serious – are the means by which he problematizes speech. And, 
Austin’s comments on joking problematize his other comments, on theatrical 
speech. Comparing the two excerpts, we see that although the example of ‘a 
poem’ is common to both passages, Austin invokes the example of the theatre 
(by mentioning actor, stage and soliloquy) in only the second passage. And he 
mentions joking in the other. He does not mention joking and the theatrical 
utterance in proximity to one another. Furthermore, Austin’s tone in each of the 
passages is quite different: unlike his comments on the theatre, his earlier 
reference to joking is, conspicuously, spoken in the first-person: ‘I must not be 
joking, for example.’ This gives the comment the feel of a more off-handed 
remark, and indeed it occurs during what Austin flags as his ‘preliminary 
isolation of the performative’, before he starts on his taxonomic effort, when he 
is noting, speculatively, the possible implications of his identification of ‘a few 
simple utterances’ that are ‘quite plainly, not utterances which could be “true” or 
“false”’ (12).  
 
More specifically, when Austin says, ‘Surely the words must be spoken 
“seriously” and so as to be taken “seriously”’ (his first uses of the ‘s-word’), he is 
fielding the imagined charge that his theory trivializes human action by saying 
that ‘to marry is to say a few words’ or ‘betting is simply saying something’. 
Austin acknowledges ‘such a doctrine sounds odd or even flippant at first’, 
adding that ‘with sufficient safeguards it may become not odd at all’ (7, 
emphasis added). He goes on to point out that 'the uttering of the words […] is 
far from being usually, even if it is ever, the sole thing necessary' for a 
performative act to be successfully brought about (8), before acknowledging 
that this qualification will not entirely clear up the confusion, or error, a fairly 
stubborn common assumption about speech, because: 
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we may, in objecting, have something totally different, and this time quite 
mistaken in mind, especially when we think of the more awe-inspiring 
performatives such as “I promise to…” […] we are apt to have a feeling 
that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the 
outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for 
information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short 
step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many 
purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the 
occurrence of the inward performance… Thus “I promise to…” obliges 
me – puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle (9-10).  
 
Note how, on the page, that word ‘seriously’ in encased in scare quotes, twice. 
It is as if Austin cannot quite bring himself to take the word ‘seriously’ entirely 
seriously. Or else perhaps he is genuinely unnerved by it; as Cavell notes, and 
as we have seen, the ‘craving for profundity’ is Austin’s ‘mortal philosophical 
enemy’.130 Moreover, 'we are apt' signals Austin's acknowledgement that this is 
a habitual way of thinking about speech: this ‘craving for profundity’ infects 
everyday practice too, and can be detected in commonplaces such as ‘to 
solemnly swear’ or ‘speak from the heart’ or ‘speak one’s mind’, which imply a 
metaphysical oneness at the moment of utterance. The assumption is that 
words refer to and put across what is inside us, that they emanate from within 
us (speaking from the heart) and that a promise is not only, or primarily, a 
verbal act – it is first and foremost an inner spiritual act, of which the words are 
merely the report or description. It is this craving for profundity, this appeal for 
metaphysical unity, that results in what Austin dismisses as a wholly mistaken 
morality of speaking –  
 
one who says ‘promising is not merely a matter of uttering words! It is an 
inward and spiritual act!’ is apt to appear as a solid moralist standing out 
against a generation of superficial theorizers: we see him as he sees 
himself, surveying the invisible depths of ethical space… Yet he provides 
the bigamist with an excuse for his ‘I do’ (10). 
 
Austin is thus arguing, very clearly, that performative utterances cannot be 
judged on the basis of their truth or falsity. Performative utterances are not 
‘merely constative reports of inward, silent actions’ (11); to utter the words ‘I 
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promise…’ is itself the action of promising – we can exclude ‘such fictitious 
inward acts’ as those we imagine being performed by the soul, heart, or any 
other such organ. In other words, because the performative ‘I promise…’ does 
what it says in the moment of saying, it names its own action, and refers only to 
itself. Austin strikes an emphatic note when, at the close of this passage, he 
states: ‘Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our 
word is our bond’ (10).  
 
However – and it is this acknowledgement that Derrida could not accept – 
Austin can be understood to acknowledge that, although ‘thoughts, feelings and 
intentions’ are not essential to the ‘success’ or ‘felicity’ of a performative, the 
idea that a speaker must have certain thoughts, feelings and intentions is a 
factor in the speech act of promising. As Austin reflects, ‘do we not actually, 
when such intention is absent, speak of a “false” promise?’ Crucially, a promise 
spoken without requisite sincerity, or seriousness, is not null or void – it still 
promises – but we might well speak of this kind of promise as ‘professed’ or 
‘hollow’, we might well feel cheated by it. Austin finds this notion important – or 
unsettling – enough to illustrate using a reference to classical literature:  
 
The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the Hippolytus 
(l.612), where Hippolytus says [he cites it here in the original Greek] i.e. 
‘my tongue swore to… but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) 
did not’ (9-10). 
 
It is Cavell who first drew my attention to this reference, from the Euripides play, 
which, as he points out, went uncommented for many years. Neither Derrida, 
nor Felman, nor, until recently, Cavell himself considered the significance of this 
allusion. Perhaps this is because it is move that appears contradictory, on 
Austin’s part, for several reasons. As Cavell notes,‘It seems to make no sense 
to say that deliberately superficial, witty, mocking Austin, would be inscribing the 
relation of his work on performative utterances to the realm of the tragic’.131 It 
might be added that Austin does not merely make a literary allusion here, but 
explicitly refers to the theatrical act, and the backstage personnel who support 
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(or subvert it). In Cavell’s reading, the distinction Hippolytus seeks to draw 
between tongue and heart represents for Austin ‘a metaphysical dodge, or a 
deviously motivated attempt at one, between saying and intending’.132 I do not 
refute this, and indeed it supports my earlier critique of Derrida’s reading of the 
place of intention in Austin’s work. However, in the context of the current 
discussion, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Austin is modeling such a key 
point about seriousness with reference to a work of literature, and one of the 
kind that he later appears to exclude most explicitly from his consideration – a 
play text. More specifically, this example evokes the scene of the theatrical 
utterance through that curious, parenthesized, reference to the ‘backstage 
artiste’. Why does Austin go this far? There is no need for him to acknowledge 
the theatricality of this reference, the fact that Euripides wrote these words to be 
‘spoken by an actor on the stage’ so explicitly. Is he allowing himself to be 
distracted into this joking depiction of the speaking body? In a footnote, he goes 
further: ‘But I do not mean to rule out all the offstage performers – the lights 
men, the stage manager, even the prompter; I am objecting only to certain 
officious understudies, who would duplicate the play’ (10).  
 
Now that we know a thing or two about Austin’s enjoyment of the figure of the 
clumsy, calamitous body, it should come as no surprise that he cannot resist 
transforming his allusion to Greek tragedy into something less than solemn. 
Through the example of Hippolytus, Austin conjures an image of the speech act 
as a theatrical production beset by an officious understudy who, superfluous to 
the events onstage, nevertheless insists upon ‘duplicating’ the play. It seems 
that Austin cannot resist elaborating on the metaphor of the theatre, and in so 
doing emphasizes the play’s physical staging rather than its textual meaning.133 
Austin's Hippolytus example dramatizes the scene of speech not as high mythic 
tragedy, but as a somewhat overwrought theatrical production, a comedy of 
errors. It is as if he is reminding us that the supposed solemnity of the 
(theatrical) occasion of promising is ever vulnerable to ‘noises off’.   
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Does this offer a way of reconstructing the kind of theatricality that did interest 
Austin, indeed that which I might go so far as to suggest is an unavoidable part 
of his theory, and his practice? A theatricality marked by the apprehension 
(indeed appreciation) of its illusion as somehow vulnerable, always, to the 
incursion of the body? That is, to the inherent comedy of a body that pretends 
to mean what it says, that always might (happen to) be speaking the truth, but 
whose declarations may be taken seriously whether or not it is ‘truth-telling’ or 
‘lying’ or ‘pretending’ or ‘under duress’ (or some uncertain combination of all 
these things). 
 
Austin’s reference to Hippolytus, with its funny-incongruous depiction of the 
body in the act of speech, can be productively considered as an instance of the 
self-subverting pleasure Austin takes in moments of exemplification. In Austin’s 
hands, Euripides’ line speaks less of the tragedy of the promise, which is 
binding above all else, and more of the comedy of Hippolytus’ excuse. ‘My 
tongue swore to but my heart did not’ – as if this unruly tongue were somehow 
working of its own accord regardless of the (silent) protestations of the heart. 
Here, we begin to see how a problem of moral philosophy coincides with the 
comic effect of incongruity. This comic effect also highlights the extent to which 
the moral question of the promising body coincides with a problem of linguistic 
reference. For what is the relationship of the word tongue to the physical thing 
of the tongue? They are absolutely separable, and yet absurdly overlaid in the 
act of speech. The one is shaped by the other. There is literally no distance 
between them and yet the one does not seem to be identical with the other. If 
the tongue does not speak on behalf of the heart, what agency is making it 
move? What agency is making it move when it refers to its own action, as the 
tongue makes the movements to shape the breath that sounds the word 
‘tongue’?  
 
As Felman demonstrates, the incongruous interrelation of speech and the body 
is felt most acutely in the case of promising, which is the performative utterance 
par excellence, and in the example of marriage, which stages the scandal of the 
speaking body. Why scandal? Because there is ‘an illusion of constancy 
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inherent in the promise’,134 but it is an illusion only. As the Don Juan myth 
demonstrates, it is not necessary that its speaker believe his own promise for 
that promise to be taken seriously, as a solemn commitment, by those around 
him. Crucially, this illusion of constancy relies on a referential illusion – 
 
the seducer’s strategy is to create, in a linguistic space that he controls 
[…] a referential illusion through an utterance that is by its nature self-
referential: the illusion of a real or extralinguistic act of commitment 
created by an utterance that refers only to itself.135  
 
Don Juan’s promise relies on the referential illusion that the words ‘I promise…’ 
refer to the ‘extra-linguistic’ action of a unified, solemn speaking body, sound of 
mind, true of heart. It implies there is absolute harmony between the external 
and internal action, between body and soul, flesh and mind. When in fact, the 
verb ‘promise’ refers to a reality it itself instigates. Thus, Austin’s performative 
theory levels a challenge to the ‘traditional conception of the referent’ (as 
advanced, for example, by Saussurian linguistics), by envisaging the referent as 
that which is ‘produced by language as its own effect’. And, as Felman 
perceptively argues: 
 
This means that between language and referent there is no longer a 
simple opposition (nor is there identity, on the other hand): language 
makes itself part of what it refers to (without, however, being all that it 
refers to). Referential knowledge of language is not knowledge about 
reality (about a separate and distinct entity), but knowledge that has to 
do with reality, that acts within reality, since it is itself – at least in part – 
what this reality is made of.136 
 
Because the performative ‘I promise…’ does what it says in the moment of 
saying, it names its own action, and refers only to its own verb, ‘promise’, rather 
than to some element of the body, the self, or what Austin calls ‘the complex 
internal machinery we use in “acting”’.137 The referential illusion on which the 
emotional power of promise relies requires a body to uphold it. This illusion 
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depends on the fact that the promise is itself a bodily act – it requires the 
presence of a body. Not only to physically produce the speech (we know that 
‘speech’ can be (re)produced by machines, or parrots), but to stand as the 
referent of the ‘I’, the body that consists in the substance in which we imagine 
the ‘promise’ to take place. In the case of a marriage promise, the body also 
stands as the guarantee – literally, what is being offered against the promise, 
what the speaking self is ceremonially ‘handing over’ (to the beloved and, in the 
same gesture, to the state of marriage, which is itself state-sanctioned).  
 
Therefore, the illusion of constancy depends on the fact that the promise is itself 
a bodily act – it requires a body to stand there and physically produce the 
speech. And, the body standing there appears as the referent of the utterance, 
a strange doubling – the organ that speaks the ‘I’ also acts (or, we might say, 
stands) as its referent. Austin's Hippolytus reference, and the way he jokingly 
undermines its solemnity with reference to the clumsy mechanics of the 
theatrical production, short-circuits this referential illusion. On this basis, it 
becomes possible to surmise that the referential illusion of the promise is 
comparable to the illusion of theatrical naturalism. According to this grand 
illusion, everything is unfolding in organic oneness, each utterance is an 
originary moment of speech, and the ‘truth’ of the character can be made 
present through the harmonious collusion of every element. But Austin’s 
reference to Hippolytus undoes this. It allows us to sense the incongruity of the 
idea of a tongue working on its own. And then, the parenthesized, apparently 
jokey reference to the ‘backstage artiste’, which institutes an odd-sounding, 
awkward metaphor of the speaker as the combined personnel of a theatrical 
production implies that speech itself is, even (or perhaps especially) in its most 
'awe-inspiringly' serious instances, a complicated, conflicted, comically 
theatrical and unavoidably physical production.  
 
 
10. Austin performing Austin  
 
At this point, let us re-approach the figure of Austin who appears at Jackson’s 
dinner table: the guy who was so roundly dismissive of theatre, who 
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exacerbated the awkwardness between the academic and the practitioners, 
who made Jackson’s job that much harder. This guy is the originator of an 
influential theory of speech that, at its inception, excluded the theatrical 
utterance as ‘hollow and void’ and ‘parasitic’. Now let us ask: can this figure 
survive the kind of reading we’ve been doing here? And if, as I suspect, the 
answer is no, then what kind of figure, what kind of philosopher, what kind of 
guy, takes his place?  
 
Does Austin’s work perpetuate (even without intending to) an anti-theatrical 
prejudice? Not in the way that is often assumed: Austin did not draw a defining 
distinction between serious and non-serious utterances, at least not the kind 
that would support a categorical exclusion of the theatrical utterance. Contrary 
to Derrida’s defender of the values of ‘seriousness’, the Austin that has 
emerged from my own encounter with him is a merciless deconstructor of false 
seriousness, is himself a critic of the metaphysics of presence. With this in 
mind, we may reflect that the more subtly problematic of Austin’s comments on 
the theatrical utterance is not the one concerning its ‘parasitism’, but that which 
describes it, with emphasis, as ‘in a peculiar way hollow and void’ (22). As I 
have argued, for Austin, ‘hollow and void’ is not necessarily a negative quality. 
Rather, it is an emptying of the illusory ‘fullness’ of the utterance that seems to 
refer to a totally present and unified heart, soul, inner act. Moreover, Austin 
himself tends to say things in a peculiar way and is interested in the peculiar 
ways of speech. He repeatedly and curiously emphasizes ‘ways’ in such a way 
as to suggest that peculiarity seems to be endlessly interesting to him: when 
reflecting on ‘Conditions for Happy Performatives’, he observes there are 
‘considerable differences between “ways” of being unhappy’ (15); and by his 
account, excuses are uttered as a means of saying, in effect: ‘I did it but only in 
a way, not just flatly like that'.138  
  
But did I, in my early appraisal of Jackson’s scene, somewhat over-emphasize 
the degree to which her difficulties can be ascribed to Austin himself? Arguably, 
what Jackson is finding awkward here is not specific to J.L. Austin, or an 
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attempt to explain his work, but has more to do with her awkwardness at 
occupying the position of the academic at the table. What makes her awkward 
is, by her own admission, the ‘occupational divide’ that separates artists from 
academics. This is a divide that – she feels and fears – operates like a class 
divide. By her own admission, Jackson ‘take[s] seriously critiques of the 
professional intellectual’ (Jackson: 5), in particular citing John Guillory’s 
suggestion ‘that the phenomenon of the intellectual rests upon an opposition to 
manual labour’.139 She links this explicitly to her awkward conversation about 
performativity: ‘As much as the opposition between “theory” and “practice” is 
erroneous, as much as both terms have a hugely complicated set of references, 
it would be disingenuous to ignore the fact this conversation took place across 
different occupational positions.’140 For Jackson, the so-called ‘performative 
turn’ has produced a disciplinary crisis within theatre and performance studies 
precisely in its exacerbation of this professional divide: ‘performative’ is the 
trendy term that seems to say like a performance and yet – as only the initiated 
know – excludes theatrical performance. The scholar who insists on this is liable 
to sounds pernickety to the practitioner, the practitioner who casually disregards 
it ill-informed to the scholar. However, as I hope I have demonstrated, Austin’s 
work is not ‘theoretical’ in the sense this implies. By demonstrating that Austin is 
not, does not behave as a ‘theorist’, at least not in the sense that Jackson 
ascribes to him, I am not proposing that I have provided a ‘correction’ of 
Jackson’s understanding. Nor am I claiming to have magically overcome the 
professional divide that makes Jackson so awkward. However, I am arguing 
that a sense of Austin’s practice as both a philosopher and a performer can 
help open up the ‘theoretical’ concept of performativity to performance. 
Sedgwick captures this sense of Austin’s practice evocatively when she writes: 
 
Clearly for Austin, taxonomic work with particular sentences is not a rigid, 
Searlean reification of performativity, but rather the filthy workshop of its 
creation, criss-crossed with skid marks, full of dichotomies that are ‘in 
need, like so many dichotomies, of elimination’ (149); it represents the 
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painful, not-yet-differentiated quick from which the performative 
emerges.141 
 
The kind of ‘workshop’ Sedgwick invokes is one I think of less as a place of 
manual work, more as a process of theatrical labour: Austin does his 
philosophizing out loud, on stage, and he implicates and involves himself (his 
voice, his position, his figure) in that process. Crucially, Austin conducts his 
philosophizing by example rather than argument, or philosophical reference, 
and his most famous examples (which include: ‘I promise…’, ‘I bequeath…’, “I 
bet…’, ‘I name this ship…’, I sentence you…’, and ‘I do…’) are, at first, as 
Sedgwick observes, presented as ‘pure, originary, and defining for the concept 
of the performative’. And although eventually Austin dismisses them as no more 
than ‘a marginal limiting case’ (150), they are, she notes, ‘reverted to over and 
over, as if no argument or analysis, no deconstruction or dismantlement could 
really vitiate or even challenge the self-evidence of their exemplary force’.142  
 
A recurrent complaint about Austin’s conception of performative utterances is 
that it remains over-indebted to the first-person. Austin writes that ‘actions can 
only be performed by persons and obviously in our case the utterer must be the 
performer’ (60). As Sedgwick notes, ‘Foucauldian, Marxist, deconstructive, 
psychoanalytic and other recent theoretical projects have battered at the self-
evidence of that “obviously”.’143 However, it might be noted that, since Austin 
reverts to these exemplary utterances over and over, and since he was doing 
his philosophizing via the medium of a lecture, a speech performance, Austin 
would have had to repeatedly speak his own exemplary utterances. Austin 
keeps saying them, these exemplary performative utterances, these sentences 
in first-person, present indicative, active voice. And the repetition of these kinds 
of exemplary utterances might well have generated a doubtfulness about the 
‘obviousness’ of the first-person pronoun that does not come through in quite 
the same way on the page. Imagine, for example, hearing (and seeing) the 
following line spoken aloud: 
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Thus, when I say ‘I promise’ and have no intention of keeping it, I have 
promised but… (16) 
 
He must allow his audience to catch a sense of how such a sentence would 
sound in use. Austin must recite this exemplary utterances as it might be said, 
and in so doing, say it himself. Perhaps it is possible to read in Austin’s text not 
only an enjoyment of examples, but an enjoyment of saying examples. That is, 
an enjoyment of speaking a performative as it might be spoken. Note, for 
example, the emphasis in the following line: 
 
‘There is a bull in the field’ may or may not be a warning, for I might just 
be describing the scenery (33) 
 
Would that emphasis have been audible in Austin’s speech performance? 
Would the speech marks have been notionally hovering when Austin 
pronounced his ambiguous ‘warning’ about the bull? This indeterminacy it itself 
rather enjoyable, a little bit funny. Perhaps this funniness (whether or not 
entirely intentional on Austin’s part) complicates Austin’s assertion that 
‘obviously in our case the utterer must be the performer’ (60). In many cases, 
what I imagine Austin’s voicing of his examples would have done is mobilized 
the inherent incongruity of Austin’s own speaking body, which would have 
‘stood’ as the exemplary body of this curious, discomforting and (above all?) 
funny effect. Unexpectedly, it is imagining Austin’s own first-person 
performance of his first-person examples that problematizes the apparently 
‘obvious’ centrality of the first-person to his theory. 
 
In the texts of his lectures, published posthumously, Austin’s presence is felt in 
a number of displaced and metaphorical ways. Many of his examples carry an 
unmistakable sense of comic timing, one that works just as well in writing as in 
speech, but which pulls me into a sense, vague and yet unmistakable, of what it 
might have been like to be a member of Austin’s audience. 
 
The boundaries between ‘inappropriate persons’ and ‘inappropriate 
circumstances’ will necessarily not be a very hard and fast one… But we 
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must distinguish between cases where the inappropriateness of persons, 
objects, names, &c. is a matter of ‘incapacity’ and simpler cases where 
the object or ‘performer’ is of the wrong kind or type […] Thus we must 
distinguish the cases of a clergyman baptising the wrong baby with the 
right name or baptising a baby ‘Albert’ instead of ‘Alfred’, from those of 
saying ‘I baptise this infant 2704’ or ‘I promise I will bash your face in’ or 
appointing a horse as Consul (34-5).  
 
In the above passage, Austin is holding his readers (and I imagine, his 
listeners) in suspense, and then pulling them up short with a joke. There is a 
game going on, too, involving the first- and second-person pronouns, the 
pronouns of address: 
 
We turn next to the infringements of A. 2, the type of infelicity which we 
have called Misapplications. Examples here are legion. 'I appoint you', 
said when you have already been appointed, or when someone else has 
been appointed, or when I am not entitled to appoint, or when you are a 
horse (34). 
 
Austin’s words continue to do things on the page: ‘when you are a horse’, or 
‘can I baptize a dog?’ When I read these phrases, I feel like Austin is 
addressing me. I am metaphorically ‘there’, pulled into the example along with 
Austin, or the figural version of him. As a reader, I am called to the scene of the 
example in a physical way. I imagine the exemplary scene, in some sense step 
into it, a risky thing to do when I am liable to get my face bashed in, or be 
transformed, momentarily, into a horse. Purely for the purposes of 
exemplification, mind you. 
 
Whether or not Austin intended to place his own body at the centre of his 
theorizing, the fact that he was speaking a lecture about first-person utterances, 
in person, arguably means that in some sense it was unavoidable that he would 
do so. As I survey my favourite of Austin’s examples, it seems that many of the 
most vivid, memorable or funny ones, the ones I find myself reverting to over 
and over, have to do with the question of what it is to be in the wrong place. If 
many of Austin’s most incongruous, funny examples, the ones featuring 
animals, are explicitly concerned with what it is to be appointed, anointed or 
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otherwise put in the position of speaking, this resonates with Shannon 
Jackson’s awkwardness in occupying the position of authority, the position from 
which a certain kind of speech is expected. However, and here is a tension at 
the heart of Austin’s work and legacy: Austinian performativity, as commonly 
summarized, remains tied to the handful of central, defining examples that 
Austin gathered at the beginning of his first lecture. In full, they read:  
 
‘I do [take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife]’ – as uttered in the 
marriage ceremony. 
‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ – as uttered when smashing the 
bottle against the stem. 
 ‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ – as occurring in a will. 
 ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’. (5) 
 
Sedgwick alludes to the ‘prestige’ of such examples,144 capturing something not 
only of the critical currency this group of utterances has acquired as a result of 
Austin’s influence, but also of their official, ceremonial nature. The first two 
cases are explicit, ceremonial performatives requiring a person of requisite 
authority or status, and the correct performance of a procedure. Taken together 
with the third, they speak of the establishment and the perpetuation of its laws 
via a structure of (male) heredity. These examples also illustrate a set of 
procedures and values that is peculiarly British; not only queen and country, 
navy and brotherhood, but also, tellingly, speculation about the weather. Now, it 
may be that these values were so natural to Austin, in the 1950s, at Oxford, that 
he did not think twice about promoting them in his examples. It may be that 
Austin, on his trip to Harvard, was playing up his image as a ‘quirky, eccentric 
Oxford don’, caricaturing himself and a certain stereotypical Englishness. He 
certainly has an ear for the silly particularity of certain customs, and appears to 
take a certain relish in casting himself in little vignettes. This, for example, from 
‘A Plea for Excuses’: 'You dropped the tea tray: Certainly, but an emotional 
storm was about to break out: or, yes, but there was a wasp'.145 
 
In either case, as we have seen, as Austin’s lectures go on, the detail which 
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inhabits these examples becomes increasingly incongruous. Austin’s exemplary 
work is tuned, increasingly, to demonstrate the various unpredictable and 
peculiar ways a performative utterance might fail, not quite fail, or succeed in 
some peculiarly unsatisfactory or disconcerting way. And, as the lectures go on, 
the imaginative zeal with which Austin enumerates possible aberrations, 
exceptions, and anomalies seems to grow all the more unruly and peculiar. 
Unavoidably, Austin must illustrate these aberrations using his own first-person, 
his figure. Due to his thematization of the first-person present indicative 
utterance, Austin cannot help but perform his examples, and in the process, 
make an example of himself. As a result, Austin’s examples in some sense 
bring Austin himself into the scene – and so aspects of his identity, his 
particularity (his being a man, an English man, an Oxford man, a man who 
raised pigs as a hobby). And at the same time, they demonstrate how his 
position can be unfixed by the peculiar operations of his own language. As I 
have argued, this amounts to a thorough and insistent problematization of the 
referential illusion of the first-person, and of the presence and authority of 
Austin, of his standing (literally, in front of those people at Harvard in 1955) as a 
philosopher.  
 
The final words of Austin’s final lecture at Harvard call attention, curiously, to his 
equivocality as to his own status as philosopher: 
 
In these lectures, then, I have been doing two things which I do not 
altogether like doing. These are: 
 
(1) producing a programme, that is, saying what ought to be done 
rather than doing something; 
  (2) lecturing. 
 
However, as against (1), I should very much like to think that I have been 
sorting out a bit the way things have already begun to go and are going 
with increasing momentum in some parts of philosophy, rather than 
proclaiming an individual manifesto. And as against (2), I should certainly 
like to say that nowhere could, to me, be a nicer place to lecture than 
Harvard (164).  
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to understand (and enjoy) the ways in which 
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Austin’s work stages the problem of speech and performance. Stages, that is, in 
a metaphorical sense. What I hope has emerged from this is that, rather than 
offering a generally applicable theory (of language, speech or performance) 
based on the clear distinction between serious and non-serious utterances, 
Austin’s work stages the uncertain and unstable relationship between the two.  
 
Austin’s closing comments tell us something about how the manner of his 
performance was instrumental to his philosophical project, or rather his project 
of questioning the grounds of a philosopher’s authority. The very final word of 
his lecture, ‘Harvard,’ is an acknowledgement of the situatedness of his speech 
act. For all the emphasis upon the scene of Austin’s address, very little of that 
actual scene has come into focus. Yes, we know it was a lecture room with a 
dwindling occupancy. But, on these pages at least, ‘Harvard’ is itself a sort of 
abstraction – rather than a tangible place it is a proper name denoting academic 
prestige. Just as a name like ‘J.L. Austin’ can be invoked at a dinner table, a 
speech act that firms up the authority of one person over another, so too can a 
name like ‘Harvard’. A practitioner of performance, one who is concerned with 
the pragmatics of the scene, might argue that my use of the word ‘performance’ 
in this chapter remains horribly, academically abstract; without a tangible sense 
of the actual room, and without description of Austin’s actual face, a sense of 
his physical demeanor, what kind of concrete tangibility does his ‘performance’ 
have on these pages? These are concerns that will be carried over into the 
following chapter, which offers an extended reading of another sort of transcript 
– the text of a comic routine by Stewart Lee, a man whose face, body and 
performance it is possible for me to describe. What might now have become 
clear is that the recourse to a particular, named, even prestigious and famous 
body’s performance of speech does not amount to a reductive insistence upon 
the authority of some kind of organizing intention. In fact, reading a text as the 
performance of a speaking body may help to destabilize those spurious yet 
persistent myths that elevate certain bodies to the status of author-figures, and 
prestigious ‘originators’ of concepts, movements or schools of thought.   
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CHAPTER 2:  
Literalising figures: Stewart Lee, deconstruction, and the Tea Cosy  
 
1. Not laughing: me at the gig  
 
Sitting in between groups of people drinking beer from plastic glasses, looking 
toward the stage onto which Stewart Lee was about to make his entrance, I felt 
conspicuous. It was November 2013, just over a year into my PhD. A year 
spent thinking, reading and speaking about Stewart Lee. And writing, or trying 
to write, some sort of scholarly account of his work, his jokes. Writing in 
particular about one joke. A joke about a tea cosy. Writing what would, many 
drafts later, become part of the chapter you are about to read. The location was 
the Leicester Square Theatre, where Lee was performing nightly, rotating half-
hour segments that would provide the material for series three of his BBC2 
show Comedy Vehicle. I had come to see Stewart Lee because I was writing 
about him, and when he appeared onstage and the applause subsided and he 
began to speak, it made me feel slightly odd, as though I had somehow brought 
my own example to life, and was now willing it to behave as it should. I was 
willing that figure up there, the one called Stewart Lee, to be funny, be 
interesting, be worthy of a PhD chapter. For a spectator at a stand-up gig, this 
was an awkward predicament: for my previous year’s work to have any value, I 
needed Stewart Lee to be funny, and yet, as the gig began, I began to worry 
that my previous year’s work seemed to have made it difficult for me to find 
Stewart Lee funny. I wasn’t laughing. I was thinking too much, perhaps. 
Anyway, it was disconcerting.  
 
What was it that made my presence at the gig, in the audience, feel not only 
weird, uncomfortable, but somehow untenable? Perhaps it was something to do 
with the tea cosy. Or rather, the considerable amount of time I had spent 
thinking and writing about the joke, or perhaps it is more accurate to say the 
routine, the ‘bit’ – the four-or-so-minutes during which Stewart Lee had talked 
about, and then, for a moment or two, talked as, a tea cosy. The routine was 
from Stewart Lee’s 2004 show, Stand-Up Comedian, a transcript of which, with 
Lee’s annotations, was published by Faber and Faber in 2010. This is how I 
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came to read it; that’s right, I read Stand-Up Comedian, and the tea cosy 
routine. I read it in a book. And then I spent the best part of a year working out 
how to read it, by which I mean, how to produce a close analysis of what I found 
to be going on in it. This analysis will take up much of the latter part of this 
chapter.  
 
Many would argue that it is a category error to subject the text of a stand-up 
routine to extended close reading. For that matter, is it not some kind of mistake 
to read a transcript of a stand-up routine in the first place? ‘A joke is funny if and 
only if you laugh at it,’ writes theorist John Limon in his definition of stand-up.1 I 
might laugh at a joke on paper, but reading is, for the most part, a solitary and 
silent activity. My laugh may well be internal. In any case, it is something I do 
alone, in the privacy of my room. But the joke I am reading was developed as 
part of stand-up routine, which is the name I will adopt to mean the next unit of 
material up from a joke (broadly speaking, a routine is made up of jokes, and a 
show is made up of routines). A stand-up joke is thus, usually, not self-
contained. The experience of stand-up is collective and relational: as Limon 
notes, in stand-up, ‘The peculiarities of the relationship between joke teller and 
audience do not make the joke seem more or less funny; they make the joke 
more or less funny'.2 Furthermore, according to Limon, ‘the collective 
experience of humour, like the personal experience of pain, fills its moment and 
perishes; reflection misprizes it of necessity’.3 
 
I did, for the record, manage to overcome my initial awkwardness, at the gig. To 
my relief, I did laugh. A few minutes into the gig, I found myself laughing quite 
by surprise. It was a particular line (about two rats fighting over a courgette that 
has fallen into a urinal) that got me. But my attempts to write about this gig, this 
experience of laughing, have come to nothing. And anyway, I was already 
committed to the attempt to write about the tea cosy. So, in this chapter I am 
not interested in laughter itself, or even very much concerned with the scene of 
the comedy gig. I am interested, in part, in how the feelings experienced in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Limon, p.12. 
2 Limon, p. 12. 
3 Limon, p. 11. 
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moment of laughing can get displaced into a weirdly intense affection for the 
idea of the funny, fuzzy or otherwise silly thing that you associate with the joke. 
This relates to the fact that, long after the laughter has perished, and long after I 
have forgotten most of the words that Lee said onstage that night, the courgette 
remains. 
 
The funniness that I am I responding to in this chapter – funniness generated by 
the figure of a tea cosy (and, as I will explain, the figure of Stewart Lee as a tea 
cosy) – is not unrelated to the feeling of laughing, suddenly, at a courgette. 
Although in the case of the tea cosy my feeling emanated from (and was 
sustained by) a moment of reading, as I will demonstrate, it nonetheless has 
something to tell us about the pleasure of laughing along with other people, in a 
room, at the same moment, at a courgette. In turn, the problem of the peculiarly 
tenacious funniness of the tea cosy and the courgette, will, in this chapter, open 
onto a series of problems – methodological and ethical – that relate to the task 
of reading.  
 
Before embarking upon this reading, this reading of and with the tea cosy, it will 
be necessary to work through a set of questions about stand-up comedy – as a 
performance form in itself, and as a form of performance that has its own 
surrounding discourse. As stand-up makes a place for itself in university drama 
departments, its definition is at stake. The question of how to define stand-up is 
often posited as one of aesthetics versus professionalism: is stand-up an 
artform, or is it ‘just’ a job? What any of this has to do with the funny, fuzzy and 
weirdly fascinating figure of a tea cosy, will, I hope, become increasingly clear.   
 
 
2. A serious business: aesthetics and professionalism  
 
Writing the foreword to the second edition of Oliver Double's Getting the Joke, 
which he calls 'a serious book by Britain's foremost comedy academic', 
comedian Ross Noble worries that it might be seen as 'a tad pretentious to 
describe stand-up in artistic terms', not least because ‘it is so populist’, 
associated as it is with the ‘lucrative areas of the entertainment world’, but 
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moreover, ‘when it is done well it looks so effortless and natural, that it appears 
as if the performer is not doing anything, merely joining the audience in a 
moment that would naturally have happened’. This is why, he suggests, ‘stand-
up is not taken seriously as an artform’. But, he adds, 'this book explores stand-
up as it should be, as a true art, and uncovers the mechanics and mysteries of 
creating it'.4 
 
Ross Noble seems to be arguing that stand-up should be taken seriously as an 
art form. But that does not mean that it is a ‘serious art form’. John Limon 
considers stand-up’s non-seriousness to be its defining point: 
 
Because it is plausible to assert that an audience is wrong about, say, an 
opera (critics will judge) or a novel (posterity will judge), opera and 
literature can stake claims to seriousness. To be serious means to 
despise the audience – to reserve the right of appeal to a higher 
jurisdiction.5  
 
This is quite a serious charge to level against ‘serious’ art forms – that they 
despise their audiences. If you are ‘wrong’ about a serious artform, for example, 
if you called the symphony beautiful when actually you were ‘seduced by the 
loveliness of the evening or the lyric athleticism of the conductor’, then you are 
liable to be ‘retroactively disabused by a critic’. But the audience’s laughter, 
being ‘the single end of stand-up’ is ‘single-minded and unimpeachable’.6  
 
‘Let’s start with the fact that I’ve got a bit of weird job,’ Double begins the first 
chapter of Getting the Joke.7 He is referring to the fact that he teaches stand-up 
comedy in a university. Double has been a lecturer in Drama at the University of 
Kent in Canterbury since 1999, where his research and teaching specialism is 
stand-up, or ‘anything in which the performer works straight out to the audience, 
performing in the first person and the present tense’.8 Before that, he was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ross Noble, ‘Foreword’ in Double, Getting the Joke, pp. ix-xii (pp. x-ix).  
5 Limon, p. 12. 
6 Limon, p. 12. 
7 Double, Getting the Joke, p. 1.  
8 University of Kent, ‘Staff Profiles: Dr Oliver Double’, <https://www.kent.ac.uk/arts/staff-
profiles/drama/double.html> [accessed 16 May 2016]. 
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professional stand-up comedian on the national comedy circuit. I saw him get 
up to introduce the keynote speaker at a conference once, and he did it as 
though he was the warm-up act. On the back cover, Double’s book is trailed as 
‘a must read for aspiring stand-up comedians, comedy fans and academics 
researching and teaching Comedy Practice and Performance Studies’. Do 
academics sit awkwardly in this list, alongside the aspiring comedians and 
comedy fans? Or was that only this academic, sitting awkwardly alongside 
comedy fans at the Stewart Lee gig in Leicester Square? 
 
As I stated in my Introduction, Stewart Lee has published a book too, a different 
sort of book. By publishing transcripts of three of his stand-up shows with Faber 
& Faber, an imprint noted for its literary credentials, Lee would appear to be 
inviting what he does to be read, and taken seriously, as literature. He 
discussed the relationship of his work to literature in a talk he gave at Edmund 
Hall, University of Oxford, framing it in terms of the discrepancy between the 
kind of work he puts in, and the work he is perceived by audiences to have 
done: 
 
What I do is I spend a year pulling together a two-hour show, which to 
me is obviously a construct because it’s got dramatic irony, character 
development as I change over the two hours, a beginning, a middle and 
an end, recurrent themes, an incident at the end that echoes an incident 
at the beginning, the same things being told from different angles that 
deliberately echo each other, even some bit of set that does something 
and still people come up to me afterwards and say “so I suppose you just 
go out there and make it all up as you go along do you?”9 
 
What Lee is talking about here is comparable to the predicament Noble outlines 
at the start of his Foreword: ‘To the casual observer I as a stand-up comic 
spend my time onstage just dicking about and showing off’.10 It is worth noting 
that, at the University of Oxford, Lee is speaking as ‘Honorary Fellow and 
alumnus’ and so shares in the prestige of the institution. But, as a stand-up 
comedian, he feels he needs to make a special case for the artistic value of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Stewart Lee, ‘On Not Writing’, online video recording, YouTube, 3 July 2013, 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrXVaytvJtQ> [accessed 23 October 2013]. 
10 Noble, p. ix. 
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what he does. On the experience of contributing to a day of talks themed 
around ‘A Celebration of Writing’, Lee reflects, 'Some people were very 
comfortable with the idea that what they did was worthwhile, others like me had 
to justify that what we did had some merit as literature'.11 
 
As they embark upon giving an account of what they do in the context of 
academia, both Noble and Lee seem conscious of the risk that it will be 
assumed they are just messing around, making it up as they go along, and thus 
in some sense not even aware of what they are doing, or how they are doing it. 
Noble mitigates this anxiety by telling his readers about how he and Double 
share 'a genuine passion for understanding and discussing the inner workings 
of comedy', referring to their 'prolonged dissection of a routine of a long 
forgotten music hall comic’.12 He admits to taking pleasure in seeing people 
back away from such conversations, and expresses surprise ‘that people think 
that a group of comics sitting around talking about comedy would be hilarious'. 
Instead, he likens what is going on in such discussions to a 'bunch of chefs 
talking about creating recipes'.13 This is slightly different to the literary mode of 
Lee’s account; Noble prefers to frame the discussion that goes on between 
comedians as one that is both professionalized and pragmatic, technical and 
slightly nerdy. It’s not funny, but neither is it serious in the way that risks 
sounding, to use Noble’s term, pretentious.  
 
Stand-up comedians do things with words for a living. It is interesting, then, to 
consider how they frame the various kinds of activities associated with their 
profession. Lee argues for his stand-up to be recognized as writing, calling 
attention to his process, the amount of time it takes. When set against the 
apparent casualness of stand-up, a comedian’s revelation of the time-
consuming laboriousness of creating jokes can function as its own joke. It is 
entertaining, for example, to watch Jerry Seinfeld, in a video for the New York 
Times online, talk about how it took him a full two years to perfect a short 
routine about Pop Tarts. ‘It's a long time to spend on something that means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Lee, ‘On Not Writing’. 
12 Noble, p. ix. 
13 Noble, p. ix. 
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absolutely nothing. But that's what I do. That's what people want me to do.’ He 
shows his notes, scrawled onto yellow notepaper with many crossings-out and 
corrections, explaining ‘I'm looking for the connective tissue that gives me the 
really tight smooth link… like a jigsaw puzzle… and if it's too long, if it's just that 
split-second too long, you will shave letters off of words, you count syllables to 
get it just…’ He trails off, before resorting to a musical metaphor: ‘It’s like 
songwriting.’14  
 
Stand-up comedians themselves do not always understand how or why a joke 
works, or fails to work, and they often freely admit this. Lee, recounting how, 
during the Edinburgh run of Stand-Up Comedian, he spent several weeks, night 
after night, trying to get a punchline to work, trying out different combinations of 
words, reflects that the way ‘some apparently random objects seem utterly 
apposite and some don’t… is almost alchemical beyond reason’.15 And Noble, 
thinking about how it feels when stand-up is working, describes the moment 
‘where hundreds of people all feel the same joy and release of laughter at the 
same time’ as something ‘thrilling and magical’ that can make comedians 
appear 'like strange aliens, alchemists of the imagination’.16 It is notable that, at 
their most (apparently) mystified at the strange workings of their craft, these 
comedians resort to similar metaphors: magic, alchemy, that which is beyond 
reason. It seems that, the more mystified the comedian, the further their rhetoric 
strays from the pragmatic, the workmanlike. 
 
Stand-up comedians, quite understandably, want to make a case for their 
specialism, their expertise, and their mastery of a difficult mode of performance. 
As Noble puts it, ‘all the elements must come together, the ideas, the 
performance and the environment must perfectly align and the comic must 
merge these elements perfectly, controlling and timing everything just right’.17 
The other side of this is that stand-ups do also seem to feel that the 
ungraspable mysteriousness of what they do – or, I might add, what their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ‘Jerry Seinfeld Interview: How to Write a Joke | The New York Times’, YouTube, 20 
December 2012 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=itWxXyCfW5s> [accessed 8 August 2016].  
15 Stewart Lee, How I Escaped, pp. 65-66.  
16 Noble, p. xi. 
17 Noble, p. xi. 
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language does in spite of them – is important, worth emphasizing, and 
celebrating. Noble praises Double for giving his readers ‘a chance to look 
behind the curtain and lift the lid and get an insight into how those moments are 
created’. Before adding, ‘I am not quite sure why there is a lid behind the 
curtains, so if you want to know about that I suggest you buy a book about 
home furnishing'.18 When their self-celebratory rhetoric becomes 
unmaneagable, or risks sounding ‘pretentious’, stand-up comedians can also 
resort once against to the simplicity, the straightforwardness, of what they do. 
This, from Ross Noble: ‘even though stand-up has its roots in theatre poetry 
and literature at its most primitive, it is just one person with funny bones in front 
of a group of people being funny’.19 Perhaps the limit point of this is the 
statement Lee makes, when explaining his rediscovered enthusiasm for the 
artform, or else the job: ‘I realised that stand-up was just one man on a stage in 
a room.’20  
 
Although it can function as a gesture of undercutting, there is something 
celebratory, too, about a statement like ‘just a man on a stage in a room’. And it 
is undoubtedly problematic when the stripping away of all pretention leaves us 
with ‘just a man’ – and, as I will demonstrate, the claim that something or 
someone is ‘just’ funny can be equally problematic. Might it be possible, then, to 
develop an account of why a particular word, or substance, or thing, or person, 
is perceived to be ‘just’ funny, and in so doing, put pressure on the self-
evidence of that ‘just’? And what might be at stake in attempting to do so? Might 
it have to do with the question of what kind of person is being assumed when, in 
the context of stand-up discourse, the ‘just one person with funny bones’ is 
praised as ‘a natural’?  
 
 
3. Figures of literal-mindedness  
 
My feelings of awkwardness at the Stewart Lee gig, and my sense of vague 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Noble, p. xi. 
19 Noble, pp. x-xi (punctuation as in original).  
20 Lee, How I Escaped, p. 39.  
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anxiety around the way I have deployed Ross Noble’s statements to serve my 
own argument, leads me to consult, once again, Shannon Jackson’s discussion 
of what she calls the ‘scholar-versus-artist divide’ in performance studies. In a 
key chapter of Professing Performance, Jackson sets out to work out how a 
particular sort of friction between practitioners and academics is discernable 
through their seemingly opposed modes of reference.21 By means of example, 
Jackson cites a ‘notoriously stalled’ conversation between Nick Kaye and Liz 
LeCompte. The former is known as a scholar of postmodern performance, the 
latter as the central theatre director with the Wooster Group, the hugely 
influential New York-based performance company. During the conversation, 
which was set up as an interview, LeCompte repeatedly refused Kaye’s line of 
questioning by saying things like ‘I don’t know what that is’, ‘I don’t speak the 
language’, ‘I don’t have an academic interest’, and ‘I’m very literal, as you can 
see’.22  
 
According to Jackson, within the sphere of performance studies, ‘this kind of 
conversational stall is ubiquitous’.23 For her, what underlies the tension that 
crackles in such friction-ridden moments between practitioner and theorist is 
that old opposition between intellectual and manual labour. This opposition is 
played out in such scenes of dialogue and can be felt in the participants’ 
recourse to different, and perhaps mutually incompatible, modes of speaking 
about performance. Jackson offers a simple model for this: it is the literal 
coming up against the figurative, or rhetorical. Jackson herself admits the scene 
is more complicated than her model implies, citing the ‘unhelpfully ubiquitous 
opposition between production and research’.24 But the binary oppositions she 
offers are themselves distractingly suggestive, especially when reified as two 
persons, LeCompte and Kaye, embodying the two sides of the polemic: 
practitioner versus theorist, manual versus intellectual, literal versus figurative.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See ‘Practice and Performance: Modernist Paradoxes and Literalist Legacies’ in Jackson, pp. 
109-145.  
22 Nick Kaye, ‘Elizabeth LeCompte: Interview,’ The Twentieth Century Performance Reader, ed. 
Michael Huxley and Noel Witts (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 228-36 (pp. 229, 230, 234) 
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When Kaye, in a moment that Jackson reads as ‘exasperated’, says, ‘That kind 
of focus doesn’t offer itself to any kind of question I might ask about meaning or 
theme, does it?’, LeCompte responds, ‘No. Again, you can talk to me about 
what’s going on onstage.’ At the end of the interview, LeCompte sums up her 
position thus: when starting work on a new piece, she says, ‘I don’t have any 
thematic ideas – I don’t even have a theme. I don’t have anything except literal 
objects – some flowers, some images, some television sets, a chair, some 
costumes I like’.25 
 
For Jackson, this is typical of the way practitioners often take pride in the fact 
that they operate in a literal and pragmatic mode, whereas scholars such as 
Kaye (and, Jackson admits, herself) see it as their job to ‘go through a variety of 
theoretical manoeuvres to illustrate that performance is hardly literal at all’.26  
 
In her discussion, Jackson grants Theory the status of a proper noun. She is 
thinking specifically of the deconstructive moment in theory, a specifically 
contextualized set of discursive developments, which she describes as a 
'mixture of literary, rhetorical, and philosophical studies whose deconstructions 
would inspire and irk humanities departments for decades to follow’.27 For 
Jackson, one of the key moments in its emergence is marked by the publication 
of Derrida's De la Grammatologie in 1967. The influence of that volume, and its 
author's critique of 'regressive metaphysics', means that a recourse to ‘literal 
objects’ is untenable, even unhearable, within certain institutional settings. 
Speaking to and on behalf of scholars, Jackson reflects that ‘many of us work 
with the assumption that no thing, person, or experience could ever have the 
full irreducibility of pure presence or the self-coincidence of a simple idea'. 
Jackson then chastens herself and her colleagues for wielding, at times 
unthinkingly, ‘the class privilege of Theory’, for being too ‘quick to roll our eyes 
at all the other “handymen” who just don’t get it’.28 
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26 Jackson, p. 112. 
27 Jackson, p. 116. 
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The figure of the handyman is one Jackson has plucked from a text by Paul de 
Man, in whose work she reads a ‘critique of literality’ that is characteristic of 
deconstruction’s ‘revival of rhetoric’.29 In 'The Epistemology of Metaphor', de 
Man reads John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, taking aim 
at the earlier philosopher’s call for philosophical discourse to free itself from the 
disruptive effects of figurative language. He cites Locke, who writes, ‘if we 
would speak of things as they are… we must allow that all arts of rhetoric […] 
are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, mislead 
the judgement’.30 Such a sentiment, argues de Man, is characteristic of 
philosophy’s age-old suspicion of rhetoric. Whilst historically, rhetorical figures 
such as metaphor have been considered allowable within poetry and literature, 
in the ‘serious’ business of philosophy, figurative language is, as de Man puts it, 
‘a disruptive scandal’.31 However – and this is where de Man begins to have 
some fun – Locke’s argument against rhetoric does not manage to free itself of 
rhetoric. His statements are undercut by the figures within his own text. For 
example, he describes language as ‘a conduit’ that, if beset by figural 
aberrations, may ‘corrupt the foundations of knowledge which are in things 
themselves’ and even worse ‘break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to 
public use’. In order to decry rhetoric, Locke deploys the language ‘not of poetic 
“pipes and timbrels” but of a plumber’s handyman’, language that ‘raises, by its 
all too graphic concreteness, questions of propriety’.32   
 
Alert to the ‘class privilege of Theory’, Jackson is bothered by de Man’s 
association of this imagined manual laborer with ‘all too graphic concreteness’. 
She reads de Man’s invocation of the plumber’s handyman as a personification 
of the ‘literalized imagination’ that drove Locke’s pursuit of “simple ideas”. For 
Jackson, de Man's resort to the anti-rhetoric of John Locke, a seventeenth-
century English philosopher, is typical of the 'partial and opportunistic 
resuscitations [that] structured many of the classic arguments of 
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31 de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, p.36.  
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deconstruction'.33 She thinks what de Man is up to here is analogous to what 
Derrida was doing in De la Grammatologie: 
 
As Derrida’s critique of presence argued that the unmediated oral does 
not precede textuality but is an ever-deferred epiphenomenon of 
textuality itself, so de Man’s critique of literality argued that simple and 
irreducible knowledge does not precede figuration but is an imagined 
state produced by figuration itself.34  
 
The Derridean and deManian deconstructive projects are aligned in Jackson’s 
model, seeming to operate via a similar thought structure, with the shared aim 
of making legible the ‘disavowed complexity in the space of the "simple’’' and 
the ‘work of figuration in the presumably literal’.35 However, it may be that 
Jackson is too quick to sum up de Man’s deconstruction as an adjunct to, a 
continuation of Derrida’s. Although she acknowledges its simplification, 
Jackson’s polemical model, which pits Kaye against LeCompte, theory against 
practice, rhetoric against literality, implies that de Man was arguing for the 
primacy, and thus the superiority of rhetoric as a mode of thought and 
expression. Whereas, arguably, in this text de Man is observing the 
unavoidability of rhetoric. Moreover, an important aim of de Man’s ‘rhetorical 
deconstruction’ was that of debunking the mystifications of metaphor, a specific 
kind of rhetorical figure that de Man critiqued as ‘totalizing’. De Man set out to 
demystify rhetorical totalisations, but not via recourse to the supposed 
‘opposite’ of rhetoric (by appealing to a kind of plain speaking). Rather, he tried 
to show how, with a little bit of prodding, texts deconstruct themselves. He 
demonstrated how the various rhetorical dimensions of a text are quite capable 
of undermining one another. One of his key methods is to show how reading a 
text closely can throw up odd, distracting figures, such as the plumber’s 
handyman. Figures that, once animated, might well refuse to leave the stage. 
 
Although Jackson seeks to summarise de Man’s argument, critique his position, 
and then move on, de Man’s own rhetorical strategies leave a residue in her 
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own text in shape of a specific figure: the figure of the handyman, which, having 
emerged out of Man’s reading of Locke, continues to be animated within 
Jackson’s account of the performance art scene of the 1960s and 1970s. For 
example, she reproaches sculptor Tony Smith for appropriating ‘the symbols of 
the handyman’s literal without knowing how to make them work’;36 alluding to 
LeCompte’s self-declared literalism, she writes that ‘Each theatrical minimalist 
recalls the practices of the handyman, telling us to beware of the simplicity of 
their “constructions”’.37 What Jackson might usefully have acknowledged in her 
discussion is that, by taking the handyman figure into her own text, she is 
demonstrating something that de Man also set out to demonstrate: the way in 
which what might be considered literary effects, in other words, figures – in this 
case, personification – also move through theoretical or critical texts, and have 
the power to disrupt them.  
 
De Man’s approach to the difference between the literal and the figurative is by 
no means straightforward, and the way he approaches (and debunks) the 
apparent binary is bound up with his singular understanding of the term 
‘rhetoric’. Rhetoric for him is the disruptive force that emerges when language 
performs. His simplest and perhaps best-known demonstration of this disruptive 
force concerns the phenomenon of the so-called rhetorical question, which, as 
he points out, may be the commonest instance of the word ‘rhetorical’ in daily 
practice. But, as his discussion demonstrates, the rhetorical question is by no 
means a simple case. It is, rather, something of a ‘semiological enigma’. For, 
when a question that is, weirdly, not a question is invoked, in speech or writing, 
‘It is not so that there are simply two meanings, one literal and the other figural, 
and that we have to decide which is the right one in a particular situation’.38 
 
The grammatical model of the question becomes rhetorical not when we 
have, on the one hand, a literal meaning and on the other hand a figural 
meaning, but when it is impossible to decide by grammatical or other 
linguistic means which of the two meanings (that can be entirely 
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incompatible) prevails.39 
 
Later in her discussion, Jackson does acknowledge that de Man 'framed the 
function of deconstructive reading around the uncertain relationship between 
the literal and the figural',40 and she cites the example – the famous example – 
by which de Man illustrates the problem of the rhetorical question, which is 
drawn from the US television sit-com All in the Family: 
 
Asked by his wife whether he wants to have his bowling shoes laced 
over or laced under, Archie Bunker answers with a question: ‘What’s the 
difference?’ Being a reader of sublime simplicity, his wife replies by 
patiently explaining the difference between lacing over and lacing under, 
whatever this may be, but it provokes only ire. ‘What’s the difference?’ 
did not ask for difference but means instead ‘I don’t give a damn what 
the difference is.’ The same grammatical pattern engenders two 
meanings that are mutually exclusive: the literal meaning asks for the 
concept (difference) whose existence is denied by the figurative 
meaning. […] Archie Bunker […] muddles along in a world where literal 
and figural meanings get in each other’s way, though not without 
discomforts.41  
 
Jackson reads these two demonstrations of de Man's deconstructive method 
alongside one another. For her, the mocking disquisition on Locke, and the 
reading of the Bunker scene, are both examples of a high-minded dismissal of 
perceived literalism that is typical of deconstructive theory. Worse, the figures 
de Man invokes as personifications of this simplistic mindset – the plumber's 
handyman, the put-upon housewife – together 'testify to a classed rhetoric as 
well as another kind of gendered rhetoric that remained unexamined in 
deconstruction.’42 
 
Someone who has made comedy a lifelong profession may well read this 
example, and Jackson’s reading of it, differently. For this is an example taken 
from a comedy, a sit-com, being deployed by a Theorist to demonstrate 
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something theoretical about language. And that in turn is being appropriated, by 
Jackson, as a comparison for the conversational stalls that occur when scholars 
and practitioners of performance meet, and to chasten the former for being, 
possibly, too quick to roll their eyes at the perceived simplicity of the latter. In 
that same process, Jackson is calling out de Man for the unchecked prejudices 
that speak through his own rhetoric, his own choice of example. The various 
appropriations and re-appropriations at work here gives rise to a set of 
problems that has taken me some time to untangle. Within the context of my 
own enquiry, this process has proven productive in several ways. First, in 
prompting me to reflect upon the way that theoreticians and practitioners of art 
and performance often enthusiastically, and self-ironically, appropriate figures 
from the world of comedy. In light of this, objections might be raised as to 
occlusion of the professional comedian, or comic actor or writer – those 
employed in the field of popular entertainment – from the discursive scenes of 
theory and performance. Second, it makes me think about the way certain 
‘types’ are represented within comedy, a field of practice that has its own mode 
of operation, a fact that is acknowledged neither in de Man’s nor in Jackson’s 
discussion. This is problematic, perhaps especially in Jackson’s discussion of 
class privilege, because comedy has its own long-established fascination with 
class, and its depictions are historically specific. All in the Family is a US 
remake of a well-known British sitcom, ‘Til Death Do Us Part, both aired during 
the 1970s, both of which revolved around a caricature of a certain kind of white 
working class sexism and bigotry. Therefore, the characters involved in the 
conversation, and the things they are talking about – bowling shoes – are 
bound up in a certain representation of working class persons and lifestyles. 
And third, it makes me wonder about how I might embark upon a task of 
producing scholarly work on stand-up comedy in early twenty-first century 
Britain, and do so from the embodied position of a woman. How might I 
exercise responsibility with regard to the figures within my own text?  
 
It is here that I turn to the work of Barbara Johnson, a contemporary and 
colleague of de Man who called attention to the ‘patterns of female effacement’ 
within his work, and more pervasively within the critical texts produced by the 
so-called ‘Yale School’ of which he was the leading member. De Man’s 
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dismissive treatment of Edith Bunker serves as her closing example. In his 
explication of the Bunkers’ marital exchange de Man does not name Edith 
Bunker, nor does he quote directly her response to her husband’s utterance, 
merely sufficing to make reference to her explanation of ‘the difference between 
lacing over and lacing under, whatever this may be…’.43 Johnson reads this as 
an instance of the 'repeated dramatization of women as simulacrum, erasure, or 
silence',44 a trope recurring within the Western aesthetic tradition, and repeated 
apparently unselfconsciously within many of the deconstructionist treatises on 
literature and rhetoric published in the 1970s and 1980s. Amongst her 
examples, she includes de Man’s tongue-in-cheek response to Locke’s 
comparison of rhetorical language to ‘the fair sex’. When Locke writes that, like 
women, ‘eloquence.. has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be 
spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault in those arts of deceiving wherein 
men find pleasure to be deceived’, de Man satirizes him via an extended 
metaphor imagining the philosophical tradition as a ‘gentlemen’s club’, into 
which a woman would only be tolerated as a picture framed on the wall, 
'preferably naked', before adding, wryly, 'things only get serious when the 
plumber must be called in'.45 As Johnson notes, de Man might be critiquing 
Locke’s anti-rhetorical prejudice, but does so by perpetuating his sexist rhetoric.  
 
Johnson includes her own earlier work in her critique, commenting 'it is not 
enough to be a woman writing in order to resist the pseudogenderlessness of 
language'. She concludes by encapsulating the difficult task of feminist 
deconstruction as ‘undertaking the effort of reinflection or translation required 
[…] to learn to listen with retrained ears to Edith Bunker's patient elaboration of 
the question, "What is the difference?"’.46 Johnson thus lays down a challenge, 
one that I have attempted to respond to in the second half of this chapter. First, 
before Edith can return, I must turn my attention to a further encounter between 
men: both deconstructionists, one a comedian, the other a theorist.  
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4. Deconstruction and wee  
 
The vignette Jackson sketches belongs to a particular discursive context – a 
time, a place, an artistic scene – that at first might appear very different from the 
one in which I find myself, as the weirded-out scholar at a stand-up comedy gig 
in twenty-first century Britain. But Jackson’s discussion prompts me to reflect 
anew upon what kinds of new professional tensions and alignments are 
emerging as stand-up makes its way into the academy. The example of stand-
up comedy makes it necessary to look again at the terms of the scholar-versus-
artist divide. On the one hand, Oliver Double appears to bridge that gap. But, on 
the other hand, the working conditions of stand-up – the competitive 
atmosphere of the circuit, the long runs at Edinburgh, the multi-date national 
tours – exacerbate the sense of a division between those who sit within the 
sequestered halls of academia and think about performance and those who 
actually get out there and do it. Stewart Lee, for example, frames the value and 
the challenge of his profession like this: 
 
Out in the provinces, beyond the citadel of theatre, the stand-up 
comedians that pitch up to council-funded venues around the country are 
actually the closest thing punters there get to experiencing real art.47  
 
He is irritated by the oft-repeated favourable summation of a comedian’s work 
as ‘the closest stand-up comedy gets to art’, complaining that the implication is, 
as far as the arbiters of high culture are concerned, ‘however good stand-up 
gets, it can never really be art’ (157). Indeed, 'In the world of the arts, a 
comedian, despite all the skills they pick up in the harshest environments, is 
never more than a “trade”.’ However, Lee writes that, by the time he had 
finished work on his 2005 show 90’s Comedian, he was more than happy to 
embrace the idea of himself as a sort of tradesman: ‘Leave me here, all you 
legitimate artists,’ he writes, ‘with my can of lager and my notebook’ (158). It is 
worth remembering at this point that, since the early days of cinema, the tasks 
associated with manual labour have been appropriated for comic purposes: 
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think of Buster Keaton sawing through a plank, or the Lumière Brothers’ early 
sketch about a thwarted gardener, or Laurel and Hardy as jobbing handymen. 
The figure of the tradesman or manual laborer, it seems, has interdisciplinary 
appeal, appropriated by comedians and artists alike (and, in the case of Lee, by 
a comedian asserting his status as a non-artist). In 2007, art journal Frieze 
released an issue with the theme: ‘The Slapstick Method: Art and Comic 
Timing’. Inside, Brian Dillon offered nine ‘Theses on Slapstick’, referring to 
Laurel and Hardy as ‘theorists of slowness’.48 It is possible, then, for slapstick’s 
inept handyman to be elevated to the status of a theorist (a position that, for 
Jackson, enjoys a certain ‘class privilege’). Via a series of displacements, it 
seems we are getting further and further from the actuality of labour, from the 
manual competence of a plumber or car mechanic.  
 
Back in 1994, Stewart Lee described himself as ‘the third most theoretically 
rigorous comedian in Britain’,49 which sounds funny. Is this because comedians 
are not customarily thought of as theorists, or because theorists are not usually 
ranked and numbered according to their ‘rigorousness’? In the years since 
1994, Lee has gained acclaim for his work, and the critical consensus would 
seem to suggest that Lee’s stand-up is unusual in a way that could indeed be 
termed ‘theoretically rigorous’. There seems to be doubt as to whether what he 
is doing can be called ‘comedy’ at all: he is said to practice ‘anti-comedy’ or 
‘meta-comedy’,50 or – and this is the most interesting in the current context – to 
be ‘deconstructing’ comedy.51 What is it about Lee’s work that elicits such 
descriptions? Perhaps the way he tells simplistic or idiotic jokes, and then 
berates his audience for laughing at them, or the way he interrupts his own 
jokes to explain why they are not working. Such explanations are often lengthy, 
and lot of people find them irritating. Others find them funny, which might lead 
us to the conclusion that, if what Stewart Lee does is deconstruction, then it’s 
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not something he does only to comedy; he also does it as comedy. In this case, 
the question we should be asking is not whether or not deconstruction – as a 
theory, or method – is appropriate to the reading of stand-up comedy, but 
instead, how it is that deconstruction can itself, in certain circumstances, 
become funny.  
 
So, on September the 11th, 2001…  
 
This is the first line of Stand-Up Comedian. Abrupt, after the forced jollity of 
Lee’s entrance, with its upbeat music, audience applause, that little comedian-
style jog onto the stage, up to the mic. In a footnote, Lee concedes that, to his 
reader, cutting the party atmosphere dead with a reference to the tragedy of the 
World Trade Center ‘probably seems in poor taste’. But, he notes ‘three years 
after 9/11, when I first began performing this show, the event was still 
inescapable on a daily basis, percolating even apparently unrelated media’ (44).  
 
Although Lee himself does not acknowledge this directly, it is arguably no 
coincidence that Lee begins Stand-Up Comedian with a reference to this date, 
the events of which ‘had changed everything' (44). This was Lee’s first show 
after a four-year break from stand-up, the first of the three transcribed in Lee’s 
self-canonizing memoir How I Escaped My Certain Fate. The blunt, literalist title 
of the show, which was listed in the 2004 Edinburgh Fringe programme as 
Stewart Lee – Stand-Up Comedian, further reinforces the sense of this as a 
deliberate moment of re-redefinition on Lee’s part.  
 
As the show goes on, Lee uses the ever-present backdrop of 9/11 to drive 
discussions around public rhetoric and what he names as ‘all the myths, lies 
and macho nostalgia that go towards forging any national identity' (73), but also 
around comedy itself as a form of public rhetoric. He seems, at various 
moments, to be addressing the particular anxieties that might attend the 
enjoyment of, even the reveling in, trivialities – silly jokes, idle talk, in the 
aftermath of a world-changing event such as the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre. At the top of the show, with the reference to 9/11, the atmosphere in the 
room is abruptly altered. The still-recent tragedy is a sensitive topic, not the kind 
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of subject matter that lends itself easily to jokes. After a pause, Lee continues 
with his anecdote. 'On September the 11th, 2001, I was on holiday,' he 
explains, 
 
And I was actually in the city of Granada in southern Spain, right. It's an 
interesting place. Granada was kind of the last point of Muslim 
occupation in medieval Europe. It's still a very mixed city – lots of 
mosques, lots of churches too, lots of Arab Spaniards and white 
European Spaniards, all getting on fine. (45) 
 
Hearing news of the attacks, Lee enters a local bar to watch the television 
coverage. It is when George W. Bush comes onscreen, proffering warlike 
rhetoric, that the atmosphere changes. 'There was suddenly a horrible tension 
between the Arab Spaniards and the white European Spaniards in this 
previously happy bar.’ After a while, Lee can't take it, so, he says, 'I went into 
the Gents to do a wee, and, er…'. He interrupts his anecdote at this point, 
acknowledging, 'A couple of people over there sniggered at the word ‘wee’. 
That’s fine, I know this is a tense subject to open with and I’m, I’m happy that 
the word ‘wee’ has helped diffuse the atmosphere a bit.' And so he continues, ‘I 
was standing there, doing a wee… out of my cock… and it was yellow… and 
smelt of wee' (47). 
 
This little interruption, a minor derailing of the topic at hand in order to revel in 
that which appears to have disrupted his efforts to tell a ‘serious’ story – the 
audience getting distracted by the mention of the word “wee” – might, at a push, 
be thought of as a deconstructive moment. Lee is putting his audience in the 
position of deconstructive readers who, according to Johnson’s definition, are 
the kind of readers who pay attention to ‘what readers have traditionally been 
trained to disregard, overcome, explain away or edit out’.52 Johnson is thinking 
of ‘contradictions, obscurities, ambiguities, incoherences, discontinuities, 
ellipses, interruptions, repetitions, and plays of the signifier’53 – all the disruptive 
textual elements that deconstructionsts might be accused of taking a little bit too 
much pleasure in. For the critics of de Man, and of deconstructive theory more 
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generally, the constant focus on the obstacles to meaning were not only 
irritating, but somehow irresponsible, seeming to amount to what Cathy Caruth 
defines as a claim that ‘language cannot refer adequately to the world and 
indeed may not refer to anything at all, leaving language, literature and even 
consciousness in general, cut off from historical reality’.54 Terry Eagleton 
appears to suggest as much when, he writes that deconstruction views 
‘famines, revolutions, soccer matches and sherry trifles as yet more 
undecidable text’.55 Offering her take, Caruth argues that de Man’s work did not 
deny that language could refer, but rather sought to problematize reference, 
and in so doing critique a certain Western conception of linguistic signification, 
one that promoted the idea that there was something natural, necessary and 
inherent in the link between words and things. De Man demonstrated how this 
myth, which promoted as necessary signs and symbols whose link with their 
meaning was, in fact, arbitrary, is woven through Western literature and 
thought, constituting a powerful and pervasive 'aesthetic ideology'. This can be 
detected, for example, in the strand of literary theory that stems from 
romanticism, which espouses a model of linguistic reference based upon 
natural law. According to this way of thinking, W.B. Yeats’ celebrated line ‘how 
can we know the dancer from the dance?’ offers a ‘vision of aesthetic 
wholeness’. And, by extension, as the critic Wendy Steiner puts it,  
 
a work of literature was a whole, a system, a body in which meaning and 
form were one, in which every idea in the text was expressed through its 
structure, and the ideas ‘meant’ the structure as well.56  
 
This, perhaps, seems far away from Lee standing onstage in 2004 and talking 
about weeing out of his cock. But there’s something going on here – not only in 
what Lee does onstage, but also in how Lee explains what he does onstage – 
that sets in motion a distinctly deManian set of questions. In a footnote to the 
‘weeing out of my cock’ line, Lee reflects, ‘I suppose what I was doing here was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1996), p. 74. 
55 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 146.  
56 Wendy Steiner, The Scandal of Pleasure: Art in an Age of Fundamentalism (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 200. 
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trying to exploit the tension of discussing something puerile in the midst of 
something terribly serious’. And then, undercutting his reflective tone, adds, 
‘Also, wee is funny’ (47). This move is reminiscent of the one that Seinfeld pulls 
when, in the New York Times video, he is pressed as to why he considers the 
line ‘we were like chimps in the dirt playing with sticks’ to be successful. He 
responds by giving one of those blank-faced smiles he’s so practiced at, 
flashing his white teeth at the camera and saying, as if it were the simplest thing 
in the world: ‘chimps are funny!’ We could read the subtext of this kind of 
statement as saying ‘of course’, ‘everybody knows’, or ‘it’s the most natural 
thing in the world’. The fact that, in Seinfeld’s case, what is under discussion is 
an image that represents something like a ‘state of nature’ only compounds the 
impression that there is some recourse to ‘natural law’ in this shoulder-
shrugging statement of self-evidence. But, as the twinkle in his eye suggests, it 
is a performance too, a performance comparable to that of Liz LeCompte 
perhaps, a way of deflecting interpretive efforts by saying ‘I’m very literal, as 
you can see’.  
 
Admittedly, Lee’s footnote about wee is not quite as blunt as my selective 
quotation implied. In full, the line reads, ‘Also, wee is funny, especially if it is 
being weed out of a cock. Into a toilet. On 9/11’ (47). Although this is not 
necessarily a fuller explanation, by further demonstrating the joke, Lee does 
seem to be going further than a Seinfeld/LeCompte ‘all I have are some literal 
objects’ moment. Historical context is at stake here, it seems. And, at this 
moment, we might recall Eagleton’s wry critique of what he evidently takes to 
be the ‘trivialising’ effects of deconstruction, the way it views ‘famines, 
revolutions, soccer matches and sherry trifles as yet more undecidable text’. In 
light of Lee’s ‘wee’ moment, it might be observed that Eagleton’s critique is 
expressed in a way that performs a comic incongruity, juxtaposing ‘serious’ 
historical events something, if not puerile, then certainly pretty trivial (it’s 
perhaps too much to point out it is literally ‘a trifle’). For now, I will do little more 
than nod to the gender specificity of Lee’s example, to the fact that he is talking 
not about sherry trifles, but about weeing out of a cock, in a Gents, near the 
start of a show in which he explicitly seeks to debunk ‘macho myths of 
nationhood’.  
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Eagleton’s statement performs the same kind of humour as Lee’s footnote, 
although the sequence is reversed: whereas Eagleton’s relies on a ‘downwards’ 
movement from the important to the absolutely trivial, Lee’s moves ‘up’, or 
perhaps ‘out’ from the puerile to the terribly serious, into what, citing de Man, we 
might think of as 'the non-verbal "outside".57 And metaphors of inside and 
outside are often invoked when people want to talk about what a text does, or 
doesn’t do, or should do. For example on the back cover of Lee’s book it says: 
‘See how jokes work, their inner mechanisms revealed, before your astonished 
face!’. Noble also refers to the ‘inner workings of comedy’, a metaphor that 
invites us to think of the comedian as a sort of skilled mechanic.  
 
Once upon a time, in literary studies, the prevailing understanding of the 
relation between form and content, was that form was on the outside, the 
meaning on the inside. As with the ‘well wrought urn’ – the critic’s job is to be 
the one able to release the secrets held within the pot, whilst celebrating its 
lovely shape. But, as de Man notes,  
 
The development of intrinsic, formalist criticism in the twentieth century 
has changed this model; form is now a solipsistic category of self-
reflection, and the referential meaning is said to be extrinsic. The 
polarities of inside and outside have been reversed […] internal meaning 
has become outside reference.58 
 
De Man points out that, because its code is often so conspicuous, and complex, 
literature necessarily breeds its own formalism. However, ‘no literary formalism, 
no matter how accurate and enriching in its analytic powers, is ever allowed to 
come into being without seeming reductive’. And this means that the project of 
the literary critic, the close reader, for whom form can quite easily become an 
‘all absorbing and tyrannical muse’, generates a sense of ethical anxiety: all this 
inwardness is thought to be unhealthy. This is why, as de Man notes, formalism 
is often described no longer in terms of the well-wrought urn, but via ‘an 
imagery of imprisonment and claustrophobia: the “prison house of language”'. 
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And thus the impulse to move ‘beyond formalism’ in order to ‘devote ourselves 
to foreign affairs, the external politics of literature’, and make the effects of our 
work felt in 'the non-verbal "outside" to which language refers’. This can lead to 
attempts ‘to reconcile the internal, formal, private structures of literary language 
with their external, referential, and public events', which, although driven by a 
‘'highly respectable moral imperative’, tends to lead to the creation of ‘false 
models and metaphors’.59 It is when such false metaphors become, according 
to de Man’s term, ‘totalising’, that the powers of abstraction – the aesthetic 
ideology – take hold.  
 
 
5. A joke 'about' a tea cosy  
 
And then there is a joke about a tea cosy. Twenty minutes into Stand-Up 
Comedian, after his account of weeing on 9/11, Lee tells a joke about a tea 
cosy. Or, to be more accurate, a tea cosy features in a joke about the American 
national character. ‘They’re not a naturally curious people,’ he says 
 
If you were to lock an American for sixty years in an empty underground 
bunker which contained nothing but a woolly tea cosy, the American 
would not even be tempted to see if the tea cosy would make a 
serviceable hat.60 
 
At the scene of Lee’s (recorded) performance, this joke gets a laugh. That is the 
first thing to note: it is, on these terms, a successful joke. There are certain 
elements of its set-up that I could cite here – contextualising factors, both 
internal and external to the text of Stand-Up Comedian, which might be 
considered relevant to a reading of this joke. I might, for example, remind you 
that Lee created and performed this stand-up show in 2004, three years after 
the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on New York, the fallout of which led to the still-
recent US led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. I might also explain that the 
tea cosy joke marks the rhythmic climax of a sequence that begins with Lee’s 
assertion that ‘America is currently the most hated country in the world’, and 
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continues, by a slightly unexpected turn, with the repeated invocation ‘you 
mustn’t hate Americans’, because ‘they live in a state of ignorant, prelapsarian 
bliss. They don’t know what’s going on.’   
 
However, you might well argue that none of this is, strictly speaking, relevant to 
the joke, at least in formalist terms, by which I mean, whether or not you know 
any of it, the joke still works: all you need to know in order to ‘get’ this joke is 
that there is such a thing as a tea cosy, and that there is a certain degree of 
resemblance between a tea cosy and a hat. Arguably, the joke relies less on its 
caricature of a national character, than on the idea (introduced via negation) of 
a person putting a tea cosy on their head, as though it were a hat. And, with 
proper joke timing, this image is held back until the very last syllable of the joke: 
‘hat’. It’s a blunt, flat sort of word. Has an impact, rhymes with ‘splat’. And 
indeed, the end of a joke, the punchline, (i.e. what makes it a joke) is often 
talked about in these terms, using words that suggest a sudden physical impact 
– a slap, or snap, or thwack, a jolt, or a fall, or a pie in the face. 
 
Recalling Jerry Seinfeld’s account of crafting a joke, the way he talks about 
counting syllables, shaving letters of words in order to make sure that the 
thwack of the punchline comes not a split-second too early or late, we could 
take a closer look at what Seinfeld would call the ‘connective tissue’ of this joke, 
the way it not only delays the punchline, but it gets us in exactly the right place 
to feel its full force. That impactful final word, ‘hat’, comes right at the end of a 
rather lofty sentence, one that is grammatically and syntactically complex. In the 
very first word, ‘If…’, we hear that the tense is conditional, the mood 
subjunctive:  
 
If you were  
 
This is speculative, it is about what might or could take place, hypothetically. A 
string of prepositions and conjunctions next –  
 
to lock an American… for sixty years…. in an empty underground 
bunker… which contained nothing… 
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but a woolly tea cosy 
 
the surprise of the tea cosy is followed by a negative conditional – 
 
the American would not even be tempted to… 
 
The repetition, the wordiness, the careful delivery – all of this also serves to 
generate anticipation. What would the American not even be tempted to do…? 
 
  … see if the tea cosy would make a… 
 
And then, before the final reveal, the word ‘hat’, there is a further delay, in the 
shape of that peculiarly formal, polysyllabic word – 
 
…serviceable… 
 
 – a word that is doing not only rhythmic work (delaying the final impactful 
syllable of the joke), but lending a certain incongruous formality to Lee’s mode 
of speaking. And it ends in a satisfying moment of closure – of ‘fit’. The tea cosy 
would make a serviceable hat. Like Seinfeld says, ‘You know in my world, the 
wronger something feels, the righter it is.’ This formalist reading reaches a nice 
moment of resolution: the tea cosy fits because it shouldn’t and it feels so silly, 
and so right.  
 
But we are not going to leave it here, just as Stewart Lee does not leave it here. 
Thus far I have cited only the first part of what is, in practice, onstage, an 
extended sequence in which the words ‘tea cosy’ are repeatedly sounded. 
 
So, it begins with the apparently self-contained, hermetically sealed, joke,  
 
If you were to lock an American for sixty years in an empty underground 
bunker which contained nothing but a woolly tea cosy, the American would 
not even be tempted to see if the tea cosy would make a serviceable hat. 
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But then,  
 
They’re far more likely to arrest the tea cosy, intern it illegally in 
Guantanamo Bay, and then repeatedly anally rape it until such a time that 
it admits that it was actually a member of an al-Qaeda training cell. Even 
though at the time of the alleged offence the tea cosy was actually working 
as a shop assistant in a branch of Currys in Wolverhampton.  
 
It might be observed that, in a formal sense, this adheres to classic joke form: 
another wordy build-up, another punchline, another incongruous image held off 
until the very end of a long sentence. This time, the lofty formality of the 
sentence is amplified by that quasi-judicial register (‘until such a time’, ‘the 
alleged offence’), that then 'falls' into the incongruous particularity of the 
punchline: a ‘branch of Currys in Wolverhampton’. But in spite of its formal 
credentials, this is not a joke to equal the previous one. No, there’s something 
about this ‘joke’ that doesn’t feel right. Stewart Lee acknowledges this. 
According to the transcript, he says, 
 
Some laughs there, other people are a bit confused. “What’s he talking 
about?”  
Right? OK, well, again, that’s a kind of bit of satire of the fact that some 
of the British citizens held in Guantanamo Bay were tortured into saying 
that they’d been in al-Qaeda camps, even though at the time they were 
supposed to be there, they were actually working as shop assistants in a 
branch of Currys in Wolverhampton.  
 
The explanation Lee offers, testily, onstage is of a different order to the ‘chimps 
are funny!’ kind of explanation. It is a direct reference to what, following de Man, 
we might name as ‘external, referential, and public events', matters of historical 
record.61 But Lee’s onstage explanation, although it appears to point clearly to 
the ‘outside world’, is not what you’d call ‘straight’. Because Lee is playing a 
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game here – acting as if the audience’s muted response was due to their lack of 
comprehension, a failure to get the reference, rather than admit that it was 
actually, probably due to the slightly tenuous and slightly logic-defying segue he 
has just made. Because, tonally, the shift was too abrupt. Lee swerved too 
quickly out of the nice, satisfying line about being locked in a bunker with a tea 
cosy and not trying it on as a hat, a well-formed joke, with fuzzy charm, that 
works ‘in isolation’, into something that seems to fancy itself as biting topical 
satire. It feels too violent, and that reference to sexual violence (which is an 
exaggerated version of the abuse alleged to have taken place at Guantanamo), 
compounds the impropriety of his figural scheme which, effectively, drags the 
tea cosy out of the hypothetical bunker and into the post-9/11 world, the world 
of Currys in Wolverhampton, in order to make an entirely predictable swipe at 
the aggressiveness of US foreign policy.  
 
But then, Lee makes an unexpected move: 
 
Other people I sense are going, “Yeah, we know about that. That’s not 
what’s confusing us. What’s confusing us here in Glasgow is the idea of 
a tea cosy working as a shop assistant in a branch of Currys. How could 
that possibly work?” 
 
What has he done here? He has directly acknowledged the audience’s 
response, blamed the joke’s failure on their miscomprehension. And what has 
emerged from this? A figure, a strange and distracting one. Much stranger, and 
much more distracting, than the image of a tea-cosy-as-hat. And, in a particular 
way, this figure is more powerfully distracting than the historical events Lee has 
just explained.  
 
Lee is the one articulating this miscomprehension, by saying ‘what’s confusing 
us..’ speaking in a voice he ascribes to his audience, or at least a part of his 
audience. That word, ‘comprehension’, with its memories of school reading 
exercises, usefully highlights not only the linguistic, but the readerly, nature of 
this problem. And miscomprehension, rather than incomprehension, is the word 
for this. As with the Austinian ‘misfire’, this is not a simple absence of effect; 
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something else is done. It’s not that by not ‘getting the joke’ the audience gets 
nothing at all. It is, rather, that they get something (some Thing) aberrant: the 
tea cosy shop assistant, the idea of it.  
 
There is also a displacement of agency here. Lee has (with feigned 
unwittingness) allowed the aberrant figure of a tea-cosy-as-shop-assistant to be 
invoked, as though it were an accident, the result of a miscommunication, rather 
than a figure created by Stewart Lee. And, what follows is several minutes 
during which the onward flow of Lee’s narrative, his show, gets stalled on this 
question of the tea cosy. A brief vignette illustrating the question of how a tea 
cosy might ‘work’ as a shop assistant is offered, a discussion as to what kinds 
of other items might be listed as working alongside the tea cosy is staged, and 
the question of how Lee might come up with a satisfactory end to the tea cosy 
routine is both discussed and deflected by Lee’s admission that the joke, in the 
first place, was plagiarized. In one sense, then, Lee uses the aberration of the 
tea cosy to stage a demonstration and a discussion of his own ‘problems at 
work’. But it is not Lee’s work, the work of a professional comedian, that will 
interest me in the pages that follow. My interest lies, principally, in the question 
of the figure itself. A ‘figure’ can mean a picture or illustration offered for the 
purposes of example. Or it can mean a body, a human body. The figural 
aberration of the tea cosy has an uncertain status between human and thing. 
And therefore, I am going to approach the tea cosy as an illustrative example of 
the problem of the figure: the question of the human-like-thing, and the thing-
like-human.  
 
In the first part of the joke, the words ‘tea cosy’ refer to the thing of that name. It 
is what might be called a ‘literal object’. Whether or not we imagine the tea cosy 
as a referent ‘outside’ or ‘inside’ the joke, it is definitely a knitted covering for a 
tea pot that we are supposed to think of when we hear those words. But, the 
second part of the joke is different. As soon as Lee says ‘arrest the tea cosy’, 
we are to understand that Lee does not literally mean ‘knitted covering for tea 
pot’, but is using the words rhetorically, as a stand-in. ‘Tea cosy’ now implies, 
indirectly, ‘person’ – and the question of the particularity of the person (i.e. a 
man, a man who has been singled out because of his religious and ethnic 
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identity) is one that we will not address directly, not yet, although we shall keep 
it close by.    
 
What is funny about the final rhetorical move of this section, the one in which 
Lee attributes miscomprehension of the rhetorical meaning of ‘tea cosy’, is the 
way it draws attention to the sheer arbitrariness of the figure, ‘a tea cosy 
working as a shop assistant in a branch of Curry’s in Wolverhampton’. There is 
nothing that feels ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ or ‘necessary’ about this. It’s not the 
dancer and the dance; there are no seductive similarities, no magical 
reconciliation between sign and referent. A tea cosy bears no resemblance to a 
human being, and it is by a series of substitutions that it has ended up as a 
shop assistant in a specific branch of an electrical superstore. De Man would 
call these substitutions ‘metonymic’. Unlike metaphor or symbol, a metonymic 
substitution carries with it no illusion of necessity linkage. Unlike metaphor, 
which substitutes one property for another on the basis of resemblance, and 
thus implies a necessary and organic link, metonymy ‘replaces the name of one 
thing with another closely associated with it’ and is marked by contingency.62 
After all, two things can become ‘closely associated’ by habit, or coincidence, or 
simply by dint of having ended up next to one another.  
 
De Man seems to have person-thing confusions specifically in mind when, 
during the course of his explication of the difference between metaphor and 
metonymy, he comments: 
 
An element of truth is involved in taking Achilles for a lion 
but none in taking Mr. Ford for a motor car. 63 
 
What he is trying to get across with this comparison is that metaphor has an 
‘inference of identity’,64 i.e. Achilles might be compared to a lion in order to 
communicate his lion-like qualities of strength and fierceness, whereas 
metonym is a ‘purely relational’ form of ‘contact’, i.e. you call your car ‘a Ford’ 
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not because there is any resemblance between the man who was named Henry 
Ford and the car itself, but because the vehicle was manufactured by a motor 
company named after the industrialist who founded it. But the association 
between tea cosy and shop assistant is not like that between Henry Ford and 
the motorcar, an association that carries with it the legal recognition of not only 
one man’s ownership of a corporation, but also the legally enshrined rights of 
that corporation, and its management, to own property in the name ‘Ford’. The 
association between the tea cosy and the shop assistant is weak (as are the 
figures ‘tea cosy’ and ‘shop assistant’ when compared with Mr. Ford or 
Achilles), established only within the space of this routine, this performance, in 
the space of an imagined exchange with an audience-figure. Tea cosy has not 
even a circumstantial relation with shop assistant, it is merely a word carried 
over from a previous figure and has no necessary link with its meaning. The 
only relationship between the words ‘tea cosy’ and a shop assistant is that 
which the joke itself has set up, rather tenuously.  
 
This relation could be described as one of ‘metalepsis’, defined by Harold 
Bloom as the process whereby ‘a word is substituted metonymically for a word 
in a previous trope’, which means it can be described ‘maddeningly but 
accurately, a metonymy of a metonymy.’ 65 An example of metalepsis might be 
useful at this point: suppose, intending to rise early, I say ‘I have to catch the 
worm tomorrow’. In this instance, the idea of catching the worm has, of course, 
been borrowed from the common saying ‘the early bird catches the worm’. I am 
saying I want to be like the bird, and yet, by omitting mention of the bird, I might 
to the literal-minded (or pedantic) listener, appear to be stating some 
inexplicable intention to get hold of a worm. Sixteenth-century literary critic 
George Puttenham wrote evocatively of ‘the hearer's conceit strangely 
entangled by the figure metalepsis,’ naming the figure, ‘the Far-fetched. As 
when we had rather fetch a word a great way off than use one nearer to hand to 
express the manner as well and plainer’. He adds that, ‘it seemeth the deviser 
of this figure had a desire to please women rather than men, for we use to say 
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by manner of proverb, things far fetched and dear bought are good for ladies’. 66 
Of all the ways figurative language can make a mess of straight talking, 
metalepsis does not appear to be considered one of the more sinister or 
threatening. Rather, it is called ‘strange’, dismissed as a feminized frivolity.  
 
But something doesn't feel quite right. Because what has been occluded by  the 
‘far fetching’ of Lee’s tea cosy (out of the imaginary bunker, into the electrical 
superstore) is a reference to a real person, a real historical event, a real act of 
oppression. Someone has been unlawfully incarcerated and subjected to 
human rights abuses and Lee is making a joke out of it. Is my method of 
reading, fixating on this figure compounding the problem? After all, I identify the 
joke with the tea cosy. I call it ‘a joke about a tea cosy’ and this, in some sense, 
is my own joke. I spent a year writing about a tea cosy. Knowledge about tea 
cosies is, it might be argued, a particularized and fairly trivial kind of knowledge, 
and the joke functions in willful, careless ignorance of events in the real world, 
of history.  
 
 
6. Literalness and serviceability  
 
This seems like as good a moment as any to ask what exactly the word ‘literal’ 
means. It could be said that, in simple terms, speaking literally is equated with 
'straight talking'. Literal language is straightforwardly referential, like ‘calling a 
spade a spade’, it points directly at things in the world, and thus offers a direct 
route out of the linguistic (or the literary, or rhetorical) and into the concrete, the 
actual. However much we might enjoy a bit of ‘wordplay’, literal talking is what 
we resort to when we need to be pragmatic, to get things done; we need literal 
language to go about our business. As the linguist Michael Toolan observes, 
'The definition of literal word and sentence meanings […] amounts to an appeal, 
in determining meanings, to the information enshrined in a reliable grammar 
and dictionary of language'. The idea that there is such a thing as literal 
reference acts as a sort of underlying ‘guarantee’ of the trustworthiness of 
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language itself. Toolan calls it a ‘deeply embedded convenience of Western 
thought’.67 
 
But, as readers of both de Man and Lee might already have noted, the attempt 
to talk about the literal is full of funny figures – figures for pragmatism – who 
linger for just a moment too long on the imagery within the above text, with its 
spade and its deeply embedded convenience, and we’re back to plumbers and 
gardeners. The suspicion that literal language has something to do with work is 
further fuelled by the way Toolan demonstrates the unreliability of an appeal to 
the ‘determining meanings’ of the literal, via the example of ‘John got the sack’. 
As Toolan explains, if 'literal meaning purports to express more "basic" or 
foundational meanings, those residing first in a sentence's component words', 
then a literal interpretation would read something like ‘“John fetched/received 
the (nonrigid) container”’.68  
 
Toolan’s staged misreading demonstrates the disjunction between a word’s 
literal meaning and so-called ‘intended meaning’, the meaning a word acquires 
through use or context or habit. Putting the question of work, or employment, 
aside for now, I want to spend a few moments thinking about the funniness of 
literalism. It’s a kind of funniness that can come across as either childish, or 
dad-like in its pedantry, or, in some contexts, superior and condescending, a 
form of linguistic conservatism (which is often not very funny at the time). In 
either case, it’s often obstructive, interruptive. A sort of willful 
miscomprehension that refuses to acknowledge the meaning the words have 
acquired through usage or take on in a specific situated context. And yes, it can 
be funny: ‘Are you trying to tell me that today John was dismissed from his 
employment? Or do you mean that he has fetched the nonrigid container?’. 
What really makes it funny, I think, is the way in which this literalising 
interpretation of the utterance retrieves the thing, the way it takes ‘got the sack’ 
and gets the sack. I mean, the non-rigid container, or the large bag made from 
a material such as hessian or thick paper and used for the storing or carrying of 
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goods.  
 
I’m quoting The Oxford English Dictionary here, in order to suggest that the 
funniness of literalism has something to do with the idea of a definition. There is 
a disjunction between the serious-sounding language of definition, and what 
might be thought of as the thingness of the referent. Because it’s not just that a 
literal interpretation mistakes ‘got the sack’ for ‘fetched the non-rigid container’, 
but that it replaces the word ‘sack’ with a description of a sack. It is as though, 
the effort to get ever closer to the ‘base level’ of reference – literal language – 
begets only more language (the language of patient explanation liable to make 
its speaker come across as either a high-minded pedant, or a sublimely 
simplistic literalist). A case in point: The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘hat’ 
as ‘a shaped covering for the head’.69 This is the literal meaning of the word. 
Why does this dictionary definition make me feel like I want to laugh? It might 
have something to do with the excess of those five words, ‘shaped covering for 
the head’ standing in for just one: ‘hat’. Why is it then, that it seems in this 
definition that the very thingness of the referent – the hatness of the hat, the 
sackness of the sack, the bagginess of the non-rigid container – is somehow 
making a mockery of the very idea of a definition, and thus of the supposedly 
clear, pure and direct language of truth? Making it seem somehow excessive 
and – crucially – indirect. ‘Shaped covering for the head’ seems to take us 
further away from ‘hat’, even as it seeks to get to the bottom of what a hat really 
is. The definition of ‘hat’ performs both the deferral and the odd presence of 
‘hat’. Indeed, the definition of the word ‘hat’ is so essentially hat that it isn’t hat 
at all.  
 
Serviceable, though. That word comes into play here. Lee’s joke asks us to 
conceive of the tea cosy as a ‘serviceable hat’. And, it might be conjectured, in 
order to ‘get’ the joke, you do a bit of literalizing dictionary work yourself, you 
think, ‘hat… shaped covering for the head… tea cosy… shaped covering of 
another sort… OK’.  Shape, or form, is the defining quality. The shape is what 
the tea cosy and the hat have in common. It is also the basic factor in the 
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functionality of both. And functionality is what is at stake, as intimated by that 
all-important qualifier serviceable. According to the dictionary, a serviceable 
item is one that is ‘fulfilling its function adequately; usable or in working order 
[…] functional and durable rather than attractive’. And there is some 
coincidence here, is there not, between the dictionary definition of hat, as 
‘shaped covering for the head’, and the value of basic, un-fancy functionality 
designated by ‘serviceable’. The minimum requirements to be met by a 
‘serviceable hat’ are that it cover the head, or to be more precise, that it in some 
sense fit the head it covers – hence ‘shaped’ rather than shapeless, formless or 
loose like, say, a scarf. And here we’re getting into another sort of discussion, I 
think. A discussion of aesthetics. In ‘A Plea for Excuses,’ Austin notes, ‘how 
much it is to be wished that similar field work will soon be undertaken in, say, 
aesthetics; if only we could forget for a while about the beautiful and get down 
instead to the dainty and the dumpy’.70 Something affective is creeping in, a 
funniness around the idea of form, and its failure. Not the well-wrought urn, nor 
the even the mildly elegant-sounding ‘shaped covering’, but the formless, the 
baggy, the dumpy.  
 
A tea cosy might be shaped like a hat, but it is not a hat. Perhaps the tea cosy 
is too conspicuously not like a hat for the person in the bunker? Perhaps there 
is some falling-short, and/or some excess of hatness here. A tea cosy has holes 
at either side – one for the handle, one for the spout. So perhaps, for the joke’s 
subject (or, we might say, object), the bunker-bound American, the tea cosy 
appears too much not a hat, its non-hat qualities are too conspicuous. For Lee 
stipulates that the bunkered person would not be tempted to ‘see’ whether the 
tea cosy would make a serviceable hat. And to see is to understand – it might, 
perhaps, suggest a certain kind of relationship between the domain of the 
mental and that of the material. Because, anyway, the bunker is a hypothetical 
place, a place of the mind. Indeed, it is, somehow, an exaggerated figural 
evocation of what the purely hypothetical, the staged-for-the-purposes-of-
theoretical-argument feels like; chilly. A tea cosy is warm, though. That’s the 
whole point of a tea cosy. And in this way, its function is similar to that of a 
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certain kind of hat, a hat you’d wear not for show, but to keep your head warm. 
It may be, then, that the tea cosy does not fall short of, but exceeds the 
requirements of a serviceable hat. Because tea cosies are the kinds of 
homespun items often adorned with decorative features: bobbles, pompoms, 
tassels perhaps. And what is emerging here, perhaps, is a little friction about 
particularity, a distracting kind of decorativeness, which interjects a further 
incongruity between the idea of a serviceable hat (suggesting something plain, 
stripped of particularity, like the dictionary definition), and the whimsical, 
handcrafted, tasseled thing you might well imagine when you hear the words 
‘tea cosy’.  
 
And here it becomes necessary to start asking questions about context. 
Because the way ‘you’ imagine the tea cosy, or whether or not you are able to 
bring an image of a tea cosy to mind, depends on certain circumstances – 
historical, cultural, and social. In order to ‘get’ the joke, you do need to know 
what a tea cosy is, and you need to know that there is a certain resemblance 
between a tea cosy and a hat. And, it might be argued that this is a culturally 
specific kind of knowledge: for a person brought up in the nation in which for 
many, tea drinking is a habitual, comforting but also in some sense a self-
defining thing to do. This might well stir up affectionate and nostalgic feelings 
about home. For example, I am British, and when I hear or read the words ‘tea 
cosy’, I cannot help but envisage a blue tassled thing covering a stainless steel 
tea pot on the floor of a living room in a 1980s semi-detached house in the 
North of England where my mum and dad sit watching Wogan. It might be 
conjectured that, even if you know what a tea cosy is, and accept that it could 
be worn as a hat, perhaps you need to have a certain familiarity with tea cosies 
for this joke to really tickle you, to the extent that you laugh out loud.  
 
At the end of this routine, Lee will stage an attempt to move on from the tea 
cosy material by delivering a decent ‘topper’, a line that will get a big enough 
laugh to make the ‘bit’ feel complete. But, as he acknowledges, the line, which 
contains a list of three woollen items, knitted things that might be found 
‘working’ alongside the tea cosy, falls flat: 
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…the cardigan, the mitten, the balaclava helmet… you’ll notice there a 
list of three things. Really they ought, comedically, to build. But the 
balaclava helmet was a disappointment. It didn’t get the laugh one would 
be hoping for there. 
 
He then explains that he ‘knew this was going to happen’, he has performed 
this same show numerous times – in Edinburgh for a month, and on tour – and 
in spite of his initially being certain the line would get a big laugh, it never 
worked. Apart, that is, from in Aldershot, ‘which is a military town, so they 
probably have a different relationship with [the balaclava]’ (64).  
 
Aside from telling us something about social context, contingent associations, 
and identification with a particular place, the Aldershot reference points back 
into the routine to what is now emerging, even within the initial ‘perfectly formed’ 
part of the joke, as a suppressed military theme. It might be argued that Lee’s 
‘American’ could conceivably be replaced by any other person who might 
plausibly be represented as uncurious and the joke would still work. You don’t 
need to be aware of current affairs or anything going on in the news to find this 
joke funny; the joke is a formal device, a bit of wordplay, self-contained, locked 
in its hermetically sealed bunker. And the bunker itself is merely a backdrop, a 
location. It could be replaced by any place of solitude. It is not intended to 
signify anything in and of itself. Because, after all, this is a joke about the simple 
possibility that a person left on their own with a tea cosy could put the tea cosy 
on their head, but does not. But, in the very first line of the joke, we were asked, 
were we not, to conceive of imprisoning an individual ‘for sixty years in an 
empty underground bunker’, and the idea of an ‘underground bunker’ itself 
carries an inference of wartime. Whether or not it was consciously registered at 
the time, there has been a suppressed theme of not only armed conflict, but 
also incarceration – senseless, inhumane incarceration at that – lurking within 
the joke all along, even before that jolting shift into the clumsy satire about 
innocent people unlawfully interned in Guantanamo Bay. The notional bunker 
may be hermetically sealed and – within the joke – it may signify a place 
removed from the world, but the connotations of the word ‘bunker’ pull us right 
back out into the world. And, the room in which the word is being uttered is in 
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the world too. This whole routine is taking place in a room in a world in which 
wars and human rights abuses of various kinds are taking place.  
 
Against the backdrop of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and human rights abuses 
in Guantanamo Bay is there not some ‘guilty inwardness’ played out in the idea 
of a room full of people laughing at a tea cosy? Or am I in fact articulating my 
own anxieties about my year-long closeted reading? Yes, tea cosies exist in the 
external world too, but arguably the sort of knowledge that a reference to a tea 
cosy calls into play, as opposed to knowledge about wars and human rights, is 
trivial. The tea cosy is the sort of ‘reference’ that is making a mockery of 
referentialism, with its promise of access to the external world. It is a joke that 
thematizes precisely the kind of trivializing pleasure-in-things that it indulges.  
 
 
7. Resisting the ‘fit’  
 
Can de Man help us here, or is he part of the problem? According to Caruth, ‘far 
from denying language access to history’ the ethical stakes of de Man’s 
‘attempt to distinguish reference from natural law’ concern the task of ‘keeping 
history from being swallowed up by the power of abstraction’.71 Caruth tells us 
that this ambitious-sounding project is played out ‘not only in de Man’s 
statements about language’ but ‘most concretely’ in the performance of his 
texts. Most particularly, Caruth argues, this can be felt in de Man’s use of 
examples, which are weirdly, distractingly impactful. Caruth is referring to one of 
de Man’s best-known essays, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, in which de Man 
explicitly addressed the objections to theory made in the name of referential 
reality.72 In Caruth’s summation, de Man responded to such charges by ‘arguing 
both conceptually for a resistance that stems from “within” theory and by 
associating this resistance with the additional connotation of something 
concrete, something like the resistance one feels upon impact’.73  
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Could the demonstration that Lee is making with this joke be understood in 
these terms? In other words, could we read this joke as a response to the 
objections made against his ‘deconstructive’ comedy in the name of referential 
reality by arguing for a resistance that stems from ‘within’ comedy? I do not 
want to be too hasty to exonerate Lee, or deconstructive comedy, or comedic 
deconstruction. And anyway, de Man’s concept of resistance itself remains 
somewhat abstract. What does this actually mean, in practice, in a text?  
 
The joke sets up, allegorically, a little practical experiment, one designed to 
ascertain whether or not a person possesses a certain quality, an attribute, one 
that is desirable and perhaps necessary to being a politically engaged human. 
One that might be believed to be innate, or natural. In the set-up he says, of 
Americans, ‘they’re not a naturally curious people’. And then he draws a link 
between this lack of natural curiosity and a lack of interest in the world beyond 
one's home country, and by extension, to a lack of awareness of historical 
events: ‘they don’t know what’s going on’, ‘Most Americans don’t own 
passports’. And then, with the tea cosy figure, the well-wrought joke, he not only 
allows his audience to enjoy laughing at the idea of a person not wearing a tea 
cosy as a hat (which is actually the image of the person wearing tea cosy as a 
hat, i.e. by laughing they positivize the negative, recuperate it) but for them to 
enjoy the fact of their laughter as an affirmation of their own ‘natural curiosity’. 
And because Lee has already linked an American lack of curiosity with their 
ignorance of world events (and therefore with the acts being perpetrated 
overseas by their government), according to the skewed logic of the joke, 
laughing at the tea cosy joke becomes tantamount to an act of political 
engagement and responsibility. By this logic, laughing at this joke means you 
are a good person, a responsible person, a British person.  
 
These are the stakes of deconstruction. When you deconstruct its rhetoric, or 
when you observe the way that Stewart Lee allows it to deconstruct its own 
rhetoric, it becomes apparent this joke has its own self-legitimating aesthetic 
ideology. If this goes unchallenged, then as a critical reader I might well end up 
praising this joke as a ‘good joke’ without acknowledging that I might well enjoy 
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this joke because it makes me feel like a ‘good person’. The joke not only gives 
me occasion to indulge my pleasure-in-trivial-things, but to make an argument 
as to its validity as a mode of engagement with the world, and a superior one at 
that. When Caruth writes that, ‘far from denying language access to history’ de 
Man’s ‘attempt to distinguish reference from natural law’ has to do with ‘keeping 
history from being swallowed up by the power of abstraction’ she is, I think, 
intimating the sort of deconstructive process I have demonstrated above.  
 
In a footnote to the tea cosy joke’s preamble, in the 2010 edition of his book, 
Lee writes,  
 
I probably wouldn’t write or perform something like this now. It seems 
glib, stereotypical, cheap and simplistic. It was funny at the time, though. 
Also, our failure to act entirely honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan 
alongside the USA means that, to the rest of the world, we’re both the 
bad guys. You have to address that now.74  
 
This reminds us that, whereas an aesthetic or formalist mindset might lead us to 
argue that the best jokes are ‘timeless,’ stand-up comedy is a historically 
contingent, situated utterance. That’s not to say that spoken comedy only 
works, or works best, in the ‘moment’ of its ‘original’ utterance. Indeed, at the 
very end of the tea cosy routine, Lee admits that he has, it seems, unwittingly 
appropriated the joke that started it all off:  
 
some kid emailed me and he went, “You know that bit you do about 
people being so bored they wear tea cosies as hats?” I went, “Yeah.” he 
goes, “Um, there’s a Spike Milligan or a Billy Connolly joke like that,” he 
said, “from 1972.”  
So, basically, I must have kind of remembered that and copied it (67). 
 
The one-liner 'Never trust a man who, when left alone in a room with a tea cosy, 
doesn't try it on' has, according to Connolly’s biographer Pamela Stephenson, 
who is also married to him, become something of a family motto. On her 
attempts to translate the line into Latin, Stephenson notes that that closest she 
has come is 'Hominem Iniocosum Non Diffidite (Never trust a man who lacks a 
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sense of humour)'.75 In this account, the initial tea cosy figure is no longer a joke 
spoken onstage but an aphorism. No longer contingent words spoken onstage 
for money, but something to live by. Although tongue-in-cheek, Stephenson’s 
recourse to the ‘motto’ is a reminder of how the trivial can be taken as a model 
for the profound. It is a reminder to me not to mistake the fact that I find the idea 
of a person wearing a tea cosy on their head funny as the sound basis for an 
epistemology. And, it is a reminder of just how tempting it would be to do so 
because, according Stephenson’s model, the act of putting a tea cosy on one's 
head becomes emblematic of the comic as such. And upon this basis it 
becomes possible to make a series of totalizing inferences. It becomes possible 
to think of this as a joke in which, via the perfectly incongruous ‘fit’ of the joke’s 
final word and image, the form coincides with the meaning. And the meaning is 
that it is right and natural to put the tea cosy on your head just as it is right and 
natural to have a sense of humour. These are reconciled, ‘magically’, it might 
be claimed, in the moment of performance. It is right and natural to find this joke 
funny, to laugh. It means I have a sense of humour. I would try the tea cosy as 
a hat because, in a sense, imaginatively, I just did. I am, therefore, included in 
the category of superior humanness that the joke constructs. I am its totalizing 
figure, magically reconciled with those other abstracted bodies as the joke’s 
ideal audience, the personification of laughter. I am in the moment, the kind of 
moment that Noble seems to promise when he writes: 
 
There is something thrilling and magical about that moment, and it is for 
that reason that it is so intriguing. The joy and success of it is in that 
moment… That moment where hundreds of people all feel the same joy 
and release of laughter at the same time.76  
 
How might I disentangle myself from this totalizing moment? Well, in the first 
place, keep going. Because the joke, the routine, the show keeps going. This is 
the professional condition of stand-up comedy; as Lee has said, 'in stand-up 
you don’t have to think “What’s my motivation?” The person’s got a reason to 
be on stage, which is that they’re an entertainer. They’ve got to fill up time. 
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Their motivation is that they’ve got to fill up time…'77 
 
But also, de Man keeps going. As James Loxley writes, 
 
de Man’s concern is to show that reading is not the business of arriving 
at a single or final understanding of the text, the kind of reading that 
could rest fulfilled in its mastery: it is rather a matter of tracing out the 
necessary sequence of irreconcilable moves or moments on which a text 
depends, and therefore of failing to end up at a position from which the 
different moments or moves could all be comprehended at once or as 
one.78  
 
So, keep going. Keep following the irreconcilable moves. Keep telling the 
difference.  
 
 
8. Wool is funny!  
 
I am not yet done with this joke, because my task now is to investigate what 
kinds of possibilities, and critical responsibilities might come with the temporality 
of reading, and the particular temporality of my own reading. How can I account 
for the stubbornness of my fixation upon this figure? What critical possibilities 
might inhere in reading a stand-up routine long after its laughter has perished, 
even after the author of the joke has disavowed it, called it out of date? In this 
latter part of the chapter, then, my discussion will draw upon a set of theoretical 
perspectives that are distinct from, although related to, the deManian 
deconstructive project. My work here proceeds from the question of how it is 
that, even after all of this careful and patient elaboration as to the joke’s 
workings, it still feels not only possible, but also perhaps important to return to 
the claim that there's just something funny, in a simple way, a silly and childish 
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way, about the idea of a knitted tea cosy working in a shop.  
 
Lee’s book, on its back cover, promise to explain ‘why “wool” is a funny word’. 
Inside, on the question of wool, Lee offers this: ‘“Wool” is a brilliant, all-purpose 
funny word. Few things are not made funnier if one imagines them being made 
out of, or coated in, wool’ (62). Is this an explanation? Or is it, by means of 
continuing the joke, the deflection, the deferral of explanation? Is explanation 
even desirable, or relevant, or possible? How might we go about developing an 
explanation as to the funniness of wool, that is, both the word and the material?  
 
In her delineation of how new ‘aesthetic categories’ might be developed for the 
twenty-first century, Sianne Ngai’s proposes the ‘zany’, the ‘cute’ and the 
‘merely interesting’ as aesthetics based not on 'powerful feelings evoked by rare 
experiences of art or nature', but on ‘milder or equivocal feelings'. The cute, for 
example, is connected with ‘ostensibly subordinate and unthreatening 
commodities’ that bring forth a 'surprisingly wide spectrum of feelings, ranging 
from tenderness to aggression'.79 Whether or not you accept the particular 
narrative she offers, Ngai’s work suggests that, far from being a ‘universal’ or 
transhistorical phenomenon, the lure of a certain kind of ‘naïve’ or childish 
pleasure in things can be given a properly historical account.  
 
In light of Ngai’s description of the cute as ‘an unusually intense yet strangely 
ambivalent kind of empathy’,80 I’d like to now turn to what is, perhaps, the most 
peculiarly funny part of the entire tea cosy routine: the moment at which the 
figure of the tea-cosy-shop-assistant, after coming into being, acquires the 
power of speech. There are two lines: a question, and an answer. Both spoken 
by Lee, but in different guises. First: ‘Hello, I don’t know if you can help me. I’m 
interested in buying one of those iPods.’ And the reply: ‘I’m sorry sir, I won’t be 
able to help you on account of the fact that I am fashioned entirely from 
colourful wool’ (62).  
 
This moment prompts a return to the question of persons and things, and a 
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turning to Barbara Johnson’s work, concerned as it is in large part with the 
question: what is a person? The linguist Émile Benveniste asked the question of 
the person through his study of personal pronouns, arguing that third-person 
pronouns should not be named ‘personal’: for Benveniste this ‘simply destroys 
the notion of “person”’, which properly belongs only to the first- and second-
person pronouns, ‘I’ and ‘you’. On this basis Johnson surmises that the way to 
treat a thing as a person is to ‘address it, turn it into an interlocutor or at least a 
listener through the rhetorical power of language.’81 The two rhetorical figures 
involved in this act of animation-through-address that are of interest here are 
apostrophe and prosopopoeia, two literary effects associated with lyric poetry. 
As I will argue, the comparison between lyric poetry and stand-up comedy – 
particularly the stand-up comedy of Stewart Lee – is not as unlikely as it may at 
first seem. Both are characterized by complex and shifting structures of 
address.  
 
Apostrophe is the poetic figure of ‘addressing a dead or absent person, an 
animal, a thing, or an abstract quality or idea as if it were alive, present and 
capable of understanding’82. It is derived from the Ancient Greek, for ‘turning 
away’, so in simple terms we could imagine the poet physically turning away 
from the reader in order to address a Grecian Urn (Keats) or to intone ‘O 
chestnut-tree’ (Yeats) or ‘O West wind’ (Shelley). And, as a reader of Lee’s text, 
I imagine him, onstage, turning away from the audience to address the 
imaginary presence. And, when I watch the DVD, this is what he does do. He 
slowly turns and looks toward a spot on the floor in the middle of the stage and 
says ‘Hello, I don’t know if you can help me. I’m interested in buying one of 
those iPods.’ 
 
An apostrophe is a form of poetic invocation, which means that it calls 
something to the scene. Here, at the scene of imaginary address, the tea cosy, 
having been summoned by a question, must reply. It does so, or appears to do 
so, via the rhetorical trope of prosopopoeia, defined as ‘either of the 
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personification of some non-human being or idea, or of the representation of an 
imaginary, dead, or absent person as alive and capable of speech’83. The word 
derives from the Greek for ‘to confer a mask’ and, in simple terms, 
prosopopoeia performs ‘face making’ through the conferral of the power of 
speech: to have a voice is to have a mouth is to have a face. To address and 
be addressed is to be face-to-face. And onstage Lee, speaking as the tea cosy, 
could be seen to lend the tea cosy figure his face. But for now I don’t want to 
think about Lee’s face, I want to think about what kind of impossible face, or 
form, the tea-cosy-shop-assistant-figure might be taking, or refusing to quite 
take, in my mind. In ‘The Epistemology of Metaphor’, de Man characterises 
prosopopoeia as emblematic of the figurative function of language, which he 
equates with a capacity to ‘make present to the senses something which is not 
within their reach because it consists, in whole or in part, of elements too 
abstract for sensory perception’.84 The tea cosy has already, on its way here, 
been figured as a thing capable of being treated as a terror suspect, interned 
illegally and ‘repeatedly anally raped’. That happened almost too quickly for 
perception to catch up, and anyway, it is difficult and absurd to envisage a 
woollen item undergoing such brutalities, and we know Lee is alluding to a 
human when he makes these references. But that is not to say that we feel 
comfortable imagining a human being subjected to this treatment – perhaps it is 
this dehumanization that is unpicturable. And hence, perhaps, the displacement 
of our empathy for a human onto the funny thing of the tea cosy.  
 
Tracing the origins of the aesthetic she names ‘cuteness’, Ngai cites one of the 
earliest recorded uses of the word, in an 1857 issue of Virginia Illustrated: 
'"What cute little socks!" said the woman'.85 And then there's ‘A small and 
compact house, what the Americans would call “cute”’, from 1900 Daily News – 
as Ngai notes, this is ‘both a feminine and a nationally specific way of using 
language’.86 Thus, it seems that from its first emergence as 'a distinctive 
judgment and style in nineteenth-century America', the cute was associated not 
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only with that which is little, soft (and quite possibly knitted), but also with a 
distinctly feminized mode of speech. It is also worth acknowledging a certain 
irony in my recourse to something identified, at its inception, with a specifically 
American mode of exclamation to account for the funniness of an explicitly 
American-mocking joke.  
 
And, as Ngai argues, speech is at stake here, for ‘though our first impulse is to 
think of the cute in visual or tactile terms, the OED’s definition interestingly 
directs our attention first and foremost to ways of speaking, both on the part of 
those who judge objects/person as cute […] and on the part of cute objects or 
persons themselves’.87 The exclamation of cuteness reflects a longing for 
littleness, but it also belittles the beholder: the person transfixed by cuteness 
might well raise the pitch of their voices, scrunch up their faces and resort to a 
form of ‘baby talk’. Cuteness is not only a mode of identification, of speech, but 
also a physical demeanour by which the people who care for the small things, 
the things considered trivial, themselves become small, trivial.  
 
Perhaps now it becomes possible to revisit the scene in which, when asked by 
his wife Edith whether he wants to have his bowling shoes laced over or laced 
under, Archie Bunker answers with a question: ‘What’s the difference?’. As de 
Man points out, Archie is not literally asking for the difference to be explained to 
him, but is making a rhetorical statement to the effect of  'I don't give a damn 
what the difference is'.88 But let us take a moment, once again, to recall Edith 
Bunker’s patient elaboration of the difference, the difference about which 
neither her impatient husband nor Paul de Man seems to ‘give a damn’ – the 
difference between two methods of lacing her husband’s bowling shoes. It could 
be argued that Edith responds to Archie’s cry of ‘what’s the difference?’ in the 
‘simplistic’ way that she does precisely because the difference does matter to 
her – because it concerns the process of tending to the objects her husband 
takes for granted. Edith is talking about, attesting to, the daily tasks of her 
domestic labour, and – like the labour itself – her testimony is unacknowledged, 
dismissed as immaterial. We are getting closer, perhaps, to being able to listen 
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with retrained ears to Edith Bunker, a woman who is silenced when she begins 
to account for the work she does. Perhaps the ‘inherent’ funniness of wool 
might also be explained by Edith Bunker, if we would listen.  
 
Knitting – traditionally the work of mother, the grandmother – can also be 
thought of as a form of feminized domestic labour. And so perhaps the 
supposed inherent funniness of wool has to do, on some level, with the notion 
of a feminized simplicity, one that is transferred onto, absorbed into, the knitted 
thing itself? It might be said that wool itself is a quiet thing. Just as it can be 
used to insulate, to keep warm, it can be used to muffle sound. Might we 
speculate that what is going on in the sly belittling of the knitted item like a tea 
cosy is a muffling of certain voices, then, a refusal to hear certain patient 
explanations of the caring work of the household? The other items that Lee lists 
as working in the shop – the cardigan, the mittens, the balaclava – along with 
the tea cosy, all carry a connotation of being wrapped up, cared for, and 
perhaps over-cared for. To be ‘coated in wool’ is to insulated, muffled. It makes 
me think of the word ‘mollycoddled’, which the dictionary tells me means to 
‘treat indulgently or overprotectively’ or – as a noun, now fallen out of use – ‘an 
effeminate man or boy’.  
 
If as Ngai suggests, there is a connection between cuteness as a commodity 
aesthetic and the objects and behaviours associated with the feminized 
domestic sphere, this link is even more strongly emphasized by Lori Merish 
who, in an earlier account of the cute commodity, proposes that the cute 
‘always in some way designates a commodity in search of its mother’.89 At this 
point, we may wish to remind ourselves of Karl Marx’s demarcation, and 
critique, of the phenomenon of commodity fetishism, a succinct summation of 
which is provided by Johnson. For Marx, she writes, commodity fetishism 
named a 'tendency to feel a human relation with the product and forget the 
human labour that produced it'. Johnson tells of how this 'misguided 
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transference of humanness from the maker to the product’90 is likened by Marx 
to ‘all that is irrational in religion and mysticism […] to the false worship of 
things, and to the desire for magic and mystery that mature human beings 
should outgrow’.91 It seems that an association of childishness is built into 
Marx’s concept. And, when the commodity fetish is experienced in the 
particularly intense and conflicted way associated with cuteness, this desire 
becomes grafted onto what Merish calls ‘a middle-class structure of familial, 
expressly maternal emotion’.92  
 
In the second chapter of the first volume of Capital, ‘The Process of Exchange’, 
Marx offers a series of curious illustrations of the relation between humans and 
commodities. First, as if speaking man-to-man, he bids his readers to picture 
themselves as the ‘guardians’ of commodities, since they ‘cannot go to market 
and perform exchanges in their own right.’93 This is, as Ngai notes, an image of 
‘paternal benevolence’. But then the tone shifts: ‘commodities’, writes Marx, 
‘lack the power to resist man. If they are unwilling, he can use force; in other 
words, he can take possession of them.’94 Now, commodities are to be thought 
of as, in Ngai’s words, not only ‘helpless beings in need of adult supervision’ but 
also ‘as objects of potential seduction or even rape’.95 Next he likens the 
commodity to a female character in Don Quixote named Maritornes who is 
‘sexually interchangeable with the other women to the oblivious hero, who thus 
ends up becoming her lover in spite of her infamous lack of charm’. 96  Marx is 
offering these comparisons mockingly: he wants the reader to recognize the 
indecency of the commodity fetish.97 But this could be read as example of the 
recurring patterns of feminine effacement that Barbara Johnson detects 
throughout Western thought.  
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In the final, prospopopoeic flourish of his satire, Marx illustrates his argument 
with a little vignette in which he asks his reader to imagine commodities 
speaking.  
 
If commodities could speak, they would say this: our use-value may 
interest men, but it is no part of us as objects. What does belong to us as 
objects… is our value. Our own intercourse as commodities proves it. 
We relate to each other merely as exchange-values.98  
 
It is ironic that, as Johnson points out, ‘Marx makes commodities speak 
precisely in order to make them confess the illusion of animation they 
promote’.99 But, as she argues, the animation is a little too strong, and threatens 
to overpower the argument. The commodities, now they can speak, seem to 
promise to entertain us all the more, with their social intercourse, their chit-chat. 
Ngai sums it up when she reflects on how, ‘for all his distancing sarcasm, Marx 
seems compelled to repeat commodity fetishism’s personification of the 
commodity’.100  
 
 
9. How would that possibly work? 
 
In some vague sense, the tea cosy speaks precisely to confess the illusion of 
animation it promotes, because when the tea cosy speaks, it says: ‘I'm sorry sir, 
I won't be able to help you on account of the fact that I am fashioned entirely out 
of colourful wool… Perhaps you’d like to ask one of my colleagues – the 
cardigan, the mitten, the balaclava helmet’ (62-3).  
 
The tea cosy speaks precisely of its fashioning, how it was made. If Marx is 
right, and by anthropomorphizing an object, ‘one transfers the social character 
of labor into a sociability among objects, sucking the humanness out of the 
makers and injecting it into the products’,101 then we might ask, is the tea cosy's 
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animation in this context another episode of feminine effacement?  
 
And when I write ‘this context’, you might ask, am I thinking about a branch of 
Currys in Wolverhampton, or the scene of Stewart Lee’s performance of this 
routine? I will attend to each in turn. First, staying within the scene of Currys in 
Wolverhampton, is not there not something funny about the idea of an electrical 
superstore – a place of hard edges, technical sales speak, the 'latest 
technologies', such as (in 2004) iPods, with their built-in obsolescence – staffed 
by all of these faintly nostalgic, saggy, motherly, knitted objects? And the (male) 
tea cosy's humiliation becomes palpable when, granted the power of speech, it 
is forced to enact a scene in which it apologizes (to a male customer, a 'Sir') for 
its knittedness 'I'm sorry sir, I won't be able to help you on account of the fact 
I'm fashioned entirely out of colourful wool'. In this man-to-man exchange, one 
that takes place in – can we conjecture – the stereotypically male 'music and hi-
fi' section of an electrical superstore, the tea cosy is rendered ineffectual by its 
softness, and its decorativeness (precisely the opposite of the products it is 
being asked to promote) – for precisely the elements that render it appealingly 
cute, and that link it with the feminized domestic sphere. 
 
And then it says, ‘Perhaps you’d like to ask one of my colleagues – the 
cardigan, the mitten, the balaclava helmet’. And at this point Lee cuts in, and 
the routine switches again.  
 
And you’ll notice there a list of three things. Really they ought, 
comedically, to build. But the balaclava helmet was a disappointment. It 
didn’t get the laugh one would be hoping for there. Umm… (63) 
 
Once again Lee breaks off his telling of the joke to acknowledge its failure. 
Referring to the show's run at the Edinburgh Fringe, he continues, 
 
So the first kind of week of the run, the month run, I kept swapping the 
order around, I was going, “Perhaps you’d like to talk to one of my 
colleagues, the balaclava helmet, mitten, cardigan. Cardigan, balaclava 
helmet, mitten,” whatever. And after weeks, still nothing… It never got 
any laughs.  
	   163	  
 
After about ten days, a friend, the Actor Kevin Eldon (whose humorously 
ceremonial nickname will be familiar to those who knew Lee’s work in the 
1990s, when he worked in partnership with Richard Herring) comes to see the 
show.  
 
And, erm… I said to him, ‘Why do you think that isn’t working?’ And he 
said, ‘Well, the problem is, all the items in your list are made of wool. And 
the tea cosy has already said to the customer that it won’t be able to help 
him on account of the fact that it is made of wool. So for the tea cosy to 
suggest to the customer that he seeks assistance from other exclusively 
woollen items, you know it simply adds insult to injury, it makes the 
situation worse.’ 
 
When Lee asks for advice as to what he should to do, Eldon replies, ‘Well, just 
think of three things that aren’t made of wool, then you’ll be alright’. But Lee's 
problems continue. He tries to improvise, ‘live in the moment’, but the next night 
onstage he can only manage to come up with ‘The stick, the wood, the toaster’. 
No laughs, 'And I went home, and I thought, Yeah, the problem is the toaster is 
an electrical item and people are thinking, “Is that working in Curry’s or is it for 
sale there?”' (65) 
 
The toaster instigates a further confusion between people and things. It also 
usefully highlights an important distinction: in the space of the electrical 
superstore. the tea cosy is not a commodity, but is working – or, as it may be, 
not working. ‘How would that possibly work?’ asks the prosopopoeised 
audience figure. And the tea cosy responds by rather politely explaining the 
reasons why it cannot work: ‘I’m sorry, sir, I won’t be able to help you,’ it says, 
‘on account of the fact that I am fashioned entirely from colourful wool.’ The tea 
cosy cites its material constitution, the method of its production, as precisely the 
reason it cannot ‘help’. Although it can appear here, the tea cosy cannot fulfill 
the job description of ‘shop assistant’; it states this explicitly – it cannot assist, 
cannot help. But it might equally have said, ‘I’m sorry, sir, I cannot be of 
service’. And, that word, 'service' takes on an added significance in the context 
of Currys in Wolverhampton, for electrical superstores can be considered 
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among the post-Fordist or, as Ngai calls them, 'postmodern workplaces' that 
operate within an increasingly service-based economy. In this context, the idea 
of being a 'productive worker' is less dependent upon quantitative data (such as 
output) and more upon qualitative factors, which include the 'subjective 
attitudes' of the individuals employed. Ngai cites the developing discourse 
around 'affective labour', drawing on the work of a range of sociologists, 
economists and activists to describe a ‘post-Fordist reorientation of the 
workplace toward the production of “productive subjectivity” which has resulted 
in the increasing emotionalization of work in general’.102 The kinds of labour 
commonly designated as 'affective' include jobs in the services sector, many of 
which are based implicitly or explicitly on women’s unpaid caring work in the 
household. Hence, perhaps, the retail worker’s solicitous enquiry: ‘Are you 
being looked after?’  
 
At this moment, it might be useful to revisit, briefly, Paolo Virno's influential 
conflation of the post-Fordist labourer with the virtuoso performer.103 According 
to Virno, the collapsing of the distinction between intellectual labour ('solitary 
and inconspicuous') and physical labour ('the production of new objects, a 
repetitive and foreseeable process’) in the post-Fordist workplace104 leads to all 
work taking on the characteristic of performance. In the post-Fordist era, 
virtuosity 'becomes the prototype of all wage labour’,105 and in the virtuoso, 
Virno seeks to invoke ‘the special capabilities of the performing artist’, more 
specifically, the speaker as performing artist. This is because, ‘When 
“subjective” cooperation becomes the primary productive force, labour activities 
display a marked linguistic-communicative quality’.106 It is ironic, therefore, that 
the tea cosy can be granted the power of speech, thus given face, made to 
appear, precisely as a result of the virtuosic work of a professional comedian, 
who is certainly a contender for the paradigmatic example of the speaker as 
performing artist. Doubly ironic that the ability to speak, to face, to appear and 
deliver the polite address to another, a ‘sir’, is – according to the political theory 
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of Virno (et al) – precisely what is required of the post-Fordist laborer.  
 
Revisiting, then, the question of the dehumanization of capitalism – here, rather 
than a displacement of the humanity of the maker onto the product, we have a 
third displacement – of the anthropomorphism of the product back onto the 
worker. And so, oddly, we are looking at a displacement of a displacement, 
which is perhaps why there is such a surprisingly complex push-pull of 
identification and alienation going on here.  
 
 
10. Herded up onstage   
 
And so to the scene of performance, a comedy club called The Stand in 
Glasgow, where Stand-Up Comedian was filmed for the DVD from which the 
transcript is taken. Attending this scene reminds us that the tea cosy is not a tea 
cosy, nor is it a worker in an electrical superstore, it is merely a figure of 
speech, one that has been 'fashioned' by Stewart Lee. Think of the scene, the 
scene of speech, of performance, and imagine Stewart Lee as he appears 
onstage. Holding a microphone, speaking, making it seem spontaneous. The 
'fashioning' of this moment, the moment at which a tea cosy 'magically' acquires 
the power of speech has been plotted, step by step, to seem like an accident – 
as a result of the childish inability of a part of audience to look beyond the funny 
idea of a tea cosy as shop assistant in order to understand Lee's sophisticated 
and topical satire. But also, the sense that this is something Stewart Lee is 
doing. 
 
When it says ‘I’m sorry sir, I won’t be able to help you on account of the fact that 
I am fashioned entirely from colourful wool’, on one level the tea cosy is 
apologizing for its lack of humanness – that it lacks a human body. But, the 
agency that the power of speech bestows upon the tea cosy is voicing its 
apology through the medium of a human body. In spite of the cartoonish 
silliness of acting out a little scene featuring a tea cosy shop assistant, Lee's 
enactment could by no means be described as 'animated'. Quite the opposite. 
He barely moves, and when he does, he moves extremely slowly and, it 
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appears, reluctantly. He shifts position, steps to his right, looks down toward 
ground level and delivers the first line, ‘Hello. I don’t know if you can help me’, 
thus granting the tea cosy a position, and designating an empty space for the 
imaginary tea cosy to occupy. Then, slowly, he shifts again, turns his body 
around and steps into that space. He starts to hunch his shoulders, very slowly, 
and angles his face, his large face with its intense and serious look, up toward 
the position he has just vacated, that of the imagined customer. This is funny. 
We understand what he is trying to do, and we understand that it is ridiculous 
and impossible: there’s no way he can get small enough to embody the tea 
cosy convincingly. His stoop is half-hearted, but the effect is strangely abject. 
Like he is doing something humiliating, something he doesn’t want to do, but 
has to. As a mime, it is willfully half-arsed, as if to emphasize the fact that Lee 
cannot get small enough to embody the tea cosy convincingly. The tea cosy is 
being made to appear, reluctantly, by Stewart Lee – it is he who, after all, has 
'fashioned' this entire thing, as a joke-gone-wrong, a deconstruction of his own 
joke-rhetoric. But we might think of it the other way too: the tea cosy is making 
Stewart Lee appear, making his body conspicuous. It might be that I am led to 
argue this because, when I watch the DVD of Stand-Up Comedian, the camera 
zooms right in on his face at this point, as though it were searching for the 
quality of woolness for which Lee’s face is (apparently) straining, and failing, to 
emit. It is as though Lee’s face is somehow all the more there due to its comical 
failure to look anything like a knitted tea cosy.  
 
About Marx's little scene, the one in which he attempts, apparently against the 
logic of his argument, to make the commodities themselves decry the delusion 
of their personhood, Ngai writes that its peculiarity lies in the way that Marx 
'asks his readers to imagine commodities speaking like child actors herded up 
on stage’.107 And Stewart Lee seems, at some level, to be asking his audience 
to see him as though he were an overgrown child actor ‘herded up’ on stage, 
someone with ambitions to be a political comedian, a topical satirist, forced to 
undertake a humiliating mime act by an audience mindlessly enthralled by a 
funny, fuzzy object they are intent upon bringing to life. What this is playing up 
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in performance, perhaps, is the humiliating fact that Stewart Lee stands on a 
stage and makes people laugh for money. This is increasingly, part of his 
curmudgeonly shtick: early in 2016 I saw him onstage at the Royal Festival Hall 
bemoaning the fact that, as a middle-aged father of two who spends all of his 
evenings performing, he has to resort to telling ‘kids do the funniest things’ 
jokes onstage simply in order to generate enough material to earn enough 
money to keep up the repayments on his mortgage.  
 
What might a live audience in 2004 have felt when they watched Lee, then 
younger, the eponymous ‘stand-up comedian’ of the show they had paid to see, 
doing his reluctant, slow, petulantly half-arsed mime? Did it become apparent to 
them, in a funny way, that this overgrown child-man was being paid to stand 
there and entertain them by pretending to be a hand-made woollen item 
associated with the feminized domestic sphere displaced, by some figural 
aberration, into an electrical superstore, apologizing for its inability to help an 
imaginary customer buy an iPod? 
 
Here I must acknowledge that, in spite of my extended close reading, I thus far 
omitted one of the moves of the jokes. When Lee first intones, on behalf of the 
audience, the question of the tea cosy: ‘What’s confusing us here in Glasgow is 
the idea of a tea cosy working as a shop assistant in a branch of Currys in 
Wolverhampon. How would that possibly work?’, Lee (as himself) replies,  
 
And again, Glasgow, I say to you, I don’t know. I don’t know how that 
would work. But what I say to you is, ‘Could a tea cosy working as a shop 
assiatant in a branch of Curry’s actually be any less effective than some 
of the people currently employed there?’ 
 
In all the various earlier versions of my discussion of this joke, I have been 
selective in my quotation, leaving out this part because I cannot quite make it fit 
with my argument. In a footnote, Lee also makes some effort to disown this 
joke: 
 
I probably wouldn’t make a joke about stupid shop assistants today. Not 
because it’s not necessarily true, but because it’s the kind of joke you 
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see on all those production-company landfill TV comedy sketch shows … 
in which privileged, middle-class actor-comedians do impressions of 
what they imagine the working classes are like (62).  
 
Only now, with my retrained ears, do I begin to listen to what Lee is saying 
here. We have returned to the question of class. But now the ‘working classes’ 
are not represented solely, or primarily, by the romanticized handymen, 
bricklayers and plumbers, the manual laborers invoked by those artists and 
theorists of the 1960s and 70s; they are retail workers, service sector 
employees, persons paid not to produce things or make stuff with their hands 
but to stand up all day, smile and address the customer (who is always right) 
with an offer of service, or ‘help’.  
 
Perhaps, then, in the context of my reading of a text of a live comedy 
performance staged in Britain in the early twenty-first century, listening to Edith 
Bunker 'with retrained ears' has to do with rethinking the associations of 
'manual' labour – updating our understanding of the 'class distinction' cited by 
Jackson. My feelings about the tea cosy led me to cuteness as delineated by 
Sianne Ngai, who suggests we retune our critical attention toward aesthetic 
experiences that revolve around images of insignificance, and triviality. And, 
Ngai argues, in contrast with Schillerean aesthetics, according to which great 
art promises 'the autonomy from forms of domination and mastery', these weak 
aesthetic moments 'confront us with images of the domination and even the 
humiliation of others in a world fundamentally rent by the division of labour’, 
and, she adds, ‘by gendered and racialized divisions of labour in particular’.108 
This renders problematic the fact of looking, and looking again, at Stewart Lee 
who, as a white middle class man with a degree from Oxford and a successful 
career in the media, is a member of a privileged class, and I do not seek to 
deflect this. However, although the case should not be overstated, it is arguable 
that, since stand-up comedy is a dominant mode of popular entertainment 
dominated by men not unlike Lee, and since mainstream comedy in Britain is a 
place where class anxiety has, since the days of Alf Garnett, been worked 
through, it does feel important to work out the ways in which ‘just a man on a 
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stage in a room’ ends up standing for all manner of other persons and things.  
 
The part of Lee's tea cosy routine to which I find myself returning, unable to 
resolve, is a scene of enactment. An embarrassed resurgence of the theatrical 
within the anti- or post-theatrical. But this theatricality is linked to a mode of 
performing that embraces a sort of wilful crapness. There is a half-heartedness 
or reluctance in his performance, as though Lee were 'acting' only under some 
kind of compulsion – even if that compulsion usually comes, dramaturgically 
and textually, from within the structure of the show, which we know to have 
been created (either solely or partly) by the person standing in front of us. My 
work in this chapter has led me to observe that this is a ridiculous and complex 
moment that also seems to tell us something about the humiliation and 
domination of the ‘service economy’, the retail sector, in which what is required 
of the worker is that they animate their service-selves in face-to-face 
encounters, no matter how reluctant they feel.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Theatrical histories and sculptural funniness: watching Kinkaleri’s I 
Cenci/Spettacolo (2004) 
 
 
1. Bit of Business with the Microphone 
 
How does the performance begin? If, as I stated in my Introduction, there is a 
kind of performance that not only emphasizes, but might be thought to be 
constituted entirely by an act of speech, then, strictly speaking, the performance 
only ‘begins’ when the performer has walked on, or stepped up to a microphone 
and, in the silence that has fallen, begins to speak. But there is something 
about this that does not quite feel right. Because before the first words are 
spoken, before the ‘Hello’, or the ‘Good evening’, or the ‘Thank you, it’s great to 
be back’, there was already a performance happening. When we entered, the 
room was buzzing with a special sort of low-level anticipation. When we found 
our seats, and turned to the stage, it was already lit, set up and ready. And 
when the lights went down, and the room fell silent, and the lights went up 
again, more brightly this time, even in those few seconds before the performer 
came onto the stage, there was something exerting a stage presence all of its 
own: the microphone. There on its stand, in the middle of the stage, plugged in, 
and switched on, ready.  
 
The work in this chapter began with the following question: how might I make 
the microphone itself available (that is, tangible, audible) as an object of 
enquiry? Is the kind of work demanded by the object of the microphone a 
materialist enquiry? In their 2014 collection, Performing Objects and Theatrical 
Things, Marlis Schweitzer and Joanne Zerdy suggest we pay ‘attention to the 
way that objects and things powerfully script, choreograph, direct, push, pull, 
and otherwise animate their human collaborators’, and think of props, or other 
theatrical objects as ‘active agents performing alongside rather than behind or 
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in service to human performers’.1 In demarcating their area of interest, 
Schweitzer and Zerdy are drawing on what Bill Brown, in his now classic 2001 
essay, named ‘Thing Theory’. Brown is drawing on Heidegger’s differentiation 
between objects and so-called things in order to reflect on the prevalence of a 
certain sort of thing-centric, or, as it might be called, ‘new materialist’, criticism 
in the 1990s. Broadly speaking, this critical project had to do with an effort to 
move beyond anthropocentric understandings of production and exchange. As 
Jane Bennett notes, ‘There was never a time when human agency was 
anything other than an interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity. What 
is perhaps different today is that the higher degree of infrastructure and 
technological complexity have rendered this harder to deny’.2 
 
According to Brown, we begin to confront the thingness of objects when they 
stop working for us’3. Unlike things, objects are what we look through, 'to see 
what they disclose about history, society, nature, or culture – above all, what 
they disclose about us'. Thus, objects function like windows: we use them, but 
we don’t really encounter them, whereas a thing is like a window when it gets 
filthy – it is a blockage or interruption of 'the circuits of production and 
distribution, consumption and exhibition'. For Brown, it is during such ‘occasions 
of contingency’, when the drill breaks, the car stalls, or you trip over some toy, 
that objects assert themselves as things’.4  
 
Brown’s formulations are particularly apt to the thing of the microphone, are 
they not? When a microphone is working, you speak through it. Hooked up to 
the in-house public address, or P.A. system, the microphone is connected, 
literally, to a ‘channel’. It amplifies, enhances what flows through it. I have in 
mind a generic kind of microphone: its bulbous end, the place for speaking, 
covered in mesh or perhaps a cover of black foam, attached to a black slightly 
fluted shaft, which can slot into the plastic holder at the top of a vertical boom 
microphone stand. It usually has a wire (although wireless options are possible), 
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and it usually hides a little ‘on-off’ switch somewhere too. This is the kind of 
microphone I’m familiar with, that I’ve requested, made use of on countless 
occasions: a standard-issue microphone, not there to be looked at, but used, it 
is merely what it is, a convenient and functional way of making things louder. 
It’s part of the onstage ‘set-up’ but it has the status of ‘equipment’ rather than 
‘prop’ or even ‘scenery’. Like Brown’s window, it does not hide, but neither is it 
there to be looked at. You notice it when it goes wrong, but may well pay very 
little attention to it when it’s working.  
 
Paying attention to the material thing itself, the microphone with its history of 
production, its implicatedness in systems of ‘the circuits of production, 
distribution, consumption and exhibition’ is a cultural materialist way of 
approaching the question of speech, performance and joking.  And in my 
previous chapter, there was much anxiety over the question of history, and the 
question of its abstraction. Therefore, perhaps a chapter examining the 
microphone – a materialist historical chapter – will function as a corrective to the 
previous chapter’s various convolutions and wormholes. Unlike Stewart Lee’s 
tea cosy, in a sense, the microphone is straightforwardly there. And yet there is 
always already something complicated about the material presence of the 
microphone, because as a thing-in-itself, it is useless. An unplugged 
microphone is ‘dead’. It only becomes ‘live’ when it is plugged into a system.  
 
When a professional performer steps up to a ‘live’ microphone and begins to 
speak, they are becoming part of a material system over which they may well 
have very little control. This is particularly the case for ‘gigging’ performers, 
comedians who, just starting out, might well spend several years working their 
way around ‘the circuit’, performing on mixed bills and at open-mic nights. The 
microphone is the site at which the gigging performer or professional speaker 
must negotiate the professional structure of the venue or institution: the room, 
the stuff in the room, the ‘system’ (the ‘public address system’). Importantly, this 
is also the moment at which the performer must negotiate with, ask for help 
from, another sort of professional: the technician. Here, a set of professional 
tensions comparable to those discussed in the previous chapter, tensions that 
concern the division between intellectual and manual labour, between worker 
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and ‘artiste’, might well be brought into play. What makes this particularly 
interesting as a site of negotiation is that, unlike, say a professional oboist or 
trumpet player, whose instrument travels with them, the person who speaks for 
a living has to make do what with the the venue provides. The performer may 
well know a lot less (or practically nothing) about how to set up and use the 
microphone than the technician. However, this performer’s relationship with the 
microphone is intimate, even erotic. It is tempting, after all, to put ones mouth 
right up against the microphone, and hearing the sound of ones merest whisper 
or breath amplified so that it overtakes a room can be curiously pleasurable. 
This evocation of the breath, the spit and the mouth signals the way in which it 
is near-impossible for me to think about the microphone without calling upon my 
own professional experiences as a performer who speaks into microphones. 
Because performing onstage is a peculiarly intense experience, my relationship 
with the microphone – as an object of professional negotiation, anxiety and 
pleasure – might also be said to be peculiarly intense. And this opens onto the 
question of the personal, and its role in this enquiry. For, having started out on 
an effort to conduct some proper historical research into the object of the 
microphone, I hit upon a problem: my research methodology in this thesis is 
explicitly framed and driven by ‘what I find funny’. Do I therefore need to start to 
will myself to find the microphone funny in order to study it? This put some 
pressure on my methodology. For is the question of ‘what I find funny’ not too 
contingent, too biased, too partial; indeed, is this recourse to personal likes and 
whims not, in the context of historical enquiry, downright improper? The 
remainder of this chapter is a case in point. It began as an attempt to do proper 
historical work on the microphone as a piece of stage equipment, a tool for 
talking. But then my attention was directed (some might say misdirected) to a 
particular performance, a piece of what might be called ‘postmodern’ theatre, in 
which an onstage microphone seemed to be playing an oddly funny role. I 
Cenci/Spettacolo, by the Italian company Kinkaleri, at the 
KunstenFESTIVALdesarts in Brussels in 2004.5 I will explain the circumstances 
of my spectatorship in due course. For now, suffice it to say that, upon watching 
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this performance I found it was the kind of performance I like, the kind of 
performance I spent some years of the previous decade trying to create, and I 
found it very funny. I experienced a feeling that I was moved to name as ‘love’. I 
loved the performance and I found it intensely, almost unbearably funny. And it 
might be said that this moment of identification and recognition, one involving 
the microphone, subverted, interrupted my proper historical research  
 
It is possible to argue that the history of the microphone is a history of 
interruption. Electrical amplification of public address is recorded from as early 
as 1919, mainly at sports events and civic events (for example, noted 
successful uses of the early systems include the U.S. presidential conventions 
of 1920, Warren Harding’s subsequent inauguration, and his dedication in 1921 
of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier6). But, as far as indoor electroacoustic 
amplification was concerned, a technical problem persisted. A report on ‘public 
address systems’ published in the Journal of Acoustic Engineering in 1923 
described the problem in the following way: 
 
In the specific cases where the sound is reproduced in the same space 
or room in which it originates, another effect is encountered, which has 
generally been termed “singing”, and is evidenced sufficiently great by 
the emission of a continuous note from the equipment.7 
 
What is being described here is the phenomenon of feedback, a problem that 
was largely overcome by new developments in directional microphones in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, when public address systems began to be installed 
in movie theatres and entertainment venues. However, the problem of 
feedback, although it can be kept in check by judicious placement of speakers 
and microphones (thus, it might be said, by someone who knows what they are 
doing), cannot be entirely eradicated. I still carry the vivid after-screech of 
certain eruptions of it, most notably from the occasion when a misbehaving 
microphone (rather ironically) disrupted my attempt to deliver a conference 
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paper about Stewart Lee’s style of delivery. Indeed, in a room in which a P.A. 
system is switched on, a sudden jab of feedback can be painful and even, in a 
low-level way, somewhat traumatic for those present, who are now alerted to 
the fact it might happen again, at any time. This perhaps explains the 
atmosphere of anticipation and even auspiciousness that can swirl around in a 
performance space in which a ‘live’ microphone is set-up and ready. The ‘buzz 
in the air’ is telling us that the microphone is ‘on’, alerts us to the possibility that, 
at any moment something might happen. 
 
Steven Connor tells a complementary narrative about what might be named as 
a certain funny volatility of amplified air. According to this narrative, the cultural 
experience and meaning of silence changed with the invention of telephony and 
radio, towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the air became newly 
perceptible.  
 
Where previously the air had been audible only in the relatively familiar 
and recognizable forms of the soughings and screeches of wind, 
electrification gave the air a new, more diffuse, unpredictable and 
illegible sonority.8 
 
This newly electrified air is volatile: ‘Users of telephones had for many years 
become inured to the annoyance of fizzing, crackling and other strange noises 
of electrical interference’.9 With the development of radio, a medium ‘identified 
with the air through which it was for the most part transmitted’, the ‘vicissitudes 
of the air’ were amplified even further, contributing to a new sense of the 
‘vulnerability of transmitted sound’. The newly electrified air is thus rendered 
newly audible: ‘What came through on the air was the sound of the air, given 
voice by being given over to the electromagnetic carriage of voice.’10 Can this 
electrification of air can be thought of as a kind of thingification, in Brown’s 
sense? When electrified, the air gains a potential for unexpected or sudden 
eruption (one that is literally 'disquieting'), a blockage or potential for malevolent 
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sabotage, the air newly asserts itself. The popularization of radio and telephony 
made a certain kind of silence newly audible – made it palpable, buzzy – made 
a 'thing' of it. Might this have something to do with the curious sort of stage 
presence – the buzz, if you like – that  it is possible for microphones themselves 
to emit, as things? Against the backdrop of this thingly silence, I will now turn 
my attention to the main event, the performance itself, the performance that 
begins with the microphone.  
 
 
 2. I Cenci/Spettacolo 
 
It begins like this. Lights come up on a bare stage. Bare, that is, apart from a 
microphone on a stand. There is music playing, loud. A pumping track with 
synth that soon becomes recognizable as a version of Rod Stewart's Da Ya 
Think I'm Sexy? The stage lights come up, bright, and the microphone casts a 
shadow on the floor. And then lights go down, down to nothing – a black out. 
The music continues to play. Then, almost immediately, up come the lights 
again, on the same stage, the same microphone. It stands there still, on its 
stand, midway up the stage, slightly to the right (our left). The floor is made of 
grey linoleum, the kind of flooring that comes in rolls and gaffer-taped down at 
the edges. We're looking down at it, an area of floor marked off as a stage, 
surrounded on three sides by black drapes. Looking, and looking again, as the 
lights go up, and then change, and then change again, and then fade, and then 
come up again and repeat. The lights will continue to change in this same 
pattern throughout the whole show. We don’t know that yet. For now, we are 
looking down onto this stage-floor. Looking, and looking again, as the lights go 
up on the stage, and then change, and then change again, and then fade, and 
then come up again lighting the stage, the grey linoleum floor, the curtains 
around three sides, the microphone.  
 
If there is something recognizable about this scene, then we might consider 
what assumptions have already been made about what is about to happen. It 
might be said that, at the very least, the microphone, on its own there on the 
stage, creates the expectation of a greeting – some kind of acknowledgement 
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of our shared presence, some kind of introduction, explanation, something that 
might help us to understand why, exactly, we are here. What else is it that we, 
the audience for this performance of I Cenci/Spettacolo might be expecting to 
see, as the lights go down and the show is about to start? The first part of the 
show’s title is a reference to Antonin Artaud’s play of 1935, The Cenci. The 
second part of the title, ‘spettacolo,’ is an Italian word meaning ‘show’, and is 
Italy is widely used to refer to a theatrical production. For an English speaker, 
the word also sounds like ‘spectacular,’ which seems to be a promise of a bit 
more than just a ‘show’. Putting Artaud aside for now, it could be said that, in 
this, its opening minute (we’re still less than a minute in, remember), I 
Cenci/Spettacolo is making a show of its showness. That is, allowing the stage 
set-up itself to perform.  
 
And there’s something very exacting about this set-up. Indeed, in the book 
Kinkaleri published in 2008, the arrangement is described with a precision 
bordering on the pedantic. Here, after I watched the show, I read that the stage 
floor consisted in five pieces of grey linoleum, taped lengthways, and that the 
perimeter of the stage was twelve by ten meters, the drapes black velvet, five 
meters high, and that the particular microphone I was looking at was a Shure 
Sm 58, mounted on a steel stand.11 There’s lovingness, too, in this care taken 
over the basic elements of the show. Or perhaps something that is even slightly 
erotic. Perhaps I say this because of that Rod Stewart number, the voice 
singing ‘sugar… sugar’, as the lights go up, and change, and fade, and we look 
at the stage with the microphone, and the voice goes ‘If you want my body and 
you think I'm sexy / Come on honey, tell me so’. It might be this combination of 
pedantry and eroticism that I found so funny. In one sense, the opening says 
‘this is what’s here, these are the necessary elements, this is what we have’, in 
another, it says ‘If you really need me, just reach out and touch me / Come on 
sugar, let me know’, played unabashedly loud, showing us what the P.A. 
system is capable of.  
 
If there’s something familiar about this scene, it’s maybe due to the fact that the 
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microphone seems to belong here, on a stage like this. That is, the stage that is 
set-up in the kind of room that, since the mid-twentieth century, has increasingly 
offered a low-cost, smaller-capacity and flexible alternative to main-stage 
auditoria – the ‘studio theatre’, or a ‘black-box studio theatre’.12 The microphone 
seems like it belongs on this kind of stage, in this kind of room – literally, a mic 
and a stand is a piece of kit that, in most cases, is provided by and thus belongs 
to the venue in which the performance is taking place. In the twenty-first 
century, microphones, mic-stands and P.A. systems are part of the ‘tech set-up’ 
of any place that is in the business of putting on gigs or shows. In such spaces 
– the more intimate, black-box configurations – it is usual for audience 
members to see the stage, set-up and ready, before the show begins, perhaps 
as you walk up the steps of a moveable seating bank, the kind that creaks a 
little as you step onto it, and find your way to an unreserved seat. And, in such 
situations, as you settle into your seats, chatting a little, looking towards the 
stage, it is not unusual to see a microphone there, waiting and ready, as part of 
the tech-set up, the pre-set.  
 
I Cenci/Spettacolo, as it goes on, will stage a number of images, encounters 
between objects and bodies, a series of smaller performance actions within the 
performance, each one taking up a given amount of time and space, some 
performed by humans, some by objects. What it will not stage, or not quite 
stage, is that which we may have been led to expect, and ancitipate, by the fact 
of the microphone on the otherwise empty stage: speech. A greeting, for 
example. A ‘Good evening and thanks for coming’. An acknowledgement of our 
shared presence, of what it is we are doing here. The bodies that appear on this 
stage will not give themselves over to speech, and least not easily. Lights come 
up again, Shure 58 microphone casts shadow, eyes adjust, lights change, 
intensify and then, we see, we start to see now, something – some thing – is 
coming on. Yes, some thing is emerging from the curtains at the back of the 
stage, edging out sideways. It is a floral duvet-cover, a bedspread, sort of 
walking. Here it comes. There is someone inside it, because the thing is human-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Christopher Baugh, Theatre, Performance and Technology, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), p. 165. 
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sized, but rectangular, and it’s vertical, but baggy. It wafts a little as it walks. 
Here it comes, advancing downstage in a straight line, and its movement is 
tentative but also sort of flouncy – because of the floral pattern, and the wafting. 
The music is loud, pumping, and speaks of seduction, desire. But the duvet-
person/person-duvet doesn't prance or slink or glide so much as creep, wonkily, 
tentatively. Corner-by-corner it makes its slow and ridiculous advance. As it 
passes by the microphone, the lights change, subtly, a sort of pinkness 
intensifying, and the duvet reaches the front of the stage, where it begins to 
collapse. Not quickly, though; it collapses slowly, folds over on itself, as though 
the life went out of it deliberately. And then stillness.  
 
A pause. We don’t yet know, but we already have an inkling that the 
performance will continue, for at least the next forty or so minutes, to defer that 
greeting, that direct acknowledgement of our presence, that the microphone 
might have led us to expect. Instead, it will test a set of relationships between 
the various things at its disposal – relations between onstage and off, between 
people and things, between sounds and images. A chair, for example, seems to 
perform its action of sitting there, occupying its position, just as deliberately as 
the man who spends some minutes balancing, with his feet on two wine 
glasses. The human performers carry out many of their actions with an 
expressionless demeanor that could be described as ‘deadpan’, as if to remind 
us that everything on the stage performs, everything is intentional, and at the 
same time, nothing is performing, at least not more than anything else. It all just 
has to happen, will happen, while we watch. Things and people going on and 
off stage. Being shown, or showing themselves. And then going, being taken 
away, or taking themselves away. A tape-deck trailing a wire plays Tchaikovsky 
while a bare-chested, masked man ‘wrestles’, showily, with a tiger skin rug. A 
woman who sits, with her back to us, on a grey plastic chair, and then gets up 
and quietly leaves (but not before taping a sign to its back: I’LL BE BACK IN A 
MINUTE). A red-upholstered office chair, on wheels, pushed on from the wings, 
spinning momentarily on its swiveling wheels.  
 
There is a tension being played out, it seems, between the showy and the 
unshowy, between effort and refusal. There is a moment at which whatever it 
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was that was going on onstage ceases, peters out, and in the ensuing silence 
the man ‘levitating’ atop his wine glasses audibly exhales (I didn’t realize he 
was holding his breath). There is a moment at which the woman with her back 
to us presses STOP on the tape deck and we hear, from the wings, the sound 
of sawing, a sound that continues for some seconds, during which everything 
onstage is still, silent. The woman sits. The sawing reaches a crescendo, and 
then stops. And then a crash. Wood falling to the floor. Another silence. Two 
things, thrown on from the wings, arc across the stage and fall with a clatter: 
chair legs.  
 
There’s an element of ‘noises off’, a specifically theatrical kind of funniness. 
Something or someone, behind a curtain, is sabotaging the show. The 
funniness at play in these moments had to do with sound and space, the 
relationship between onstage and offstage, and how the space of the room and 
the space of the stage were being rendered audible, or, it seems, drowned out. 
Put on mute.  
 
For the first forty or so minutes none of the performers addresses the audience 
directly, although there are two moments at which a man steps up to the 
microphone. The first time, a masked man yells into it as he beats his bare 
chest. The second man, in jeans and T-shirt, delivers something vaguely 
identifiable as a ‘speech’. That is, he makes the gestures and the sounds of 
great oratory, making sounds phonetically like English, specifically a Southern 
American drawl (perhaps an imitation of then-US President George W. Bush), 
with all the intonation of speech. It’s just that nothing he says actually ‘says’ 
anything: it’s just a sound.  
 
And it is perhaps this play of amplified and non-amplified, the sense of 
something deliberately withheld, that made one particular moment especially 
funny to me: when the microphone was moved, its channel was left on, or ‘live’, 
so that the microphone picked up the clunky sound of itself and its stand being 
picked up and plonked down. This happened more than once, and the 
performer on each occasion was expressionless, whereas, it seemed, the 
microphone was all-too expressive, ‘live’. What became audible was the sound 
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of the stage thing amplifying itself, demanding our attention, reminding us that, 
on this stage, everything apart from speech seems to be taking place.   
 
Thus, in I Cenci, there are various borderlines between played across: barriers 
between languages, barriers between language and not-language, a division 
between performers and technicians, between actions that seem adeptly 
‘professional’ and those that seem almost willfully unprofessional, and there is a 
play between the rituals associated with a theatrical stage, and the deadpan 
insistence that this is, after all just a room. 
 
 
3. Turn-of-the-century gigness   
 
Having basked, somewhat, in its afterglow, I now feel it incumbent upon me to 
attempt to locate I Cenci/Spettacolo’s peculiarly funny theatricalism, and my 
response to it, in its discursive context. Certain of Joe Kelleher’s insights as to 
Kinkaleri’s work, in his book The Illuminated Theatre, has proven invaluable to 
my efforts here. In his discussion of Kinkaleri’s subsequent work Nerone (2006), 
Joe Kelleher suggests that what he calls ‘the basic “black box” configuration of 
latter-day studio or laboratory theatre,’ is a key determining factor in the kind of 
work that Kinkaleri make. This kind of space, ‘low-cost, unadorned, flexible, the 
sort of space where anything that happens can mutate into something else’13 
has a lot to do with what goes on in I Cenci/Spettacolo – the pace, the rhythm, 
the expectations and surprises, the acoustics and the materials, the things 
going on and off, the stuff – we might say, the stuff they get away with. Kelleher 
writes, too, about I Cenci/Spettacolo, or rather about a fifteen-minute ‘study’, 
performed some time in 2003, featuring material that would form part of the full-
length version that premiered the following year. Material that included, it should 
be said, a ‘performer conducting some business for several minutes with a 
standing electric fan and a microphone’.14 In light of the show’s title, with its 
allusion to Artaud, that ‘modernist theatre iconoclast,’ whose writings of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Joe Kelleher, The Illuminated Theatre: Studies on the Suffering of Images (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2015), p. 61.  
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1930s ‘set out an agenda of fundamental challenges to the expectations, the 
satisfactions, indeed the very means and function of theatrical representation as 
such’, Kelleher wonders whether Kinkaleri are offering some sort of ‘reflection 
upon the state of theatrical representation today’. And indeed, Kelleher finds 
something of this in the fifteen-minute sketch, although admits it made him 
bemused and befuddled, although, he writes, ‘it did make me want to laugh’. 15 
 
Kelleher describes his interpretive response to the piece as one of recognition. 
Yes, perhaps something not altogether un-Artaudian, he allows, albeit ‘with the 
high modernist temperature turned down somewhat’. But, more acutely,  
 
what I felt the company was up to had less to do with reading back to 
modernist theatre than it did with another level of recognition, an 
association with contemporaneous theatre and performance practices I'd 
encountered or become aware of in London and other European cities 
(and also in the USA), through the 1990s and after.16  
 
Kelleher describes this world as one of a 'latter-day "experimental" theatre', thus 
offering a vague and yet familiar denominator of the kind of thing you might see 
in a black-box theatre studio. The kind of thing you might expect to see at 
festivals like the KunstenFESTIVALdesarts in Brussels, where I Cenci 
premiered in 2004. For the moment, I am less concerned here with terminology 
than with the way Kelleher characterises this kind of theatre. ‘It was work’ he 
writes, ‘to take just one particular trope – that often involved performers 
standing at microphones, proffering an intimacy, although not an intimacy "for" 
anyone in particular’.17 My ears prick up at this mention of the microphone: it 
feels significant, in the context of my own work in this chapter, that when 
seeking to characterize what he called ‘the new work – the postmodern work, 
the postdramatic work or however we are learning to call it’, Kelleher reaches 
for the image of performers standing at microphones. Geographically dispersed 
as it appears to be (found in London, Europe and the USA), according to 
Kelleher, during a certain period of time (the 1990s and after) a kind of theatre 
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became recognizable for a dramaturgy in which the microphone is instrumental.  
 
Claire MacDonald defines dramaturgy as ‘a kinetic and time-based practice, a 
material process in movement, that both frames and takes place in the moment 
of performance’.18 Kelleher’s discussion of Kinkaleri arranges itself around the 
theme of ‘recognition’, tracing its origins as a ‘philosophical legend’ to Hegel. 
Outside of, or perhaps in tandem with, its properly philosophical meaning, which 
I will not attempt to capture on these pages, there is something useful, 
suggestive, about the word ‘recognition’. As Kelleher suggests, recognition 
plays a large part in theatrical sense-making, or dramaturgy, which, as 
MacDonald reminds us is an activity undertaken by both the makers and 
spectators of a work of performance, ‘attending to the many dimensions of 
making and making sense’.19 Questions around recognition are relevant 
particularly, perhaps, to the kind of dramaturgy we're considering here, that 
which may be called not only ‘postmodern’, ‘postdramatic’, or ‘experimental’, but 
devised too, suggesting the show gathered together out of bits, turns or, to 
reference the famous book by Tim Etchells, ‘certain fragments’.20 And, as I'll go 
on to discuss, recognition also has a lot to do with what you find funny. I think in 
a complicated way. 
 
As artistic director of Forced Entertainment, who are widely cited as leading 
exponents of this kind of work, Etchells is not incidental to this historical 
genealogy, this narrative. And Forced Entertainment are serial microphone-
users, from Club of No Regrets (1993) to The Thrill of it All (2010), many of the 
company’s most defining and influential works have revolved in some way 
around a microphone, or several. In their work, the microphone is not only an 
aesthetic choice, but a practical tool. It offers both position and gesture: 
standing at the mic, passing the mic, holding the mic in front of another 
performer in an interview set-up, commentating on or providing a ‘voice-over’ to 
what other performers are doing. The microphone thus plays an active role in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Claire MacDonald, ‘Conducting the Flow: Dramaturgy and Writing’, Studies in Theatre and 
Performance, 30:1 (2010), 91-100 (pp. 94-5). 
19 MacDonald, p. 95. 
20 Tim Etchells, Certain Fragments: Contemporary Performance and Forced Entertainment 
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the process by which much theatre, or performance, of this kind is created; 
‘devising,’ is a process whereby, often – not always, but often – the things that 
the individual performers are doing onstage are things that they themselves 
have offered, invented, improvised, tried out, during the process of working out 
the show. And, as Kelleher notes, the microphone functions as a ‘stage in itself’: 
mounted on a stand, the microphone becomes a place, a position. Just as it 
stands on a stage, it inaugurates the ground on which it stands as a stage: and 
this stage-within-a-stage orients the action that occurs around, behind, and in 
front of it.  And so, it can be said that a microphone-oriented dramaturgy is one 
that makes the location for not one unified action or representation, but a 
number of separate and even self-contained performances or 'turns' that may 
overlap, compete with, or succeed one another.  
 
 
4. If you don’t laugh  
 
For the purposes of the current discussion, let us settle on the term ‘postmodern 
theatre’ as a descriptor for the ‘new’ work, so-called, now not so new. In 
Kelleher’s text, postmodern theatre is identified first via a trope, now an 
emblem. 
 
If a lasting emblem of modernist theatricality had been Artaud's famous 
image of the actor as a sacrificial victim burning at the stake and 
signaling through the flames, an exemplum of this later turn-of-the-
century work was the more pedestrian image of a hired actor in a gorilla 
costume, standing in a theatre foyer – in a foyer, mind you, not on a 
stage – with a sign around their neck that read "If you don't laugh I don't 
get paid.”21  
 
A trope, an emblem. Two kinds of figures, both embodied by figures. We can 
think of the trope of performers standing at microphones as inhering within the 
theatrical work, whereas the emblem of the jobbing gorilla stands outside it, 
literally, in the foyer. The jobbing gorilla is emblematic of the condition of the 
work in general. In both cases though, we have a figure that stands. And, in 
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both cases a speech act is happening, but in neither case does this speech 
become audible to us, the readers. The microphone amplifies ‘an intimacy’, ‘a 
form of obligation’, but we do not hear what that says. On the other hand, we 
‘hear’ what the gorilla has to say for itself, but of course, amidst the bustle of the 
foyer, this figure is conspicuously silent.  
 
Of course, it is possible to give the gorilla back its story, if not (at least within the 
bounds of my current discussion) its voice, as it was Forced Entertainment who 
staged this tableau in the foyer of Mousonturm in Frankfurt, in November 
2003.22 The following year, the gorilla costume was donned by Claire Marshall 
onstage in Bloody Mess, the show that marked the company’s twentieth 
anniversary, and that premiered at KunstenFESTIVALdesarts on 7 May 2004, 
which – in a coincidence the significance of which will become clearer as I 
explain my own connection with this work – was the day before I 
Cenci/Spettacolo premiered in the same city, at the same festival (albeit in a 
smaller room).  
 
I think about the gorilla’s exhortation: "If you don't laugh…" which, although it 
might be 'funny' in some sense, is not necessarily conducive to laughter, not in 
the satisfying, cathartic, whole-room-laughing way that we might associate with 
comedy proper. Hence, perhaps, Kelleher’s emphasis on the location of this 
living statue: ‘in a foyer, mind you, not on a stage’. A foyer is a place of 
passage, and of chit-chat, not the sealed-in, atmospheric hush of the theatre-
room.  A foyer is place where tickets are sold, drinks bought, posters displayed: 
a place of commerce, then, both social and monetary. And I have to admit at 
this point to the circumstances of my spectatorship. I was never in a theatre, or 
even in a foyer outside a theatre in which I Cenci/Spettacolo was taking place. I 
watched it on DVD, in London, in 2015. I watched it in a different sort of room, a 
domestic one: my living room. And I watched it on my own. I wonder how this 
relates to what I experienced as the unbearable funniness of I 
Cenci/Spettacolo, which made me feel like I wanted to laugh, but not out loud.  
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5. Who and what 
 
Perhaps because of the circumstances of my spectatorship, perhaps because 
of the nature of the piece, I did not identify with those onstage as individuals. 
With no prior knowledge of the company or their personnel, I did not recognize 
faces, and had no sense of whether the bodies on stage were co-authors, 
regular members of the company, or hired in actors. Indeed, after my first 
viewing, I didn’t even have a clear sense of how many performers were 
involved. According to the production notes, which I consult afterwards, onstage 
I saw two men and one woman: Luca Camiletti, Marco Mazzoni and Christina 
Rizzo. They share credit for directing, scenography and costume with three 
others: Matteo Bambi, Massimo Conti and Gina Monaco.23 But I did not know 
those names at the time of my viewing. Really, I should have at least 
remembered that the woman was called Christina: the man with the microphone 
introduced her, saying ‘Beside me, Christina’. This man, barechested but 
unmasked, also attempts to introduce Luca. ‘Luca’, he says. A pause. ‘Luca? 
Can you come up onstage please?’ Nothing happens. ‘Well, alright’, he says, 
‘let me keep going’. With my new found knowledge of the show’s personnel, I 
realise the joke here is that Luca, the only other performer, is providing the real-
time translation from offstage. Towards the end of the show, the man I now 
identify, rightly or wrongly, as Marco repeatedly asks us (or rather, them, those 
who were in the theatre that night): ‘Do you want me to do the scene of the 
fakir?’ No response. Again he asks: ‘Yes or no?’ A few lacklustre ‘no’s’ from the 
dark. ‘The ones who said no can leave and then I’ll do the scene.’ They are 
notable, these two bits, for being the most visibly agitated any of the performers 
get all night. Notable too, perhaps, for being the parts of the show I failed to 
remember so clearly after my first viewing. Perhaps I attended less to these 
parts because this kind of this is almost too familiar: performers introducing 
themselves, and one another, using their real names. This kind of work is full of 
‘Gregg and Gary’ and ‘Terry and Cathy and Claire’, as are many of the scholarly 
responses to such work. And perhaps the prevalence of first-name-terms 
spectatorship in this era is another reason to hold onto the way I saw, upon first 
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viewing, not individuals but the impersonality of these bodies, moving, going on 
and off, bringing things and taking them away.  
 
Not that I mean to claim that my non-identification with the individual persons of 
the piece, my inability to recognize them by face or name affords me a such a 
thing as ‘critical distance’; on the contrary, I think my distance from the 
individuals onstage goes some way to explain the intense, almost delirious 
feelings of delight I experienced, watching the DVD there in my living room. The 
particular kind of funniness I'm describing is bound up with my having feelings 
for and about the piece itself, what it was doing. And what I felt for it was 
something, at the time, I felt moved to describe, and declare, as love. Watching 
from my sofa, alone in a room in 2015, I was thinking, over and over again, ‘I 
love this’.                                  
 
That I named the feeling as ‘love’ may well have something to do with the way 
that, at some point, beyond the half way point, the words ‘I LOVE YOU’ are 
spelled out in capital letters on the stage floor, in some sort of tape. Masking 
tape, it looks like. It’s during the speech, by which I mean, the ‘speech’, the 
incomprehensible oration. As it reaches its crescendo, the man at the mic 
nearly shouting, his arm aloft, finger pointing skywards, a second man enters 
and, with deft and decisive movements, begins taping the letters across the 
front of the stage: ‘I LOVE Y…’ emblazoned in impressively neat copperplate 
lettering, the sound of the tape continuing as the lights fade out, and then back. 
The man did this much as a technician would mark the position of a 
microphone, a summary, businesslike taping task, the clichéd phrase emerging 
from his movements became obvious long before it was finished. ‘I LOVE YOU’; 
a cliché that sometimes speaks the truth.  
 
I think again of Kelleher’s reference to performers ‘proffering an intimacy, 
although not an intimacy "for" anyone in particular’,24 which rather prompts the 
question, who is being addressed with these words, these written words? Who 
are they “for”? Could it be that I, watching I Cenci/Spettacolo on my own in my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Kelleher, p. 66.  
	   188	  
room, had the feeling that, with these words, the piece was in some sense 
addressing me, personally, me who was not there? And, indeed, the specifically 
theatrical funniness of this show teases at a feeling of something that is hidden, 
and it sets in play an uncertainty as to who, or what is, waiting there. What is 
going on in the wings, under the floor, beyond the edge of the stage? Who is 
behind these operations?  
 
Who is behind it? Who is doing it? These are dramaturgical questions, perhaps 
ontological ones too. And they open onto questions about the division of labour: 
who is doing this work? Who is behind it? Who is visible, and who, or what is 
not visible, and yet there? For example, who is making the lights so incessantly 
go up, change, change again, and go down? Is it the technician, sitting behind 
us (I mean them, the audience who were there in 2004, not me, there in my 
house in 2015) in the ‘box’, the one employed, in the parlance of the theatre, to 
‘operate’? At a certain point in my viewing of I Cenci, when it became clear to 
me that these lighting changes were going to continue throughout the entire 
piece, a part of my brain was making a calculation as to how and why this 
decision might have been made, imagining the conversation the company might 
have had with the theatre's in-house technician, how they might have tried to 
explain what they wanted, even produced a ridiculously extensive cue-sheet. 
That thought amused me, at first, but then I imagined the technician getting 
stressed out – pissed off, perhaps, or else anxious to do it right, which seemed 
worse, and so I allowed myself to conclude that the lighting changes were not 
manual, but automated. Yes, the cues would have been programmed into the 
lighting board in advance, I thought, during the get-in, when there was time, 
perhaps over a coffee. Because, I was thinking, there is no way this many cues 
could be plotted and timed precisely. The fades-to-black and cross-fades and 
fade-ups had nothing more than a chance relation to the action onstage. Yes, I 
was satisfied with this, the conclusion that no one was doing the lighting 
changes – not the hand of the technician acting under instructions, not the 
artistic intentions of whoever made those sorts of decisions saying ‘yes, 
precisely now, just as the man in the mask walks up to the microphone’. Later, I 
discovered that, in fact, it was company member Matteo Bambi operating the 
lights during the performance. And, although their arrangement was formulaic 
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(twelve floodlights arranged above the playing space in a circle, like a clock, set 
up and focused according to Kinkaleri’s plan), the sequence of the lighting 
changes was not. Kinkaleri’s production notes have this to say: ‘L’accensione di 
uno più fari è casual, la loro rotazione non sembra seguire regole precise.’25 
When I show this sentence to Giuseppe, my neighbour, who is Italian, he tells 
me that it means, in essence, that the sequence of the lights doesn’t seem to be 
following any rules. It ‘is more or less casual’. And so what I interpreted as 
programmed was, in fact, manual. But it was not done with the heavy sounding 
‘dramaturgical’ intention I at times felt. It was casual.  
 
Curious then, that I had interpreted this casualness as programmatic. Certainly, 
in spite of believing that no one was doing the lighting, that the relation between 
lighting state and onstage action was purely arbitrary, as I watched, I kept 
feeling as though I had been caught out. Little doubts emerged. In certain of the 
lighting changes, the crossfades or blackouts, the transitions or ‘cues’, there 
was such a feeling of dramaturgical intention. Even though I had consciously 
registered, accepted as a fact, that the lighting’s combination with the other 
elements was purely random, my senses – my sense of what was happening – 
kept telling me otherwise, even just momentarily. This happened throughout the 
piece. It felt, deliciously, like I was being tricked, and tricked again, into feeling 
something. Perhaps this explains my feeling of being held in some sort of 
continuous state of suspense. Perhaps it explains why there was something 
almost erotic in my relation to the show. I felt as though I was being enticed, 
and then held back, pulled in by the show’s atmospherics, and then thrown out 
again, back onto my sofa.  
 
‘I LOVE YOU’ is emblazoned, irreversibly, as it seems to me on the grey 
linoleum floor. Knowing the way things work on these kinds of stages, I know 
that the stuff that amasses gradually throughout the show tends to stay there, 
and anyway it’ll take too long to peel this off, and although the pace of the piece 
is slow, I don’t believe they’ll attempt such a messy action in front of an 
audience; that’s surely a job for after the show is over. This reminds me that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kinkaleri, La Scena Esausta, p. 89. 
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these attendances to the space, the stuff, the equipment of the space, are 
usually within the remit of the technician, and usually happen when it is not in 
theatrical mode of stage/audience but when, lit up by those lights they call 
‘workers’, it is exposed and inhabited as just a room, a literal room with four 
walls and a ceiling and a floor. But then, towards the end of the show, the man 
reappears with a roll of flooring, the same grey linoleum that covers the stage. 
Businesslike as ever, he places it down and, with a small kick, unrolls it, all at 
once the ‘I LOVE YOU’ is gone. With this gesture, floor is no longer ignorable (if 
it ever was) as some neutral 'ground' for the figures 'written' when the bodies 
and things move across it - it's revealed to be flooring, a portable and temporary 
covering, just another of the theatrical apparatus being corralled into meaningful 
action. As though the things in and of and belonging to the theatre, or the thing 
of theatre itself, were acting this out. As though the stage itself were now being 
recruited to join in the game of showing and hiding, tantalising us with possible 
explanations and then, quite casually, taking them away.   
 
 
6. LOVING the floor  
 
Perhaps it is time for me to acknowledge that I used to spend a lot of time in 
rooms like this, or at least engaged in activities that had this kind of black box 
studio theatre in mind. My feelings of recognition had to do with knowing how it 
feels to be not only in the room, but in the show. I mean, how it feels to put your 
hands or knees or even your face against that particular kind of linoleum floor 
covering, and also how it feels to devise and improvise and pull a show together 
as it, the show-thing, resists, pushes back at you in various frustrating and 
bewildering ways. So perhaps the love and the almost unbearable funniness I’m 
describing have something to do with a kind of longing or physical desire for the 
thing of theatre, I mean, the feeling of being in it, the physical grappling with its 
materials. And perhaps this is connected to a sort of professional longing, not 
only for a past in which the career to which I aspired was still, potentially, in the 
future, but also a yearning to, once again, be someone who does something not 
only with words, but with things. I mean, things you can physically pick up and 
put down again.   
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And is it possible to historicise this set of feelings? If so, the process would be 
one that would have to acknowledge the entanglement of personal with the 
professional, the economic with the autobiographical. I'm aware of how 
embarrassing it can be when someone goes misty eyed and starts recounting 
episodes from 'life in the theatre', so I will keep this brief. I will also revert to 
using the first-person plural, although this time the ‘we’ is not an imagined 
gathering but an actual collaboration. Not wishing to write an official history, I 
will not name names, but I will give dates.  
 
In 2004, we went in a car over to Brussels to the KunstenFESTIVALdesarts to 
see the premiere of Bloody Mess. It was in the Kaaitheater on 7 May 2004, at 
8.30pm. As previously mentioned, the premiere of Kinkaleri's I Cenci/Spettacolo 
occurred in the same city, at the same festival, the following evening, at 6pm, in 
the Théâtre 140. But we did not see it. As you now know, I didn't watch I 
Cenci/Spettacolo until eleven years later, and then on DVD, at which point I 
think not only ‘I love this’, but ‘we would have loved this’, although the ‘we’ in 
question no longer exists, at least, not in that way. What does remain, however, 
is the fact that, two years later, at the start of 2006, we flew from London to 
Berlin, on Ryanair, with a brick in a suitcase.  
 
To understand why and how this came about, it is necessary to go back to the 
previous decade. In 1992 the sculptor Cornelia Parker made an installation 
called ‘Neither From Nor Towards’ using around one hundred bricks, in various 
states of erosion, picked up from the beach beside the White Cliffs of Dover.26 
Midway through 2006, having seen an image of this work,27 we went to Dover. 
At the time we were trying to find material for a performance, trying to think like 
artists. At Dover, we found the coastline was still littered with the sea-smoothed 
bricks just like those Parker had used. We took one as an unexpected souvenir.  
 
I now think of the brick as a kind of fan fiction Macguffin. How it ended up in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Cornelia Parker, Neither From Nor Towards, 1992, bricks and wire , 250 x 250 x 400cm, Arts 
Council Collection. 
27 See, for example, Cornelia Parker, Avoided Object (Cardiff: Chapter, 1996), p. 4.  
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show I cannot quite remember, but it did. And so when we got our first proper 
gig, in Berlin, we booked a flight and packed the brick. This was 2006 early in 
the budget airline’s history, before the implementation of its famously punitive 
luggage policy. Nevertheless, we incurred a significant excess baggage fee. 
Feeling invested in the performance, we paid. Now we had the brick, the story 
of the brick, and the joke of the brick. Not only did the brick have a backstory, 
but the backstory had a punchline. We would introduce the brick, and the brick 
would introduce us by giving us an occasion for the kind of self deprecating 
‘British humour’ that went down well on the European festival circuit in the early 
years of the 21st Century. 
 
Set down here, the brick is a decoy, of sorts. But I will return to it.  
 
 
7. American Idol  
 
There is a sculpture by the American artist Rachel Harrsion from 2008, around 
the same time as I Cenci and the brick, called American Idol. 28 In this work, we 
see another microphone stand, another microphone. This time, though, it is set 
up not onstage in a black box theatre studio, but in another sort of room, but an 
art gallery, the so-called ‘white cube’. As well as the stand-mounted mic, there 
is a block, a monolith. A wonky, rough-edged thing standing upright, roughly the 
size and height of a person. The mic-stand is set up in front of it, at a slight 
angle, so that the monolith appears to be stepping up to the mic, or else 
stepping back from it. The piece is called American Idol; a performance of some 
sort is being intimated, but also deferred, or refused. After all, the microphone is 
unplugged, conspicuously so, the wire snaking off to nowhere. 
 
Harrison’s sculptural works usually consist of several contrasting elements 
arranged in tension with one another. More often than not, one of these 
elements will be a monolith of sorts, a rough-edged thing. The one we see in 
American Idol is, according to the accompanying list of materials, made of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Rachel Harrison, American Idol, 2008, wood, polystyrene, cement, Parex, acrylic, microphone 
with stand, 62 x 24 x 89cm, Greene Naftali, New York.  
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‘wood, polystyrene, cement, Parex, acrylic’ (‘microphone with stand’ is also 
included in this list). It looks like it has been been knocked-together out of 
roughly hacked bits of wood or polystyrene, plastered, and then given a 
somewhat unceremonious paint job: tentative areas of yellow, purple, turquoise, 
a big spatter of what looks like gold around its middle.  
 
Writing in Frieze, Jennifer Allen refers to the tension within Harrison’s work as 
that between ‘the mute, Modernist, hand-sculpted form and the chatty, mass-
produced commodity’.29 You could see American Idol as a joke precisely on the 
perceived muteness of the modernist hand-sculpted form, the ascetic whiteness 
of its grainy surfaces splashed showily with paint, as though it were desperately 
trying to win votes as a contestant on the eponymous TV show.  
 
The critic John Kelsey writes that, although in the contemporary art world, 
Harrison is known as a ‘sculptor’ (from the Latin sculptere, to scratch or carve), 
she ‘does not cast or carve but in several senses, set up her works: erect, of 
course, but also establish, plan, and maybe even trick them into situations 
where they will be caught or blamed’.30 He suggests therefore, that a more 
productive way of referring to her works is as ‘statues’; statue comes from the 
Latin status, position and statuere, to set up. A position and a set-up – the latter 
term is almost synonymous with ‘assemblage’, but not quite, as ‘set-up’ implies 
more strongly the work of a human agent, ‘set-up’ for some purpose (for 
example, for the purpose of a stand-up comedy performance). Of course, a joke 
might be said to have a ‘set-up’, or indeed, a joke can be a set-up: you can set 
something up for a fall. And of course, in the sphere of performance, the ‘tech 
set-up’ is the time and arrangement that so often revolves around a 
microphone.  
 
The funny tension at play in American Idol is enhanced by the way the monolith 
is set a little back from the mic, at a forty-five degree angle, creating the curious 
impression of reluctance, shyness, modesty. A set of exchanges, then, between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Jennifer Allen,’Moving Targets’, Frieze, 110 (October 2007), 232 – 237 (p. 234). 
30 John Kelsey, ‘Sculpture in an Abandoned Field’, in Rachel Harrison: If I Did It, ed. by Heike 
Munder and Ellen Seiferman (Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2007), pp. 120-125 (p. 120).  
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extroversion and reticence, expressiveness and stolidity. What, if anything, can 
this sculpture tell us about the microphone as a theatrical thing? And how might 
an appreciation of the particular performance of this work open onto a 
discussion of what I found so (not-laugh-out-loud) funny about Kinkaleri’s take 
on postmodern theatricality? 
 
Critics frequently describe Harrison’s work as ‘theatrical’ or having a quality of 
‘performance’, and when they do so, they often name check Michael Fried. 
Fried is the art critic who wrote ‘Art and Objecthood’, a famous essay that is still 
frequently quoted and that, for many years after its initial publication, in 
Artforum in 1967,31 influenced the terms in which certain types of art and 
theatre (and the relationship between the two) were discussed. In particular, as 
both Shannon Jackson and Nicholas Ridout have suggested, Fried’s essay 
represents an influential moment in ‘the emergence of “theatricality” as a key 
(and negative) term in the understanding of certain post-modern arts 
practices’.32 In the following pages, I will use the example of Harrison's work to 
open Fried's essay to a reading that, in turn, opens onto Kinkaleri's I 
Cenci/Spettacolo. In the process I hope to animate a set of exchanges between 
theatrical and sculptural funniness. In order to do this, it will become necessary 
to enjoy the funny affective quality of each – that is, the way I feel like I want to 
laugh not only when I watch Kinkaleri's performance and look at Harrison's 
sculpture, but also when I read and think about Fried's essay.  
 
 
8. Literalism and theatricality   
 
In ‘Art and Objecthood’ Fried advances a strident critique, indeed 
condemnation, of a certain strain of Minimalist art he calls ‘literalist’, which he 
seeks to distinguish from the artwork he most esteems, namely Abstract 
Expressionist painting. He takes the work and statements of Donald Judd and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Reprinted in Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 148-172. 
32 Ridout, Nicholas, Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical Problems, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2006), p. 5. 
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Robert Morris as exemplary of the sensibility he has disparagingly called 
‘literalist’ on the basis that these sculptors had become concerned, above all 
else, with the material fact of their work – its overall shape, its objecthood, its 
presence in a room in which the viewer is also present. He cites Morris’ 
statement about an art that ‘takes relations out of the work and makes them 
functions of space, light, and the viewer’s field of vision’, and of ‘one’s 
awareness of oneself existing in the same space as the work’.33 In Fried’s view, 
the defining aim of modernist painting (and thus art in general) was its attempt 
to ‘defeat or suspend its own objecthood’.34 The modernist painting must be 
autonomous, self-contained, and thus ‘compel conviction’ as a work of art. In so 
doing, it might afford a viewer the opportunity to become ‘absorbed’ in the work. 
Fried is espousing a work of aesthetic autonomy, an artwork that holds its own. 
And the way that Fried condemns the so-called literalist work’s failure to 
achieve (or even strive toward) this aesthetic autonomy is by calling it 
‘theatrical’. And he wields this term of disparagement with all the emphasis he 
can muster. He writes, ‘the imperative that modernist painting defeat or 
suspend its objecthood is at bottom the imperative that it defeat or suspend 
theatre’.35 
 
It would be easy for a theatre practitioner to take it rather personally that Fried 
uses the word ‘theatrical’ as an insult, especially when he writes statements like 
'theatre is now the negation of art’.36 But, for a long time, for this theatre 
practitioner, feeling mildly indignant at Fried's famously intemperate tone was 
overshadowed by a feeling of incomprehension. It seemed to make no sense 
that Fried would deploy the word in this context. When people use the word 
'theatrical' as a term of disparagement, they usually mean in some sense 
conspicuously fake, perhaps even histrionic. Along with this comes images of a 
rather stuffy, silly building, with footlights and velvet curtains, and scenery 
lowered from mechanical pulleys, and actors with powdered faces pretending to 
be other people. Whereas Fried uses the word 'theatrical' it to disparage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Fried, p. 153. 
34 Fried, p. 151. 
35 Fried, p. 160, emphasis here, and in all citations from this edition, original. 
36 Fried, p. 153. 
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minimalist sculptures, which, with their stripped-bare aesthetic, would appear to 
embody the very opposite of theatre. The works of Morris and Judd from this 
period are geometric, plain, repetitive. Nothing representing anything else, the 
materials are just what they are, the shapes as plain as they could be.  
 
It might be observed, though, that Fried is fully aware that by accusing the 
minimalists of theatricality, he is calling upon an unexpected term. He wields it 
with relish, this shocking accusation of theatricality, a term that Morris, Judd et 
al would not think of using about their own work and, arguably, a condition of 
which they would not be at all happy to hear their work accused. And so, with all 
the rhetorical emphasis he can muster, Fried is calling attention to what he 
perceives as a new and worrying trend: outbreaks of theatricality in the least 
expected places. The minimalists’ ‘literalist espousal of objecthood,’ he writes, 
despite appearances to the contrary, ‘amounts to nothing other than a plea for a 
new genre of theatre'.37 It is important to acknowledge, at this point, that, as 
Philip Auslander notes, ‘Fried is prejudiced against “theatricality” but not against 
theatre as such’.38 He is diagnosing a trend that he dislikes within the art world, 
rather than dismissing the validity of all theatre as an artistic practice. Indeed, 
towards the end of his essay Fried acknowledges that the ‘need to defeat what I 
have been calling theatre’ has also been felt within the theatre itself – he cites 
‘of course’ Brecht and Artaud. For Fried, the efforts of these two modernist 
theatre revolutionists are defined by their recognition of theatre's ‘need to 
establish a drastically different relation to its audience'. It seems that the 
audience is a key part of the problem, if not the problem. He continues, 'For 
theatre has an audience – it exists for one – in a way the other arts do not; in 
fact, this more than anything else is what modernist sensibility finds intolerable 
in theatre generally’.39 The dependence on the audience – this is 'intolerable' for 
modernism, an intellectual movement that prizes aesthetic autonomy. The 
neediness of theatre, its outwards projection, the sense in which it exists only 
for the audience.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Fried, p. 153. 
38 Philip Auslander, From Acting to Performance: Essays in Modernism and Postmodernism 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 51. 
39 Fried, p. 163. 
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Fried's disdain for the minimalist sensibility had to do with its concern for ‘the 
actual circumstances’ in which the viewer encounters the work, ‘the experience 
of literalist art is of an object in a situation – one that, virtually by definition, 
includes the beholder’.40 The italics here suggest that there is something that 
Fried finds really too much about this – the inclusion of the beholder in what 
Morris calls ‘the entire situation’,41 the situation that is itself part of the work, 
means that the sculpture needs a viewer in order to work. A ‘theatrical’ 
sculpture needs an audience in a way that Fried considers improper and even 
faintly embarrassing. Picking up my earlier discussion of postmodern theatre, I 
would like to push this analysis one step further and suggest that Fried's anti-
theatrical sentiment can also be thought of as an expression of what Kelleher 
called ‘modernism's perennial disdain towards the economic sphere’.42 For the 
condition of existing for an audience, that is needing an audience, depending on 
one, is tainted not only with a need for recognition but by an economic 
imperative – and this fatally compromises its aesthetic autonomy, as though the 
theatrical is that which says ‘if you don't look at me, I don't get paid’. Or, 
perhaps, because it’s an art object, it’s saying something more like ‘if you don’t 
activate my objecthood I'm not worth anything – as art, or on the art market (for 
the two are now entangled)’.  
 
At this point, we might remind ourselves of the conflation of modernism with 
muteness, of the critic’s trope of 'the mute, Modernist, hand-sculpted form'. It 
seems that Fried, as a champion of Modernist work, would rather the art 
maintained its dignified and mysterious silence (or, you could say he would 
rather it let him, the modernist art critic, do the talking). Auslander suggests that 
with hindsight, we can understand that ‘Fried was describing a sensibility 
overtaking the artworld', in other words, ‘Fried’s “theatricality” is what we now 
call “postmodernism”’.43  
 
It is worth noting that Fried's intemperately worded espousal of a particular sort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Fried, p. 153. 
41 Fried, p. 154. 
42 Kelleher, p. 66. 
43 Auslander, 52. 
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of anti-theatrical prejudice became unexpectedly influential for attempts, within 
performance and theatre studies, to work out what this postmodernism meant 
for the theatre. Such accounts often shared Fried's disdain for theatricality, and 
instead searched for redemption in a kind of literalism, or anti-
representationalism. But instead of dwelling upon this anti-theatrical turn in 
performance studies, I will instead turn to Nicholas Ridout’s response to it in 
Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical Problems (2006). Ridout's work is 
useful for the current discussion for its working-through of the relationship 
between Fried's deployment of theatrical alongside literalist, and what might be 
called ‘The Theatre,’ by which I mean that place we often still imagine when 
someone says 'theatre', the grand building, the footlights, the curtains, the 
scenery and the actors pretending to be other people.  
 
Ridout's key critical move is ‘an identification of theatre with a certain kind of 
unease’.44 He cites Fried’s key argument, that ‘Literalist sensibility is theatrical 
because […] it is concerned with the actual circumstances in which the beholder 
encounters literalist work […] the experience of literalist art is of an object in a 
situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the beholder.’45 Calling 
attention to Fried’s italicization, Ridout observes that ‘it is an awareness of one’s 
body as a presence in a situation that seems to constitute the condition of 
theatricality in this argument’.46 By this logic, what Fried frames as the 
‘overcoming of theatre’ (which for him defines the aim of true art, of Modernist 
painting), depends upon the work’s capacity to ‘absorb the viewer, permit her a 
moment of self-transcendence in contemplation of the work’.47 In this context, 
self-transcendence means forgetting oneself, momentarily forgetting one has a 
body, and that that body is part of a situation, a set of circumstances. For 
Ridout, the kind of beholder Fried is imagining getting absorbed in the 
modernist painting is 'all consciousness,’ someone whose embodiedness has 
‘receded into the complete darkness of a non-existent auditorium the better to 
contemplate the wholly unsituated picture that is suddenly almost both subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ridout, p. 7. 
45 Fried, p. 153. 
46 Ridout, p. 8. 
47 Ridout, p. 8. 
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and object of this act of contemplation of absorption’.48 As Ridout’s 
metaphorisation implies, this self-transcendence is not entirely antithetical to the 
aims of theatre as we know it. Indeed, he suggests the closest parallel to the 
absorption and aesthetic autonomy that Fried seeks in modernist painting is 
theatrical realism, a dramaturgical style that can be traced to the nineteenth-
century playhouse and the naturalistic, ‘fourth wall’ theatre it staged. In other 
words, The Theatre, wherein the footlights, scenery, curtains associated with 
the Victorian playhouse need not literally be present for the conventions to 
work. These conventions are also, it must be said, dependent in large part on 
electricity. The introduction of electrical light meant not only that the stage could 
be bright, the auditorium dark, but that the lights could be ceremonially dimmed 
to signal the start of the show and draw focus to the brightly lit stage. As Ridout 
notes, theatrical realism operates according to the ‘pictorial values of 
illusionism’, which are ‘sustained by conditions of spectatorship in which a 
darkened auditorium becomes the norm’. And, for Ridout, what theatrical 
realism and Fried’s model of Modernist art share, is that they 'seek to eliminate 
the spectator from the set-up'.49   
 
Although its origins can be traced to the 19th Century, this set of expectations, 
and the pleasures attendant upon them – sitting in the darkened auditorium, 
watching the curtain rise on a brightly lit stage-picture, becoming absorbed in 
the goings-on onstage – have not themselves been consigned to history. 
Indeed, my own experience of theatregoing is often haunted by a yearning for a 
sort of disappearance into the absolute dark. As the lights fade out, and a quiet 
falls, I often find myself disappointed by the incompleteness of the blackout, 
compromised as it invariably is by exit signs and phone screens, and the fidgety 
unsilentness of those around me. However much I might try to be a good post-
Cagean (in other words, postmodern) spectator, telling myself to accept these 
contingencies as part of the experience, part of the performance, because the 
entire situation is the work, I often find myself irritated that I am being denied 
the kind of self-transcendence, the absorption, that somewhere deep down I 
must feel is owing. What I'm not sure of is whether I feel it's what I owe the 
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theatre, or what the theatre owes me. Arguably, this confusion arises from the 
tension between the expectation of a work's aesthetic autonomy, and the 
feeling of having paid for a particular sort of experience.  
 
 
9. Muteness, hiddenness and the sculptural funny 
 
For Ridout the tension between the absorptive promise of the theatre and the 
fact that it remains an encounter between bodies is the source not only of 
embarrassment, but of a pleasurable sort of unease. The affect he is describing 
is contiguous with the funny affects I am responding to in this thesis more 
broadly, and in this discussion in particular. But now, it is necessary to make 
things a bit more explicit, to push at what might be particularly, peculiarly funny 
in this moment of exchange and confusion between a (supposedly) non-
figurative sculpture and a certain kind of funny anthropomorphism that Fried 
names as ‘stage presence’.50   
 
In a curious passage, one that endures as the most memorable and revealing 
of ‘Art and Objecthood’, Fried describes a hypothetical encounter with a literalist 
object. He writes that, 
 
In fact, being distanced by such objects is not, I suggest, entirely unlike 
being distanced or crowded by the silent presence of another person; the 
experience of coming upon literalist objects unexpectedly – for example, 
in somewhat darkened rooms – can be strongly, momentarily, disquieting 
in just this way.51  
 
Ridout reads in this passage an encounter that is ‘intensely theatrical in its 
circumstances’ – an uneasy intimacy, pervaded by a sense that something is 
not quite right. Just as, in the theatre, the wished-for absorption never quite 
comes off: ‘The proxemics are inducing discomfort. Someone is too close or too 
far away, in a “darkened” space, too’.52 What’s at play in this discomfort? 
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51 Fried, p. 155. 
52 Ridout, p. 9. 
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Proxemics, semi-darkness and also silence. A silence that is somehow full. 
When considered in conjunction with the anthropomorphic presence that Fried 
is describing, this silence can only be thought of as a withholding of speech, 
which makes it sound as if Fried is disconcerted that the sculpture refuses to 
speak to him. Why would this bother Fried? What is it about this feeling of co-
presence that he finds so unacceptable?  
Certainly, this anthropomorphic quality undoes the claims that Judd and Morris 
make on behalf of their work. Fried cites Judd’s explicitly denunciation of the 
‘naturalistic and anthropomorphic image’ formed by sculpture that is ‘made part 
by part, by addition, composed’, adding that Judd ‘would include include the 
work of David Smith and Anthony Caro under this description’.53 This is what 
Judd is striving against when he aims for the wholeness, the singleness of 
shape that he calls a ‘Specific Object’. For Fried, however, it is precisely this 
emphasis on shape – the ‘singleness’ of which secures ‘the wholeness of 
object’54 – that generates what he identifies as a curiously anthropomorphic 
effect. For, he writes, is it not the case that ‘the entities or beings encountered in 
everyday experience in terms that most closely approach the literalist ideals of 
the nonrelational, the unitary and the wholistic are other persons’.55 Fried is 
reflecting here on the fact that the scale of much literalist work, compares fairly 
closely with that of the human body. Alongside their tendency to be roughly-
human sized, Fried also objects to the perceived hollowness of literalist art 
works, citing ‘the impression, which numerous critics have mentioned, that Judd 
and Morris’s pieces are hollow’.56 This apparent hollowness (the illusion of it, if 
not the objective fact), is for Fried, ‘almost blatantly anthropomorphic’ because it 
is by dint of this that the sculptures exude ‘the quality of having an inside’.57 
 
Fried’s perception of the thing’s interiority, or perceived or imagined inner 
space, as ‘almost blatantly anthropomorphic’ is consistent with a way of 
imagining humanness long established within the aesthetic tradition. After all, 
having an inside and an outside is, as Barbara Johnson notes, the most general 
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54 Fried, p. 151. 
55 Fried, p. 156. 
56 Fried, p. 151. 
57 Fried, p. 156. 
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description of a human. In an essay on figures of muteness within the poetic 
tradition, Johnson reminds us that, like Keats’ Grecian urn, mysterious and 
silent, things with interiority are often used as metaphors for the relation 
between ‘body and soul, expression and intention’.58 Inner space connotes the 
space of sentience, and it is something one ‘has’. And here, having gets 
confused with being, which in turn suggests some kind of agency. For what 
disconcerts Fried is his sense of these sculptures having an inside, and thus it 
is possible to detect, within his writing, a suspicion that the things themselves 
are deliberately, maliciously withholding something from him. Yes, the sense of 
something withheld is there in, and perhaps constitutive of, the theatrical-
sculptural funniness I am attempting to articulate. Something withheld, hidden, 
but there. Indeed, what Fried finds particularly egregious is the fact that this 
anthropomorphism is ‘hidden’. His comments on this reveal that he considers 
hiddenness to be inherently theatrical: ‘a kind of latent or hidden naturalism, 
indeed anthropomorphism, lies at the core of literalist theory and practice. The 
concept of presence all but says as much’. Her writes, ‘what is wrong with 
literalist work is not that it is anthropomorphic but that the meaning and, equally, 
the hiddenness of its anthropomorphism are incurably theatrical’.59 So, although 
minimalist artists make literalist claims, vociferously rejecting figurativism in 
favour of a ‘new,’ non-representational objecthood, Fried is arguing that the 
work of the minimalist artists fails at non-figurativeness by emitting, in spite of 
what appeared to be their creators' best efforts, an anthropomorphic – or 
‘naturalist’ presence. What’s more, this is an anthropomorphic presence that is 
hidden, and that seems to also itself depend on hiddenness – the impression 
that the objects ‘have’ an interior, a space within.   
 
I want to nudge this towards an apprehension of the funniness of Fried’s 
relation to these objects. He is disconcerted by the idea of being in a room with 
an object that is ‘performing’ this muteness, this hollowness. He senses that its 
anthropomorphic performance is all the more aggressive, obtrusive because it 
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Feuerstein, Bill Johnson Gonzalez, Lili Porten and Keja Valens (Durham and London: Duke 
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59 Fried, p. 157. 
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is hidden. The thing looks nothing like a person, and does not appear to be 
making any effort in that direction, yet it is exuding a quality that is person-like. 
It is exuding this quality precisely by withholding it, and disconcerting Fried 
precisely with the sense of this withholding. And, tellingly, Fried characterizes 
this quality with a theatrical metaphor, naming it as a ‘kind of stage presence’. 
This stage presence is, he writes, ‘a function, not just of the obtrusiveness and, 
often, even aggressiveness of literalist work, but of the special complicity that 
the work extorts from the beholder’.60 Fried describes this ‘stage presence’ 
almost with a sense of consternation. He finds it aggressive. Not only is the 
object hiding something, but it is hiding that it is hiding it, and it wants him to 
play along. Indeed, it has given him no choice but to play along. Fried’s 
consternation at this state of affairs tells us something about the sculptural-
theatrical funny. And it tells us something about Michael Fried. What disturbs 
him is a sense of uncertainty about what a thing wants. He accuses it of 
needing him – to look at it, activate it, assure it of its value. And then he seems 
upset by the possibility that it doesn’t need him at all, or at least, seems to be 
pretending not to care. This registers in the suspicion that the object’s silence is, 
somehow, aimed at him.  
 
A fuller account of the way gendered tropes are played out in the Friedean 
scene of looking would need to take into account the way much Minimalist 
sculpture was, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, bound up with the 
performance of a certain kind of masculinity. As Jackson notes, he ‘literalist’ 
tendency Fried identifies was bound up with the appropriation of classed 
symbols of authenticity associated with the manual worker (for example, Tony 
Smith’s ‘cross-class fascination with the smoke stacks on the New Jersey 
turnpike’61). Although this fuller account lies beyond the scope of the current 
discussion, it is possible to conjecture that Fried’s status as man is bound up 
with the particular funniness his text performs. What can be detected, in his little 
vignette of happening across the sculpture, is the self-consciousness of a man 
becoming aware of his own physical presence in a room. He is disconcerted 
because he feels he is being observed, and he somewhat incongruously – and 
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perhaps a little but hysterically – calls this ‘theatrical’. We might conjecture that 
he responds thus because, as a man, an art critic at that, he is used to being 
the one doing the looking. The thingness of ‘Michael Fried’ within this scene – 
the man with the status of a critic – is critically useful, usefully suggestive, as an 
exemplary body, a body with a famous man’s name. 
 
Could it be that there is a kind of funniness where the theatrical and the 
sculptural meet, an attitude or affective quality that, in a gallery context, might 
get called ‘theatrical,’ and in a theatrical context, might feel somehow 
‘sculptural’? If so, it might feel something like ‘I LOVE YOU’, an ostentatious 
and sentimental declaration being summarily taped onto a grey vinyl floor by a 
performer who handles the task with the adeptness of a technician. Or like 
those words, ‘I LOVE YOU’ being almost, but not quite covered over using the 
material of the floor, the material we’d been sitting here looking at but not really 
seeing, but that now is being recruited – or nudged – into action. It might inhere 
in the play between amplification and and muteness, the funny combination of 
the two. Or this sculptural-theatrical funniness might inhere in the uncertainty 
over whether this is something a person is doing, or something the show itself is 
doing. Or in the slow movement of the show through moments of at which 
something almost gets said, but does not, or the sequences that feel like a 
reveal, but then the reveal does not reveal anything apart from, perhaps, 
another kind of hiding. 
 
I Cenci/Spettacolo stages the juxtaposition between live microphones and 
deadpan performers. Or between the lively intangibility of air and the 
stubbornness of matter that, in spite of its aggressive withholding, or perhaps 
because of it, cannot help but emit an anthropomorphic presence. What can be 
said about the microphone onstage that amplifies nothing, besides itself being 
picked up and set down again, on its stand? Perhaps this microphone is 
amplifying, in some sense, that which the show itself is withholding. A 
microphone that makes palpable a certain kind of a sculpturally funny 
theatricality, one that hides the fact that it is hiding within its ploy or pretension 
toward self-evident literalness. 
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10. Heroics  
 
‘We don't need to be "loyal" to Artaud,’ Kinkaleri write, in the programme notes 
for I Cenci/Spettacolo, ‘we aren't motivated by drawing family trees that list the 
names of those closest to the madman’. And perhaps the question of an author, 
an artistic forebear, a discoverer or idol is what is being staged in their show. 
Artaud’s 1935 production of The Cenci in Paris closed after just seventeen 
performances. Compromised from the start by Artaud’s acceptance of a theatre 
‘completely unsuitable’ for the realization of his artistic vision of a Theatre of 
Cruelty (the Folies-Wagram, which was ‘traditionally constructed, and 
specialized in operetta’62), it was, according to Artaud’s friend, Roger Blin, ‘a 
commercial piece, half way to what he wanted to do in the theatre’. Artaud 
reportedly said, ‘There will be between the Theatre of Cruelty and The Cenci 
the difference which exists between the roaring of a waterfall or the unleashing 
of a natural storm, and all that remains of their violence once it has been 
recorded in an image.’ 63 This reminds me of how, near the beginning of 
Kinkaleri’s I Cenci, as the walking duvet retreats, it deposits a piece of paper, 
which reads ‘HOUDINI 1901’. The name is that of a famous escapologist, the 
year is when his famous straightjacket stunt was filmed for commercial release 
by the French movie company Pathé.64 A reminder, perhaps, that Harry 
Houdini’s feats of endurance, ‘heroic’ as they may have been, were undertaken 
for the purposes of entertainment, ‘just for show’.  
 
During the 2000s, Rachel Harrison made a series of works named after notable 
men, some of them ‘public figures’, some what you might describe as ‘American 
idols’: Amerigo Vespucci, Fats Domino, Al Gore, Johnny Depp – all of them her 
characteristic clumsy-looking monoliths, but sculpted in such a way that a nook 
or outcrop might bear some small item, a small element of décor linked via 
association to the name (Al Gore has a domestic thermostat, Fats Domino a 
can of SlimFast, Johnny Depp a single hoop earring). Kelsey describes these 
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works as operating ‘between disguise and sculpture’: they operate at the ‘point 
beyond which sculptural properties of material, form and structure disperse into 
more hysterical outbreaks of style’. 65   
 
‘Women can’t have heroes,’ Harrison once said,66 and this makes me think, 
once again, about my position as a female reader and spectator of men, 
famous men. It makes me think about my enjoyment of the performances of 
Stewart Lee and Paul de Man and J.L. Austin. ‘I am seduced by Austin’, writes 
Felman, in a move I resisted (perhaps in large part aware that I would be writing 
extended chapters on Stewart Lee, not a dead writer but a living man, a man 
whose body is onstage for me to see, and for me to be seen to be seeing). I 
am, though, in some sense, seduced by Kinkaleri’s performance. I loved it, and 
I found it unbearable. Perhaps what I found peculiarly intensely funny was its 
staging of maleness as a silly (yet, in some other sense, deadly serious), kind of 
spectacle.  
 
 
11. The joke of the brick  
 
At the moment of acknowledging that I might have seen, that I was close to 
seeing, the premiere of I Cenci, I put a brick in the middle of the chapter. Almost 
like the brick, set down, could in its solidity mitigate the regret, and ephemerality 
of performance. Lugging a brick around in a suitcase is a somewhat ridiculous 
thing to do. It is also a reassuring, if funny, way of retrieving the lost hours 
dedicated to the work of theatre-making and live performance, remembering the 
physical work of it.  
 
In the context of my autobiography, the brick bespeaks the anxiety of influence, 
and attests to way influence plays out less as a linear, family-tree style set of 
‘inheritances’ and more as a series of semi-planned acts of beachcoming, 
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bumping-intos, contingencies, and awkwardness in foyers. Often anxious and 
confused as much as they are hopeful and intentional, these are the material 
practices that one might undertake in the effort to stake out a ‘place’ for oneself 
within a particular professional field.  
 
Incidentally, I can’t remember what happened to the actual brick; I have an idea 
we threw it into the Spree, the river that runs through Berlin, but this may have 
just been something we had said we would do. The brick gets a little less solid, 
a little less real. Whatever poetic, elegiac or humorous qualities it retains, the 
brick story, and the brick joke, that we told onstage in Berlin in 2006 would 
certainly mean differently now, in 2016, after the referendum, ‘Brexit’, in the 
midst of a housing crisis, as does much of the theatrical work, and the jokes 
therein, that I loved, and I made, or tried to make, in the early years of the 21st 
century.  
 
The Ryanair excess baggage fee was a worthwhile investment; not only did it 
bring the brick story up-to-date, but it reassured us that the brick was, after all, a 
literal thing, with a weight, a heft to it. But the baggage fee also, it could be said, 
reincorporated the brick into a system of commerce and exchange. Not 
necessarily by putting a price on it, but rather, by turning it into a joke. Perhaps 
the question that should be asked here is whether it is possible to conduct 
cultural materialist enquiries in proximity to jokes. Do jokes, which have a 
different sort of value, or ‘pay-off’, subvert the materialism of the ‘things’ they 
reference, or transform? 
 
How does a feeling of finding things funny, a response that might be thought of 
as wholly 'subjective', respond to questions of history, the historical and the 
materialist? There is something improper about it, something exposing, 
embarrassing. It might say more about you than you realize. Because there’s 
an element to it that is ‘personal’: a sense of humour as something one ‘has’. 
Equated with a sense of identity with and from the things we like – what appeals 
to me, my sense of humour. A sense of humour defines me, is desirable 
(‘GSOH’) and is something in which I take pleasure in identifying myself, and it 
is something that is shared. It sounds quite glib, a shared sense of humour, and 
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this may be why it is not often directly acknowledged as a required quality for 
collaboration, and factor in professional spectatorship. This may be because an 
‘in joke’ is generally something to be avoided (or at least, not admitted to). 
 
What is the relation between personal history (with its emotions and 
associations and attachments, its baggage) and social or economic or cultural 
history (i.e. history ‘proper’)? If the relation is one of uncertainty, perhaps this is 
especially so in the field of performance. In which each performance-thing is 
hyper-contextual and ephemeral. And in particular in this kind of performance 
making, in which, as Kelleher notes, people 'invest lives'. This investment gives 
a particular weight, something emotional, to certain work, work that by its look 
or feel is quite silly or light. This undoubtedly influences that the kinds of 
‘investments’ I might have in certain kinds of work as a spectator and hence as 
a scholar (a professional spectator, albeit one who spectates in an 
‘unprofessional’ manner – at home, years too late, distractedly). My strong 
feelings (pleasure and desire and delight) for the things in the show and the 
thing of the show force me to ask certain questions – can a response that is so 
subjective, coded as it is by the particularities (contingencies, vagaries) of my 
personal experience (my story), be usefully considered in more properly 
academic way, a culturally materialist way (history)? Can there be such a thing 
as a personal, embodied kind of cultural materialist performance criticism? Or 
perhaps the question should be, can materialist performance criticism ever be 
anything other than personal, embodied, emotional, coded by the contingencies 
of experience?  
 
Chapter One ended with an acknowledgement of a recurrent complaint about 
Austin’s modes of philosophizing which had to do with its implicit assumption 
that, ‘obviously’, the body seen to be doing the uttering is the one ‘behind’ the 
act. In response, I argued that, by thinking about Austin’s philosophical 
performance as itself the act of a speaking body, it becomes possible to think of 
his work as a performative displacement of his own first person, through the act 
of speaking his example. I wonder how this chapter’s acknowledgement, 
staging, of my own first person relates to this. However, it might be observed 
that, in this chapter, I never quite make it onto the stage. In my evasive 
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declarations I do not allow myself to become fully visible, thus revealing the 
contingency of my own embodied position. Instead, and with the aid of my brick 
decoy, I go through a set of discursive and writerly maneuvers that amount to a 
funny sort of hiding. The chapter that follows will attempt to remedy this set of 
affairs by bringing the question of my authorial, and spectatorial, first-person if 
not onto the stage, then certainly into the room, in an embodied way.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Identification, collectivity, guilt: on being Stewart Lee’s audience 
 
1. The room 
 
In this, the final Chapter of the thesis, I wish to return to the conceptualization of 
direct address that I elaborated in the Introduction. There, I suggested that, in 
an age of digital communications, the idea of a person standing there, saying 
things out loud, in the presence of others, remains important to the way we 
imagine speech. I also considered the various ways in which, in the 
performance of direct address, and especially the performance of a self-
referencing direct address into a microphone, the act of speech is oddly 
redoubled, as though the performer’s act were saying, ‘I am speaking to you, 
and I am calling attention to the fact that I am speaking to you’. If, as my 
reading of Felman and Butler has suggested, there is something inherently 
funny about the speaking body, then this implies that funniness may itself be 
redoubled when a body stands up to show its performance of speaking, a 
funniness that can be felt before a single word has been spoken. But what of 
the funniness of being spoken to? How does it feel to become, even notionally, 
the destination, or the object, of a direct address? Does this call into play 
another body – not the one standing up, on the stage, in the light, but the one 
(the numerous ones) sitting there, down below, in the semi-dark? 
 
When Stewart Lee steps onto the stage, the first thing he says is this: 
 
Um. Now, I’m going to tell you a story, right, it’ll take about, um, an hour 
and fifteen minutes, er which is a little bit too long for a show without an 
interval. But it’s also not long enough to split into two halves. It’s kind of 
disappointing either way. But it is a little bit too long, so if you need to go 
for a wee during that, you can do that and I’m not the sort of person who 
picks on anyone.1  
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This is 90’s Comedian, a show that Lee first began performing in 2005, and 
stopped performing in 2006. Another performance that I found funny, another 
show I never saw live. I watched it on DVD, in 2009, in a room in a shared 
house in Stoke Newington in North London, with my friend Holly. And this fact, 
you may quite understandably be thinking, makes this performance a rather 
unsuitable case study for a chapter on the feelings associated with direct 
address. But then, onstage at the Chapter Arts Centre in Cardiff in 2005, Lee 
turns to look directly into the camera and says: 
 
Likewise, if you’re watching this at home on a DVD and you need to go 
for a wee, you can just pause it and I’ll have no problem with that. I won’t 
even know that it’s happening, literally. 2  
 
And we laughed, my friend Holly and I, at the way the man on the screen (a 
man we had not really thought much about since the nineties) acknowledged 
and anticipated our deferred and distant act of spectating, addressing us as if 
we were in some sense co-present, in the room. Or rather, addressing the 
camera as if it were us (or me, for there is something peculiarly intimate about 
the way he leans right into the camera and refers to my potential urge to wee), 
or a window onto this room, the one we are in. This mediated address might be 
argued to be somehow both more and less ‘direct’ than the way Lee speaks to 
me, and my co-spectators, in the situation of the live gig. Is it a different kind of 
phenomenon altogether? It certainly feels different. And yet, I think it could have 
something to tell us about the feelings associated with being addressed in one’s 
position as spectator, audience member, in a live situation. As I will argue, the 
feelings of being addressed are mixed up with feelings about not quite ‘being’, 
or feeling not quite ‘addressed’, and open onto another set of weird redoublings 
that concern my feelings of coincidence and non-coincidence with my own 
body, the bodies around me, and the collective ‘body’ that is the audience.  
 
First of all, let us set the scene. The gig takes place in a room. Not the same 
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kind of room as my room at home, the one where I watch my DVDs and read 
my books, but a ‘room for comedy’. Stand-up comedians call it this: they say 
‘the room’. For her research into what makes a ‘good room’ for comedy, Sophie 
Quirk spoke to comedians, promoters, who told her they preferred low ceilings 
and hard surfaces, densely packed seating, low stage so that people feel close 
to the performer, no awkwardly placed doors.3 And yet comedians perform in all 
kinds of spaces – from stadiums to black-box theatres, from student union bars 
to the London Palladium. In all cases, the comedian will, with pleasing matter-
of-factness, refer to the performance space as ‘the room’. In some sense, this 
emphasis upon the four walls, ceiling and floor reflects the acoustic imperative 
of stand-up: the room contains and amplifies laughter. As stand-up Dan 
Atkinson tells Quirk, ‘you want nowhere for the laugh to go’, which is why 
‘comedy in a tent’s usually shit because the fabric just lets the laugh out’.4 But 
comedians are not only referring to the physical space when they speak of 
‘working the room’, they are also referring to a combination of factors, including 
the collective mood and character of the audience. And, as Quirk notes, just as 
it is possible to refer to ‘practices that seek to shape the room’, it seems 
‘audiences can also be shaped, and their behaviour manipulated and 
contained’.5 A good room for comedy, then, is not the same as my room at 
home, the one in which I watch my DVDs, read my theoretical texts and look at 
photographs of sculptures; in the context of stand-up performance, ‘the room’ 
speaks of that which is collective. The phrase itself is collectivizing. If I go out to 
that room, along with all those other bodies, I become part of ‘the room’, 
synonymous with it. 
 
On the question of direct address, the critical discourse of stand-up tends to 
make certain kinds of claims regarding the relation between the stage and the 
auditorium (claims that, often, are part of a more or less explicit effort to 
differentiate the stand-up address from theatrical speech). For example when, 
near the beginning of Getting the Joke, Oliver Double attempts a definition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Sophie Quirk, ‘Containing the Audience: The “Room” in Stand-Up Comedy’, Participations: 
Journal of Audience and Reception Studies, 8:2 (2001), 219-238. 
4 Quirk, p. 228. 
5 Quirk, p. 222.  
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stand-up, he lists three main points (‘besides the fact of it being funny’). The 
second, titled ‘direct communication’, reads: 
 
It involves direct communication between performer and audience. It’s an 
intense relationship, with energy flowing back and forth between stage 
and auditorium. It’s like a conversation made up of jokes, laughter and 
sometimes less pleasant responses.6  
 
In stand-up, it seems, the audience plays an active role in shaping the 
comedian’s performance. This is why many people find the idea of performing 
stand-up terrifying. The ‘room’ in which stand-up is performed is, typically, a 
noisy place, wherein the audience is licensed to interrupt or redirect or cut short 
a routine, and, in the final instance, force the comedian from the stage. As 
Double writes, in the third of his definitional points: 
 
The stand-up comedian is duty bound to incorporate events in the venue 
into the act. Failure to respond to a heckler, a dropped glass or a ringing 
phone will result in the audience losing faith in a performer's ability.7  
 
This assertion of the comedian’s ‘duty’ to respond to ‘events’ is preceded by the 
subheading: ‘present tense’. Double is clear about this: because it 
‘acknowledges the performance situation’, stand-up can be said to take place 
‘in the present tense, in the here and now’.8 Double is making an ontological 
claim here, about stand-up’s liveness. At first glance, what he is proposing 
seems easy enough to accept. Stand-up does happen in the ‘here and now’: 
the comedian addresses the audience directly or, as Double has written 
elsewhere, works ‘straight out to the audience, performing in the first person 
and the present tense’.9 In this chapter, I ask how it feels to be addressed 
(‘directly’) by a performer standing on a stage. It is by paying close attention to 
the modes of address deployed by a specific performer – Stewart Lee – within 
the space of a single performance, that my discussion puts various kinds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Double, Getting the Joke, p. 19. 
7 Double, Getting the Joke, pp. 19-20. 
8 Double, Getting the Joke, p. 19. 
9 University of Kent, ‘Staff Profiles: Dr Oliver Double’,  <https://www.kent.ac.uk/arts/staff-
profiles/drama/double.html> [accessed 16 May 2016].  
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pressure on the definition Double sets out. In particular, it problematizes his 
conflation of the ‘here and now’ of the performance (the ‘situation’ unfolding ‘in 
the venue’) with a grammatical ‘present tense’.  
 
As my work here has unfolded, I have found that attending to modes of address 
means paying close attention to what Denise Riley calls those ‘deeply inherent 
aspects of language which do not refer and yet which themselves act’. For, ‘a 
language also works at the pervasive level of its musculature, quietly but 
powerfully, through its grammatical and syntactic joints’.10 Perhaps, as a level of 
attention, the grammatical sounds a little dry, unpromising and far removed 
from the excitement of the stand-up gig (especially in light of my declared need 
to get out more). But, working under Riley’s influence, I hope to demonstrate 
how apparently minor linguistic junctures – pronouns, propositions, shifts in 
tense – are instrumental to the highly (and often strangely) physical 
affectiveness of speech. What seems like grammatical quibbling is often the key 
to the ‘deeply inherent’ funniness of speech’s relation to the bodies it describes, 
positions and speaks through (or, as Riley would have it, across).  
 
Although stand-up’s direct address might seem simple (for what could be more 
straightforward, more direct, than a performer stepping onto a stage and 
acknowledging those who have gathered, saying ‘Hello, good evening, thanks 
for coming’?), I will argue that direct address is a difficult and strange 
phenomenon that masquerades as simple, straight, and self-evident. Stand-
up’s illusion of simplicity relies to some extent on familiarity; when practitioners, 
scholars and audiences speak of stand-up, a claim to directness is often 
accompanied by the recourse to the spectator feeling as if they are a partner in 
a normal, everyday conversation. As the folklorist Ian Brodie writes, ‘Much of 
stand-up comedy’s appeal is precisely its contiguity with small group talk, as 
opposed to oratorical or theatrical modes’.11 Or, as John Morreall notes in his 
Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor, ‘the more successful stand-up comics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Riley, Impersonal Passion, pp. 3-4. 
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talk to their audiences in as conversational way as possible’12 For comedian 
Ross Noble, when a gig is going really well, ‘The conceit of watching a show is 
forgotten and the audience member feels like the comic is talking to them in a 
one-on-one conversation'.13  
 
As my work in the Introduction and Chapter Three has attested, the 
‘conversational’ and ‘everyday’ modality of the stand-up comedian’s 
performance depends upon the microphone, that which, in the words of Brodie, 
‘makes one loud without forcing one to be loud’.14 For Brodie, this returns the 
public act of addressing a crowd to ‘the intimacy of face-to-face encounter’.15 
And here, we can read another symmetrical way of describing the stand-up 
‘encounter’: face-to-face, one-on-one. The recurrence of these symmetrical 
terms in definitional talk around stand-up signals the importance of a notional 
reciprocality and dialogism at the scene of performance. As a folklorist 
conducting a study of stand-up comedy, Brodie has a particular agenda. 
Broadly speaking, folklore operates under the guiding principle that popular 
culture originates from ‘the people’, and therefore it is incumbent upon Brodie to 
frame stand-up in these terms in order to justify it as a legitimate object of 
folkloric enquiry. At the start of his book he recounts an objection, from a 
colleague, that ‘This is not folklore! This is show business!’16 Brodie’s 
(retroactive) response to this objection structures the central argument of his 
book. In the first place, stand-up, is ‘a form of talk that on the surface is more or 
less indistinguishable in potency from everyday forms of vernacular discourse’, 
which falls under the purview of folklorists.17 And yet, as Brodie acknowledges, 
stand-up comedy enacts ‘a complex transposition of vernacular forms of talk 
into a more formal, mediated context and […] this more formal, mediated 
context introduces a distance between audience and performer that needs 
reconciliation’. Stand-up’s ‘professionalization’ of intimate talk imposes a 
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Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 83.  
13 Noble in Double, p. x.  
14 Brodie, p. 52. 
15 Brodie, p. 51. 
16 Brodie, p. 3. 
17 Brodie, p. 43. 
	   216	  
distance: the 'indeterminate spatiotemporal distancing' of mediation (DVD, 
television or YouTube), or what Brodie calls 'the socio-cultural distance of 
speaking to a group of which he or she is not a member’. Or, more simply, it 
might be proxemics: 'the performer being on a stage and the audience not'.18 
 
Brodie’s own professional imperative (that he frame stand-up performance as 
properly folkloric, ‘of the people’) means that he is very insistent upon 
‘overcoming’ the separation between performer and spectators, ‘reconciling’ 
distance with intimacy. He frames his critical task as 'working toward the 
successful reconciliation of intimacy and distance'.19 At times, his account is 
over insistent upon this reconciliation almost to the point of absurdity. It seems 
Brodie is determined to eradicate from his account of stand-up performance not 
only ‘distance’ and ‘separation’, but physical space as such. Stand-up ‘aims at 
bridging distances’,20 he writes, including, most directly, the ‘separation of the 
performer and audience through the use of a stage’.21 He insists that the stage 
should be thought of as a ‘concession to performance rather than a divisive 
structure’,22 which can be overcome through the use of a microphone, which 
enables the performer’s voice to ‘transcend the acoustic limitations of physical 
space’.23  
 
What I find particularly problematic in Brodie’s determination to reconcile 
discordant or distancing aspects of stand-up performance is a tendency I read 
also in Noble’s and, to a lesser extent, Double’s accounts: the minimization of 
the comedian’s body. Electroacoustic amplification is instrumental to this 
downplaying: the microphone amplifies, and it minimizes. It amplifies speech, 
but by enabling the comedian to speak in a ‘natural’ register, minimizes the 
physicality of speaking. Arguably though, the downplaying of the bodily aspect 
of speech occurs not just in the discourse around stand-up, but also onstage, 
where it is possible to observe, for example, Stewart Lee standing still, 
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apparently doing nothing with his body, apart from the occasional gesture, for 
pretty much the entire hour he is onstage (although it is worth noting that Lee is 
famous for being amongst the least animated of stand-ups currently at work). 
This may be why, if the comedian’s body is mentioned at all in accounts of 
stand-up performance, it is usually in order to add a bit of surrounding context 
to a quoted joke or routine. I include my own account of Lee’s performance in 
this: in most cases you don’t mention or describe the body unless the joke 
makes absolutely no sense on paper without explaining a particular gesture or 
facial expression. In an admiring account of stand-up, when the body is 
mentioned, there seems to be an accompanying attempt to minimize it, to 
emphasize the degree to which the comedian appears, as Noble puts it, to be 
‘hardly doing anything’. When a comedian is on form, Noble writes, ‘Laughs are 
seemingly triggered by nothing more than tiny movements of the face or a 
pause that contains no words or sounds’.24 And Double spends a whole chapter 
accounting for what happens when a comedian is ‘doing just enough with the 
face, voice and body to paint a picture in the mind of the audience’.25 
 
Arguably, and curiously, comparing stand-up to a ‘one-on-one conversation’ or 
‘intimate face-to-face encounter’ is also in some sense a displacement of the 
bodies of both performer and spectators. For the relation between spectator 
and performer is not one of symmetry, equality or intimacy. To put it crudely, 
from the perspective of the spectators, there are tens, perhaps even hundreds 
of us, but only one comedian. We, for the most part, sit down whereas the 
comedian, by definition, stands up. And we, from our seats, can see the stand-
up comedian standing there, alone, on a stage. Perhaps it is raised, only 
slightly, as in a comedy club, in which case the stand-up stands above us. Or 
perhaps we look down from a raked seating bank, or even from a dress circle, 
upon the figure standing alone. In any case, the comedian has a microphone, 
and speaks, addresses us, and in doing so is visible to us, head to foot.  
 
But it is worth considering that definitions of stand-up, at the level of their 
grammatical and syntactical joints, reflect an uncertainty that is also felt at the 
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scene of the gig. As a spectator, is there something oddly doubled about the 
way you are addressed at times familiarly, in intimate tones, as if a partner in 
conversation, and yet are unable to reply (unless you heckle, which in most 
cases, rather than being a continuation of dialogue, breaks the illusion of 
conversation)? Perhaps a weird feeling of pseudo-symmetry pervades the gig 
itself? 
 
Brodie’s fifteen point definition of stand-up evidences a little uncertainty around 
the relation between the performer and the audience. To cite his first two points, 
stand-up comedy is typically, ‘1. a spoken, verbal performance by a sole 
individual; 2. in front of, to, and in collaboration with an audience’.26 The first 
point is clear enough; the second, with its prepositional quibbling, less so – in 
front of, to, with. The confusion, which I take to be not accidental, and not trivial, 
arises when Brodie is attempting to ascertain the relation not between audience 
and performer (his third point attests to ‘a clear demarcation’ between the two), 
but between the audience and the ‘spoken verbal performance’. The bodies on 
their own know their place; it is the phenomenon of spoken address that makes 
the relationship less certain – the act of speech is happening in front of, to, and 
with its addresses.  
 
The face-to-face-ness, the frontality of speech is, of course, inherently 
connected with the acoustics of the voice. Near the beginning of Dumbstruck, 
his history of ventriloquism, Steven Connor asserts that ‘the voice always 
requires and requisitions space’. According to Connor, it does so, first and 
foremost, by establishing relations of facing and frontality’: 
 
More even than my gaze, my voice establishes me in front of things and 
things in front of me, typically in an arc of about 30 degrees; for my voice 
pulls the world into frontality, and disposes it spatially in relation to this 
frontality. […] As I speak, I seem to be situated in front of myself, leaving 
myself behind.27  
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Connor’s formulation is suggestive of how, by speaking, it seems, one projects 
oneself (or one’s ‘self’) forwards, thus overcoming space. It may seem logical, 
therefore, to surmise that the electroacoustic amplification of a voice only 
furthers and intensifies its space-disposing forward projection. However, we 
also might consider how, at the scene of the stand-up gig, electroacoustic 
amplification actually disturbs or disorientates the frontality of speech. Imagine 
the scene: a room, not large, audience gathered around, at tables, on three 
sides of the temporary stage. On the stage, which is raised only slightly, about 
30cm, a man stands and speaks, his voice amplified by the microphone he 
holds up to his mouth. The spectators are closely packed, elbow to elbow, 
some of them are only meters from the comedian. This is the kind of set-up that 
might get called, in the brochure, ‘intimate’. But its intimacy is not the easy, 
comfortable kind; I have seen Stewart Lee perform in this kind of room, and the 
fact that he is close to me and he is amplified makes for a weirdly distorted 
intimacy. The microphone both intensifies and displaces that feeling of being 
face-to-face with him for, depending on the placement of the speakers, his 
voice may be coming from somewhere behind him, or behind me.  
 
I am describing a specific set-up, that which was used for the filming of Lee’s 
show 90s Comedian, which took place on 10 March 2006 in the black-box 
theatre space of Chapter Arts, in Cardiff. I was not present at this gig; as 
previously mentioned, I watched it on DVD. But, as the above paragraph 
attests, I have seen Stewart Lee perform in similar set-ups, on numerous 
occasions, and my experience of watching Lee’s performance via the mediation 
of a DVD is strongly influenced by my physical memory of being co-present, 
there, at the scene of the gig. That is not to say that the two kinds of 
spectatorship are interchangeable, and neither am I suggesting that the 
memory of the ‘live’ experience can be called upon to reanimate the ‘deadness’ 
of a mediated performance (watching a DVD, I am no less a body, and no less 
alive than when I am out in public). Rather, as my opening vignette implied, in 
stand-up there is always already a complex interplay between the different 
modes of watching, and there are moments at which Stewart Lee exploits this.  
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In this chapter, I turn my attention to selected parts of 90s Comedian, firstly, 
because it is a show that, as I will argue, not only mobilizes, but thematizes the 
funny incongruity of the speaking body. Lee calls attention to not only to his own 
body, but to various other bodies both imaginary and actual, including the body 
of the spectator. This show also depends on the funny identification of oneself 
with, and as, the imaginary collective body of the audience. In my reading, I will 
draw on Riley’s work to reflect on how hopes and discomforts about collectivity 
open up political questions, and in doing so reveal a politics within language, a 
politics that operates pervasively, at the level of grammar.  
 
 
2. Put on display 
 
Methodologically, there is an element of convenience and necessity in my 
choice of 90s Comedian as a case study. Attending to the grammatical 
subtleties of Lee’s complex and shifting address requires close and repeated 
watching, and the DVD of the show, along with the published transcript, makes 
this possible. Wherever possible, I have set my observations about the feeling 
induced by my extended, repeated spectatorship of 90s Comedian in dialogue 
with my own imperfectly remembered experiences of seeing Lee live. To further 
differentiate my mode of enquiry in this chapter from my work in Chapter Two, I 
will arrange citations of Lee’s speech in a way that suggests the timing of his 
delivery, which I have notated from repeat viewing of the DVD.28 Although I do 
not engage in extensive descriptions of Lee’s appearance, his vocal timbre, or 
physical gestures, I hope the white space of the page will in some way leave a 
space for these to be imagined, and perhaps, in some curious way, the strong 
implication of what is absent may, for the reader, become funny in itself.  
 
Lee embarks, in the early minutes of 90s Comedian, on an account of ‘a load of 
stuff’ that happened to him the previous year (in 2005). Some of this ‘stuff’ may 
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already be known to the people in the audience: as co-creator of Jerry Springer: 
The Opera, a ‘satirical musical’ which became a surprise West End hit, Lee had 
become the co-focus of a media furor surrounding the show’s irreverent 
depiction of Jesus Christ. A right-wing Christian pressure group had made every 
effort to close down the production, leading a campaign that resulted in an 
attempted High Court blasphemy prosecution and, in Lee’s words ‘the collapse 
of four years of work into financial non-viability’. 
 
But the story he tells, in the opening ten minutes of the show, is a story about 
his body. In February, he explains, he had to go into hospital with diverticulitis – 
'that’s where your stomach starts to poison you'. While he was there, he tells us, 
he had to have 'an endoscopy’. In his book, in footnote, Lee clarifies: ‘The 
procedure is actually called a ‘colonoscopy. But “endoscopy always seemed to 
work better onstage, perhaps because it didn’t include the telegraphing prefix 
“colon”’.29 Onstage, he clarifies: 'That's where they insert a fibre-optic tube into 
your anus'. And then he sets the scene: 
 
I was being wheeling in there,  
and I was lying on a slab,  
and I was naked  
except for this kind of third-length, floral-print hospital gown, 
right.  
Goes down to about – 
There. 
[indicating, with his left hand, a line across his chest, between the top 
two buttons of his suit] 
Now, I’ve never understood the design of them,  
because as a man, right,  
I’m not ashamed  
of my breasts, OK?  
What I want concealed  
are my genitals –  
[indicating the area of his groin] 
my penis, my two testicles 
 – they’re the source of my 
shame – but,  
the design  
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of the third-length, floral-print hospital gown  
makes it look as if I’ve  
chosen to expose them.  
[pause] 
In a coquettish fashion.  
[pause] 
Which I would never do, I wouldn’t do that.  
 
I think about my experiences of looking at Stewart Lee, from a seat down 
below. He is separated from the crowd and facing us and thus visible in a way I 
am not. He is offered up as thing to look at in a way that I am, to my relief, not, 
as I take a sip of beer and look towards him. How might I use that experience to 
write about what happens in this short sequence, which is ostensibly a 
preamble to the anecdote about the endoscopy (that is actually a 
colonoscopy)? As Lee speaks, I look towards the man onstage, whose body I 
can see, and I imagine the body being described. They are both the body of 
Stewart Lee, one of them visible, one of them imagined. The image I have is a 
strange mixture of anatomical diagram and idiosyncratically attired human and 
is conjured by Lee’s exacting description of his appearance  The ‘third-length 
floral-print hospital gown’ ends, abruptly, to reveal a body that Lee has 
described with the unflinching impersonality of a doctor: ‘genitals’, ‘penis’, ‘two 
testicles’. He didn't need to spell it out like this; he could have euphemized, 
dysphemized, implied. He could have said ‘my bits’ or ‘down there’ or ‘my cock 
and balls’. He could have just left a suggestive silence, or pointed. But he said 
‘my genitals,’ and then, specified further, ‘my penis, my two testicles’ and at the 
same time he gestured toward the area.  
 
Lee’s over-emphatic linguistic reference, when combined with a gesture of 
pointing to the body standing makes for a funny over-insistence, and puts me in 
mind of Judith Butler’s distinctive take on the incongruous interrelation of a body 
and its speech. She writes, 'That the speech act is a bodily act means that the 
act is redoubled in the moment of speech: there is what is said, and then there 
is a kind of saying that the bodily “instrument” of the utterance performs’.30 The 
act is redoubled. Is this why, in my imagination I am, rather than stripping Lee of 
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his clothes in order to reveal the nakedness beneath, superimposing an image 
of his naked body over his actual visible clothed one? 
 
In the above citation, from Excitable Speech, Butler is responding to Shoshana 
Felman’s rethinking of the Austinian speech act, which asserts that the ‘scandal’ 
of speech is that, as it is necessarily a bodily act, the speech act ‘cannot know 
what it is doing’.31 In Butler’s summation, Felman reminds us that the body, 
always to some extent ‘unknowing about what it performs […] always says 
something that it does not intend, and is not the emblem of mastery and control 
that it sometimes purports to be’.32 
 
Is this image of the speaking body apt to a professional comedian’s act of 
speaking? It might be conjectured that, in the discourse of stand-up, the 
comedian’s body is often upheld as, precisely, an ‘emblem of mastery and 
control’. Noble, for example, writes that the comic must bring together 'the 
ideas, the performance and the environment […] controlling and timing 
everything just right while the audience gets lost in the moment’, before 
concluding that this is what makes stand-up ‘the most direct form of expression 
with the comic being the writer, director and performer all at the same time’.33 In 
the ‘moment’, it seems, of idealized mastery and control, the comedian – as 
writer, director and performer – embodies all the work of production, controlling 
everything, so that the audience can forget the ‘conceit’ of the show, and gets 
‘lost in the moment’. It might be added, the bodies of both performer and 
spectator get lost in this ‘moment’ too.34  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Felman, Scandal, p. 96. 
32 Butler, Excitable Speech, p. 10. 
33 Noble in Double, p. xi. 
34 This is a theatrical metaphor for the speaking body that might be compared to that offered by 
J.L. Austin in How to Do Things With Words, as cited in Chapter One. As you may recall, Austin 
augmented Hippolytus’ dismayed cry about his self-divided act of speech by adding theatrical 
personnel in parentheses, as in ‘my tongue swore to… but my heart (or mind or other backstage 
artiste) did not’, adding via a footnote: ‘I do not mean to rule out all the offstage performers – the 
lights men, the stage manager, even the prompter’ (Austin, How to, pp. 9-10). In Austin’s 
metaphorical theatre, it seems the performance is vulnerable to ‘noises off’. In Noble’s 
metaphor, however, the ‘production’ (of speech) is going well. The naturalistic illusion is 
achieved. In a figure comparable to Yeats’ dancer, the process is embodied by the performer in 
a moment of transcendence. Instead of ‘How can we know the dancer from the dance?’, it’s a 
sort of ‘How can we know the comedian from the comedy?’, or 'How can we know the joker from 
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But, in Lee’s endoscopy anecdote, there is something about Lee’s body that, in 
a funny way, is out of his control. There is something excessive, and strange 
about the way his body appears, something that cannot be ‘incorporated into 
the act’. I am appropriating that phrase from Double’s comments as to the 
comedian’s ‘duty’ to not only acknowledge or respond to ‘events in the venue’, 
but to ‘incorporate’ them into the act (the act of speech), making it all flow 
seamlessly, reassuring the spectators by making it seem that the comedian is in 
control not just of his or her own performance, but of everything that happens in 
the room. But Double’s first point of definition is more suggestive, I think, of 
what is going on when Lee tells his endoscopy anecdote. Stand-up, writes 
Double, ‘puts a person on display in front of an audience’.35 At the level of 
syntax and grammar, we might observe that there is something peculiarly 
passive about Double’s sentence: stand-up ‘puts a person on display in front of 
an audience’? The person is not the subject but the object of this sentence; 
stand-up itself is the subject of the verb ‘to put’, suggesting that the comedian 
has not walked onto the stage of his or her own volition, but has been in some 
sense plonked down there by an external agency – a professional imperative, 
perhaps. But what is also being implied here is, I argue, the active and 
embodied nature of the spectator's act of looking. For it is when Double is 
acknowledging the visibility of the comedian’s body that his grammatical voice 
slips into the passive, as though it were the gaze of the audience that rendered 
the comedian’s act of appearing (of, literally, standing up on a stage) in some 
sense, out of his or her control.   
 
When Stewart Lee says ‘my genitals, my penis, my two testicles’, he adds 
‘they’re the source of my …shame’. There slight pause before the word ‘shame’, 
which accentuates the humorousness of this admission, as though he is 
confessing to having genitals, and being ashamed of them. Where we might 
expect an admission of embarrassment, a little bit of blushing, Lee names his 
feeling as shame; an incongruously biblical concept for a stand-up show 
(although, as we know, this show is unfolding against the backdrop of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the joke?' 
35 Double, Getting the Joke, p. 19.  
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threatened blasphemy prosecution, and will culminate in an extended sequence 
in which Lee, in similarly unflinching detail describes a drunken urine- and 
vomit-soaked encounter with Jesus Christ). In the anecdote, in the third-length 
hospital gown, Lee is conscious about being seen as having chosen to expose 
himself. And here, again, there is a play between active and passive, subject 
and object: ‘makes it look as though I've chosen’. By being put in the gown, the 
Stew-in-the-story has been put in a position of exposure. Here we might recall 
the passive voice of Double’s construction – stand-up ‘puts a person on 
display’. The Stewart Lee in the story is doubly shamed – by the exposure of his 
body (seen from the outside) and by the perception that he has in some sense 
willed this self-exposure. It is not insignificant that Stewart Lee the comedian, 
the one telling the story, is standing on a stage, as he says this, facing us, 
frontally, his body available to our gaze. 
 
‘I address my account,’ writes Butler, ‘and in addressing my account I am 
exposed to you.’36 Butler’s thoughts on exposure are drawn, in part, from those 
of Adriana Cavarero who, in Relating Narratives, develops a take on the post-
Hegelian relational ethics of Hannah Arendt.37 Her thoughts on exposure are 
the most useful for Butler’s argument, and the most suggestive for my own. 
Interpreting Cavarero, Butler writes, ‘we are beings who are, of necessity, 
exposed to one another in our vulnerability and singularity, and that our political 
situation consists in part in learning how best to handle – and to honour – this 
constant and necessary exposure’. Thus, at the scene of address, ‘the “I” 
encounters not only this or that attribute of the other, but the fact of this other as 
fundamentally exposed, visible, seen, existing in a bodily way and of necessity 
in a domain of appearance.’38 And, therefore, each act of self-narration 
constitutes a further enactment, and a further exposure.  
 
It may seem a bit trivializing, or else literal-minded, to refer to this Arendtian 
ethics of exposure in the context of a man who is being paid to stand on a stage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, p. 38, emphasis original. 
37 Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997). 
38 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, pp. 31-3. 
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and narrate a scene of his own merely embarrassing nakedness. But I think 
Lee’s anecdote of literal self-exposure does also usefully draw attention to a 
kind of exposure that is being enacted when any speaking body stands up, in 
front of people, and tells a story about itself. And, at the beginning of 90s 
Comedian, a show that will stage ethical questions that pertain to how bodies 
are spoken to and about, Lee reminds those present (and distant, at home) that 
they are looking at his body, something he himself cannot see. By so doing, he 
is implicating the people who are present in the act, reminding them of their 
responsibility. As we shall see, this will become more important (and more 
overt) as the show goes on. 
 
 
3. Your anus  
 
Before Lee begins telling the story of the endoscopy, before he even begins 
what I have called the preamble to the story of the endoscopy, he detains 
himself over an apparently minor, quite odd, qualification. It concerns, directly, 
the relative positions, and bodies – both actual and imaginary – of himself and 
his audience.  
 
‘So I had to go into hospital in North London,’ he begins, speaking with 
characteristic slowness and emphasis – long pauses, careful enunciation:  
 
and while I was there, I had to have an endoscopy, right.  
That’s where they insert a camera 
on a fibre-optic tube  
into your anus – now,  
on that occasion, Cardiff, it was my anus.  
 
But it would be your anus  
if it were you  
that were undergoing  
the endoscopy, right,  
 
because in medical science as a rule  
there’s a direct relation  
between who is the subject of a procedure  
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and the information that the doctors are trying to find out.  
That’s why you can’t send a friend along instead,  
even if they really love investigative surgery. 
 
Why does Lee embark upon this rather convoluted qualification at this point? It 
could be read as just a bit of waffle, bit of delay, a way to make a joke out of the 
necessary clarification of the medical term. In a footnote, Lee says what he set 
out to do was a play on the old gag about the name of the planet Uranus 
sounding like ‘your anus’.39 But, in fact, I think what this sequence actually ends 
up doing has to do with a funniness that inheres in the second-person pronoun, 
‘you’, especially within the conditions of stand-up performance.  
 
In a series of essays that set out ‘grammar for performance writers’, John Hall 
suggests, amongst the pronouns, ‘I’ and ‘you’ make particular demands upon 
the practitioner and theorist of performance. Amongst the pronouns, the first- 
and second-person might well be argued to be ‘the most necessary’ at the 
scene of speech, for ‘They are the ones that seem to embed us, warmly even, 
in the action of exchange’. In speech, the second-person is necessary, ‘ if only 
to provide the pretext for a monologue’. 40 However, in performance, the ‘you’ 
becomes the nexus of uncertainty. For, as Hall writes, ‘as soon as more than 
two are gathered’ there arises the possibility of confusion over whether ‘you’ is 
plural or singular, Standard English having long since shed the thou/you 
distinction that might have helped clarify matters. We have to look for contextual 
clues, and it very soon becomes necessary to permit a body onto the 
hypothetical stage:  
 
For example, in a vague, easily imagined context, someone is talking as 
I. There are three others present. The speaker’s body, and her look, 
angle themselves subtly towards one of them: this must be you. Or 
perhaps the speaker keeps her eyes on the floor because she cannot 
bring herself to reveal the intimacy of a you. Or again, in oratorical 
confidence, her eyes sweep the company as she pluralizes – perhaps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Lee, How I Escaped, p. 66.  
40 John Hall,  ‘Missing Persons: Personal Pronouns in Performance Writing’, Performance 
Research, 3:1, 87-90 (p. 87). 
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even communalizes – the occasion.41  
 
The first time he says 'your anus', Lee does not appear to looking at anyone in 
particular, but neither are his eyes to the floor. In the first instance, he is 
intoning ‘you’, in its possessive form, to denote a non-specific person-in-
general. He is not talking about any specific person’s anus, but merely clarifying 
a bit of medical terminology, ‘an endoscopy – that's where they insert a fibre 
optic tube into your anus’. But there is something funny going on. As Lee 
suggests, ‘your anus’ does sound like the name of the planet, although here the 
innuendo is reversed – it is not that it sounds like Lee is saying the word ‘anus’, 
he is actually referring to the body part, anus. I find this funny in precisely the 
ambiguous, peculiar manner I have been parsing throughout this thesis. It 
doesn't quite make me laugh, but it gets me, somehow. Of course, Lee is not 
referring directly to my anus, but, because Lee speaks 'anus' with possessive 
pronoun that is personal, and because the anus is an intimate, private part of 
the body, there is something oddly, intrusively intimate about that phrase, ‘your 
anus’.  
 
Remember when Lee, superfluously, named his own private parts onstage? He 
said ‘my penis, my two testicles’. Why is there something strange, discomforting 
and slightly funny about hearing those anatomical terms preceded by a 
possessive singular personal pronoun? It might have something to do with what 
Riley, in a chapter quite appositely titled ‘All Mouth and No Trousers’, calls 
‘reification embarrassment’, a specific variety of the broader phenomenon she 
names ‘linguistic embarrassment’. Riley detects a ‘distinctly grammatical or 
syntactical aspect to reification; the very word means making a thing out of what 
is not a thing’.42 When the words deployed name bodily parts or functions, there 
can arise ‘a benign and useful embarrassment about uttering a language of 
reification’. By means of example, Riley cites the medical encounter: ‘A 
conversation with a doctor gets easy enough once the threshold of naming has 
been crossed; here there’s no pretense to anything except clinical description’. 
But ‘this first linguistic awkwardness is inescapable’. Linguistic embarrassment 
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42 Riley, Impersonal Passion, p. 102. 
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in general is characterized by ‘the desire not to be heard, first and foremost, as 
a speaking thing’.43 Heard and, we might add, seen. We see the speaking body 
that reifies its own parts, the parts that are hidden, but now – disconcertingly – 
present. And, similarly, ‘your anus’ might be introduced in the form of a 
generality, in a dispassionate medicalised register, but when directed toward a 
person who is present, bodily, the words might well register as an improperly 
direct reference to a part of that person’s anatomy, whether or not ‘intended’ to 
function in that manner. So, when Lee, very slowly and very deliberately, 
pronounces 'your anus', it gets me perhaps because it makes me feel, weirdly, 
that a part of my body is being invoked. If, as according to Ross Noble’s 
measure, this show is going well and I feel as if Stewart Lee is speaking to me 
in a one-on-one conversation, then arguably this effect is intensified.  
 
Before he says ‘your anus’, Lee calls the audience 'Cardiff', which is the 
conventional way for a gigging performer to identify an audience by addressing 
them by the name of the town, or the venue, in which the gig is taking place. 
Perhaps, by ascribing an anus to ‘Cardiff’, Lee is emphasizing and mobilizing 
the confusion over whether the ‘you’ the comedian addresses is to be 
imagined/experience as an individual or a collective body? Perhaps he is 
establishing a relationship of correspondence and substitutability between his 
own singular, personal anus, and the generalized, imaginary anus that belongs 
to everybody and nobody in particular, the transhistorical collective anus of all 
the people. To claim so would be to appropriate the terms offered by Mikhail 
Bakhtin in Rabalais and his World, where he sets out his highly influential 
theory of carnival laughter. For Bakhtin, carnival laughter is the most powerful 
mode of expression of an ancient tradition of folk culture, and grotesque realism 
is the literary expression of the carnivalesque. In this descriptive mode the 
bodily element ‘is presented not in a private, egotistic form, severed from the 
other spheres of life, but as something universal, representing all the people’.44 
And indeed, it might be said that, by end of this show, the scene in the Chapter 
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Arts Centre is veritably Rabalaisian: Lee says, ‘I vomited into the gaping anus of 
Christ till the gaping anus of Christ was overflowing with my sick’, and then 
repeatedly says those sorts of things, whilst the audience, who were initially 
resistant, tense, finally succumb and the room dissolves into laughter. Lee 
himself has said that, during this final section, he was exploring the extent to 
which ‘piling up of obscenity might reach a point where it became 
transcendental, or even beautiful’,45 transformed into ‘something funny, 
something sometimes even moving or cathartic’.46  
 
In the realm of carnival, it is via an exaggeration of bodily orifices ‘that the 
confines between bodies and between the body and the world are overcome’.47 
In 90s Comedian, the image of the ‘gaping anus of Christ’ is, Lee suggests, in 
some sense a call-back to the comedian’s own ‘rectal invasion’ in the early part 
of the show. By this logic, Lee’s reference to ‘your anus’, the anus of both (and 
neither) my own body and Cardiff’s is spoken in order incorporate the 
spectators into this overcoming of confines. And, to give this final ‘cathartic’ 
sequence of 90s Comedian a Bakhtinian gloss, as the room 'dissolves' or 
'collapses' into laughter so too do the formalities of the social world, and the 
distinctions between individuals: I lose control of my body, the whole room 
dissolves into anarchic laughter, and I can no longer tell where ‘I’ end and ‘you’ 
begin. In this interchange and interorientation there is the opportunity for me to 
reimagine my own corporeal subjectivity, for me to re-experience what my own 
body does (its urges and expulsions, its being taken hold of by this joyous and 
anarchic convulsion – whole room laughing) as being the expression of 
something bigger than me – ‘we’.  
 
Evocative as it may be, this account of what happens ‘in the room’ during Lee’s 
performance of 90s Comedian, by losing sight of the awkward and shifting 
quality of Lee’s ‘you’, loses sight of the complex and uncertain addressive 
politics at play. The distinct positions of ‘I’ and ‘you’ are collapsed into a joyous, 
and revolutionary entity named 'we' representing 'the people'. However, for 
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46 Lee, How I Escaped, p. 129. 
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Cavarero it is ‘you’, a pronoun she argues is symptomatically overlooked by 
modern and contemporary developments of political thought that offers a 
starting point for ethical work. The second-person pronoun is ‘ignored by 
individualistic doctrines, which are too preoccupied with praising the rights of 
the I’. But neither does it find a home in ‘the schools of thought to which 
individualism is opposed’, which tend to avoid the contiguity of the you in order 
to avoid ‘falling into the decadence of the I,’ and instead privilege collective 
plural pronouns: 
 
Indeed, many revolutionary movements (which range from traditional 
communism to the feminism of sisterhood) seem to share a curious 
linguistic code based on the intrinsic morality of pronouns. The we is 
always positive, the plural you is a possible ally, the they has the face of 
an antagonist, the I is unseemly, and the you is, of course, superfluous.48  
 
In spite of the ‘cathartic’ final movement of 90’s Comedian, and in spite of the 
resounding applause with which the Cardiff crowd respond to Lee’s revelation, 
at the very end, that the transgressive material was aimed at those who would 
seek to apply ‘limits to freedom of expression, either through legislation or 
intimidation or threats’, I do not think 90’s Comedian offers an easy route to 
collectivity. Lee ends with a declaration that sounds serious, even noble: ‘I 
personally haven’t enjoyed the last half hour at all, I do it only to safeguard your 
liberty’. This feels like rhetoric proper, the stuff of great oratory. And, judging by 
their applause, the spectators seem to want to respond as though they were 
party to the affirmation of democracy as such, and perhaps that it how it felt. 
But, there remains something discomforting and difficult about the strange 
amplified intimacy of this gig, a distorting sense of being just that little bit too 
close, a weirdly persistent over-emphasis on the moments, within address, at 
which the bodies in the room (and the body of ‘the room’) are made to feel self-
divided, doubled.  
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4. Coincidence  
 
Stand-up ‘happens in the present tense, the here and now,’ as Double states, 
with deceptive straightforwardness.49 Deceptive, because, to quibble, much of 
the time, Lee is not speaking in the present tense. For example when Lee says 
‘your anus’ he is speaking in the conditional, or subjunctive, tense: ‘it would be 
your anus if it were you’. This tense is speculative, it has to do with what could 
happen, what is possible. It establishes a relation of substitutability between 
mine and yours: it was my anus, it could be your anus. The I and the you are no 
longer face-to-face, sharing the same space and time (it might also be said that, 
since the point of exchange is my anus/your anus, the supposed face-to-
faceness of the stand-up encounter is being funnily upended). In Lee’s stand-up 
(and indeed, in speech more generally), there is a complex interplay of tenses. 
 
This interplay can be funny on more than one level. Remember when Lee said 
he wished the Top Gear presenter had died in the car crash that did nearly kill 
him? And then he said ‘it’s just a joke, like when they do their jokes on Top 
Gear’. I would like to spend a moment thinking once again about what he said 
after that: ‘But, coincidentally, as well as it being a joke, it’s also what I wish had 
happened’. To say ‘I wish…’ activates (and emphasizes) the subjunctive mood, 
and signals departure from ‘factual’ uttering into the realm of the imagined. To 
then say that, ‘coincidentally’, what has been expressed in the subjunctive is 
also actual, has a funny and complicated effect. Although it is not voiced 
explicitly, the disruptive and funny import of that word, coincidentally, is also 
being called into play when Lee gives an account of his endoscopy. It is in play 
in the ways we are invited to look at, and imagine, the man standing in front of 
us. In a recent interview, referring to his onstage persona, Lee hesitates over 
how to refer to the self he presents onstage: ‘with him, with me – I call him 
him’.50 In the commentary published alongside 90s Comedian, Lee 
differentiates the ‘visible Stewart Lee onstage’ from the ‘Stewart Lee inside his 
brain controlling him’.51 During his performance (and, arguably, whenever he 
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speaks, or appears, in public) there is a play of these different ‘hims’. The 
Stewart Lee onstage might tell a story about being onstage as ‘Stewart Lee’, or 
he might tell a story about being in the hospital, as the body about to undergo a 
procedure. As we know, there are also moments at which the body of Stewart 
Lee can stand for the body of another person (or, indeed, for a thing, such as a 
tea cosy). At certain moments there may be a coincidence between two or more 
of the Stewart Lees, at others a further subdivision or doubling. This occurs, for 
example, during the endoscopy anecdote, in which Lee not only describes his 
appearance when undergoing an uncomfortable and invasive procedure – ‘I 
was lying on a slab, and I was naked except for this kind of third-length, floral-
print hospital gown. And I had a fibre-optic tube inserted into my lubricated 
anus’ – but then repeats the exact formulation each and every time he refers to 
his own body: 
 
So I was being wheeled in there, I was lying on a slab, and I was naked 
except for this kind of third-length, floral-print hospital gown.  
And I had a fibre-optic tube inserted into my lubricated anus.  
And then suddenly, out of nowhere, and this is true, the doctor said,  
‘Oh I see from your notes that you’re a famous comedian.’ 
[pause, slowly building laugh] 
And I said to him,  
‘There’s a problem with that sentence, isn’t there, Doctor?  
Which is that if the phrase “You are a famous comedian” 
is preceded by the qualifying phrase, “I see from your notes…” then I’m 
not,  
and I’m not anyway really. 
And then the nurse interrupted, rather aggressively. She went,  
‘Well I’ve never heard of you’, 
as if it were I that had arrogantly introduced this vain notion into the 
endoscopic procedure. 
 
Having been invited, as spectators, to imagine this ‘Stewart Lee’ figure we see 
before us with the body in the story, a body that is attributed both anatomically 
correct genitals, and shame (both of which are made available to our perception 
by the third-length floral-print hospital gown), we are now asked to imaginatively 
shift perspectives. We ‘see’ the body through the eyes of a pair of medical 
practitioners who, somewhat inappropriately, seem to be trying (and failing) to 
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envisage Stewart Lee as he would appear onstage: not as just any body, but as 
a comedian. We are imaginatively putting ourselves in the position of someone 
else, someone failing to imagine how Lee would appear on a notional stage 
whilst – coincidentally – looking at how Stewart Lee does appear, is appearing, 
‘as a comedian’ onstage, on an actual, situated stage. 
 
So I said to her, ‘Well I am a comedian.’ 
And she said, ‘Well, you don’t look like a comedian.’ 
And I said ‘Why?’ And she said,  
‘A comedian should look funny.’ 
 
A pause here. Another laugh begins to build. Lee has made it possible for me to 
complete the joke in my mind, and the punchline is both verbal and visual: the 
words describing his appearance and the image of it. He does not even not 
need to say the punchline. But he says it anyway, he makes it explicit: 
 
Now, at the time… 
[another pause, the laugh grows]  
I was lying naked on a slab in a third-length, floral-print hospital gown,  
with a fibre optic tube inserted into my lubricated anus…   
[pause] 
If I’d seen that,  
I would have laughed. 
 
Now something complicated is happening with temporality. Lee is saying what 
has, in effect, already been said. The force of the words was felt as a potential, 
as something implied, the laugh came before the punchline. And then, the 
words themselves, the by-now calcified formula, are funny, again in themselves.  
 
During this joke, I feel the pleasure of that linguistic pre-echo, the anticipation of 
the words Stewart Lee will speak aloud. I laugh in recognition. I laugh also to 
signal that I understand where this is going. There is pleasure in being able to 
anticipate where it is going, it is the privilege of being 'in on' the joke. But, when 
it also means that I am made to visualize the image of the man standing in front 
of me lying naked, prone, undergoing an invasive procedure, the privilege is 
dubious. This sense of dubious inclusion, or complicity, in the jokes, will be 
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tested, pushed, as the show goes on. In the middle section Lee will 
congratulate me for ‘being ahead of the punchlines’; towards the end, he will 
voice (what he imagines to be) my objections to his references to Jesus Christ 
in terms of a ‘performer-audience bond of trust’ that has been broken, precisely 
because (in Lee’s citation of ‘our’ words) ‘we weren’t expecting to be made to 
visualize this image’. 
 
The question of visibility and exposure is complicated here, because there is a 
certain confusion between internal and external, the narrated and the actual, 
the imagined and the spoken-out-loud. Lee is telling a story about his body 
undergoing an invasive procedure, one that makes his insides visible to himself: 
‘I lay there,’ he says ‘looking at live video-footage relay of my rotting and 
bleeding internal organs’ (and a further confusion and correspondence happens 
at this point if you happen to, in fact, be watching Lee say this on video). At the 
same time, a confusion of boundaries happens between me and him, my 
imagined version of him and – this will become more important as the show 
goes on - how I imagine he has anticipated me, my response. And, as I will 
demonstrate, at various moments throughout this show (and Lee's work more 
generally), I am invited to enjoy the coincidence and non-coincidence of my 
own body, and self, with the various bodies, and positions, implied by Stewart 
Lee's ‘you’.  
 
 
5. Ethical problems, funny identification 
 
The mid-section of 90s Comedian is all about ‘you’. This is not the ‘cathartic’ 
final sequence, the extended continuous story about meeting Christ on a dark 
road. It is a roughly thirty-minute sequence during which Lee moves through a 
series of different topics, and puts various kinds of pressure on the idea that 
stand-up address is in any way straightforward. In Lee’s summation, this section 
functions to shape the audience into a ‘workable unit’ ready for the (it seems to 
him) more important business with Jesus. However, to read this section purely 
as a demonstration of Lee’s ‘skill, bravery and inventiveness’, or the 
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‘exceptional deftness’ of his delivery52 (i.e. his ‘mastery’), would be to lose sight 
of the ethical problems it stages, problems concerning ethics of speaking and 
being addressed, and more particularly, of speaking onstage as a stand-up 
comedian, and being in the room, being addressed as an audience.  
 
As the show moves into its mid-section, Lee picks up a thread from earlier: the 
then-recent suicide attacks on the London Transport system on July 7 2005. He 
recalls watching the rolling news coverage on the day, much of which seemed 
to consist of ‘journalists running around trying to get statements out of bomb 
survivors that weren't really in a fit state to give statements’. Taking a piece of 
paper from his pocket, he continues, ‘And I started writing them down, right.’ 
Unfolding the paper: 'This was, um, a guy that had survived the King's Cross 
bomb...’, he reads: "The rescue workers have been amazing, really amazing, I 
mean I take my hat off to them. I’m not wearing a hat, obviously, but if I was, I 
would take it off." There is a hesitant, uneven laughter. Gesturing across the 
room, Lee says: 
 
And laughs over here, a smattering of applause,  
and then doubt spreading to the back corner.  
[pause] 
Now. Don’t judge me for this, OK? Don’t be uncomfortable,  
I am a human being like you… I watched that news report,  
I thought, ‘I hope these people are OK…’  
[pause] 
But on the other hand, I’m also a comedian,  
so I was thinking, ‘Mind you, it’s quite funny, I should write it down.’ 
 
With this abrupt undercutting gesture, it might seem like here Lee is saying that 
the stand-up gig is no place for ethics, that the business of comedy 
necessitates a suspension of those sorts of concerns. Job trumps essence. Like 
the mobster in an anecdote that Riley recounts: when questioned as to the 
‘humanity’ of his actions, he shrugs and says ‘I’m a gangster’.53  
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Humanness is in question here too: ‘I’m a human being like you,’ says Lee, 
tacitly reassuring us that we are human beings, ‘but I’m also a comedian.’ 
Taking the heat off us – you are human, I’m a comedian – in other words, it’s 
me doing it. And this seems to work, because next he quotes another survivor, 
“After the bus blew up, I saw people lying outside the British Medical 
Association headquarters. Ironic, but if you’re going to do this kind of thing, 
that’s the place to do it I suppose”, and this, which with its reference to injured 
bodies should feel more uncomfortable, gets an unambiguous, whole-room 
laugh.   
 
But it isn’t simply that he’s let us off the hook; something else has happened. 
When Lee drew attention to the audience’s response – ‘laughs over here, a 
smattering of applause, and then doubt spreading to the back corner’ – this 
itself was already funny. Why should it be funny in and of itself that Lee calls 
attention to a laugh not happening? Saying something like 'not much of a laugh 
there' after a joke has fallen flat is a curiously effective trick, one to which many 
comedians resort during live performance. On tour, or on a month-long run at 
the Edinburgh Fringe, the comedian does the same ‘show’ again and again, the 
audience knows this, and the comedian knows they know this. A skilled 
performer might, therefore, switch in and out of ‘the show’ – break off to 
comment on how it is going, how other audiences have reacted differently, 
admit that the last bit was an ad-lib, that it didn’t quite work, that the comedian 
will not try that again. It can be pleasurable, the feeling of acknowledgement, 
and the feeling of the singularity of this, this given moment of performance. But, 
arguably, this trick only works because of its tension with the conventionality, 
the impersonality of ‘the show’ that – we all know – goes on much the same 
night after night whether or not you or I are here. Sure, stand-up needs an 
audience, but that is not to say that this comedian needs me. And indeed, the 
gap between the implied audience (the notional, ideal or absolute audience or 
gig) and those of us here in this room can itself be exploited for comic purposes 
(and Stewart Lee in particular has become fond of telling audiences that they 
are less responsive, less clever, than crowds on previous nights of the tour).  
 
But the way Lee does it in this particular instance is funny in a peculiar way. 
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Read it again: 
 
And laughs over here, a smattering of applause,  
and then doubt spreading to the back corner. 
 
He is identifying the audience not only by their acoustic behavior, laughter and 
applause, but also something less tangible – doubt – but he is giving the doubt 
a shape, and using the idea of the doubt to call attention to the shape of the 
audience, the shape of the room.  
 
I am reminded here of the strangely thingifying way that comedians habitually 
refer to a gathering of spectators as ‘the room’, a dynamic entity they may speak 
of ‘working’, ‘losing’ or ‘shaping’. As Dan Atkinson puts it, the aim is to have the 
audience ‘believing that they’re one lump’.54 Could it be that the way Lee says 
‘doubt spreading to the back corner’ is funny has to do with the very idea of 
being part of an audience, being identifiable not as ‘me’ but as one of many 
bodies combining as a ‘lump’? Is it this sense of a shape or form the edges of 
which are not ‘mine’, and over which I have little direct control, that makes me 
feel funny? And could it be that the position of audience is not only impersonal 
(it could have been anyone, I only happen to be the one sitting here, as one of 
the ‘bums on seats’), but somehow thingifying?  
 
In some sense, identification is at stake, self-identification and identification of 
self amongst others. Riley, a great theorist of identification, writes, 'Any act of 
identification is systematically askew, since I'm envisaging what I presume that 
I'm supposed, in the eyes of others, to really be. By a consent which I could not 
anyway withhold, I become a voyeur of myself in the guise of a such-and-such, 
recognising that I'm looking at what I must look like through refracting lenses.’55 
When we transfer this to the scene of stand-up, that word ‘consent’ is 
interesting. Because we have always already consented to whatever it is the 
comedian will do to us to make us laugh. At the scene of stand-up comedy, 
which is not a symmetrical encounter ‘looking at what I must look like’ means 
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looking at what ‘we’ must look like. Could it be, then, that the intense affective 
experience of spectating stand-up has something to do with how spectators 
imagine themselves as they appear – as this thing called 'audience' – and the 
comedian is the one who reflects it back to them – as the one separated off 
alone, with the microphone, the one who is in the position to observe this 
crowd-thing, and identify it out loud? Certainly, this is a particular sort of funny 
feeling that Lee generates in the next juncture of 90s Comedian. He does a 
minute or so on Al Qaeda (‘there’s lots of good stories from the war against 
terror’), before turning his attention to what, with jarring flippancy, he calls 'this 
great book of, of trial transcripts, of American soldiers accused of human-rights 
abuses in, in Abu Ghraib'. And then, he begins to talk about the 'photographing 
of a naked, hooded, bound Iraqi civilian being dragged out of a cell, er, on his 
hands and knees'. Citing the defence mounted in court by the lawyer 
representing one of the accused soldiers, that the Iraqi was not dragged but 
was ‘crawling of his own free will’, Lee wonders, aloud, ‘what it is that the 
naked, hooded, bound Iraqi civilian was crawling of his own free will towards?’, 
before continuing: 
 
I like to think he was crawling towards the notion of Western democracy.  
But obviously he was having some difficulty knowing which way to crawl, 
er,  
because of the hood, er,  
and because of the fact that he was approaching a palpably abstract 
concept. 
 
Again, a mixed response from his audience, and again, Lee calls attention to 
this fact: 
 
OK? So there’s good laughs for that over here in this area, 
and those tail away towards that corner there.  
 
But this time, he takes it further, cutting abruptly across the laugh with,  
 
When it’s late at night, there’s a long set to get through, as I said, there 
isn’t going to be time for me to work a mixed-ability room tonight.  
Now. So. Everybody over here  
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[indicating audience members sitting to the right of the stage] 
for the rest of the night, you’re on board,  
you’re going to be Team A, OK?  
And you won’t mind if I don’t play over here too much,  
I’m going to be mainly concentrating  
on Team F in that corner. 
 
As he says this, indicating, vaguely, an area of the room, there is the kind of 
laughter that signals pleasured consternation. By so naming parts of the 
audience, he is grading them as though they were pupils at school, pitting them 
in competition. What’s more, he is implying that those in the corner are trailing 
by several grades: they are not the ‘very good’ Team B, nor even the 
‘satisfactory’ Team C. They are Team F. F for ‘fail’.  
 
He then turns to addresses ‘Team A’: 
 
we must do everything we can to make them feel comfortable  
and we will bring them along with us.  
[pause] 
Don’t laugh at them, don’t even look at them, right?  
Look at me, Team A.  
Don’t laugh at them, Team A.  
 
As he says this, there is laughter, uproarious laughter, emanating from the area 
of the audience he is addressing, from ‘Team A’. But that is not to say that 
those addressed, and thus identified, as Team A are not necessarily laughing at 
those identified as Team F, but at the fact that Lee has dared to divide and label 
his audience in such a blatant, reductive fashion. But, by saying ‘don’t laugh at 
them’, Lee (mis)identifies their laughter as laughter that is caused by, and 
directed at, the other part of the audience. By negation he makes one part of 
the audience laugh at the other, and, by saying, ‘don’t even look at them’, 
effectively exposes one part of the audience to the gaze of the other. 
 
And then, turning to Team F, he says: 
 
And I know this is weird, what’s happening now,  
‘cause you’ve thought,  
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‘Ooh, let’s go out and sit in the dark and judge someone’, right?  
But now you’re being judged and it feels strange, right,  
but don't worry, you will…  
I will… you will not be…  
look, it's fine, OK?  
 
The audience’s response is so vociferous that it interrupts him. And, perhaps 
evidencing some confusion over whose action or perspective is at stake here, 
when his address breaks down it breaks down on pronouns, emphasizing the 
switching of perspective: ‘you will…. I will…. you will not be…’.  
 
Is being named as Team F an insult that a spectator might take personally? 
From the evidence of the DVD, it seems that those in the Team F corner are 
laughing at least as uproariously as those elsewhere in the room, if not more. 
Arguably, the identity that is ‘Team F’ does not coincide perfectly with those 
people who happen to be in those seats. Instead, ‘Team F’ represents the 
imagined collective consciousness of 'anyone who doesn't like this', a 
personification of ‘doubt in the room’. And indeed, feelings of discomfort, worry 
or confusion about the kinds of topics Lee is making jokes about may well have 
affected – in different ways and to differing degrees – everyone present, not just 
those unfortunate souls who happen to be sitting in the Team F area. This 
doubt is not funny in and of itself, but becomes funny when acknowledged, 
made spatial; an unsubtle reification of a subtle and complicated set of feelings.   
 
It is worth mentioning that, as a viewer of the commercially released DVD, I 
watched Lee performing a highly polished version of 90s Comedian to a crowd 
who were not only appreciative, but who knew they were being filmed. By Lee’s 
own account there were gigs during which the audience were much more 
starkly divided, and at which this would have played out differently. It is 
relevant, too, that this performance of 90s Comedian took place in an arts 
venue, a black-box theatre studio. Lee makes reference to this fact at numerous 
moments: this the kind of venue that attracts a ‘niche’ crowd, people who might 
also go to the theatre, rather than, say, the Millennium Stadium around the 
corner, which might be frequented by the kind of people who enjoy watching 
Robbie Williams ‘dressing as a luminous skeleton’. By invoking Team F, 
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Stewart Lee does not just personify the resistance to the joke, but caricatures 
this resistance as belonging to someone who is not cultured enough to 
appreciate the joke. 
 
 So all I’m saying is, if you’re…  
It’s OK not to like this,  
but if you don’t like it,  
that means you’re  
the same as Robbie Williams.  
 
For many of his critics, it is precisely this kind of self-declared elitism that makes 
Lee not only unfunny, but intolerable. A London-dwelling Oxford graduate 
Observer columnist with his own BBC2 programme pouring scorn upon those 
who he considers to be uncultured? For Daily Telegraph reviewer Dominic 
Cavendish, who walked out of a gig at the Leicester Square Theatre in 
November 2013, this was too much: 
 
the first half-hour or so was beset by his own interruptions, as he took 
issue with our wrong-headed laughs, our lack of responsiveness, our 
failure to ‘make connections’ and our want of imagination in coming up 
with suggestions when asked to do so. 
 
This review has become somewhat notorious – indeed, Lee has quoted 
onstage the most damning part of it, which reads, 
 
If Lee had a shred of interest or insight into the working lives of other 
people, he’d realise that those who give up an evening at the end of a 
week to see him deserve his thanks not his toxic scorn.56 
 
Cavendish’s critique hinges upon an expression of concern for everyday 
'working people' who have invested their hard-earned money and their precious 
leisure time to be entertained rather than insulted. In identifying them as 
vulnerable to Lee's 'scorn', Cavendish is tacitly accepting Lee's apparent 
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scornful appraisal of the audience: they are indeed 'wrong-headed' and lacking 
in imagination. In other words, they are all Team F, an undifferentiated and 
gullible constituency of 'everyday people' who need protection from the 'scorn' 
of the educated, elevated likes of Stewart Lee. With his demarcation of 'other 
people' with 'working lives', Cavendish also somehow implies that, unlike the 
people who go to see him, Lee is not a person who has to work. And, although 
he appears to be casting himself as their defender, Cavendish appears to be 
most baffled (and appalled) by the honest hardworking people's apparent 
enjoyment of Lee's treatment: he notes that ‘For some reason’ the crowd ‘didn’t 
mutiny at this sardonic onslaught’, and even ‘lapped up the abuse with an 
agreeable chortle’. I could go further in my deconstruction of this Daily 
Telegraph critic's stance, but, as a self-identifying member of Lee's typically 
Left-leaning, metro-elite audience I would do that, wouldn't I? I admit, 
Cavendish's critique usefully raises the question of how an audience might be 
described or identified, and how I, as a member of Lee's audience might 
describe or identify myself. And also, how it is that a crowd of people might find 
it enjoyable to be (or appear to be) insulted.  
 
In order to work through these question of identification, I will return to 90s 
Comedian, and what remains, for me, the most genuinely uncomfortable 
moment of the entire show. Lee has returned to the thread about the trial of US 
soldiers accused of human-rights abuses in Abu Ghraib prison. He says, 
 
Lynndie England was a female American soldier and she was 
photographed  
pointing and laughing at the naked genitals of hooded, bound Iraqis.  
And at her trial the judge intervened, rather unusually, and said  
that he wasn’t convinced that Lynndie England knew what she was 
doing.  
Now, I don’t believe that,  
‘cause in my experience,  
when a woman points and laughs at a man’s genitals,  
she’s normally fully aware of the effect that will have. 
[pause] 
In my experience.  
Especially if he’s hooded and bound. 
[pause] 
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In my experience. 
[breaks off] 
The laugh spreading into the, the Team F region for that,  
because it’s a kind of bit of satire about the news,  
but it’s got cocks in it as well.  
So that helps to bring the whole room onside.  
 
 
Could this in fact be the most ethically questionable joke in the entire show? 
Moving, as it does, from a reference to the shaming as torture of Iraqi prisoners, 
through a trivializing substitution of his own body (the ‘shame’ and ‘exposure’ of 
which he is willingly staging, for money), into what Lee himself calls, in a 
footnote to the transcript, ‘a pathetic cock joke’.57  
 
I laughed at this joke. In fact, I still find it funny now, when I think about it. Does 
that, in some sense, render me a member of Lee’s 'Team F' (in other words, 
have I failed the test that Lee has set for me)? Well, yes and no. Because Lee 
has not set a test so much as a trap disguised as a test. Lee successfully 
makes me laugh by saying the word ‘cock’, but I simultaneously laugh because 
I am appreciating that he has staged an instance in which it appears that I have 
laughed at ‘cocks’. I am, it seems, both Team A and F, and neither. I was not 
high-mindedly laughing at the ‘bit of satire about the news’, but neither was I 
simply laughing at the idea of a penis, the mention of exposed genitals. That is, 
not until Lee said the word ‘cocks’, and then I was laughing. At play here too, is 
perhaps also a weaker variety of shame, remembered from Lee’s earlier 
description of himself in the third-length floral-print hospital gown: the shame at 
being seen to have done something, intentionally, that you did not, and would 
not, do (at least, not intentionally). Because, as he does with the joke about the 
tea cosy working as a shop assistant in a branch of Currys in Wolverhampton, 
Lee sets me up to laugh at something, and then comments on the collective 
laugh as though ‘we’ had laughed at something different, something stupider. 
This is, crucially, a feeling that is, in part, linguistic. That is not to say it is not 
also physical: it might be named as a form of reification embarrassment 
emerging from the surprise of hearing a slang word for a penis; after we have 
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become inured to all those mentions of ‘genitals’, hearing the word ‘cock’ makes 
a thing of it again. 
 
Although I definitely do not 'belong' to Team F, here I am, gamely laughing at 
the kind of pathetic cock joke that Lee makes it appear he has included solely 
for their low-minded pleasure. Because of the funny personification of Team F 
(as a Robbie-Williams-luminous-skeleton figure), even if I happen to be sitting in 
the ‘Team F area’, I might well be afforded the pleasure of laughing both at 
Team F and as Team F. I think this ‘both-and’ laughter is what people are 
thinking of when they describe what Lee is doing as 'meta-comedy'. This odd 
term is not necessarily useful to my own work, for my laugh is not a 'meta-laugh' 
(for how would such a thing be possible?); it is really my body that is laughing. 
That is not to say that I am not in some sense self-divided in my laugh. I laugh 
at the idea of Team F laughing at cocks in the same moment as laughing – in 
my surprise – at Lee's abrupt recourse to this base word, 'cocks'. I understand 
and enjoy the joke on more than one level at once and am, in part, laughing at 
the fact that I have been caught out.  
 
But of course, I am writing this from the position of one who was not ‘in the 
room’ when those who happened to be sitting a particular corner of the room 
were named as ‘Team F’, and therefore my identification with this position is 
hypothetical, imaginary. Those who did ‘happen’ to be in the room, and to find 
themselves in the position of Team F were exposed to a gaze that was not 
hypothetical but actual. If and when I have been in the room when Lee has 
deployed similar room-dividing tactics – as I was at the Royal Festival Hall when 
Lee mocked the upper circle of ‘Southbank Centre mailing list types’, playing 
them off against the ‘art students’ who had paid a fiver to sit at the side of the 
stage – I have sometimes become aware of someone sitting next to me, stonily 
silent, not enjoying it at all, and this can make for awkwardness: I hear my own 
laugh, and I hear my laugh as it would be heard, and even though I am laughing 
because I do find it funny, if I imagine myself through refracting lenses, I also 
understand it is possible that I am laughing merely to show I get the joke.  
 
Thus far, doing a certain sort of reading – that is, using the experience of having 
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been to see Stewart Lee to feel my way through the text’s grammatical and 
syntactical joints, its positional power – has brought to light the surprisingly 
complex and ambiguous combination of linguistic affects elicited by an 
apparently minor moment in the show. What I wish to take forward from this is 
the sense in which – whether or not I am at the gig or reading a text of the gig 
afterwards – I am being called to the scene of address. That is, called as a 
body, parts embarrassingly reified, and subtly, the question of my personhood 
is called into play. Simultaneously, the question of my collective identification is 
raised. I am prompted to ask how I identify myself, or indeed, whether I am able 
to identify with the collectivized ‘self’ that is implied, perhaps expected of me, 
us, of ‘we’.  
 
 
6. Interpellation and the temporal strangeness of guilt  
 
In his seminal essay ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’, Althusser names 
interpellation as the means by which ideology functions to turn individuals into 
‘subjects’. In the illustrative scenario Althusser sketches, a policeman hails a 
passerby with a cry of ‘Hey, you there!’. The one who recognizes himself in that 
call turns around, and, ‘By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty degree physical 
conversion, he becomes a subject’.58 
 
Peter Bailey has deployed Althusser’s concept to conceptualize direct address 
in the Victorian music hall. In Bailey's account, the audience of this early form of 
mass entertainment was formed of recent incomers to cities exponentially 
swelled by industrialization, a disparate crowd whose ‘awareness of their 
shared experience had to be activated anew at every performance’. Just as 
interpellation is an ‘ideological address or hailing that recruits individuals into a 
particular subject-role or identity’, the music hall performer’s direct address 
‘activates the corporate subjectivity of the crowd, and calls an audience into 
place’. With its 'affirmation of a newly urbanised people’, music hall thus 
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represents the first instance of a mass entertainment audience.59 Bailey’s 
account of music hall offers a historical precedent for the convention of 
addressing the audience by the name of the venue or city in which a gig is 
taking place, and a way of thinking about the gigging performer's euphoric 
shout-out which, supposedly, in the moment of being called, pulls you into the 
collective excitement of ‘the moment’.  
 
On the basis of this model, interpellation appears to share its temporality with 
Austin’s performative utterance – like the marriage ceremony’s ‘I do’, the call or 
hail does its work 'in the moment' of being uttered, and on this basis, the 
interpellation could be named as a kind of performative utterance. The idea of 
the performative-interpellation is certainly suggestive in the context of the gig. 
After all, it’s only a short leap from ‘Hey you!’ to a call like ‘Hello Glastonbury!’ or 
‘Thank you Wembley!’ However, as Riley argues at length in The Words of 
Selves, the temporal logic of Althusser’s concept of interpellation is trickier than 
this performative model would suggest. By offering this curiously memorable 
street scene, with its policeman and its passer-by and its one-hundred-and-
eighty-degree turn, it seems he has provided, as Riley notes, a ‘powerfully 
distracting vignette’.60 No sooner has he offered what he calls this 'little 
theoretical theatre' than he seeks to almost completely cancel it out:  
 
But in reality, these things happen without any succession. The 
existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as 
subjects are one and the same thing. I might add: what seems to take 
place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street) in reality takes place 
in ideology.61  
 
What was, at first, exemplified as a ‘call’ or ‘hail’ that sounded in a given place 
and time, and described a relation between bodies, is actually not a sequence, 
not something that can be observed to ‘take place’, but a condition that is to be 
understood as ‘always already’ in play. As Riley notes, Althusser’s 
qualifications, in effect, obliterate the scene. The timing of the turn is erased, as 
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‘interpellation and subjection both happen in one and the same blow’, and 
actually there is ‘no balletic spinning round, and no outdoors either’.62 It is 
difficult to grasp the strange temporality of this ‘idea of the simultaneity of the 
subject’s interpellation with its recognition of its place’, which ‘under the logic of 
grammar, seems implausible.’63 And, as Riley observes, it is not just the timing 
of the street scene that is confusing; there is something odd about the scene 
itself. For, if you spend any amount of time really thinking it through, you might 
quibble, as Riley does, that 'any half-competent villain would refuse the 
temptation to glance round but would carry on purposefully walking'.64 But, in 
theory, interpellation is, Althusser maintains, a call that always gets it right’: 
 
Experience shows that the practical telecommunications of hailings is 
such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one 
hailed always recognises that it is really him who is being hailed.65  
 
In Althusser's model, the policeman's ‘Hey, you there!’ is not a friendly greeting; 
it is an accusation. It presupposes guilt. If a well-practised criminal, knowing 
how to dodge the call, would carry on walking, then we might consider that the 
'one' who turns around is perhaps a person (like me or you) who fears being 
accused or something or other, even if we know (or think we know) we are not 
guilty of any crime. As Althusser himself reflects, interpellation ‘is a strange 
phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely by “guilt feelings” 
despite the large numbers who “have something on their consciences”’.66 
Althusser calls interpellation ‘strange’, and indeed, the abundance of scare-
quotes in his text suggests that there is something strange going on, a 
strangeness that seems to hover around the question of guilt. And indeed, the 
street scene is accompanied by a scare-quote-ridden footnote, which reads: 
‘Hailing as an everyday practice subject to a precise ritual takes a quite 
“special” form in the policeman’s practice of “hailing” which concerns the hailing 
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of “suspects”’. 67  
 
Riley, reading Althusser's text at the level of its 'grammatical and syntactical 
joints,' the 'pervasive level of its musculature', suggests that his ‘famous 
adverbial adjective’ […] “always already” with its strange-but-true-temporality, in 
itself possesses a shading of guilt’. She goes on to argue that the apparent 
contradictions of the street scene should not be overlooked as errors, for 
‘Althusser, knowing all about the temporal strangeness embedded in his theory, 
had deliberately made it integral to his polemic’. For the temporal structure of 
guilt itself is, as Riley’s puts it, ‘bizarre’. Guilt ‘can precede some wrongdoing 
which may never be enacted; it can often be an anticipating emotion’ (and on 
this point she differentiates it from shame); you can feel guilty for something you 
have not done, something that you are relieved not to have yet done. Or you 
can feel guilty in some general, unplaceable way and try to work out what it is 
you must have done. The timing of guilt is itself, 'always already'; guilt is ‘the 
emotion that runs in advance of the deed and is always primed to be 
activated’.68   
 
Whilst declaring herself cautious of psychoanalytic readings of the author 
himself, Riley finds productive models for guilt’s temporal strangeness in 
Althusser’s own life story, which he tells in his autobiography The Future Lasts 
a Long Time. According to Riley, 
 
Incidents of quietly paranoiacal guilt pack his story as responses to real 
or imagined accusations; so the couple of noisy shots fired among a 
noisy crowd at a sports stadium, into which he and his father had slipped 
without paying for their tickets, were, he half-imagined, actually meant for 
him.69  
 
Riley takes from the story of the bullets fired into the crowd a metaphor for the 
feeling of a verbal accusation: whether or not it was, you might well feel it was 
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aimed at you. Imagine the scene: a speaker is addressing a crowd or a group 
with some generalized disquisition on people who are, say, habitually late for 
meetings, or don't turn up to parties for spurious reasons. Your feeling of prior 
guilt might lead you to reflect (either silently or out loud): ‘Was that aimed at 
me?’ Such a thought might be dismissed as paranoid, or egotistical, but it 
brings the question of the linguistic form of the interpellation into play. For an 
interpellation to work you would have to believe it was aimed at you; whether or 
not it was, there may be something inherent in the linguistic form of the 
interpellation that feels accusative, feels personal in this way. It may be that 
Althusser’s theory strikes a chord because of ‘the usual effect of being accused: 
to be made to feel guilty, irrespective of whether or not you actually are'.70 Thus, 
the timing of guilt, is always already; it is ‘the emotion that runs in advance of 
the deed and is always primed to be activated’.71  
 
How are these rather unhappy scenes related to the scene of the stand-up gig, 
the scene of joking? A joke is, after all, according to John Limon’s summation of 
Freud, an escape to ‘a prior happiness’72. What would an always-already 
primed guiltiness have to do with it? Whether or not guilt is actually in play at 
the scene of the gig, I do think an understanding of the scene of a Stewart Lee 
gig in particular can draw something from the models provided by Riley’s 
reading of Althusser. The Althusserian narrative of guilt certainly offers a 
different, less heartwarming take on the idea of the spectator feeling like the 
comedian is speaking to them in a ‘one-on-one’ manner; the feeling that an 
utterance addressed to a crowd might actually be intended for you and you 
alone is not necessarily a happy one. I must admit that I find this anecdote 
about Althusser as the guilt-ridden boy in a packed stadium even more 
compelling than the famous scene of the policeman’s ‘Hey, you!’  Perhaps it 
gets me (and thus in some sense seems aimed at me) because it relates to a 
scene of gathering, and the feeling of being in a crowd, and yet, somehow, not 
wholly ‘in’ it.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Riley, Words of Selves, p. 84. 
71 Riley, Words of Selves, p. 83. 
72 Limon, Stand-Up, p. 12, emphasis added.  
	   251	  
As I have already intimated via my earlier recourse to ‘verbal embarrassment’, 
Riley’s thoughts about linguistic feelings are apposite to Stewart Lee’s stand-up 
performances. For, offers Riley, there may be a ‘linguistics of guilt to be 
distinguished from a psychology of guilt’.73 Recall, if you will, from my 
Introduction, an evocation of the weird feeling of lying when you aren’t. In 
anecdotal form, it runs something like: you feel poorly; you can’t go to the party 
and so telephone the host to explain. As you give your reasons, as well as 
feeling guilty for disappointing her, you feel like you are lying. You put the 
phone down and think, ‘maybe I’m not ill?’. Whereas in this case, a 
psychoanalyst would diagnose unconscious guilt (you didn't really want to go in 
the first place), Riley suggests the discomfort has to do with the linguistic 
formula of the excuse itself. This ‘possesses the overarching structure of a lie, 
irrespective of whether or not it happens on this occasion to be true’.74 Similarly, 
an accusation, or any sort of 'critical interpellation', 'with its syntactical structure 
of an attack’, might be thought to 'automatically produce a reflex guiltiness'.75  
 
Riley is careful to clarify that she suggested that some, not all, guilt is linguistic, 
but she draws productive inferences from the idea of this kind of guilt. Her 
thoughts relate to the possibility of failed interpellation. Can interpellation, with 
its accusatory structure, be refused? You might response with a ‘But I…’, as in: 
‘But actually I’m not a criminal, not guilty’. To refuse the interpellation could 
grant a small relief. But, the inverse phenomenon, which may be less 
reassuring, is that of feeling as if an interpellation, although aimed in your 
general direction, has not quite worked. This relates to the feeling of being an 
imposter, which, Riley suggests, ‘could be recognised as not so rare or 
pathological at all, but as itself immanently generated as feeling by the 
everyday machinations of interpellative language’.76 The person who ‘may 
hesitate because she can’t authentically enter in to an attribution, can’t 
internalise it’ may also feel guilty. This is what Riley identifies as ‘linguistic guilt', 
associated with 'an inescapable failure to thoroughly be', the feeling that you 
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‘can’t quite either be or not be in the collective category, can’t coincide with it or 
easily escape it’.77 That may well involve 'a demurral, a discomfort, or a guilt 
which is linguistic’.78  
 
 
7. Always already  
 
If, as we have seen, the way Lee addresses his audience can mobilize 
(perhaps inadvertently) feelings of linguistic embarrassment, and odd moments 
of disassociation or disjuncture between what you feel you are and how you 
seem to be being described, or labeled, what part if any does linguistic guilt play 
in this scene? The answer brings us back to the question of the social make-up 
of Lee's audience. As Sharpe, Dewsbury and Hynes note in their article on the 
'micropolitical interventions' of Stewart Lee, the kinds of people who go to see 
Stewart Lee live, and who identify themselves as ‘Stewart Lee's audience’ are 
‘characteristically Left-leaning’.79 We might also speculate that they are the kind 
of people who might read the Observer (in which Lee has a regular column), 
would typically be in favour of state subsidy for many things, including the arts, 
and who support these non-commercial cultural activities by attending. It might 
be added that Lee's audience also includes the kinds of people who work as 
academics in universities and write admiring articles about Lee's 'micropolitical 
interventions'. All of this is another way of saying that Lee’s typical audience are 
people who might well have internalized that curious linguistic code based on 
the morality of pronouns, according to which the ‘we’ is always positive. This 
base-level collective identification is the requisite for political action, and an 
acknowledgement of shared responsibility for the inequalities upon which their 
comfortable lives (that include fun things like going to see stand-up comedy) are 
built – a colonial past, a continuing over-exploitation of world resources, an 
economy that requires and perpetuates structural inequalities of various kinds. 
When the prerequisite for inclusion in the ‘we’ is the shouldering of shared guilt, 
you – yes, you, the one identified via that ‘superfluous’ second-person pronoun 
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– might find yourself feeling guilty for feeling the wrong sort of guilt. Your 
personal private guilt not quite coinciding with the public societal guilt, not 
feeling authentic, feeling, perhaps, a little bit too linguistic, quibbling over 
pronouns, feeling strange about grammar. As Riley notes, 'to back away from 
something so apparently reasonable as a liberal self-indictment can produce a 
stubborn wilfulness and a guilt that one can’t wholeheartedly sign up for a club 
[…] a guilt at refusing guilt'.80  
 
We are moving towards understanding of what it feels like to be ‘in’ Stewart 
Lee's audience as having to do with a weird ethico-political negotiation of a 
compacted array of guilt-feelings. Guilt that is linguistic, guilt that is liberal, guilt 
about guilt. In order to see how this plays out at the scene of the gig, I wish to 
return to what remains, for me, the most genuinely uncomfortable part of 90’s 
Comedian: Lee's references to the human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.  
 
Lee names Lynndie England as one of the soldiers put on trial (earlier he also 
named another, Charles Graner). He details her crime, and in the process 
invokes an image of a 'female American soldier photographed pointing and 
laughing at the naked genitals of hooded, bound Iraqis'. And then he displaces 
this disturbing scene via a recourse to his 'own’ experience and (thus his own 
body, his own genitals, implying they are being mocked by the gaze of an 
unimpressed woman, perhaps invoking a vague memory of the disparaging 
nurse from the earlier anecdote of exposure). Finally, he renders this doubtful, 
not quite funny segue resoundingly funny by switching back to the strand of 
'bringing Team F along' (thus revealing that the entire vignette was staged 
precisely for this purpose). When the reference to (and evocation of) the human 
rights abuses gives way to a ‘pathetic cock joke’, and discomfort gives way to 
laughter, a complicated negotiation over guilt and identification is taking place. 
Different kinds of guilt are getting confused with one another: an admission or 
declaration of guilt that is public and necessary (the soldier held to account by 
due process), guilt that is personal and confused (the feeling of somehow 
having taken part in the abuse just by thinking of the image of it), and guilt that 
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is somehow itself guilty (the guilty pleasure of laughing at a cock joke). 
 
So much for guilt, what of shame? As Limon has argued in a recent article, Abu 
Ghraib is frequently discussed in terms of shame, and can be understood as 
the exploitation of a culturally specific notion of shame as a weapon of war: the 
shaming-as-torture, and the greater shame of torture.81 Do I, as a member of 
Lee’s ‘impeccably liberal minded audience’, feel in some way ashamed of, guilty 
about, or responsible for the human rights abuses Lee is describing? If I do, it is 
in a confused way, complicated by the fact that I am negotiating these feelings 
whilst watching a stand-up comedian say things that are, I am aware, intended, 
above all, to make me laugh.   
 
And I did laugh, I laughed at ‘cocks’. And the surprise reflex of laughing 
suddenly means that it may be more accurate to say I had laughed, already, at 
the pathetic cock joke, and then before I had time to disentangle the confusion 
Lee generated about what it was I was actually laughing at, he had already 
moved on to the next joke. My laugh is taken from me, revealed not to have 
been 'mine' so much as a predictable and conventionalized response to 
something Lee had planned in advance. The localised guilt of a named 
individual is set in tension with the more dispersed guilt of a crowd showing 
themselves to be capable of being collectively manipulated into laughing at a 
stupid, tasteless joke. The temporal logic of this is strange: we are guilty not of 
laughing, but of having laughed. Perhaps what Riley names linguistic guilt, with 
its temporal strangeness, can rendered funny precisely by timing? That is not to 
say that laughing at, in spite of or as a result of this guilt-feeling gets me out of 
it. For, throughout 90s Comedian, the complex and strange temporality of the 
jokes do not just make me laugh; they produce a feeling of being implicated. 
Always already implicated. 
 
In the defining move of her argument, Riley notes, ‘we should also remember 
the guilt attendant on a too-easy enrolment in the ranks of those making their 
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confessions’,82 and suggests that ‘a more helpful politics will recognise a useful 
provisionality in the categories of social being’.83 Accordingly, if we can accept 
that ‘hesitations in inhabiting a category are neither psychological weaknesses 
nor failures of authenticity or solidarity’, we might begin to work out how 
‘mutating identifications, sharpened by the syntactical peculiarities of self-
description’s passage to collectivity, decisively mark the workings of political 
language’.84 In light of this, is it plausible to suggest that rather than 
straightforwardly ‘working the room’, Lee is doing something that allows us to 
appraise the ‘workings of political language’ – that is, not talking about politics 
so much as staging it, through his addressive practices? Might Lee’s stand-up 
comedy, indeed, have to do less with ‘catharsis’, and more with what Riley calls 
‘mutating identifications’? Certainly, as I have discovered in the course of my 
discussion, tracing the various shifts within the way Lee addresses his audience 
certainly reveals a play upon ‘the syntactical peculiarities of self-description’s 
passage to collectivity’.  
 
When such questions are at stake, perhaps a scene of mediated spectatorship, 
such as that of my friend Holly and I watching 90’s Comedian in a room in a 
house in North London in 2009, is not a bad place to embark upon a meditation 
upon the ethics and affective politics of the ‘direct address’. As I have stated, in 
an age in which we carry them around in our bags and our pockets, screens 
have become ‘personal’. Perhaps that is why a certain kind of straight-into-the-
camera address feels like it is, for me and me alone. At the start of the 90’s 
Comedian DVD, Lee looks directly into the camera and speaks as if to me. And 
he tells me ‘if you need to go for a wee...’, thus in some sense calling my body 
to his scene of address. And yet, in the same gesture, he also reminds me that, 
although he has anticipated my act of spectating, the actions of my body are not 
something that he could either see, or fully anticipate. He tells me it’s OK if I 
need to go to the toilet, he says ‘I won’t even know that it’s happening, literally’. 
And, oddly, by reminding me that I am not in a position to be ‘literally’ exposed 
by either his address, or his gaze, Lee does remind me that, by comporting his 
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body to me, he is in some sense also exposing my body. This address reminds 
me that my body, although not present at the scene, remains vulnerable to 
address. By referring to my body, he is calling attention to that which is most 
unknown to me, and in doing so he reminds me that I have a body with which to 
act in, and upon the world. By reminding me that I act in this ‘future’, in ways 
that his act cannot fully anticipate, he raises the question of my agency, and my 
responsibility. He is, in effect, making me ask myself what it is that I will do now. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis started out from a vague and yet easily imagined scene of address, 
an exemplary scene in which one person stands up on a stage and speaks to a 
gathering of persons. In this conclusion, I wish to stage one final exemplary 
scene of speech, one that will bring this discussion into focus alongside one of 
the key problematics that has emerged during the writing of this thesis: the 
problem not only of the first-person, but of my first-person. The problem of my 
inclusion, my implicatedness in the scenes about which I am writing.  
 
At a certain moment within the second episode of the first series of his BBC2 
programme, Lee turns to look directly into the camera, which is behind him 
onstage. The stage in question is at the Mildmay Social Club in North London, 
where Lee performs stand-up in front of a live audience. He also, frequently, 
turns to the camera in order to ‘directly address’ those viewers who are 
watching at home. In this instance, his tone is accusatory. He says: 
 
I'll tell you what I don't understand about you,  
[looking directly into camera, close up]  
right, thanks for watching, but… what is it that you want?  
The public. 
[turning to the live audience] not you, you're good people aren't you,  
you've come out to see live entertainment. 
But [turning back to camera]  
you people  
you people at home – not them [pointing to live audience]  
look at them!  
But [looking into camera] you…  
you, [pointing] you.  
Not them, they're here!  
You.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Television’, Stewart Lee’s Comedy Vehicle, BBC2, 23 May 2009, 10pm.  
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This scene of address is of interest for several reasons. Firstly, and most 
obviously, it reanimates many of the affective peculiarities of the ‘direct address’ 
that were active in the previous chapter, but does so in a way that brings the 
question of mediated versus ‘live’ spectatorship more sharply into focus. Lee is, 
once again, dividing his audience into two parts and playing them off against 
one another, exposing one to the gaze of the other. But here, instead of the 
division being drawn within the stand-up room, he is playing the live audience 
off against the televisual one. Each is, alternately, the object of his direct 
address, his ‘you’: the way he switches between the two is funny in a way that 
feels almost quite physical, but also strongly and peculiarly grammatical. When 
Lee looks into the camera, the way he says ‘you’ makes it functions almost like 
a single-word accusation. If Riley is right, when interpellation works it does so 
on the basis of a prior guilt, which is always primed to be activated by an 
utterance that takes the form of an accusation, whether or not it was aimed at 
you.  
 
I watched this episode at home. I was thus positioned to be the target of Lee’s 
accusatory you. I was not there, in the Mildmay Social Club. I was thus not, 
according to Lee, one the ‘good people’ who had ‘come out to see live 
entertainment’. And yet, on the other hand, as someone who has chosen to 
make performance my lifelong profession (not least by writing a PhD thesis 
about Stewart Lee from a department of drama), I am also one of those ‘good 
people’ who is committed to going out to see live entertainment. Just not on that 
night. On that night I was at home, watching the television. By circumstance, it 
seemed, on that particular night, I could put myself in the position of both and 
neither of Stewart Lee’s ‘yous’: I was not at the live performance, and yet I was, 
and remain, the sort of person who might be.   
 
I have allowed myself this final exemplary vignette because at play within it are 
some of the key problematics of my thesis project as it reaches its conclusion. 
The differentiation that Lee is (or appears to be) making, between the ‘good 
people’ who go out to see live performance, and the (by implication) ‘bad 
people’ who do not, reflects values that might be thought of as implicit within the 
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very activity of performance studies. It also reanimates some of the anxieties 
that came to light in Chapter Two’s extended reflection upon the perceived 
‘unhealthy inwardness’ of reading as opposed to the healthy fresh air of ‘public 
events’. And it makes it necessary, once again, to ask a question about the 
methodology of this study. For, having, in the early pages of this thesis, set out 
my concern as having to do with the speaking body at the scene of 
performance, I have proceeded to conduct my enquiries primarily by writing 
about speaking (or else stubbornly mute) bodies imagined through reading, or 
viewed on screens: I read J.L. Austin’s lectures, and imagined what it might 
have been like to watch him say the words; finding myself unable to relax at a 
Stewart Lee gig, I went home and reread the transcript of his tea cosy routine; I 
watched Kinkaleri’s I Cenci/Spettacolo on a DVD in my living room at home. 
And, in the final chapter of the thesis, I returned to Stewart Lee, this time 
modeling the scene of spectating 90’s Comedian on DVD in dialogue (and in 
tension) with remembered experiences of gig-going.  
 
It is possible to argue, on an immediate and practical level, that there is an 
element of necessity in the methodologies I have adopted and developed in 
these chapters. As Chapter Two and Chapter Four have demonstrated, Stewart 
Lee’s stand-up performance proceeds via a complex and shifting address 
structure, and it is simply not possible to give an account of the linguistic 
particularities brought into play without returning (and returning) to a mediation 
of some sort. Although it would be possible to ‘do a Derrida’ and argue that, 
since it depends upon pre-existing linguistic convention Lee’s staged utterance 
is necessarily (and at times fairly overtly) citational, I am not going to suggest 
that my kind of readerly, mediated spectatorship is a more apposite approach to 
his work than ‘being there’ at the gig. Although my methods have, I argue, 
produced valuable knowledge about Lee’s work, and about the performativity of 
speech when it is performed, I now think it is time, not to put too fine a point on 
it, that I got out of this room. My hope is that my work here, which draws upon a 
necessarily restricted palette, will provide the critical groundwork for thinking 
through further and more diverse spectatorial engagements.  
 
However, although it is possible to glance at this thesis, register its range of 
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cases as running from ‘Stewart Lee’ to ‘Kinkaleri (on DVD)’ and think ‘restricted 
palette’, staging the question of what, exactly, constitutes a ‘case’ might just be 
the key intervention of this thesis. For are not the lectures of J.L. Austin, the 
conversational stalls of Shannon Jackson, or the interjections of Edith Bunker 
also ‘cases’? Cannot the story, or the joke, of the brick that travelled to 
Germany on Ryanair also be considered to function here as a case (one that 
happened to, literally, be in a case)? Reading across and between these 
chapters, it becomes apparent that this thesis stages a set of mutually 
informative, and at times mutually disruptive exchanges between modes of 
engagement with, and between registers of discourse about, exemplary scenes 
of speech.  
 
Acknowledging the presence of the microphone in many of the exemplary 
scenes of direct address to which this thesis returns prompted a consideration 
of its place within a particular historical and economic context, and its 
importance to a number of key artistic and theoretical discussions around 
‘postmodernism’. However, the emphasis of my work in this respect has been 
theoretical rather than historical. The stakes of this enquiry have to do not with 
historical detail, but with encouraging (or perhaps tricking) various interlocutors 
to speak to one another in new ways. This has entailed placing texts in 
relationships that might at first seem odd, jarring, or downright irreverent. After 
all, to say that I am reading Stewart Lee with Paul de Man might, in itself, sound 
like some sort of joke. One of the most productive things to emerge from the 
juxtaposition of ‘high’ theory with what de Man calls (perhaps mockingly) ‘the 
sub-literature of mass entertainment’ is the observation that what is often called 
the ‘direct address’ of stand-up in fact operates via a complex and shifting play 
of figures of address.  
 
Through its extended engagement with the work of Stewart Lee, this thesis has 
produced a particular sort of knowledge about the performance practice of 
direct address, and by extension, about speech more generally. This proceeds 
from the observation what is going on during Lee’s direct address is a kind of 
figuring of the audience. During his performances, Lee addresses the people 
gathered at his gigs as if are this or that kind of audience, or person, or thing. 
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This makes it feel, at certain moments, and in a peculiar way, like the people 
who do happen to be there are somehow not really there, and that Lee is 
speaking to an imaginary figure that he himself has created, and spoken into 
being. On this basis, we might conjecture that, on some level, ‘Stewart Lee’s 
audience’ is nothing more than a literary effect, an imagined, metaphorical 
presence, a figural entity, spoken into being by Stewart Lee himself. And 
certainly, it might be said that ‘Glasgow’ or ‘Cardiff’ or ‘Stewart Lee’s audience’ 
in an expanded sense figure in this text in a purely figurative way: I have made 
no efforts toward ethnographic fieldwork here, nor does my study employ 
sociological methods. Some may consider this a failing, for does it not grant too 
much authority to what it is that Stewart Lee says about (and to, and on behalf 
of) his audience, denying the spectators their agency, and in some more 
fundamental sense, their personhood? Perhaps, but the terms of this enquiry 
prompt me to ask, in response, whether it is possible to posit knowledge about 
a either a localized gathering of spectators, or an audience in the wider sense, 
that does not in some sense rely upon some sort of personification.  
 
As Riley suggests, the feeling of being an imposter, that ‘inescapable failure to 
thoroughly be' might usefully be thought of as ‘not so rare or pathological at all, 
but as itself immmanently generated as feeling by the everyday machinations of 
interpellative language’.2 Against this backdrop, it becomes possible to argue 
that there may be something not only pleasurable, but also politically useful, 
about being offered the chance to spectate your own objectification as a 
linguistic, perhaps a literary effect. There is a funny sort of pleasure in feeling 
your ‘self’ and its actions taken out of your own control, narrated back to you as 
though you were the ‘you’ Lee is addressing. In political terms, Lee’s work might 
be offering a way to enjoy the non-coincidence of the me-personally and the 
we-collectively; because it gives an opportunity to see how identification and 
misidentification works in funny ways, and because it hypostatizes this 
collectivism and shows it to be not the wholly ‘good’ thing various political 
movements (and the more general and dispersed feeling of self-identifying as 
someone ‘on the left’) assume it to be. Rather, the ‘we’ (the ‘good people’) are 
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just as capable of petty-mindedness, laughing at stupid cock jokes, distracted 
and uncertain about what’s right and not, and liable to be duped by linguistic 
game-playing, as the patchily engaged, questionably intentioned, opaque and 
changeable individual. Far from this being a sign of the hopelessness of the 
situation, the failure of the political will of 'the people', I'm wondering whether it 
might be precisely the feeling of being positioned, spoken across, rendered 
passive, not being able to answer back, and – more peculiarly – being identified 
with and as a position or identity that you know is not identical with your own, 
but may at certain moments coincide uncomfortably with what you think you 
might be, or should be, or might be seen to be, is key to the pleasure of 
spectating Stewart Lee’s stand-up. Yes, interpellation, understood as the 
process by which 'authority anchors itself in those it addresses',3 is a serious 
business. But, as Lee’s work demonstrates, it can also be shown to be funny by 
being shown to be happening. And, I argue that a project that seeks to get at 
the ethics of speech as it acts upon and through us within a particular set of 
social, historical and political contexts, very much needs to take this pleasure 
into account.  
 
In this thesis, my distinctive way of reading the relational ethics developed by 
Judith Butler, Adriana Cavarero and Denise Riley, has led me to suggest that 
there is a type of funniness that is inherent in the body that stands in front of 
another body and says ‘I…’. The inherent funniness of speech has to do with 
what Felman so productively termed the incongruous interrelation of speech 
and a body. Crucially, within this model, the funniness of the speaking body is 
not necessarily to be thought of as something the body is doing. Yes, it is 
possible to develop tactics of mobilizing, this funniness, and exploit it, perhaps 
for professional purposes, as Lee’s successful career attests. But, crucially, a 
body can only become visible within a given socio-historical context. This 
context renders certain kinds of bodies differently visible, and therefore funny, 
or unfunny, in a number of politicized ways.   
 
To a certain extent, in this context, the funniness of Stewart Lee has to do with 
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his appearance, on stage, as a man. A certain kind of man. Lee’s audience, 
Left-leaning and impeccably liberal minded as they (or we) are (or like to think, 
or need to believe, we are) are liable to find this man-body funny, because he 
can stand as, and make fun of, a certain kind of man – a man like on Top Gear 
or the same as Robbie Williams. The kind of man who is a member of the 
establishment, more or less still dominant on television and in the media and in 
spheres of public communication and speech – in parliament, in the law courts, 
in the pulpit, on the various concrete situations of the ‘public stage’. And 
arguably, to look at this body as it is exposed and rendered funny and to a 
certain extent shamed and humiliated is not only bearable, but becomes 
enjoyably funny, in ways that it would not be to watch another kind of body 
humiliate ‘itself’ in these sorts of ways.  
 
In this thesis I have been drawn to the moments at which Lee seems like he 
does not want to be onstage, has been ‘put’ there, on display – an object of 
display, a thing that speaks. Those moments at which the funniness of his 
performance has less to do with something he is doing, than with the way his 
bodily appearance, presence, is being staged, shown to be out of his control. 
This is where my interest in work like Kinkaleri’s I Cenci/Spettacolo comes into 
play, because there is a kind of bodily funniness that the two kinds of work 
share – that is, the stand-up of Stewart Lee and many of the works of 
performance that have shaped recent understandings of postmodern 
theatricality. This funniness has to do with a half-heartedness or reluctance in 
the performance, as though the performer were 'acting' only under some kind of 
compulsion. In light of my work in this thesis, I have begun to understand the 
sort of funniness that emanates from a body that is undertaking an act of 
standing, speaking, performing, with a stubborn or else a humiliated sort of 
reluctance. This wilful crapness, the weakness of the attempt, can, it seems, be 
understood in a historical way; against, that is, the history of aesthetics, and 
against a materialist history of the conditions of production in ‘a world 
fundamentally rent by the division of labour’.4 
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We might think of this weakness as manifest in moments at which we are faced 
with the palpable failure of the body standing onstage to inhabit the role – not a 
theatrical role so much as the role of a person authorized to speak in public. It 
might be said that all of the examples I examine in this thesis emanate from the 
work of people who are attuned to something of the funniness of standing up in 
front of other people and speaking. From J.L. Austin to Kinkaleri, via Stewart 
Lee, these bodies are, in a funny way, engaged in performances of their own 
reluctance, or inability, to fully embody the heroic gesture of self-assertion 
required to underwrite their act of speech, their ‘stand-up’ activity.  
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